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March 11, 2020

How Darktrace Antigena Email Caught A Fearware Email Attack

Darktrace effectively detects and neutralizes fearware attacks evading gateway security tools. Learn more about how Antigena Email outsmarts cyber-criminals.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Dan Fein
VP, Product
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11
Mar 2020

The cyber-criminals behind email attacks are well-researched and highly responsive to human behaviors and emotions, often seeking to evoke a specific reaction by leveraging topical information and current news. It’s therefore no surprise that attackers have attempted to latch onto COVID-19 in their latest effort to convince users to open their emails and click on seemingly benign links.

The latest email trend involves attackers who claim to be from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, purporting to have emergency information about COVID-19. This is typical of a recent trend we’re calling ‘fearware’: cyber-criminals exploit a collective sense of fear and urgency, and coax users into clicking a malicious attachment or link. While the tactic is common, the actual campaigns contain terms and content that’s unique. There are a few patterns in the emails we’ve seen, but none reliably predictable enough to create hard and fast rules that will stop emails with new wording without causing false positives.

For example, looking for the presence of “CDC” in the email sender would easily fail when the emails begin to use new wording, like “WHO”. We’ve also seen a mismatch of links and their display text – with display text that reads “https://cdc.gov/[random-path]” while the actual link is a completely arbitrary URL. Looking for a pattern match on this would likely lead to false positives and would serve as a weak indicator at best.

The majority of these emails, especially the early ones, passed most of our customers’ existing defenses including Mimecast, Proofpoint, and Microsoft’s ATP, and were approved to be delivered directly to the end user’s inbox. Fortunately, these emails were immediately identified and actioned by Antigena Email, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response technology for the inbox.

Gateways: The Current Approach

Most organizations employ Secure Email Gateways (SEGs), like Mimecast or Proofpoint, which serve as an inline middleman between the email sender and the recipient’s email provider. SEGs have largely just become spam-detection engines, as these emails are obvious to spot when seen at scale. They can identify low-hanging fruit (i.e. emails easily detectable as malicious), but they fail to detect and respond when attacks become personalized or deviate even slightly from previously-seen attacks.

Figure 1: A high-level diagram depicting an Email Secure Gateway’s inline position.

SEGs tend to use lists of ‘known-bad’ IPs, domains, and file hashes to determine an email’s threat level – inherently failing to stop novel attacks when they use IPs, domains, or files which are new and have not yet been triaged or reported as malicious.

When advanced detection methods are used in gateway technologies, such as anomaly detection or machine learning, these are performed after the emails have been delivered, and require significant volumes of near-identical emails to trigger. The end result is very often to take an element from one of these emails and simply deny-list it.

When a SEG can’t make the determination on these factors, they may resort to a technique known as sandboxing, which creates an isolated environment for testing links and attachments seen in emails. Alternatively, they may turn to basic levels of anomaly detection that are inadequate due to their lack of context of data outside of emails. For sandboxing, most advanced threats now typically employ evasion techniques like an activation time that waits until a certain date before executing. When deployed, the sandboxing attempts see a harmless file, not recognizing the sleeping attack waiting within.

Figure 2: This email was registered only 2 hours prior to an email we processed.

Taking a sample COVID-19 email seen in a Darktrace customer’s environment, we saw a mix of domains used in what appears to be an attempt to avoid pattern detection. It would be improbable to have the domains used on a list of ‘known-bad’ domains anywhere at the time of the first email, as it was received a mere two hours after the domain was registered.

Figure 3: While other defenses failed to block these emails, Antigena Email immediately marked them as 100% unusual and held them back from delivery.

Antigena Email sits behind all other defenses, meaning we only see emails when those defenses fail to block a malicious email or deem an email is safe for delivery. In the above COVID-19 case, the first 5 emails were marked by MS ATP with a spam confidence score of 1, indicating Microsoft scanned the email and it was determined to be clean – so Microsoft took no action whatsoever.

