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July 18, 2023

Understanding Email Security & the Psychology of Trust

We explore how psychological research into the nature of trust relates to our relationship with technology - and what that means for AI solutions.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Hanah Darley
Director of Threat Research
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18
Jul 2023

When security teams discuss the possibility of phishing attacks targeting their organization, often the first reaction is to assume it is inevitable because of the users. Users are typically referenced in cyber security conversations as organizations’ greatest weaknesses, cited as the causes of many grave cyber-attacks because they click links, open attachments, or allow multi-factor authentication bypass without verifying the purpose.

While for many, the weakness of the user may feel like a fact rather than a theory, there is significant evidence to suggest that users are psychologically incapable of protecting themselves from exploitation by phishing attacks, with or without regular cyber awareness trainings. The psychology of trust and the nature of human reliance on technology make the preparation of users for the exploitation of that trust in technology very difficult – if not impossible.

This Darktrace long read will highlight principles of psychological and sociological research regarding the nature of trust, elements of the trust that relate to technology, and how the human brain is wired to rely on implicit trust. These principles all point to the outcome that humans cannot be relied upon to identify phishing. Email security driven by machine augmentation, such as AI anomaly detection, is the clearest solution to tackle that challenge.

What is the psychology of trust?

Psychological and sociological theories on trust largely centre around the importance of dependence and a two-party system: the trustor and the trustee. Most research has studied the impacts of trust decisions on interpersonal relationships, and the characteristics which make those relationships more or less likely to succeed. In behavioural terms, the elements most frequently referenced in trust decisions are emotional characteristics such as benevolence, integrity, competence, and predictability.1

Most of the behavioural evaluations of trust decisions survey why someone chooses to trust another person, how they made that decision, and how quickly they arrived at their choice. However, these micro-choices about trust require the context that trust is essential to human survival. Trust decisions are rooted in many of the same survival instincts which require the brain to categorize information and determine possible dangers. More broadly, successful trust relationships are essential in maintaining the fabric of human society, critical to every element of human life.

Trust can be compared to dark matter (Rotenberg, 2018), which is the extensive but often difficult to observe material that binds planets and earthly matter. In the same way, trust is an integral but often a silent component of human life, connecting people and enabling social functioning.2

Defining implicit and routine trust

As briefly mentioned earlier, dependence is an essential element of the trusting relationship. Being able to build a routine of trust, based on the maintenance rather than establishment of trust, becomes implicit within everyday life. For example, speaking to a friend about personal issues and life developments is often a subconscious reaction to the events occurring, rather than an explicit choice to trust said friend each time one has new experiences.

Active and passive levels of cognition are important to recognize in decision-making, such as trust choices. Decision-making is often an active cognitive process requiring a lot of resource from the brain. However, many decisions occur passively, especially if they are not new choices e.g. habits or routines. The brain’s focus turns to immediate tasks while relegating habitual choices to subconscious thought processes, passive cognition. Passive cognition leaves the brain open to impacts from inattentional blindness, wherein the individual may be abstractly aware of the choice but it is not the focus of their thought processes or actively acknowledged as a decision. These levels of cognition are mostly referenced as “attention” within the brain’s cognition and processing.3

This idea is essentially a concept of implicit trust, meaning trust which is occurring as background thought processes rather than active decision-making. This implicit trust extends to multiple areas of human life, including interpersonal relationships, but also habitual choice and lifestyle. When combined with the dependence on people and services, this implicit trust creates a haze of cognition where trust is implied and assumed, rather than actively chosen across a myriad of scenarios.

Trust and technology

As researchers at the University of Cambridge highlight in their research into trust and technology, ‘In a fundamental sense, all technology depends on trust.’  The same implicit trust systems which allow us to navigate social interactions by subconsciously choosing to trust, are also true of interactions with technology. The implied trust in technology and services is perhaps most easily explained by a metaphor.

Most people have a favourite brand of soda. People will routinely purchase that soda and drink it without testing it for chemicals or bacteria and without reading reviews to ensure the companies that produce it have not changed their quality standards. This is a helpful, representative example of routine trust, wherein the trust choice is implicit through habitual action and does not mean the person is actively thinking about the ramifications of continuing to use a product and trust it.

