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November 7, 2022

[Part 1] Analysis of a Raccoon Stealer v1 Infection

Darktrace’s SOC team observed a fast-paced compromise involving Raccoon Stealer v1. See which steps the Raccoon Stealer v1 took to extract company data!
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Mark Turner
SOC Shift Supervisor
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher
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07
Nov 2022

Introduction

Towards the end of March 2022, the operators of Raccoon Stealer announced the closure of the Raccoon Stealer project [1]. In May 2022, Raccoon Stealer v2 was unleashed onto the world, with huge numbers of cases being detected across Darktrace’s client base. In this series of blog posts, we will follow the development of Raccoon Stealer between March and September 2022. We will first shed light on how Raccoon Stealer functioned before its demise, by providing details of a Raccoon Stealer v1 infection which Darktrace’s SOC saw within a client network on the 18th March 2022. In the follow-up post, we will provide details about the surge in Raccoon Stealer v2 cases that Darktrace’s SOC has observed since May 2022.  

What is Raccoon Stealer?

The misuse of stolen account credentials is a primary method used by threat actors to gain initial access to target environments [2]. Threat actors have several means available to them for obtaining account credentials. They may, for example, distribute phishing emails which trick their recipients into divulging account credentials. Alternatively, however, they may install information-stealing malware (i.e, info-stealers) onto users’ devices. The results of credential theft can be devastating. Threat actors may use the credentials to gain access to an organization’s SaaS environment, or they may use them to drain users’ online bank accounts or cryptocurrency wallets. 

Raccoon Stealer is a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) info-stealer first publicized in April 2019 on Russian-speaking hacking forums. 

Figure 1: One of the first known mentions of Raccoon Stealer on a Russian-speaking hacking forum named ‘Hack Forums’ on the 13th April 2019

The team of individuals behind Raccoon Stealer provide a variety of services to their customers (known as ‘affiliates’), including access to the info-stealer, an easy-to-use automated backend panel, hosting infrastructure, and 24/7 customer support [3]. 

Once Raccoon Stealer affiliates gain access to the info-stealer, it is up to them to decide how to distribute it. Since 2019, affiliates have been observed distributing the info-stealer via a variety of methods, such as exploit kits, phishing emails, and fake cracked software websites [3]/[4]. Once affiliates succeed in installing Raccoon Stealer onto target systems, the info-stealer will typically seek to obtain sensitive information saved in browsers and cryptocurrency wallets. The info-stealer will then exfiltrate the stolen data to a Command and Control (C2) server. The affiliate can then use the stolen data to conduct harmful follow-up activities. 

Towards the end of March 2022, the team behind Raccoon Stealer publicly announced that they would be suspending their operations after one of their core developers was killed during the Russia-Ukraine conflict [5]. 

Figure 2: Raccoon Stealer resignation post on March 25th 2022

Recent details shared by the US Department of Justice [6]/[7] indicate that it was in fact the arrest, rather than the death, of a key Raccoon Stealer operator which led the Raccoon Stealer team to suspend their operations [8].  

The closure of the Raccoon Stealer project, which ultimately resulted from the FBI-backed dismantling of Raccoon Stealer’s infrastructure in March 2022, did not last long, with the completion of Raccoon Stealer v2 being announced on the Raccoon Stealer Telegram channel on the 17th May 2022 [9]. 

 

Figure 3: Telegram post about new version of Raccoon Stealer

In the second part of this blog series, we will provide details of the recent surge in Raccoon Stealer v2 activity. In this post, however, we will provide insight into how the old version of Raccoon Stealer functioned just before its demise, by providing details of a Raccoon Stealer v1 infection which occurred on the 18th March 2022. 

Attack Details

On the 18th March, at around 13:00 (UTC), a user’s device within a customer’s network was seen contacting several websites providing fake cracked software. 