The Cat and Mouse Game

Cyber-criminals are permanently in flux, quickly moving to outsmart security teams and bypass current defenses. Recognizing email as the easiest entry point into an organization, they are capitalizing on the inadequate detection of existing tools by mass-producing personalized emails through factory-style systems that machine-research, draft, and send with minimal human interaction.

Domains are cheap, proxies are cheap, and morphing files slightly to change the entire fingerprint of a file is easy – rendering any list of ‘known-bads’ as outdated within seconds.

Cyber AI: The New Approach

A new approach is required that relies on business context and an inside-out understanding of a corporation, rather than analyzing emails in isolation.

An Immune System Approach

Darktrace’s core technology uses AI to detect unusual patterns of behavior in the enterprise. The AI is able to do this successfully by following the human immune system’s core principles: develop an innate sense of ‘self’, and use that understanding to detect abnormal activity indicative of a threat.

In order to identify threats across the entire enterprise, the AI is able to understand normal patterns of behavior beyond just the network. This is crucial when working towards a goal of full business understanding. There’s a clear connection between activity in, for example, a SaaS application and a corresponding network event, or an event in the cloud and a corresponding event elsewhere within the business.

There’s an explicit relationship between what people do on their computers and the emails they send and receive. Having the context that a user has just visited a website before they receive an email from the same domain lends credibility to that email: it’s very common to visit a website, subscribe to a mailing list, and then receive an email within a few minutes. On the contrary, receiving an email from a brand-new sender, containing a link that nobody in the organization has ever been to, lends support to the fact that the link is likely no good and that perhaps the email should be removed from the user’s inbox.

Enterprise-Wide Context

Darktrace’s Antigena Email extends this interplay of data sources to the inbox, providing unique detection capabilities by leveraging full business context to inform email decisions.

The design of Antigena Email provides a fundamental shift in email security – from where the tool sits to how it understands and processes data. Unlike SEGs, which sit inline and process emails only as they first pass through and never again, Antigena Email sits passively, ingesting data that is journaled to it. The technology doesn’t need to wait until a domain is fingerprinted or sandboxed, or until it is associated with a campaign that has a famous name and all the buzz.

Antigena Email extends its unique position of not sitting inline to email re-assessment, processing emails millions of times instead of just once, enabling actions to be taken well after delivery. A seemingly benign email with popular links may become more interesting over time if there’s an event within the enterprise that was determined to have originated via an email, perhaps when a trusted site becomes compromised. While Antigena Network will mitigate the new threat on the network, Antigena Email will neutralize the emails that contain links associated with those found in the original email.

Figure 4: Antigena Email sits passively off email providers, continuously re-assessing and issuing updated actions as new data is introduced.

When an email first arrives, Antigena Email extracts its raw metadata, processes it multiple times at machine speed, and then many millions of times subsequently as new evidence is introduced (typically based on events seen throughout the business). The system corroborates what it is seeing with what it has previously understood to be normal throughout the corporate environment. For example, when domains are extracted from envelope information or links in the email body, they’re compared against the popularity of the domain on the company’s network.

Figure 5: The link above was determined to be 100% rare for the enterprise.

Dissecting the above COVID-19 linked email, we can extract some of the data made available in the Antigena Email user interface to see why Darktrace thought the email was so unusual. The domain in the ‘From’ address is rare, which is supplemental contextual information derived from data across the customer’s entire digital environment, not limited to just email but including network data as well. The emails’ KCE, KCD, and RCE indicate that it was the first time the sender had been seen in any email: there had been no correspondence with the sender in any way, and the email address had never been seen in the body of any email.

Figure 6: KCE, KCD, and RCE scores indicate no sender history with the organization.

Correlating the above, Antigena Email deemed these emails 100% anomalous to the business and immediately removed them from the recipients’ inboxes. The platform did this for the very first email, and every email thereafter – not a single COVID-19-based email got by Antigena Email.