The principle of dependence is especially important in trust and technology discussions, because the modern human is entirely reliant on technology and so has no way to avoid trusting it.5   Specifically important in workplace scenarios, employees are given a mandatory set of technologies, from programs to devices and services, which they must interact with on a daily basis. Over time, the same implicit trust that would form between two people forms between the user and the technology. The key difference between interpersonal trust and technological trust is that deception is often much more difficult to identify.

The implicit trust in workplace technology

To provide a bit of workplace-specific context, organizations rely on technology providers for the operation (and often the security) of their devices. The organizations also rely on the employees (users) to use those technologies within the accepted policies and operational guidelines. The employees rely on the organization to determine which products and services are safe or unsafe.

Within this context, implicit trust is occurring at every layer of the organization and its technological holdings, but often the trust choice is only made annually by a small security team rather than continually evaluated. Systems and programs remain in place for years and are used because “that’s the way it’s always been done. Within that context, the exploitation of that trust by threat actors impersonating or compromising those technologies or services is extremely difficult to identify as a human.

For example, many organizations utilize email communications to promote software updates for employees. Typically, it would consist of email prompting employees to update versions from the vendors directly or from public marketplaces, such as App Store on Mac or Microsoft Store for Windows. If that kind of email were to be impersonated, spoofing an update and including a malicious link or attachment, there would be no reason for the employee to question that email, given the explicit trust enforced through habitual use of that service and program.

Inattentional blindness: How the brain ignores change

Users are psychologically predisposed to trust routinely used technologies and services, with most of those trust choices continuing subconsciously. Changes to these technologies would often be subject to inattentional blindness, a psychological phenomenon wherein the brain either overwrites sensory information with what the brain expects to see rather than what is actually perceived.

A great example of inattentional blindness6 is the following experiment, which asks individuals to count the number of times a ball is passed between multiple people. While that is occurring, something else is going on in the background, which, statistically, those tested will not see. The shocking part of this experiment comes after, when the researcher reveals that the event occurring in the background not seen by participants was a person in a gorilla suit moving back and forth between the group. This highlights how significant details can be overlooked by the brain and “overwritten” with other sensory information. When applied to technology, inattentional blindness and implicit trust makes spotting changes in behaviour, or indicators that a trusted technology or service has been compromised, nearly impossible for most humans to detect.

With all this in mind, how can you prepare users to correctly anticipate or identify a violation of that trust when their brains subconsciously make trust decisions and unintentionally ignore cues to suggest a change in behaviour? The short answer is, it’s difficult, if not impossible.

How threats exploit our implicit trust in technology

Most cyber threats are built around the idea of exploiting the implicit trust humans place in technology. Whether it’s techniques like “living off the land”, wherein programs normally associated with expected activities are leveraged to execute an attack, or through more overt psychological manipulation like phishing campaigns or scams, many cyber threats are predicated on the exploitation of human trust, rather than simply avoiding technological safeguards and building backdoors into programs.

In the case of phishing, it is easy to identify the attempts to leverage the trust of users in technology and services. The most common example of this would be spoofing, which is one of the most common tactics observed by Darktrace/Email. Spoofing is mimicking a trusted user or service, and can be accomplished through a variety of mechanisms, be it the creation of a fake domain meant to mirror a trusted link type, or the creation of an email account which appears to be a Human Resources, Internal Technology or Security service.

In the case of a falsified internal service, often dubbed a “Fake Support Spoof”, the user is exploited by following instructions from an accepted organizational authority figure and service provider, whose actions should normally be adhered to. These cases are often difficult to spot when studying the sender’s address or text of the email alone, but are made even more difficult to detect if an account from one of those services is compromised and the sender’s address is legitimate and expected for correspondence. Especially given the context of implicit trust, detecting deception in these cases would be extremely difficult.

How email security solutions can solve the problem of implicit trust

How can an organization prepare for this exploitation? How can it mitigate threats which are designed to exploit implicit trust? The answer is by using email security solutions that leverage behavioural analysis via anomaly detection, rather than traditional email gateways.

Expecting humans to identify the exploitation of their own trust is a high-risk low-reward endeavour, especially when it takes different forms, affects different users or portions of the organization differently, and doesn’t always have obvious red flags to identify it as suspicious. Cue email security using anomaly detection as the key answer to this evolving problem.

