Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Ron Nichols
Senior Information Security Analyst at AAA Washington (Guest Contributor)
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02
Feb 2022
AAA Washington is best known for its emergency road service, but operates in a broader range of areas including insurance and travel. Our priorities from a security side are two-fold: making sure we are adequately prepared to defend against advanced and pertinent threats like ransomware, and protecting the sensitive data of our employees and our members.
About two years ago, we hit a fork in the road. Our information security team was conscious that we had a gap in real-time monitoring, and in particular, 24/7 response. It wasn’t that we didn’t already have tools in place, or that we weren’t shipping logs, we just didn’t have a 24/7 protocol. So if an attack were to come in at 3am, for example, we weren’t confident enough in our ability to take immediate action to contain the threat.
So we looked at two options. It was our Matrix ‘red pill or blue pill’ moment: a choice between the willingness to learn a life-changing truth by taking the red pill, or taking the blue pill and opting for the more traditional path.
For us, that blue pill – and what many recommended at the time – was the option of consulting an external 24/7 Security Operations Center. We knew this would solve our problem, but it also had a lot of drawbacks, mainly around time consumption: you have to get a service-level agreement (SLA) in place, set up SNMP traps, ship logs over to the SOC, who are then tasked with untangling those logs. You know that the SOC is then looking at AAA Washington’s environment along with hundreds of others. You’ve got to develop a relationship with the SOC technician who doesn’t know the nuances of your environment or your business logic…
So understandably there was a level of reluctance there.
And then we had the red pill, which for us, was Darktrace, offering AI technology that could learn our environment all by itself, and respond autonomously to emerging attacks. No steep learning curve, no ongoing maintenance.
We had to try it. Cloud deployments are available but even for our on-prem arrangement, the trial process was a no-brainer: we got the box, plugged it in, and we were off and going. If we didn’t like it, all we had to do was unplug it and ship it back.
The visibility Darktrace gave us was immediately apparent, and in that first week it alerted us to the fact that every other night, 1GB of outbound traffic was going to an East Coast data center from our back-up appliance. We thought we knew what was going on in our digital enterprise, but we had no idea – Darktrace providing that knowledge and filling those gaps showed us that this was heading exactly in the direction we wanted.
Autonomous Response
So full marks for visibility and anomaly detection, but what about that response capability that led us to consider Darktrace in the first place? We were keen to see what actions Antigena would recommend and assess their accuracy and severity.
Being naturally risk-averse at AAA Washington, we initially set Antigena up in human confirmation mode, meaning an operator had to give the green light before it took action. It took about two weeks for it to learn the nuances of our digital environment, and it wasn’t long before we found its actions were extremely accurate, and minimally disruptive.
It never took drastic action like quarantining a device, it simply stopped what we needed it to. It played a significant role in protecting us in the wake of some high-profile attacks, including the SUNBURST attacks and the more recent Log4shell vulnerability.
Adapting to a hybrid cloud strategy
In the two years since deploying Darktrace, we have made significant changes to our digital infrastructure – including, like so many others, migrating to the cloud. I wondered whether we would lose the visibility and protection we got from Darktrace when this happened.
But with its dedicated SaaS Modules for Microsoft 365 and others, Darktrace had this covered. It’s been able to shed a light on malicious activity occurring across our full Microsoft 365 product suite.
We can see things like unusual email forwarding rules that indicate an account takeover. With other tools, it takes six to eight clicks to find that information. The information is available, but accessing that data is a complex and convoluted process. Darktrace delivers that holy grail of having a single pane of glass view in a security tool. Having that detailed one stop view means reducing mean time to understanding, and mean time to response.
Self-Learning AI on the endpoint
And when large-scale remote working came about, Darktrace again brought visibility and Autonomous Response to cover our endpoint devices, protecting them from threats like ransomware that would go undetected from network coverage alone. The ability to stop these threats at the first hurdle, before they spread and infected other devices, was crucial for us.
It was another case of Darktrace adapting, and another reason I’m confident about working with Darktrace as a long-term partner: every time I think Darktrace is going to not be as relevant, these new developments bring us up to speed.
Keeping the show on the road
Darktrace has done exactly what we wanted to do by filling that gap we had in 24/7 response. But it has gone further by proving that time and time again, it can adapt as our digital infrastructure changes and grows, and can cover our employees wherever they work.