Conclusion

Cyber AI does not distinguish ‘good’ from ‘bad’; rather whether an event is likely to belong or not. The technology looks only to compare data with the learnt patterns of activity in the environment, incorporating the new email (alongside its own scoring of the email) into its understanding of day-to-day context for the organization.

By asking questions like “Does this email appear to belong?” or “Is there an existing relationship between the sender and recipient?”, the AI can accurately discern the threat posed by a given email, and incorporate these findings into future modelling. A model cannot be trained to think just because the corporation received a higher volume of emails from a specific sender, these emails are all of a sudden considered normal for the environment. By weighing human interaction with the emails or domains to make decisions on math-modeling reincorporation, Cyber AI avoids this assumption, unless there’s legitimate correspondence from within the corporation back out to the sender.

The inbox has traditionally been the easiest point of entry into an organization. But the fundamental differences in approach offered by Cyber AI drastically increase Antigena Email’s detection capability when compared with gateway tools. Customers with and without email gateways in place have therefore seen a noticeable curbing of their email problem. In the continuous cat-and-mouse game with their adversaries, security teams augmenting their defenses with Cyber AI are finally regaining the advantage.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Dan Fein
VP, Product

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November 20, 2025

Managing OT Remote Access with Zero Trust Control & AI Driven Detection

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The shift toward IT-OT convergence

Recently, industrial environments have become more connected and dependent on external collaboration. As a result, truly air-gapped OT systems have become less of a reality, especially when working with OEM-managed assets, legacy equipment requiring remote diagnostics, or third-party integrators who routinely connect in.

This convergence, whether it’s driven by digital transformation mandates or operational efficiency goals, are making OT environments more connected, more automated, and more intertwined with IT systems. While this convergence opens new possibilities, it also exposes the environment to risks that traditional OT architectures were never designed to withstand.

The modernization gap and why visibility alone isn’t enough

The push toward modernization has introduced new technology into industrial environments, creating convergence between IT and OT environments, and resulting in a lack of visibility. However, regaining that visibility is just a starting point. Visibility only tells you what is connected, not how access should be governed. And this is where the divide between IT and OT becomes unavoidable.

Security strategies that work well in IT often fall short in OT, where even small missteps can lead to environmental risk, safety incidents, or costly disruptions. Add in mounting regulatory pressure to enforce secure access, enforce segmentation, and demonstrate accountability, and it becomes clear: visibility alone is no longer sufficient. What industrial environments need now is precision. They need control. And they need to implement both without interrupting operations. All this requires identity-based access controls, real-time session oversight, and continuous behavioral detection.

The risk of unmonitored remote access

This risk becomes most evident during critical moments, such as when an OEM needs urgent access to troubleshoot a malfunctioning asset.

Under that time pressure, access is often provisioned quickly with minimal verification, bypassing established processes. Once inside, there’s little to no real-time oversight of user actions whether they’re executing commands, changing configurations, or moving laterally across the network. These actions typically go unlogged or unnoticed until something breaks. At that point, teams are stuck piecing together fragmented logs or post-incident forensics, with no clear line of accountability.  

In environments where uptime is critical and safety is non-negotiable, this level of uncertainty simply isn’t sustainable.

The visibility gap: Who’s doing what, and when?

The fundamental issue we encounter is the disconnect between who has access and what they are doing with it.  

Traditional access management tools may validate credentials and restrict entry points, but they rarely provide real-time visibility into in-session activity. Even fewer can distinguish between expected vendor behavior and subtle signs of compromise, misuse or misconfiguration.  

As a result, OT and security teams are often left blind to the most critical part of the puzzle, intent and behavior.

Closing the gaps with zero trust controls and AI‑driven detection

Managing remote access in OT is no longer just about granting a connection, it’s about enforcing strict access parameters while continuously monitoring for abnormal behavior. This requires a two-pronged approach: precision access control, and intelligent, real-time detection.