Anomaly detection enabled by machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) removes the inattentional blindness that plagues human users and security teams and enables the identification of departures from the norm, even those designed to mimic expected activity. Using anomaly detection mitigates multiple human cognitive biases which might prevent teams from identifying evolving threats, and also guarantees that all malicious behaviour will be detected. Of course, anomaly detection means that security teams may be alerted to benign anomalous activity, but still guarantees that no threat, no matter how novel or cleverly packaged, won’t be identified and raised to the human security team.

Utilizing machine learning, especially unsupervised machine learning, mimics the benefits of human decision making and enables the identification of patterns and categorization of information without the framing and biases which allow trust to be leveraged and exploited.

For example, say a cleverly written email is sent from an address which appears to be a Microsoft affiliate, suggesting to the user that they need to patch their software due to the discovery of a new vulnerability. The sender’s address appears legitimate and there are news stories circulating on major media providers that a new Microsoft vulnerability is causing organizations a lot of problems. The link, if clicked, forwards the user to a login page to verify their Microsoft credentials before downloading the new version of the software. After logging in, the program is available for download, and only requires a few minutes to install. Whether this email was created by a service like ChatGPT (generative AI) or written by a person, if acted upon it would give the threat actor(s) access to the user’s credential and password as well as activate malware on the device and possibly broader network if the software is downloaded.

If we are relying on users to identify this as unusual, there are a lot of evidence points that enforce their implicit trust in Microsoft services that make them want to comply with the email rather than question it. Comparatively, anomaly detection-driven email security would flag the unusualness of the source, as it would likely not be coming from a Microsoft-owned IP address and the sender would be unusual for the organization, which does not normally receive mail from the sender. The language might indicate solicitation, an attempt to entice the user to act, and the link could be flagged as it contains a hidden redirect or tailored information which the user cannot see, whether it is hidden beneath text like “Click Here” or due to link shortening. All of this information is present and discoverable in the phishing email, but often invisible to human users due to the trust decisions made months or even years ago for known products and services.

AI-driven Email Security: The Way Forward

Email security solutions employing anomaly detection are critical weapons for security teams in the fight to stay ahead of evolving threats and varied kill chains, which are growing more complex year on year. The intertwining nature of technology, coupled with massive social reliance on technology, guarantees that implicit trust will be exploited more and more, giving threat actors a variety of avenues to penetrate an organization. The changing nature of phishing and social engineering made possible by generative AI is just a drop in the ocean of the possible threats organizations face, and most will involve a trusted product or service being leveraged as an access point or attack vector. Anomaly detection and AI-driven email security are the most practical solution for security teams aiming to prevent, detect, and mitigate user and technology targeting using the exploitation of trust.

References

1https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/trust-project/videos/waytz-ep-1.aspx

2Rotenberg, K.J. (2018). The Psychology of Trust. Routledge.

3https://www.cognifit.com/gb/attention

4https://www.trusttech.cam.ac.uk/perspectives/technology-humanity-society-democracy/what-trust-technology-conceptual-bases-common

5Tyler, T.R. and Kramer, R.M. (2001). Trust in organizations : frontiers of theory and research. Thousand Oaks U.A.: Sage Publ, pp.39–49.

6https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00426-006-0072-4

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Hanah Darley
Director of Threat Research

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July 21, 2026

スタジアム運営を任されるAI。セキュリティチームはこれをどう保護すべきか?

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スタジアム運営に使われるAIをどう保護するべきか

主なポイント

  • AIはアクセス管理、群衆管理、チケット発行、設備管理、監視カメラ等、スタジアムの運営に重要な機能に導入されつつある。  
  • シャドーAIやサードパーティAIの利用はスタジアムのセキュリティチームの目の届かないところでリスクを生み出している。
  • セキュリティチームはどのようなAIシステムが存在しているかだけでなく、それらが何にアクセスし、どのようなアクションを実行できるかを理解できなければならない。
  • イベントのレジリエンスにはAI、IT、OT、アイデンティティ、サードパーティ全体に渡る継続的監視と対応が必要。