Figure 4: The above figure — obtained from the Darktrace Event Log for the infected device — highlights its connections to cracked software websites such as ‘licensekeysfree[.]com’ and ‘hdlicense[.]com’ before contacting ‘lion-files[.]xyz’ and ‘www.mediafire[.]com’

The user’s attempt to download cracked software from one of these websites resulted in their device making an HTTP GET request with a URI string containing ‘autodesk-revit-crack-v2022-serial-number-2022’ to an external host named ‘lion-filez[.]xyz’

Figure 5: Screenshot from hdlicense[.]com around the time of the infection shows a “Download” button linking to the ‘lion-filez[.]xyz’ endpoint

The device’s HTTP GET request to lion-filez[.]xyz was immediately followed by an HTTPS connection to the file hosting service, www.mediafire[.]com. Given that threat actors are known to abuse platforms such as MediaFire and Discord CDN to host their malicious payloads, it is likely that the user’s device downloaded the Raccoon Stealer v1 sample over its HTTPS connection to www.mediafire[.]com.  

After installing the info-stealer sample, the user’s device was seen making an HTTP GET request with the URI string ‘/g_shock_casio_easy’ to 194.180.191[.]185. The endpoint responded to the request with data related to a Telegram channel named ‘G-Shock’.

Figure 6: Telegram channel ‘@g_shock_casio_easy’

The returned data included the Telegram channel’s description, which in this case, was a base64 encoded and RC4 encrypted string of characters [10]/[11]. The Raccoon Stealer sample decoded and decrypted this string of characters to obtain its C2 IP address, 188.166.49[.]196. This technique used by Raccoon Stealer v1 closely mirrors the espionage method known as ‘dead drop’ — a method in which an individual leaves a physical object such as papers, cash, or weapons in an agreed hiding spot so that the intended recipient can retrieve the object later on without having to come in to contact with the source. In this case, the operators of Raccoon Stealer ‘left’ the malware’s C2 IP address within the description of a Telegram channel. Usage of this method allowed the operators of Raccoon Stealer to easily change the malware’s C2 infrastructure.  

After obtaining the C2 IP address from the ‘G-Shock’ Telegram channel, the Raccoon Stealer sample made an HTTP POST request with the URI string ‘/’ to the C2 IP address, 188.166.49[.]196. This POST request contained a Windows GUID,  a username, and a configuration ID. These details were RC4 encrypted and base64 encoded [12]. The C2 server responded to this HTTP POST request with JSON-formatted configuration information [13], including an identifier string, URL paths for additional files, along with several other fields. This configuration information was also concealed using RC4 encryption and base64 encoding.  

Figure 7- Fields within the JSON-formatted configuration data [13]

In this case, the server’s response included the identifier string ‘hv4inX8BFBZhxYvKFq3x’, along with the following URL paths:

  • /l/f/hv4inX8BFBZhxYvKFq3x/77d765d8831b4a7d8b5e56950ceb96b7c7b0ed70
  • /l/f/hv4inX8BFBZhxYvKFq3x/0cb4ab70083cf5985b2bac837ca4eacb22e9b711
  • /l/f/hv4inX8BFBZhxYvKFq3x/5e2a950c07979c670b1553b59b3a25c9c2bb899b
  • /l/f/hv4inX8BFBZhxYvKFq3x/2524214eeea6452eaad6ea1135ed69e98bf72979

After retrieving configuration data, the user’s device was seen making HTTP GET requests with the above URI strings to the C2 server. The C2 server responded to these requests with legitimate library files such as sqlite3.dll. Raccoon Stealer uses these libraries to extract data from targeted applications. 

Once the Raccoon Stealer sample had collected relevant data, it made an HTTP POST request with the URI string ‘/’ to the C2 server. This posted data likely included a ZIP file (named with the identifier string) containing stolen credentials [13]. 

The observed infection chain, which lasted around 20 minutes, consisted of the following steps:

1. User’s device installs Raccoon Stealer v1 samples from the user attempting to download cracked software

2. User’s device obtains the info-stealer’s C2 IP address from the description text of a Telegram channel

3. User’s device makes an HTTP POST request with the URI string ‘/’ to the C2 server. The request contains a Windows GUID,  a username, and a configuration ID. The response to the request contains configuration details, including an identifier string and URL paths for additional files

4. User’s device downloads library files from the C2 server

5. User’s device makes an HTTP POST request with the URI string ‘/’ to the C2 server. The request contains stolen data

Darktrace Coverage 

Although RESPOND/Network was not enabled on the customer’s deployment, DETECT picked up on several of the info-stealer’s activities. In particular, the device’s downloads of library files from the C2 server caused the following DETECT/Network models to breach:

  • Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer
  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations
Figure 8: Event Log for the infected device shows 'Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer' model breach after the device's download of a library file from the C2 server

Since the customer was subscribed to the Darktrace Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) service, they were proactively notified of the info-stealer’s activities. The quick response by Darktrace’s 24/7 SOC team helped the customer to contain the infection and to prevent further damage from being caused. Having been alerted to the info-stealer activity by the SOC team, the customer would also have been able to change the passwords for the accounts whose credentials were exfiltrated.