Zero Trust access controls provide the foundation. By enforcing identity-based, just-in-time permissions, OT environments can ensure that vendors and remote users only access the systems they’re explicitly authorized to interact with, and only for the time they need. These controls should be granular enough to limit access down to specific devices, commands, or functions. By applying these principles consistently across the Purdue Model, organizations can eliminate reliance on catch-all VPN tunnels, jump servers, and brittle firewall exceptions that expose the environment to excess risk.

Access control is only one part of the equation

Darktrace / OT complements zero trust controls with continuous, AI-driven behavioral detection. Rather than relying on static rules or pre-defined signatures, Darktrace uses Self-Learning AI to build a live, evolving understanding of what’s “normal” in the environment, across every device, protocol, and user. This enables real-time detection of subtle misconfigurations, credential misuse, or lateral movement as they happen, not after the fact.

By correlating user identity and session activity with behavioral analytics, Darktrace gives organizations the full picture: who accessed which system, what actions they performed, how those actions compared to historical norms, and whether any deviations occurred. It eliminates guesswork around remote access sessions and replaces it with clear, contextual insight.

Importantly, Darktrace distinguishes between operational noise and true cyber-relevant anomalies. Unlike other tools that lump everything, from CVE alerts to routine activity, into a single stream, Darktrace separates legitimate remote access behavior from potential misuse or abuse. This means organizations can both audit access from a compliance standpoint and be confident that if a session is ever exploited, the misuse will be surfaced as a high-fidelity, cyber-relevant alert. This approach serves as a compensating control, ensuring that even if access is overextended or misused, the behavior is still visible and actionable.

If a session deviates from learned baselines, such as an unusual command sequence, new lateral movement path, or activity outside of scheduled hours, Darktrace can flag it immediately. These insights can be used to trigger manual investigation or automated enforcement actions, such as access revocation or session isolation, depending on policy.

This layered approach enables real-time decision-making, supports uninterrupted operations, and delivers complete accountability for all remote activity, without slowing down critical work or disrupting industrial workflows.

Where Zero Trust Access Meets AI‑Driven Oversight:

  • Granular Access Enforcement: Role-based, just-in-time access that aligns with Zero Trust principles and meets compliance expectations.
  • Context-Enriched Threat Detection: Self-Learning AI detects anomalous OT behavior in real time and ties threats to access events and user activity.
  • Automated Session Oversight: Behavioral anomalies can trigger alerting or automated controls, reducing time-to-contain while preserving uptime.
  • Full Visibility Across Purdue Layers: Correlated data connects remote access events with device-level behavior, spanning IT and OT layers.
  • Scalable, Passive Monitoring: Passive behavioral learning enables coverage across legacy systems and air-gapped environments, no signatures, agents, or intrusive scans required.

Complete security without compromise

We no longer have to choose between operational agility and security control, or between visibility and simplicity. A Zero Trust approach, reinforced by real-time AI detection, enables secure remote access that is both permission-aware and behavior-aware, tailored to the realities of industrial operations and scalable across diverse environments.

Because when it comes to protecting critical infrastructure, access without detection is a risk and detection without access control is incomplete.

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About the author
Pallavi Singh
Product Marketing Manager, OT Security & Compliance

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November 21, 2025

Xillen Stealer Updates to Version 5 to Evade AI Detection

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Introduction

Python-based information stealer “Xillen Stealer” has recently released versions 4 and 5, expanding its targeting and functionality. The cross-platform infostealer, originally reported by Cyfirma in September 2025, targets sensitive data including credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, system information, browser data and employs anti-analysis techniques.  