現代のスタジアムは、他に類を見ないインフラです。以前にも書いたことがありますが、イベント開催日には、スタジアムに生命が吹き込まれ、グッズや食べ物の販売、交通のハブ、広大な通信インフラ、そしてフィールド上のさまざまな技術など、これらが連携した1つの巨大なエコシステムとして機能します。その規模と複雑性により、スタジアムはサイバーセキュリティにとって最も過酷な環境の1つとなっています。その運営に今、AIを導入することで私たちは新たな次元のリスクを負おうとしています。

スタジアム運営にAIを導入することの利点は明らかです。スタジアム運営者はAIを使うことにより、混雑したゲートからファンを安全に誘導し、売店の需要を予測し、生体認証システムを管理し、不審な動きを監視カメラで見つけ、また空調や換気を制御することができます。上手く使えば、イベントをより安全に、迅速に、より効率的にすることができます。

ただし、AIはセキュリティモデルも変化させます。

ダークトレースが最近発表したスポーツを取り巻く脅威状況についての調査では、プロスポーツ組織のサイバーセキュリティプロフェッショナルを対象に、自組織の運用範囲の中でサイバー侵害が最も重大な影響を及ぼすのはどこかという質問をしました。調査対象のプロフェッショナルの最も多い34%が指摘した分野は、スタジアムの運営でした。それと同時に、35%は自組織がすでにスタジアムの運営にAIを使用している、あるいは今後12か月間に導入の予定があると回答しています。

セキュリティチームはもはや、スタジアムを中心とした従来型のITシステムだけを保護しているのではありません。スタジアムの基盤となる重要機能を動かしている、AIシステムの保護も求められるようになっているのです。

承認済みAIとシャドーAIの違い

スタジアムのセキュリティチームが知っているAIと、そうでないAIの間には明確な違いがあります。

承認済みAIとは、審査およびテストされ、施設の運用環境に統合されたAIです。こうしたAIは、監視カメラのアナリティクス、アクセス管理、設備管理、チケット発行、ロジスティクス、放送オペレーション、海賊版対策などに使われているかもしれません。それらのAIには、明確なオーナーシップ、アクセス制御、ログ記録、ベンダーレビュー、データ保護規則などがあるはずです。それによってリスクがなくなるわけではありませんが、セキュリティチームは適切なガバナンスを整備できます。

シャドーAIはそれとは違います。シャドーAIとは、従業員、請負業者、サプライヤーによる承認されていないAIの利用です。多くの場合それは善良な意図で始まります。たとえば、作業をもっと早く進めたいと思う人がいるかもしれません。あるいは、ブリーフィングの原稿を作るためにスタッフが内部情報をパブリックAIにペーストする、開発者がチケット発行プログラムのデバッグのためにAIアシスタントを使用する、サプライヤーがAIスケジューリングツールを配送ルートに接続する、デザイナーがモックアップ作成のために未公開の会場設計図やスポンサーの資料をAIにアップロードするなどの事です。

これらの行動はいずれも、それを行っている人からすればセキュリティ上の判断のようには感じられません。しかし、これらの行為は機密性の高い運営データを、スタジアムが管理していない環境に送出し、隠れたリスクを生みます。

承認済みAIスタックは、セキュリティチームから見えています。シャドーAIスタックは多くの場合そうではありません。

試合開催日に増幅するリスクと影響

通常のエンタープライズ環境であれば、不審なログイン、普段とは異なるデータ転送、予期しないサードパーティサービスへの接続をセキュリティチームが調査するための時間は数時間あるでしょう。スタジアムでは、インシデントが起こる可能性の高い瞬間は、チームに最も余力がなくインシデントが最も大きな影響を及ぼし得るタイミング、つまり試合開催日です。

群衆管理に使われているAIシステムが予期せぬ振る舞いをしたとき、その問題は単に技術上の問題ではありません。それは会場内の物理的な動きに影響を及ぼすかもしれません。

サプライヤーツールが運営データを承認されていないAIプラットフォームに送信すれば、それはデータガバナンスだけの問題ではありません。配送ルートやアクセス制限のスケジュール、スタッフ配備計画などが漏洩するかもしれません。

最も危険なシナリオは必ずしも派手な、劇的な攻撃とは限らず、外部ベンダーがソフトウェア更新でAI機能を追加した、あるいはスタッフのワークフローで未承認のツールが使用されているなど、誰も想定していなかった隠れた依存関係から発生することがあります。

