Blog
/
/
July 14, 2021

Darktrace Detects Egregor Ransomware in Customer Environment

See how Darktrace managed to detect and eliminate an Egregor ransomware extortion attack in a customer environment without the use of any signatures.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Justin Fier
SVP, Red Team Operations
Default blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog image
14
Jul 2021

Ransomware groups are coming and going faster than ever. In June alone we saw Avaddon release its decryption keys unprompted and disappear from sight, while members of CLOP were arrested in Ukraine. The move follows increasing pressure from the US intelligence community and Ukrainian authorities, who took down Egregor ransomware back in February. Egregor had only been around since September 2020. It survived less than six months.

But these gangs aren’t going away – they are simply going underground. Despite ‘closures’, cases of ransomware continue to rise and new threat actors and independent hackers pop up on the Dark Web every day.

As malware actors lay low and resurface with new variants, keeping up with the stream of signatures and new strains has become untenable. This blog studies the techniques, tools and procedures (TTPs) observed from a real-life Egregor intrusion last autumn, which showcases how Self-Learning AI detected the attack without relying on signatures.

Egregor: Maze reloaded

150 companies
worldwide have fallen victim to Egregor.

Law enforcement authorities have been busy this year. Aside from Egregor and CLOP, actions were taken against Netwalker in Bulgaria and the US, while Europol announced that an international operation had disrupted the core infrastructure of Emotet, one of the most prominent botnets of the past decade.

All parties – from governments down to individual businesses – are taking the threat of ransomware more seriously. In response to this added pressure, cyber-criminals often prefer to shut up shop rather than hang around long enough to be arrested.

DarkSide famously closed down after the Colonial Pipeline attacks, only nine months after it had been created. An admin from the Ziggy gang announced that it would issue refunds and was looking for a job as a threat hunter.

“Hi. I am Ziggy ransomware administrator. We decided to publish all decryption keys.

We are very sad about what we did. As soon as possible, all the keys will be published in this channel.”

Take this apology with a pinch of salt. The players which have ‘closed down’ have not had a change of heart, they’ve just changed tack. Different names and new infrastructure can help keep the heat off and circumvent US sanctions or federal scrutiny. PayloadBIN (a new ransomware which cropped up last month), WastedLocker, Dridex, Hades, Phoenix, Indrik Spider… all just aliases for one single group: Evil Corp.

The FBI are becoming more aggressive in their methods of infiltration and disruption, so it is likely we will see more of these U-turns and guerrilla-style tactics. Temporary pop-up gangs are an emerging trend in place of large, established enterprises like REvil, whose websites also vanished following the attack against Kaseya. And there is no doubt we will continue to witness these ‘exit scams’, where groups retire and re-brand, like Maze did last September, when it came back as Egregor.

Darktrace detects malware regardless of the name or strain. It stopped Maze last year, and, as we shall see below, it stopped its successor Egregor, even though the code and C2 endpoints used in the intrusion had never been seen before.

30%
of ransom profits are taken by Egregor developers.

Egregor ransomware attack

Back in November 2020, Egregor was in full bloom, targeting major organizations and exfiltrating data in ‘double extortion’ attacks. At a logistics company in Europe with around 20,000 active devices, during a Darktrace Proof of Value (POV) trial, Egregor struck.

Figure 1: Timeline of the attack. The overall dwell time — from first C2 connection to encryption — was five days.

As a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) gang, it appears Egregor had partnered with botnet providers to facilitate initial access. In this case, the compromised device carried signs of prior infection. It was seen connecting to an apparent Webex endpoint, before connecting to the Akamai doppelganger, amajai-technologies[.]network. This activity was followed by a number of command and control (C2) and exfiltration-related breaches.

Three days later, Darktrace observed lateral movement over HTTPS. Another device – a server – was seen connecting to the amajai host. This server wrote unusual numeric exectuables to shared SMB drives and took new service control. A third host then made a ~50GB upload to a rare IP.

Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst summarizes the initial C2 and unusual SMB writes in a similar incident, followed later by a large upload to a rare external endpoint.

After two days, encryption began. This triggered multiple hosts breaches. On the final day, the attacker made large uploads to various endpoints, all from ostensibly compromised hosts.

Retrospective analysis

$4m
is the highest recorded cost of an Egregor ransom.

If the attack had not been neutralized at this point, it could have resulted in significant financial loss and reputational damage for the company. The two-pronged attack enabled Egregor both to encrypt critical resources and to exfiltrate them, with a view to publicizing sensitive data if the victims refused to pay up.