If RESPOND/Network had been enabled on the customer’s deployment, then it would have blocked the device’s connections to the C2 server, which would have likely prevented any stolen data from being exfiltrated.

Conclusion

Towards the end of March 2022, the team behind Raccoon Stealer announced that they would be suspending their operations. Recent developments suggest that the arrest of a core Raccoon Stealer developer was responsible for this suspension. Just before the Raccoon Stealer team were forced to shut down, Darktrace’s SOC team observed a Raccoon Stealer infection within a client’s network. In this post, we have provided details of the network-based behaviors displayed by the observed Raccoon Stealer sample. Since these v1 samples are no longer active, the details provided here are only intended to provide historical insight into the development of Raccoon Stealer’s operations and the activities carried out by Raccoon Stealer v1 just before its demise. In the next post of this series, we will discuss and provide details of Raccoon Stealer v2 — the new and highly prolific version of Raccoon Stealer. 

Thanks to Stefan Rowe and the Threat Research Team for their contributions to this blog.

References

[1] https://twitter.com/3xp0rtblog/status/1507312171914461188

[2] https://www.gartner.com/doc/reprints?id=1-29OTFFPI&ct=220411&st=sb

[3] https://www.cybereason.com/blog/research/hunting-raccoon-stealer-the-new-masked-bandit-on-the-block

[4] https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/raccoon-the-story-of-a-typical-infostealer

[5] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/raccoon-stealer-malware-suspends-operations-due-to-war-in-ukraine/

[6] https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdtx/pr/newly-unsealed-indictment-charges-ukrainian-national-international-cybercrime-operation

[7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fsz6acw-ZJY

[8] https://riskybiznews.substack.com/p/raccoon-stealer-dev-didnt-die-in

[9] https://medium.com/s2wblog/raccoon-stealer-is-back-with-a-new-version-5f436e04b20d

[10] https://blog.cyble.com/2021/10/21/raccoon-stealer-under-the-lens-a-deep-dive-analysis/

[11] https://decoded.avast.io/vladimirmartyanov/raccoon-stealer-trash-panda-abuses-telegram/

[12] https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2021/09/threat-thursday-raccoon-infostealer

[13] https://cyberint.com/blog/research/raccoon-stealer/

Appendices

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Mark Turner
SOC Shift Supervisor
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher

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April 21, 2026

How a Compromised eScan Update Enabled Multi‑Stage Malware and Blockchain C2

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The rise of supply chain attacks

In recent years, the abuse of trusted software has become increasingly common, with supply chain compromises emerging as one of the fastest growing vectors for cyber intrusions. As highlighted in Darktrace’s Annual Threat Report 2026, attackers and state-actors continue to find significant value in gaining access to networks through compromised trusted links, third-party tools, or legitimate software. In January 2026, a supply chain compromise affecting MicroWorld Technologies’ eScan antivirus product was reported, with malicious updates distributed to customers through the legitimate update infrastructure. This, in turn, resulted in a multi‑stage loader malware being deployed on compromised devices [1][2].

An overview of eScan exploitation

According to eScan’s official threat advisory, unauthorized access to a regional update server resulted in an “incorrect file placed in the update distribution path” [3]. Customers associated with the affected update servers who downloaded the update during a two-hour window on January 20 were impacted, with affected Windows devices subsequently have experiencing various errors related to update functions and notifications [3].

While eScan did not specify which regional update servers were affected by the malicious update, all impacted Darktrace customer environments were located in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region.

External research reported that a malicious 32-bit executable file , “Reload.exe”, was first installed on affected devices, which then dropped the 64-bit downloader, “CONSCTLX.exe”. This downloader establishes persistence by creating scheduled tasks such as “CorelDefrag”, which are responsible for executing PowerShell scripts. Subsequently, it evades detection by tampering with the Windows HOSTS file and eScan registry to prevent future remote updates intended for remediation. Additional payloads are then downloaded from its command-and-control (C2) server [1].