イベントが始まると、これらの隠れたつながりが運営上のリスクになる可能性があります。

サプライチェーンはスタジアムのアタックサーフェス(攻撃対象領域)の一部

すべての大規模スポーツイベントは、さまざまなサプライチェーンとパートナーシップで構築されています。ケータリングサービスや輸送、放送システム、施設管理チームなど、あらゆるピースが必須であり、それぞれがセキュリティチャネルを作り出しています。サプライチェーン侵害のリスクはすでによく知られており私たちが目にしてきたいくつかの有名な侵害事例の原因となっています。マジソン・スクエア・ガーデンを所有するMSG Entertainment社のデータ侵害事例は3月に大きく報道されましたが、これはMSG Entertainment社のバックオフィスシステムで使用されていたOracleのE-Business Suiteから発生していました。また、2018年の平昌冬季オリンピックを標的としたOlympic Destroyer攻撃はこの大会のメインITサービスプロバイダーに対する侵害から始まったと言われています。そして、AIの導入によりこのリスクは増大しつつあります。

スタジアム自体は自社のAIシステムに厳しいルールを設けているかもしれませんが、ベンダーは別のツールを使っている場合があります。スタッフの配備や、配送のタイミング、在庫、顧客とのやり取りの管理にAIを使っている業者もあるでしょう。また、既に使用しているソフトウェアにAI機能が追加されていることに気が付いていないケースもあります。

スタジアムの運営でAIを保護する際の最も難しい問題の1つはこの点です。リスクはスタジアムが選択したツールから来るとは限らないのです。サプライヤーが選択したツールや、有効に設定されていることをサプライヤーが知らなかった機能からリスクが発生する可能性があります。

セキュリティチームは、ベンダーのアクセスを管理するのと同じようにベンダーのAIを扱う必要があります。サプライヤーが何に接続できるか、どのようなデータを見ることができるか、どのようなツールを使っているか、そしてこれらのツールがデータ露出や水平移動(ラテラルムーブメント)の新たな経路を作り出さないかを知る必要があるのです。

サードパーティAIツールがリスクを作り出すのに深いアクセス権は必要ありません。特定の情報が不適切なタイミングで露出するだけでリスクを招きます。

スタジアム運営におけるAIについてセキュリティチームが確認すべき4つの質問

AIがスタジアム運営の一部となるなかで、セキュリティチームは基本的な承認リストの先へ進む必要があります。次の4つの点を問う必要があります:

1.  AIはどこで使われているか?

すぐに思いつくのは、コンピュータービジョン、アクセス管理、チケット発行、ロジスティクス、設備管理等のツールです。しかし、SaaSプラットフォーム、ベンダーツール、ブラウザ拡張、開発者ワークフロー、スマートビルディングシステム、コラボレーションツールにも見えにくい形でAIが含まれています。

2. AIは何にアクセスできるか?

そのAIはインシデントログ、スタジアム設計図、チケット発行データ、ビデオ映像、建物管理、ファン情報、認証情報、サプライヤーシステムを見ることができるでしょうか?それは情報を分析するだけでしょうか、それともアクションを実行することもできるでしょうか?

3. AIは何を実行できるか?

AIエージェントは単なる受動的ツールではありません。APIを呼び出す、記録を更新する、命令を生成する、ワークフローをトリガーする、あるいはユーザーやサービスアカウントの権限を持って行動できるものもあります。スタジアムにおいて、その違いはきわめて重要な意味を持ちます。アクションを提案するAIシステムと、アクションを実行できるAIの間には大きな違いがあります。

4. 何が正常な状態か?

セキュリティアーキテクチャとしては、静的なルールだけでは不十分となるでしょう。AIの使用状況は急激に変化します:既存のプラットフォーム内にAIツールが出現し、ベンダーがAIを使った新しいサービスを追加し、多忙をきわめたスタッフはAIを使った回避策を見つけるかもしれません。セキュリティチームは、何かが変化したときにそれを発見できるよう、人、アイデンティティ、デバイス、ネットワーク、クラウドサービス、サプライヤー、AIツールのすべてにわたって正常な振る舞いを理解している必要があります。