The update to v4/v5 includes significantly more functionality, including:

  • Persistence
  • Ability to steal credentials from password managers, social media accounts, browser data (history, cookies and passwords) from over 100 browsers, cryptocurrency from over 70 wallets
  • Kubernetes configs and secrets
  • Docker scanning
  • Encryption
  • Polymorphism
  • System hooks
  • Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Command-and-Control (C2)
  • Single Sign-On (SSO) collector
  • Time-Based One-Time Passwords (TOTP) and biometric collection
  • EDR bypass
  • AI evasion
  • Interceptor for Two-Factor Authentication (2FA)
  • IoT scanning
  • Data exfiltration via Cloud APIs

Xillen Stealer is marketed on Telegram, with different licenses available for purchase. Users who deploy the malware have access to a professional-looking GUI that enables them to view exfiltrated data, logs, infections, configurations and subscription information.

Screenshot of the Xillen Stealer portal.
Figure 1: Screenshot of the Xillen Stealer portal.

Technical analysis

The following technical analysis examines some of the interesting functions of Xillen Stealer v4 and v5. The main functionality of Xillen Stealer is to steal cryptocurrency, credentials, system information, and account information from a range of stores.

Xillen Stealer specifically targets the following wallets and browsers:

AITargetDectection

Screenshot of Xillen Stealer’s AI Target detection function.
Figure 2: Screenshot of Xillen Stealer’s AI Target detection function.

The ‘AITargetDetection’ class is intended to use AI to detect high-value targets based on weighted indicators and relevant keywords defined in a dictionary. These indicators include “high value targets”, like cryptocurrency wallets, banking data, premium accounts, developer accounts, and business emails. Location indicators include high-value countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Japan, along with cryptocurrency-friendly countries and financial hubs. Wealth indicators such as keywords like CEO, trader, investor and VIP have also been defined in a dictionary but are not in use at this time, pointing towards the group’s intent to develop further in the future.

While the class is named ‘AITargetDetection’ and includes placeholder functions for initializing and training a machine learning model, there is no actual implementation of machine learning. Instead, the system relies entirely on rule-based pattern matching for detection and scoring. Even though AI is not actually implemented in this code, it shows how malware developers could use AI in future malicious campaigns.

Screenshot of dead code function.
Figure 3: Screenshot of dead code function.

AI Evasion

Screenshot of AI evasion function to create entropy variance.
Figure 4: Screenshot of AI evasion function to create entropy variance.

‘AIEvasionEngine’ is a module designed to help malware evade AI-based or behavior-based detection systems, such as EDRs and sandboxes. It mimics legitimate user and system behavior, injects statistical noise, randomizes execution patterns, and camouflages resource usage. Its goal is to make the malware appear benign to machine learning detectors. The techniques used to achieve this are:

  • Behavioral Mimicking: Simulates user actions (mouse movement, fake browser use, file/network activity)
  • Noise Injection: Performs random memory, CPU, file, and network operations to confuse behavioral classifiers
  • Timing Randomization: Introduces irregular delays and sleep patterns to avoid timing-based anomaly detection
  • Resource Camouflage: Adjusts CPU and memory usage to imitate normal apps (such as browsers, text editors)
  • API Call Obfuscation: Random system API calls and pattern changes to hide malicious intent
  • Memory Access Obfuscation: Alters access patterns and entropy to bypass ML models monitoring memory behavior

PolymorphicEngine

As part of the “Rust Engine” available in Xillen Stealer is the Polymorphic Engine. The ‘PolymorphicEngine’ struct implements a basic polymorphic transformation system designed for obfuscation and detection evasion. It uses predefined instruction substitutions, control-flow pattern replacements, and dead code injection to produce varied output. The mutate_code() method scans input bytes and replaces recognized instruction patterns with randomized alternatives, then applies control flow obfuscation and inserts non-functional code to increase variability. Additional features include string encryption via XOR and a stub-based packer.

Collectors

DevToolsCollector

Figure 5: Screenshot of Kubernetes data function.