Darktrace’s coverage of eScan exploitation

Initial Access and Blockchain as multi-distributed C2 Infrastructure

On January 20, the same day as the aforementioned two‑hour exploit window, Darktrace observed multiple devices across affected networks downloading .dlz package files from eScan update servers, followed by connections to an anomalous endpoint, vhs.delrosal[.]net, which belongs to the attackers’ C2 infrastructure.

The endpoint contained a self‑signed SSL certificate with the string “O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd, ST=SomeState, C=AU”, a default placeholder commonly used in SSL/TLS certificates for testing and development environments, as well as in malicious C2 infrastructure [4].

Utilizing a multi‑distributed C2 infrastructure, the attackers also leveraged domains linked with the Solana open‑source blockchain for C2 purposes, namely “.sol”. These domains were human‑readable names that act as aliases for cryptocurrency wallet addresses. As browsers do not natively resolve .sol domains, the Solana Naming System (formerly known as Bonfida, an independent contributor within the Solana ecosystem) provides a proxy service, through endpoints such as sol-domain[.]org, to enable browser access.

Darktrace observed devices connecting to blackice.sol-domain[.]org, indicating that attackers were likely using this proxy to reach a .sol domain for C2 activity. Given this behavior, it is likely that the attackers leveraged .sol domains as a dead drop resolver, a C2 technique in which threat actors host information on a public and legitimate service, such as a blockchain. Additional proxy resolver endpoints, such as sns-resolver.bonfida.workers[.]dev, were also observed.

Solana transactions are transparent, allowing all activity to be viewed publicly. When Darktrace analysts examined the transactions associated with blackice[.]sol, they observed that the earliest records dated November 7, 2025, which coincides with the creation date of the known C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net as shown in WHOIS Lookup information [4][5].

WHOIS Look records of the C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net.
Figure 1: WHOIS Look records of the C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net.
 Earliest observed transaction record for blackice[.]sol on public ledgers.
Figure 2: Earliest observed transaction record for blackice[.]sol on public ledgers.

Subsequent instructions found within the transactions contained strings such as “CNAME= vhs[.]delrosal[.]net”, indicating attempts to direct the device toward the malicious endpoint. A more recent transaction recorded on January 28 included strings such as “hxxps://96.9.125[.]243/i;code=302”, suggesting an effort to change C2 endpoints. Darktrace observed multiple alerts triggered for these endpoints across affected devices.

Similar blockchain‑related endpoints, such as “tumama.hns[.]to”, were also observed in C2 activities. The hns[.]to service allows web browsers to access websites registered on Handshake, a decentralized blockchain‑based framework designed to replace centralized authorities and domain registries for top‑level domains. This shift toward decentralized, blockchain‑based infrastructure likely reflects increased efforts by attackers to evade detection.

In outgoing connections to these malicious endpoints across affected networks, Darktrace / NETWORK recognized that the activity was 100% rare and anomalous for both the devices and the wider networks, likely indicative of malicious beaconing, regardless of the underlying trusted infrastructure. In addition to generating multiple model alerts to capture this malicious activity across affected networks, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to compile these separate events into broader incidents that summarized the entire attack chain, allowing customers’ security teams to investigate and remediate more efficiently. Moreover, in customer environments where Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was enabled, Darktrace took swift action to contain the attack by blocking beaconing connections to the malicious endpoints, even when those endpoints were associated with seemingly trustworthy services.

Conclusion

Attacks targeting trusted relationships continue to be a popular strategy among threat actors. Activities linked to trusted or widely deployed software are often unintentionally whitelisted by existing security solutions and gateways. Darktrace observed multiple devices becoming impacted within a very short period, likely because tools such as antivirus software are typically mass‑deployed across numerous endpoints. As a result, a single compromised delivery mechanism can greatly expand the attack surface.

Attackers are also becoming increasingly creative in developing resilient C2 infrastructure and exploiting legitimate services to evade detection. Defenders are therefore encouraged to closely monitor anomalous connections and file downloads. Darktrace’s ability to detect unusual activity amidst ever‑changing tactics and indicators of compromise (IoCs) helps organizations maintain a proactive and resilient defense posture against emerging threats.