The affiliates who deployed the ransomware in this case were highly skilled. They leveraged a number of sophisticated techniques including the use of a large number of C2 endpoints, with doppelgangers and off-the-shelf tools.

The adoption of HTTPS for lateral movement and reconnaissance reduced lateral noise for scans and enumeration. The complex C2 had numerous endpoints, some of which were doppelgangers of legitimate sites. Furthermore, some malware was downloaded as masqueraded files: the mimetype Octet Streams were downloaded as ‘g.pixel’. These three tactics helped obfuscate the attacker’s movements and trick traditional security tools.

Ransomware attacks are occurring at a speed that even five years ago was unimaginable. In this case, the overall dwell time was less than a week, and part of the attack happened out of office hours. This highlights the need for Autonomous Response, which can keep up with novel threats and does not rely on humans being in the loop to contain cyber-attacks.

Gone today, here tomorrow

Egregor was busted in February, but we may well see it resurface under a different name and with modified code. If and when this happens, signatures will be of no use. Catching never-before-seen ransomware, which employs novel methods of intrusion and extortion, requires a different approach.

The endpoint in the case study above is now associated via open-source intelligence (OSINT) with Cobalt Strike. But at the time of the investigation, the C2 was unlisted. Similarly, the malware was unknown to OSINT and thus evaded signature-based tools.

Despite this, Self-Learning AI detected every single stage of the in-progress attack. No action was taken as it was only a trial POV so Darktrace had no remote access in the environment. However, after seeing the power of the technology, the organization decided to implement Darktrace across its digital estate.

Thanks to Darktrace analyst Roberto Romeu for his insights on the above threat find.

Learn how Darktrace stops Egregor and all forms of ransomware

Darktrace model detections:

  • Agent Beacon to New Endpoint
  • Agent Beacon (Long Period)
  • Agent Beacon (Medium Period)
  • Agent Beacon (Short Period)
  • Anomalous Octet Stream
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
  • Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Breaches
  • Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External
  • Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Beacon to Young Endpoint
  • Data Sent To New External Device
  • Data Sent to Rare Domain
  • DGA Beacon
  • Empire Python Activity Pattern
  • EXE from Rare External Location
  • High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score
  • High Volume of New or Uncommon Service Control
  • HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination
  • Large Number of Model Breaches
  • Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint
  • Low and Slow Exfiltration
  • Multiple C2 Model Breaches
  • Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
  • Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint
  • Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches
  • Network Scan
  • New Failed External Connections
  • New or Uncommon Service Control
  • Numeric Exe in SMB Write
  • Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • SMB Drive Write
  • SMB Enumeration
  • SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination
  • SSL or HTTP Beacon
  • Suspicious Beaconing Behaviour
  • Suspicious Self-Signed SSL
  • Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
  • Quick and Regular Windows HTTP Beaconing
  • Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
  • Unusual BITS Activity
  • Unusual Internal Connections
  • Unusual SMB Version 1 Connectivity
  • Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Justin Fier
SVP, Red Team Operations

More in this series

No items found.

Blog

/

Network

/

June 27, 2025

Patch and Persist: Darktrace’s Detection of Blind Eagle (APT-C-36)

login on laptop dual factor authenticationDefault blog imageDefault blog image

What is Blind Eagle?

Since 2018, APT-C-36, also known as Blind Eagle, has been observed performing cyber-attacks targeting various sectors across multiple countries in Latin America, with a particular focus on Colombian organizations.

Blind Eagle characteristically targets government institutions, financial organizations, and critical infrastructure [1][2].

Attacks carried out by Blind Eagle actors typically start with a phishing email and the group have been observed utilizing various Remote Access Trojans (RAT) variants, which often have in-built methods for hiding command-and-control (C2) traffic from detection [3].

What we know about Blind Eagle from a recent campaign

Since November 2024, Blind Eagle actors have been conducting an ongoing campaign targeting Colombian organizations [1].

In this campaign, threat actors have been observed using phishing emails to deliver malicious URL links to targeted recipients, similar to the way threat actors have previously been observed exploiting CVE-2024-43451, a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows that allows the disclosure of a user’s NTLMv2 password hash upon minimal interaction with a malicious file [4].