The technology presents us with all the information we need in a single pane of glass with the Threat Visualizer. With the Mobile App, I can get notifications of high-priority alerts and Darktrace’s autonomous actions, wherever I am. And when there’s a serious incident, there is always someone available to offer support and get me what I need to know, fast.
Taking that red pill all those months ago was one of the best decisions I’ve made as an IT security professional. Whatever challenges are down the road, I’m confident Darktrace will be there to meet them.
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Ron Nichols
Senior Information Security Analyst at AAA Washington (Guest Contributor)
Agentic attacks in the wild: Inside three ARTEX investigations
Darktrace analyzes three real-world ARTEX investigations, revealing how agentic AI attack frameworks appear on networks and in the cloud. From China-nexus espionage and financial-sector intrusions to Azure credential collection, learn which behaviors (beaconing, TLS anomalies, tunneling, identity abuse) expose compromise, and why shared AI tooling complicates threat attribution for security teams.
Darktrace qualifies for NATO’s Cybersecurity Dynamic Marketplace
Darktrace has qualified across all eight categories in the first lot of NATO’s Cybersecurity Dynamic Marketplace, creating opportunities to support the Alliance’s cyber defense needs.
Microsoft Perception, Agentic Insiders and the Role of Behavioral Security
This week at Ignite, Microsoft announced that Microsoft Perception is generally available. It is a significant milestone for the industry, and one we welcome as a Microsoft partner. Microsoft is putting an architectural bet at the center of its security strategy: AI has changed the speed of cyber, and defense must change with it.
At Darktrace, we’ve long held the same view, so it’s encouraging to see a partner of Microsoft’s scale articulate it so clearly and bring it to market.
Security gets a team of agents
Perception is Microsoft’s agentic security system. It orchestrates red, blue, and green team agents through playbooks in a closed loop: red agents simulate attacks, blue agents detect, triage and investigate, and green agents fix and remediate. Rather than adding another assistant to the SOC, it creates coordinated teams of agents that share context. Security teams set the guardrails and approve high-impact actions.
Microsoft frames this as a three-layer cyber stack: signals, sensors and actuators; a context layer; and agents, harness and models on top. Together with partner sources, the foundation produces more than 165 trillion signals per day.
The announcement also makes a second point that matters just as much. Microsoft is treating AI agents themselves as a new insider-risk category. In its words, “Agents are the new insiders.” They work at machine speed, around the clock, with broad access to data, apps, tools and other agents, and like any insider they can make mistakes, be manipulated or be compromised. New capabilities such as Dynamic Agent Risk (now in preview) and dynamic Conditional Access controls are designed to assess and contain that risk as it changes.
Four truths about security in the agentic era
The announcement is built on four ideas, and together they describe the new reality security teams are defending:
Static security can’t keep up. Microsoft validates what many security practitioners have observed; the window between a vulnerability’s discovery and its exploitation is collapsing from months to minutes. Manual triage can’t answer that pace. Autonomous detection and response is now a requirement, not simply a “nice to have”.
Agents must be treated as insiders. The question for security teams is no longer only “who is this user?” but “what is this agent actually doing?” Identity tells you who an agent is. Policy tells you what it is allowed to do. Neither tells you whether its behavior is normal.
Security is moving from signatures to behavior and context. Dynamic Agent Risk looks across identity, data, endpoint, cloud and network signals and asks whether an agent’s actions are drifting from the intent of its task. That is behavioral thinking, and it is philosophically close to the Adaptive AI approach Darktrace has pioneered.
Machine-speed attacks demand machine-speed response. Humans set the objectives and guardrails. Autonomous systems do the work inside them, both detecting and acting. Microsoft’s design has agents investigate, recommend and, within approved boundaries, act, with security teams setting the limits. At this pace, the gap between knowing something is wrong and doing something about it has to close to seconds.
The opportunity: where control plane meets behavioral context
Perception is an extraordinary control plane for agentic security. The question for security leaders is how to make it even more effective in the environments they actually run.
Real enterprises are heterogeneous. They run AWS and Google Cloud alongside Azure, and OT, IoT and third-party identity alongside Entra. Increasingly they also run AI agents and MCP-connected systems that no single vendor’s telemetry fully covers. Microsoft’s architecture recognizes this, with more than 500 connectors into the wider ecosystem.