The ‘DevToolsCollector’ is designed to collect sensitive data related to a wide range of developer tools and environments. This includes:

IDE configurations

  • VS Code, VS Code Insiders, Visual Studio
  • JetBrains: Intellij, PyCharm, WebStorm
  • Sublime
  • Atom
  • Notepad++
  • Eclipse

Cloud credentials and configurations

  • AWS
  • GCP
  • Azure
  • Digital Ocean
  • Heroku

SSH keys

Docker & Kubernetes configurations

Git credentials

Database connection information

  • HeidiSQL
  • Navicat
  • DBeaver
  • MySQL Workbench
  • pgAdmin

API keys from .env files

FTP configs

  • FileZilla
  • WinSCP
  • Core FTP

VPN configurations

  • OpenVPN
  • WireGuard
  • NordVPN
  • ExpressVPN
  • CyberGhost

Container persistence

Screenshot of Kubernetes inject function.
Figure 6: Screenshot of Kubernetes inject function.

Biometric Collector

Screenshot of the ‘BiometricCollector’ function.
Figure 7: Screenshot of the ‘BiometricCollector’ function.

The ‘BiometricCollector’ attempts to collect biometric information from Windows systems by scanning the C:\Windows\System32\WinBioDatabase directory, which stores Windows Hello and other biometric configuration data. If accessible, it reads the contents of each file, encodes them in Base64, preparing them for later exfiltration. While the data here is typically encrypted by Windows, its collection indicates an attempt to extract sensitive biometric data.

Password Managers

The ‘PasswordManagerCollector’ function attempts to steal credentials stored in password managers including, OnePass, LastPass, BitWarden, Dashlane, NordPass and KeePass. However, this function is limited to Windows systems only.

SSOCollector

The ‘SSOCollector’ class is designed to collect authentication tokens related to SSO systems. It targets three main sources: Azure Active Directory tokens stored under TokenBroker\Cache, Kerberos tickets obtained through the klist command, and Google Cloud authentication data in user configuration folders. For each source, it checks known directories or commands, reads partial file contents, and stores the results as in a dictionary. Once again, this function is limited to Windows systems.

TOTP Collector

The ‘TOTP Collector’ class attempts to collect TOTPs from:

  • Authy Desktop by locating and reading from Authy.db SQLite databases
  • Microsoft Authenticator by scanning known application data paths for stored binary files
  • TOTP-related Chrome extensions by searching LevelDB files for identifiable keywords like “gauth” or “authenticator”.

Each method attempts to locate relevant files, parse or partially read their contents, and store them in a dictionary under labels like authy, microsoft_auth, or chrome_extension. However, as before, this is limited to Windows, and there is no handling for encrypted tokens.

Enterprise Collector

The ‘EnterpriseCollector’ class is used to extract credentials related to an enterprise Windows system. It targets configuration and credential data from:

  • VPN clients
    • Cisco AnyConnect, OpenVPN, Forticlient, Pulse Secure
  • RDP credentials
  • Corporate certificates
  • Active Directory tokens
  • Kerberos tickets cache

The files and directories are located based on standard environment variables with their contents read in binary mode and then encoded in Base64.

Super Extended Application Collector

The ‘SuperExtendedApplication’ Collector class is designed to scan an environment for 160 different applications on a Windows system. It iterates through the paths of a wide range of software categories including messaging apps, cryptocurrency wallets, password managers, development tools, enterprise tools, gaming clients, and security products. The list includes but is not limited to Teams, Slack, Mattermost, Zoom, Google Meet, MS Office, Defender, Norton, McAfee, Steam, Twitch, VMWare, to name a few.

Bypass

AppBoundBypass

This code outlines a framework for bypassing App Bound protections, Google Chrome' s cookie encryption. The ‘AppBoundBypass’ class attempts several evasion techniques, including memory injection, dynamic-link library (DLL) hijacking, process hollowing, atom bombing, and process doppelgänging to impersonate or hijack browser processes. As of the time of writing, the code contains multiple placeholders, indicating that the code is still in development.