Despite Microsoft patching this vulnerability in November 2024 [1][4], Blind Eagle actors have continued to exploit the minimal interaction mechanism, though no longer with the intent of harvesting NTLMv2 password hashes. Instead, phishing emails are sent to targets containing a malicious URL which, when clicked, initiates the download of a malicious file. This file is then triggered by minimal user interaction.

Clicking on the file triggers a WebDAV request, with a connection being made over HTTP port 80 using the user agent ‘Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19044’. WebDAV is a transmission protocol which allows files or complete directories to be made available through the internet, and to be transmitted to devices [5]. The next stage payload is then downloaded via another WebDAV request and malware is executed on the target device.

Attackers are notified when a recipient downloads the malicious files they send, providing an insight into potential targets [1].

Darktrace’s coverage of Blind Eagle

In late February 2025, Darktrace observed activity assessed with medium confidence to be  associated with Blind Eagle on the network of a customer in Colombia.

Within a period of just five hours, Darktrace / NETWORK detected a device being redirected through a rare external location, downloading multiple executable files, and ultimately exfiltrating data from the customer’s environment.

Since the customer did not have Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability enabled on their network, no actions were taken to contain the compromise, allowing it to escalate until the customer’s security team responded to the alerts provided by Darktrace.

Darktrace observed a device on the customer’s network being directed over HTTP to a rare external IP, namely 62[.]60[.]226[.]112, which had never previously been seen in this customer’s environment and was geolocated in Germany. Multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) providers have since linked this endpoint with phishing and malware campaigns [9].

The device then proceeded to download the executable file hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe.

Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to an unusual location based in Germany.
Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to an unusual location based in Germany.
Darktrace’s detection of the affected device downloading an executable file from the suspicious endpoint.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device downloading an executable file from the suspicious endpoint.

The device was then observed making unusual connections to the rare endpoint 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com and performing unusual external data activity.

This dynamic DNS endpoint allows a device to access an endpoint using a domain name in place of a changing IP address. Dynamic DNS services ensure the DNS record of a domain name is automatically updated when the IP address changes. As such, malicious actors can use these services and endpoints to dynamically establish connections to C2 infrastructure [6].

Further investigation into this dynamic endpoint using OSINT revealed multiple associations with previous likely Blind Eagle compromises, as well as Remcos malware, a RAT commonly deployed via phishing campaigns [7][8][10].

Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to the suspicious dynamic DNS endpoint, 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to the suspicious dynamic DNS endpoint, 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com.

Shortly after this, Darktrace observed the user agent ‘Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19045’, indicating usage of the aforementioned transmission protocol WebDAV. The device was subsequently observed connected to an endpoint associated with Github and downloading data, suggesting that the device was retrieving a malicious tool or payload. The device then began to communicate to the malicious endpoint diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com over the new TCP port 1512 [11].

Around this time, the device was also observed uploading data to the endpoints 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com and diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com, with transfers of 60 MiB and 5.6 MiB observed respectively.

Figure 4: UI graph showing external data transfer activity.

This chain of activity triggered an Enhanced Monitoring model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK. These high-priority model alerts are designed to trigger in response to higher fidelity indicators of compromise (IoCs), suggesting that a device is performing activity consistent with a compromise.

 Darktrace’s detection of initial attack chain activity.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of initial attack chain activity.

A second Enhanced Monitoring model was also triggered by this device following the download of the aforementioned executable file (hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe) and the observed increase in C2 activity.

Following this activity, Darktrace continued to observe the device beaconing to the 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com endpoint.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to correlate each of the individual detections involved in this compromise, identifying them as part of a broader incident that encompassed C2 connectivity, suspicious downloads, and external data transfers.

Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the activity observed on the affected device.
Figure 6: Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the activity observed on the affected device.
Figure 7: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of the affected device’s broader connectivity throughout the course of the attack.

As the affected customer did not have Darktrace’s Autonomous Response configured at the time, the attack was able to progress unabated. Had Darktrace been properly enabled, it would have been able to take a number of actions to halt the escalation of the attack.

For example, the unusual beaconing connections and the download of an unexpected file from an uncommon location would have been shut down by blocking the device from making external connections to the relevant destinations.

Conclusion

The persistence of Blind Eagle and ability to adapt its tactics, even after patches were released, and the speed at which the group were able to continue using pre-established TTPs highlights that timely vulnerability management and patch application, while essential, is not a standalone defense.

Organizations must adopt security solutions that use anomaly-based detection to identify emerging and adapting threats by recognizing deviations in user or device behavior that may indicate malicious activity. Complementing this with an autonomous decision maker that can identify, connect, and contain compromise-like activity is crucial for safeguarding organizational networks against constantly evolving and sophisticated threat actors.