このことは、わずかな異常が重大な意味をもつかもしれない、イベント開催中の環境において特に重要です。未承認のAIサービスへの接続は、ある状況では無害かもしれませんが別の文脈では深刻なものとなる可能性があります。そしてAIエージェントによるアクションの実行は、午前3時にセットアップを行っている状況では予期されたものかもしれませんが、試合開催中にそのアクションが発生した場合、疑わしいものかもしれません。あるアクティビティを意味のあるセキュリティ情報にするのはコンテキストです。また、迅速な対応を可能にするのもコンテキストであると言えます。組織内のAIベースセキュリティシステムが、アクションを実行する必要があることを知るためのリアルタイムのコンテキストを構築できれば、マシンスピードで脅威に対応できます。

AIはスタジアムの安全に貢献できる、ただしAIが安全であることが条件

AIにはスタジアム運営に貢献できる役割があります。観客の混雑をより早期に検知し、ボトルネックを解消し、施設をより効率的に管理し、ファン体験を向上させ、プレッシャーのかかる状況下でイベント運営チームをサポートすることができます。

問題への答えはすべてのAIの導入のペースを落とすことではありません。それが解決策ではありません。答えは、AIを可視化し、管理し、試合日の運営の一部となる前に安全にすることです。

スタジアムの運営チームやイベント主催者にとって、これはAIの使用を会場とサプライヤーエコシステム全体にわたってマッピングすることを意味します。また、各AIシステムが何にアクセスでき、どのようなアクションを実行できるかを理解することです。スタッフの判断で回避策を探すのに任せるのではなく、彼らのニーズを満たす承認済みのツールを提供することも重要です。ベンダーとの契約や監査にAIの利用について明記することも必要です。さらに、わかりやすい主なシステムだけではなく、環境全体で動作を監視することも大事です。スタジアムから見えないものを安全にすることはできません。

AIが、スタジアム内の人の移動、アクセスの制御、設備の管理、サプライヤーのサポート、メディアの権利保護の一部となるとき、それはもはや追加機能ではなく、イベントインフラの一部となるのです。

イベントインフラは、スタジアムのゲートが開く前に入念に準備され、安全でシームレスかつ信頼性の高いイベント体験を実現するのに必要な、オペレーショナルレジリエンスによって維持されなければなりません。

Darktraceはスタジアム運営のためのAIをどう保護できるか

ダークトレースは、10年以上にわたり構築してきたビヘイビアAIの専門技術を、複雑で曖昧な環境で機能するように設計された、組織全体をカバーするプラットフォームで提供しています。2022 FIFAワールドカップカタール大会からF1グランプリまで、Darktraceは世界のさまざまな会場や米国中のスタジアムにおいて運営を支える統合された大規模なITおよびOT環境を保護しています。

他のサイバーセキュリティ技術は、過去の攻撃に基づいて新しい攻撃を予測しようとします。しかし問題は、AIが人間のように動作することです。あらゆるアクションが新たな情報をもたらし、それによってAIの動作は変化するため、予測不可能です。過去に見られた攻撃の戦術はもはや方程式の小さな部分に過ぎません。その結果多くのベンダーは実証されていない技術を買収し、改修することによりAIの保護を行おうとしています。  

ダークトレースのアプローチは他とは根本的に異なります。ダークトレースの適応型AIは、人とAIの振る舞いを学習し続けることにより組織についての理解を構築するため、動作の逸脱が起こった時にそれを検知し自律的に対応することが可能です。ダークトレースの提供するビヘイビアベースの防御プラットフォームは、新たなワークフロー、エージェント、アプリケーションの導入に対応して組織内のAI、人、インフラを保護することにより、大規模なAI変革を可能にします。

AIによって変化する組織の潜在力。Darktraceは組織が自信を持って前へ進むのに役立ちます。ダークトレースはスタジアムインフラ内の人とテクノロジーを保護するセキュリティチームに対し、新たなテクノロジーの導入を保護するのに必要な理解、可視性、自律的アクションを提供し、AI時代を構築するための変革を後押しします。

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Karim Benslimane
VP, Field CISO

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July 15, 2026

Security After Signatures: Operating in a World of Pre‑CVE Disclosure Exploitation, Collapsed Trust Boundaries, and Autonomous Systems

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Three shifts have reshaped what it means to defend an enterprise securely.  

First, exploitation often begins before defenders have a Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier, a security advisory, or an entry in the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog.