That is where Darktrace’s role is distinct. The challenge isn’t signal volume, where Microsoft’s scale is unmatched. It’s deeply understanding what is normal for a specific organization, across every system, identity and agent in it. Together, we deliver two complementary layers:
Microsoft brings global intelligence and orchestration. It tells you what is known, what it means and what to do about it.
Darktrace brings organization-specific behavioral context. It tells you what is unusual here, right now, across the organizations AI, people and infrastructure, even if it has never been seen before.
The difference shows up in the numbers. A large enterprise generates billions of signals. Darktrace turns them into thousands of incidents, narrows those to hundreds of AI-led investigations, and surfaces as few as 20 that merit a human’s attention. For an agentic SOC, that kind of evaluated, prioritized input makes agents faster, not busier.
As enterprises deploy more agents, the hard problem becomes behavior that is technically permitted but unusual, manipulated or inconsistent with the agent’s purpose. Consider an agent that normally reads Salesforce records during US business hours and suddenly starts enumerating SharePoint and opening unusual outbound connections. Each step may use valid access and approved tools, so identity and policy checks can all pass. Spotting it requires knowing the behavior is abnormal for this agent, in this environment, right now.
That is why one principle in Microsoft’s AI Transparency Initiative matters so much: organizations should be able to see what their AI accesses and does, and independently verify those actions.
Identity and permissions answer “should this agent be allowed to do this?”
Behavioral defense answers “even though it is allowed, is what it’s doing normal?”
Deterministic controls around non-deterministic AI are the right foundation, and continuously learned baselines are how organizations can verify those controls are working.
What to look for in an agentic SOC architecture
As organizations adopt platforms like Perception, we’d encourage them to look for three capabilities:
Behavioral context in the control plane. Agents work best with high-confidence signals rather than thousands of raw alerts: here is the behavior that materially deviates from this organization’s learned normal.
Behavioral reasoning on demand. During an investigation, agents should be able to ask what changed around a given identity, device or agent in the last 24 hours, and get a clear answer.
Autonomous, coordinated response across the stack. Response should be as fast as the threat without being reckless: acting immediately when confidence is high, constraining or reversing actions when it isn’t, and keeping a human in the loop when it matters. Within policy and human-approval guardrails, it should target the abnormal behavior rather than the whole business process and span identity, endpoint and the wider environment.
These are the areas where we’re focused, and where we look forward to working with Microsoft and the broader ecosystem.
Response is where speed is won or lost
In the AI era, detection and investigation only matter if action follows quickly. Perception brings agentic orchestration to that problem, with security teams setting the guardrails and approving high-impact steps. Autonomous response from Darktrace takes a complementary approach: it responds on behavioral deviation, in a way that is proportionate and targeted. It can interrupt activity that is abnormal for that specific device, identity or agent while leaving normal business activity running.
The two approaches fit together naturally. Behavioral signals can tell an orchestration layer that something has changed and how confident the system is. Orchestrated playbooks can then coordinate wider containment across identity, endpoint and cloud, within the policies customers define.
The bigger picture
The industry’s architecture is converging on identity, policy, telemetry, behavior, autonomous reasoning and machine-speed response. Microsoft is building formidable pieces of that picture, especially identity, policy, telemetry and orchestration.
Behavior is the layer Darktrace is built to provide: an independent intelligence that continuously learns how humans, machines and AI agents normally act, detects the moment reality departs from intent, and can respond to that deviation in a targeted, proportionate way that keeps normal business running. When attacks move at machine speed, understanding what is abnormal and acting on it quickly have to go together.
Perception brings together what Microsoft knows and orchestrates the response across its stack. Darktrace helps organizations understand what is normal for them and act on what isn’t. Customers building their agentic security strategy will need both.
Congratulations to our partners at Microsoft on this milestone. We look forward to helping customers secure the agentic era together.
Agentic attacks in the wild: Inside three ARTEX investigations
Key insights
· Darktrace observed activity in several customer environments involving infrastructure and behaviors associated with reported ARTEX-enabled campaigns, including activity linked to China-nexus espionage and financially motivated attacks.
· In the higher-confidence cases, known infrastructure appeared alongside beaconing, unusual TLS, reconnaissance, tunneling, script retrieval, SMB activity and external data transfer. One Azure case had no observed network command and control at all, only key listing and application identity activity.
· ARTEX is now used by actors with different objectives. Identifying the framework can help locate relevant activity, while the behavior around the affected system provides the stronger evidence for understanding compromise and attribution.