Credit to Charlotte Thompson (Senior Cyber Analyst), Eugene Chua (Principal Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

IoCs

IoC – Type - Confidence
Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19045 – User Agent

62[.]60[.]226[.]112 – IP – Medium Confidence

hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe – Payload Download – Medium Confidence

21ene.ip-ddns[.]com – Dynamic DNS Endpoint – Medium Confidence

diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com  - Hostname – Medium Confidence

Darktrace’s model alert coverage

Anomalous File / Suspicious HTTP Redirect
Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Location
Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint
Device / Anomalous Github Download
Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity
Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
Compromise / Suspicious File and C2
Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA
Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections
Device / Large Number of Model Alert

Mitre Attack Mapping:

Tactic – Technique – Technique Name

Initial Access - T1189 – Drive-by Compromise
Initial Access - T1190 – Exploit Public-Facing Application
Initial Access ICS - T0862 – Supply Chain Compromise
Initial Access ICS - T0865 – Spearphishing Attachment
Initial Access ICS - T0817 - Drive-by Compromise
Resource Development - T1588.001 – Malware
Lateral Movement ICS - T0843 – Program Download
Command and Control - T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer
Command and Control - T1095 – Non-Application Layer Protocol
Command and Control - T1571 – Non-Standard Port
Command and Control - T1568.002 – Domain Generation Algorithms
Command and Control ICS - T0869 – Standard Application Layer Protocol
Evasion ICS - T0849 – Masquerading
Exfiltration - T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Exfiltration - T1567.002 – Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

References

1)    https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/blind-eagle-and-justice-for-all/

2)    https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmgsites/in/pdf/2025/04/kpmg-ctip-blind-eagle-01-apr-2025.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf

3)    https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-remote-access-trojan/#:~:text=They%20might%20be%20attached%20to,remote%20access%20or%20system%20administration

4)    https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-43451

5)    https://www.ionos.co.uk/digitalguide/server/know-how/webdav/

6)    https://vercara.digicert.com/resources/dynamic-dns-resolution-as-an-obfuscation-technique

7)    https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1437795

8)    https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-malware/remcos-malware/

9)    https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/b3189db6ddc578005cb6986f86e9680e7f71fe69f87f9498fa77ed7b1285e268

10) https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/21ene.ip-ddns.com

11) https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/diciembrenotasenclub.longmusic.com/community

Continue reading
About the author
Charlotte Thompson
Cyber Analyst

Blog

/

Network

/

June 19, 2025

Customer Case Study: Leading Petrochemical Manufacturer

Default blog imageDefault blog image

Headquartered in Saudi Arabia, this industry leading petrochemical manufacturer serves customers in more than 80 countries across diverse markets throughout Europe, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, China, and Southeast Asia.

Cyber resiliency critical to growth strategy

This leading petrochemical manufacturer’s vision is to be one of the major global players in the production and marketing of designated petrochemicals and downstream products. The company aims to significantly increase its capacity to up to a million metric tons within the next few years.

With cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure increasing 30% globally last year, cyber resiliency is essential to supporting the company’s strategic business goals of:

  • Maximizing production through efficient asset utilization
  • Maximizing sales by conducting 90% of its business outside Saudi Arabia
  • Optimizing resources and processes by integrating with UN Global Compact principles for sustainability and efficiency
  • Growing its business portfolio by engaging in joint ventures to diversify production and add value to the economy

However, the industry leader faced several challenges in its drive to fortify its cybersecurity defenses.

Visibility gaps delay response time

The company’s existing security setup provided limited visibility to the in-house security team, hindering its ability to detect anomalous network and user activity in real time. This resulted in delayed responses to potential incidents, making proactive issue resolution difficult and any remediation in the event of a successful attack costly and time-consuming.

Manual detection drains resources

Without automated detection and response capabilities, the organization’s security team had to manually monitor for suspicious activity – a time-consuming and inefficient approach that strained resources and left the organization vulnerable. This made it difficult for the team to stay current with training or acquire new skills and certifications, which are core to the ethos of both the company’s owners and the team itself.

Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure increasing

The petrochemical manufacturer is part of a broader ecosystem of companies, making the protection of its supply chain – both upstream and downstream – critical. With several manufacturing entities and multiple locations, the customer’s internal structure is complex and challenging to secure. As cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure escalate, it needed a more comprehensive approach to safeguard its business and the wider ecosystem.