Secondly, the trust boundary has moved beyond the network edge into identities, tokens, APIs, and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) workflows.  

Third, an increasing share of business activity is executed through automation, integrations, and AI agent-like systems that can act faster than teams can verify intent.  

If your security model still relies on detecting known bad artefacts, triaging isolated alerts, and waiting for confirmation before acting, you are already behind the threat.  

This is not a failure of security teams; it’s a failure of the operating model to keep pace with how the environment has changed.

A SOC built around alerts and signatures assumes that malicious activity will eventually surface as an event. In real incidents, however, the decisive evidence is rarely a single event. Instead, it is a chain of individually explainable actions that only appears malicious once you connect the dots across identity, non-human identity, cloud, email, SaaS, operational technology (OT), and network telemetry.

The defenders succeeding today observe behaviors, link them into sequences, understand what those sequences mean, and contain impact before the full story unfolds. That is the operating model the current threat environment demands.  

Exploitation before disclosure

The first shift is the straightforward: the time to exploit has dropped to nearly zero.  

In one example, Darktrace observed a sequence of subtle but strategically significant anomalies within a customer environment that later aligned with exploitation of CVE‑2025‑0994 in Trimble Cityworks by likely Chinese-nexus threat actors. Behavioral indicators were visible at least 18 days before public disclosure, with related anomalies emerging 40 to 50 days earlier during the intrusion window.  

This case illustrates a familiar pattern: clusters of weak‑signal anomalies combing to form an actionable picture of intrusion long before a CVE is published. Such activity reflects long‑horizon, option‑preserving operator models often associated with mature state‑linked activity.  

Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of malicious exploitation of CVE 2025-0994, later tied to Chinese-nexus threat actors targeting critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the US, weeks before public disclosure.

Throughout 2025 and 2026, Darktrace has continued to observe the value of anomaly-based detections across a range of incidents.

CVE CVE Public Disclosure Date Darktrace Detection Date Days Between Detection of Exploitation and CVE Public Disclosure
CVE 2025 0994
(Trimble City Works)
2025-02-06 2025-01-19 18 Days
CVE 2025-24183
(Apache)
2025-03-10 2025-02-18 20 days
CVE 2025-10035
(Fortra GoAnywhere)
2025-09-18 2025-09-11 7 days

Identity is the real control plane

The second shift is that identity has replaced perimeter as the primary control plane. As Darktrace’s Annual Threat Report 2026 illustrated, identity remains the main challenge in defending against modern intrusions. A clear example is the Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) case published by Darktrace in December 2025. A phishing email led to the compromise of an Office 365 account. Session hijacking bypassed multi-factor authentication (MFA), and the compromised account was used for follow-on phishing and persistence activities including the creation of malicious email rules.  

Every step in that sequence mattered. A successful login alone does not prove legitimacy. An inbox rule, on its own, may not appear catastrophic. Mail activity, viewed in isolation, may seem operationally normal. But the behavioral chain tells a different story: credential theft, token abuse, persistence, and onward compromise through a trusted identity.  

This is why the question is no longer “Did the user authenticate successfully”. The more important question is, “Does this identity action make sense right now, in this context, given what came before it?” The AiTM case shows how identity can be compromised. In practice, however, attacks rarely remained confined to identity alone.  

In another Darktrace case, a compromised SaaS account triggered activity across the email, SaaS, and network layers, including inbox rule changes, phishing propagation, and connections to suspicious infrastructure. Viewed in isolation, none of these events were decisive. Together, however,  they formed a behavioral sequence that revealed the intrusion, with the full attack story automatically correlated and surfaced to defenders by Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst.  

Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst correlated and appended additional events to the incident, including other users who connected to the suspicious redirect link after outbound phishing emails were sent.

AI accelerates the threat  

The third shift is the one many teams still underestimate: trusted tooling, integrations, and AI agent-like systems can create actions that appear legitimate but are strategically dangerous.  

The shift becomes clearer when examining how governments are now framing AI risk. In 2026, guidance published by CISA, UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and Five Eyes partners warned that agentic systems expand attack surfaces, accumulate privilege, and can behave in ways that are difficult to predict or explain [1]. The advice is simple: assume unexpected behavior and design controls around it.  