Steganography

The ‘SteganographyModule’ uses steganography (hiding data within an image) to hide the stolen data, staging it for exfiltration. Multiple methods are implemented, including:

  • Image steganography: LSB-based hiding
  • NTFS Alternate Data Streams
  • Windows Registry Keys
  • Slack space: Writing into unallocated disk cluster space
  • Polyglot files: Appending archive data to images
  • Image metadata: Embedding data in EXIF tags
  • Whitespace encoding: Hiding binary in trailing spaces of text files

Exfiltration

CloudProxy

Screenshot of the ‘CloudProxy’ class.
Figure 8: Screenshot of the ‘CloudProxy’ class.

The CloudProxy class is designed for exfiltrating data by routing it through cloud service domains. It encodes the input data using Base64, attaches a timestamp and SHA-256 signature, and attempts to send this payload as a JSON object via HTTP POST requests to cloud URLs including AWS, GCP, and Azure, allowing the traffic to blend in. As of the time of writing, these public facing URLs do not accept POST requests, indicating that they are placeholders meant to be replaced with attacker-controlled cloud endpoints in a finalized build.

P2PEngine

Screenshot of the P2PEngine.
Figure 9: Screenshot of the P2PEngine.

The ‘P2PEngine’ provides multiple methods of C2, including embedding instructions within blockchain transactions (such as Bitcoin OP_RETURN, Ethereum smart contracts), exfiltrating data via anonymizing networks like Tor and I2P, and storing payloads on IPFS (a distributed file system). It also supports domain generation algorithms (DGA) to create dynamic .onion addresses for evading detection.

After a compromise, the stealer creates both HTML and TXT reports containing the stolen data. It then sends these reports to the attacker’s designated Telegram account.

Xillen Killers

 Xillen Killers.
FIgure 10: Xillen Killers.

Xillen Stealer appears to be developed by a self-described 15-year-old “pentest specialist” “Beng/jaminButton” who creates TikTok videos showing basic exploits and open-source intelligence (OSINT) techniques. The group distributing the information stealer, known as “Xillen Killers”, claims to have 3,000 members. Additionally, the group claims to have been involved in:

  • Analysis of Project DDoSia, a tool reportedly used by the NoName057(16) group, revealing that rather functioning as a distributed denial-of-service (DDos) tool, it is actually a remote access trojan (RAT) and stealer, along with the identification of involved individuals.
  • Compromise of doxbin.net in October 2025.
  • Discovery of vulnerabilities on a Russian mods site and a Ukrainian news site

The group, which claims to be part of the Russian IT scene, use Telegram for logging, marketing, and support.

Conclusion

While some components of XillenStealer remain underdeveloped, the range of intended feature set, which includes credential harvesting, cryptocurrency theft, container targeting, and anti-analysis techniques, suggests that once fully developed it could become a sophisticated stealer. The intention to use AI to help improve targeting in malware campaigns, even though not yet implemented, indicates how threat actors are likely to incorporate AI into future campaigns.  

Credit to Tara Gould (Threat Research Lead)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendicies

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

395350d9cfbf32cef74357fd9cb66134 - confid.py

F3ce485b669e7c18b66d09418e979468 - stealer_v5_ultimate.py

3133fe7dc7b690264ee4f0fb6d867946 - xillen_v5.exe

https://github[.]com/BengaminButton/XillenStealer

https://github[.]com/BengaminButton/XillenStealer/commit/9d9f105df4a6b20613e3a7c55379dcbf4d1ef465

MITRE ATT&CK

ID Technique

T1059.006 - Python

T1555 - Credentials from Password Stores

T1555.003 - Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers

T1555.005 - Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers

T1649 - Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates

T1558 - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets

T1539 - Steal Web Session Cookie

T1552.001 - Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files

T1552.004 - Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys

T1552.005 - Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API

T1217 - Browser Information Discovery

T1622 - Debugger Evasion

T1082 - System Information Discovery

T1497.001 - Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks

T1115 - Clipboard Data

T1001.002 - Data Obfuscation: Steganography

T1567 - Exfiltration Over Web Service

T1657 - Financial Theft

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About the author
Tara Gould
Threat Researcher
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