Keeping and growing skills and focus in-house

To strengthen its cybersecurity strategy, the company considered two options:

  1. Make a significant initial and ongoing investment in a Security Operations Center (SOC), which would involve skills development outside the company and substantial management overhead.
  2. Use a combination of new, automated tools and an outsourced Managed Detection and Response (MDR) service to reduce the burden on internal security specialists and allow the company to invest in upskilling its staff so they can focus on more strategic tasks.

Faced with this choice between entirely outsourcing security and augmenting the security team with new capabilities, the customer chose the second option, selecting Darktrace to automate the company’s monitoring, detection, and response. Today, the petrochemical manufacturer is using:

Extending the SOC with 24/7 expert support

To alleviate the burden on its lean security team, the company augmented its in-house capabilities with Darktrace’s Managed Detection & Response service. This support acts as an extension of its SOC, providing 24/7 monitoring, investigation, and escalation of high-priority threats. With Darktrace’s global SOC managing alert triage and autonomously containing threats, the organization’s internal team can focus on strategic initiatives. The result is a stronger security posture and increased capacity to proactively address evolving cyber risks – without expanding headcount or sacrificing visibility.

A unique approach to AI

In its search for a new security platform, the company’s Director of Information Technology said Darktrace’s autonomous response capability, coupled with Self-Learning AI-driven threat reduction, were two big reasons for selecting Darktrace over competing products and services.

AI was a huge factor – no one else was doing what Darktrace was doing with [AI].”

Demonstrated visibility

Before Darktrace, the customer had no visibility into the network activity to and from remote worker devices. Some employees need the ability to connect to its networks at any time and from any location, including the Director of Information Technology. The trial deployment of Darktrace / ENDPOINT was a success and gave the team peace of mind that, no matter the location or device, high-value remote workers were protected by Darktrace.

Modular architecture  

Darktrace's modular architecture allowed the company to deploy security controls across its complex, multi-entity environment. The company’s different locations run on segregated networks but are still interconnected and need to be protected. Darktrace / NETWORK provides a unified view and coordinated security response across the organization’s entire network infrastructure, including endpoint devices.

Results

The petrochemical manufacturer is using Darktrace across all of its locations and has achieved total visibility across network and user activity. “Darktrace is increasing in value every day,” said the Director of Information Technology.

I don’t have a big team, and Darktrace makes our lives very, very easy, not least the automation of some of the tasks that require constant manual review.”

Time savings frees analysts to focus on proactive security

Darktrace / NETWORK provides continuous, AI-driven monitoring and analysis of the company’s network activity, user behavior, and threat patterns, establishing a baseline of what normal activity looks like, and then alerting analysts to any deviations from normal traffic, activity, and behaviors. Darktrace’s autonomous response capabilities speed up response to detected threats, meaning intervention from the security team is required for fewer incidents and alerts.

In October 2024 alone, Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst saved the team 810 investigation hours, and autonomously responded to 180 anomalous behaviors that were uncovered during the investigations. With Darktrace managing the majority of threat detection and response efforts, the security team has been able to change its day-to-day activity from manual review of traffic and alerts and belated response to activity, to proactively fortifying its detection and response posture and upskilling to meet evolving requirements.  

Layered email protection reduces phishing threats

The company’s email infrastructure posed a challenge due to petrochemical industry regulations requiring on-premises email servers, with some security delivered via Microsoft Azure. By integrating Darktrace / EMAIL into the Azure stack, the organization has reduced the volume of phishing emails its users receive by 5%.

“Now we have one more layer of security related to email – every email goes through two filters. If something is not being caught or traced by Azure, it is being detected by Darktrace,” said the Director of Information Technology. “As a result, we’re now seeing only about 15% to 20% of the phishing emails we used to receive before implementing Darktrace.”

Preparing for a secure future

The time saved using Darktrace has helped the security team take proactive steps, including preparing for new cyber resilience regulations for Saudi Arabia’s Critical National Infrastructure, as mandated by the National Cybersecurity Authority (NCA).

“The team now has ample time to prepare policies and procedures that meet the new NCA regulations and, in some cases, enhance the requirements of the new law,” said the Director of Information Technology. “All of this is possible because they don’t need to keep watch; Darktrace takes on so much of that task for them.”

Continue reading
About the author
The Darktrace Community
Your data. Our AI.
Elevate your network security with Darktrace AI