The real risk is not AI usage. It is unknown autonomy: systems with credentials, data access, and action paths that can execute workflow steps without sufficient behavioral validation, traceability, or human oversight. Darktrace’s Model Context Protocol (MCP) risk analysis provides a useful framework for understanding this challenge. Over-privileged agents, content injection, and tool abuse become high-consequence risks when connected systems can dynamically retrieve data, execute actions, and communicate externally.  

Whether security teams like it or not, AI is already in the enterprise. It will help drive innovation, but it will also be abused, whether accidentally or maliciously. In each of the cases below, AI either scaled the attacker, built the tooling, or existed within the environment as something to exploit or misuse.

1. AI as an Attack Multiplier

In one campaign targeting Mexican government entities, a single operator used commercial AI platforms to generate exploits, automate reconnaissance, and process large volumes of data, compressing work that would traditionally have required an entire team into a single workflow [2].  

Darktrace is also observing this trend further down the stack. In one case, Darktrace identified AI-generated malware exploiting React2Shell, where an attacker used a Large Language Model (LLM) to produce working exploit code and deploy it at scale.  

[darktrace.com], [darktrace.com]

2. AI as an Attack Surface

Attempted AI exploitation is now appearing within customer environments. In one case involving an automation technology manufacturer, a compromised LLM proxy was seemingly used as a stepping stone to access additional AI services. When that attempt failed, the attacker pivoted to cryptomining.

What is clear is that the AI layer has already become an asset worth probing, exploiting, and pivoting through. It is also clear that defenders benefit from rapidly understanding how these activities connect. In this case, Cyber AI Analyst automatically pieced together the intrusion, while Darktrace’s Managed Threat Detection service alerted to the customer, enabling the activity to be contained before it could progress further.

Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst's investigation into a compromised LLM proxy that was abused for cryptomining activity.

AI as a trusted but dangerous actor

This does not require a cinematic vision of “rogue AI.” The Salesloft incident provides a more grounded example, where AI and automation operate with legitimate access but served malicious intent. In that case, attackers abused compromised OAuth tokens associated with the Drift AI chat agent to export significant volumes of data from Salesforce environments.  

The activity resembled legitimate API usage and relied on trusted SaaS integrations rather than malware or other obvious signs of intrusion. That is precisely the challenge. Traditional security controls are good at detecting forced entry, but far less effective when a trusted application integration behaves in a way that is technically permitted yet operationally harmful.  

In these scenarios, the security challenge shifts from validating access to validating behavior.

This is what that looks like in practice: AI-linked identities executing legitimate actions that require behavioral validation rather than access validation.

Figure 4: Darktrace / SECURE AI highlights anomalous activity across AI identities, surfacing critical behavior that requires validation and containment.

Early observations from Darktrace / SECURE AI deployments reinforce this reality. Across Darktrace's observed fleet, AI service connections per deployment increased 13% during the first half of 2026, reaching over 16 million connections overall. The typical organisation now interacts with seven different AI providers, evidence that AI is no longer operating at the edges of the enterprise. It is increasingly woven into day-to-day business activity.

The most common risks are not compromised models or advanced AI attacks. Instead, they stem from employees and business functions exposing sensitive information through entirely legitimate-looking interactions. Darktrace has observed repeated submission of personally identifiable information (PII), tax information, identification documents, and medical data into LLM prompts, alongside widespread use of unsanctioned (shadow) AI services and growing AI activity from mobile devices.  

For defenders, the challenge is increasingly one of context: understanding when legitimate business use crosses into material risk, while preserving privacy and user trust.

Conclusion

Across all three shifts, the pattern is the same: behavior precedes understanding. Security teams are not losing because adversaries have become invisible. An increasingly outdated security model assumes that malicious activity will reveal itself cleanly and early. It no longer does.  

In 2026 and beyond, defenders win by understanding behavioral sequences, continuously validating trust, and acting before certainty becomes hindsight. That is security after signatures. That is security in the AI era.

Credit to: Daniel Levy, Threat Hunting Data Scientist

Edited by: Ryan Traill, Content Manager

References

[1] https://www.cyber.gov.au/business-government/secure-design/artificial-intelligence/careful-adoption-of-agentic-ai-services  

[2]https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2026-02-26/hacker-used-anthropics-claude-ai-to-steal-mexican-government-data

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Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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