Credit to Joanna Ng (Associate Principal Cybersecurity Analyst) and Min Kim (Associate Principal Cybersecurity Analyst) and Tara Gould (Malware Researcher Lead)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

  • Anomalous File::Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL
  • Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Expired SSL
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

  • vhs[.]delrosal[.]net – C2 server
  • tumama[.]hns[.]to – C2 server
  • blackice.sol-domain[.]org – C2 server
  • 96.9.125[.]243 – C2 Server

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1071.001 - Command and Control: Web Protocols
  • T1588.001 - Resource Development
  • T1102.001 - Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver
  • T1195 – Supple Chain Compromise

References

[1] https://www.morphisec.com/blog/critical-escan-threat-bulletin/

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/escan-confirms-update-server-breached-to-push-malicious-update/

[3] hxxps://download1.mwti.net/documents/Advisory/eScan_Security_Advisory_2026[.]pdf

[4] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/delrosal.net

[5] hxxps://explorer.solana[.]com/address/2wFAbYHNw4ewBHBJzmDgDhCXYoFjJnpbdmeWjZvevaVv

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About the author
Joanna Ng
Associate Principal Analyst

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April 17, 2026

中国系サイバー作戦の進化 - それはサイバーリスクおよびレジリエンスにとって何を意味するか

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サイバーセキュリティにおいては、これまではインシデント、侵害、キャンペーン、そして脅威グループを中心にリスクを整理してきました。これらの要素は現在も重要です -しかし個別のインシデントにとらわれていては、エコシステム全体の形成を見逃してしまう危険があります。国家が支援する攻撃者グループは、個別の攻撃を実行したり短期的な目標を達成したりするためだけではなく、サイバー作戦を長期的な戦略上の影響力を構築するために使用するようになっています。  

当社の最新の調査レポート、Crimson Echoにおいてもこうした状況にあわせて視点を変えています。キャンペーンやマルウェアファミリー、あるいはアクターのラベルを個別のイベントとして分類するのではなく、ダークトレースの脅威調査チームは中国系グループのアクティビティを長期的に連続した行動として分析しました。このように視野を拡大することで、これらの攻撃者がさまざまな環境内でどのように存在しているか、すなわち、静かに、辛抱強く、持続的に、そして多くのケースにおいて識別可能な「インシデント」が発生するかなり前から下準備をしている様子が明らかになりました。  

中国系サイバー脅威のこれまでの変化

中国系サイバーアクティビティは過去20年間において4つのフェーズで進化してきたと言えます。初期の、ボリュームを重視したオペレーションは1990年代にから2000年代初めに見られ、それが2010年代にはより構造化された、戦略に沿った活動となり、そして現在の高度な適応性を備えた、アイデンティティを中心とした侵入へと進化しています。  

現在のフェーズの特徴は、大規模、攻撃の自制、そして永続化です。攻撃者はアクセスを確立し、その戦略的価値を評価し、維持します。これはより全体的な変化を反映したものです。つまりサイバー作戦は長期的な経済的および地政学的戦略に組み込まれる傾向が強まっているということです。デジタル環境へのアクセス、特に国家の重要インフラやサプライチェーン、先端テクノロジーにつながるものは、ある種の長期的な戦略的影響力と見られるようになりました。  

複雑な問題に対するダークトレースのビヘイビア分析アプローチ

国家が支援するサイバーアクティビティを分析する際、難しい問題の1つはアトリビューションです。従来のアプローチは多くの場合、特定の脅威グループ、マルウェアファミリー、あるいはインフラに判定を依存していました。しかしこれらは絶えず変化するものであり、さらに中国系オペレーションの場合、しばしば重複が見られます。

Crimson Echo は2022年7月から2025年9月の間の3年間にDarktrace運用環境で観測された異常なアクティビティを回顧的に分析した結果です。ビヘイビア検知、脅威ハンティング、オープンソースインテリジェンス、および構造化されたアトリビューションフレームワーク(Darktrace Cybersecurity Attribution Framework)を用いて、数十件の中~高確度の事例を特定し、繰り返し発生しているオペレーションのパターンを分析しました。  

この長期的視野を持ったビヘイビア中心型アプローチにより、ダークトレースは侵入がどのように展開していくかについての一定のパターンを特定することができ、動作のパターンが重要であることがあらためて確認されました。  

データが示していること

分析からいくつかの明確な傾向が浮かび上がりました:

  • 標的は戦略的に重要なセクターに集中していたのです。データセット全体で、侵入の88%は重要インフラと分類される、輸送、重要製造業、政府、医療、ITサービスを含む組織で発生しています。   
  • 戦略的に重要な西側経済圏が主な焦点です。米国だけで、観測されたケースの22.5%を占めており、ドイツ、イタリア、スペイン、および英国を含めた主要なヨーロッパの経済圏と合わせると侵入の半数以上(55%)がこれらの地域に集中しています。  
  • 侵入の63%近くがインターネットに接続されたシステムのエクスプロイトから始まっており、外部に露出したインフラの持続的リスクがあらためて浮き彫りになりました。  

サイバー作戦の2つのモデル

データセット全体で、中国系のアクティビティは2つの作戦モデルに従っていることが確認されました。  

1つ目は“スマッシュアンドグラブ”(強奪)型と表現することができます。これらはスピードのために最適化された短期型の侵入です。攻撃者はすばやく動き  – しばしば48時間以内にデータを抜き出し  – ステルス性よりも規模を重視します。これらの侵害の期間の中央値は10日ほどです。検知の危険を冒しても短期的利益を得ようとしていることが明らかです。  

2つ目は“ローアンドスロー”(低速)型です。これらのオペレーションはデータセット内ではあまり多くありませんでしたが、潜在的影響はより重大です。ここでは攻撃者は持続性を重視し、アイデンティティシステムや正規の管理ツールを通じて永続的なアクセスを確立し、数か月間、場合によっては数年にわたって検知されないままアクセスを維持しようとします。1つの注目すべきケースでは、脅威アクターは環境に完全に侵入して永続性を確立し、600日以上経ってからようやく再浮上した例もありました。このようなオペレーションの一時停止は侵入の深さと脅威アクターの長期的な戦略的意図の両方を表しています。このことはサイバーアクセスが長期にわたって保有し活用するべき戦略的資産であることを示しており、これは最も戦略的に重要なセクターにおいて最もよく見られたパターンです。  

同じ作戦エコシステムにおいて両方のモデルを並行して利用し、標的の価値、緊急性、意図するアクセスに基づいて適切なモデルを選択することも可能だという点に注意することも重要です。“スマッシュアンドグラブ” モデルが見られたからといって諜報活動が失敗したとのみ解釈すべきではなく、むしろ目標に沿った作戦上の選択かもしれないと見るべきでしょう。“ローアンドスロー” 型は粘り強い活動のために最適化され、“スマッシュアンドグラブ” 型はスピードのために最適化されています。どちらも意図的な作戦上の選択と見られ、必ずしも能力を表していません。  

サイバーリスクを再考する

多くの組織にとって、サイバーリスクはいまだに一連の個別のイベントとして位置づけられています。何かが発生し、検知され、封じ込められ、組織はそれを乗り越えて前に進みます。しかし永続的アクセスは、特にクラウド、アイデンティティベースのSaaSやエージェント型システム、そして複雑なサプライチェーンネットワークが相互接続された環境では、重大な持続的露出リスクを作り出します。システムの中断やデータの流出が発生していなくても、そのアクセスによって業務や依存関係、そして戦略的意思決定についての情報を得られるかもしれません。サイバーリスクはますます長期的な競合情報収集に似てきています。

その影響はSOCだけの問題ではありません。組織はガバナンス、可視性、レジリエンスについての考え方を見直し、サイバー露出をインシデント対応の問題ではなく構造的なビジネスリスクとして扱う必要があります。  

次の目標

この調査の目的は、これらの脅威の仕組みについてより明確な理解を提供することにより、防御者がより早期にこれらを識別しより効果的に対応できるようにすることです。これには、インジケーターの追跡からビヘイビアの理解にシフトすること、アイデンティティプロバイダーを重要インフラリスクとして扱うこと、サプライヤーの監視を拡大すること、迅速な封じ込めのための能力に投資すること、などが含まれます。  

ダークトレースの最新調査、”Crimson Echo: ビヘイビア分析を通じて中国系サイバー諜報技術を理解する” についてより詳しく知るには、ビジネスリーダー、CISO、SOCアナリストに向けたCrimson Echoレポートのエグゼクティブサマリーを ここからダウンロードしてください。 

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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