Introduction
Attackers have moved beyond using AI for phishing and are running agentic frameworks; open-source tools like ARTEX, CAIRN, PentAGI and Hexstrike that let AI agents scan, exploit and move through an environment with little human input [1]. ARTEX has moved quickly from an offensive security project into live intrusion activity. Since at least August 2026, the framework has been associated with espionage, financially motivated attacks and opportunistic campaigns across government, financial services, technology, defense, telecommunications and other sectors. The FBI has documented ARTEX activity spanning reconnaissance, exploitation, credential abuse, lateral movement, collection, command and control, and exfiltration [2].
Darktrace has observed activity in customer environments that overlaps with infrastructure, tooling and behaviors reported in several of these campaigns. The cases below highlight how those intrusions appeared on the network, including the activity visible before an analyst can determine which actor or framework may be responsible.
ARTEX as part of the attacker workflow
ARTEX is an open-source, multi-agent offensive security platform that converts high-level objectives into actions carried out by specialized agents [2]. Operators have used it to automate activity across the attack lifecycle, including scanning, exploitation, credential activity and post-compromise operations. Some reported intrusions moved from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours [2].
The framework is now associated with actors pursuing different objectives and using different post-exploitation tooling. The original public repository was removed in October 2026, but archived copies and localized versions remain available. For defenders, ARTEX is more useful as context for an investigation than as an attribution shortcut.
Darktrace observations show the same point at network level. Infrastructure linked to reported ARTEX campaigns appeared alongside beaconing, tunneling, unusual TLS, reconnaissance, file retrieval and lateral activity.
Case 1: Espionage-linked activity
Darktrace observed activity associated with BLOODALCHEMY command-and-control (C2) infrastructure in two customer environments. In one environment, five devices communicated with nginxmysql[.]com and 45.153.126[.]223 between October 23 and November 2. Both indicators had previously been linked to China-nexus espionage activity involving ARTEX [4].
The connections were accompanied by suspicious beaconing, repeated successful connections and unusual self-signed TLS. One system began making suspicious TLS connections to nginxmysql[.]com on October 23. Beaconing followed on October 24, and SMB scanning appeared later in the sequence. Other affected systems subsequently communicated with previously unseen external endpoints.
Prior to the observed C2, Darktrace detected curl requests retrieving executable and script content including /systemd, /wazuh, linux_amd64, u.sh and q.sh. Related telemetry included DRSGetNCChanges activity consistent with DCSync, LDAP enumeration, DNS zone transfers, network scanning, certificate downloads and SMB writes involving start.bat.
Figure 1: Darktrace investigation showing suspicious network activity associated with infrastructure linked to reported ARTEX activity.
Figure 2: Darktrace detection showing anomalous self-signed TLS activity during the espionage-linked investigation.
BLOODALCHEMY has been reported in more than one China-nexus cluster [5]. SoftEther infrastructure observed in one environment provided another point of correlation with reported VAPOR PANDA tradecraft. The moderate-confidence assessment tying this to a Chinese nexus threat actor is based on infrastructure, victim context, tradecraft behavior that followed the initial connection, and public reporting.
Case 2: Financial-sector activity
In early November, Darktrace observed activity in two financial-sector environments that overlap with reported ARTEX infrastructure. On November 5, a server connected to 213.111.150[.]145:8099 and downloaded wisp-agent, associated with WISP C2 activity.
Figure 3: Darktrace's Real-Time AI Analyst investigation showing a server making repeated HTTP requests, using a curl user agent, to a rare external endpoint on port 8099.
In a second environment, a device attempted connections to 85.11.167[.]52 on November 1 and 2. The connections occurred alongside beaconing to new and rare destinations, anomalous TLS, possible tunneling and unusual package downloads.
The device also communicated with temp[.]sh, ssh.localhost[.]run, localhost[.]run, termbin[.]com, pastebin[.]com and GitHub-hosted release infrastructure. The sequence showed potential tooling retrieval, C2, tunneling and use of external services capable of staging or moving data.
Figure 4: Darktrace investigation showing connections to new and rare external destinations during the financial-sector activity.
Case 3: Credential collection in Azure
On October 20, Darktrace observed a sweep of credential collection in a customer’s Azure environment that is consistent with ARTEX use. The intrusion began with connections to the virtual network from 43.98.196[.]73 (Alibaba Cloud). Open-source scanning data associates the address with ARTEX.
A compromised user identity made requests to the Azure Resource Manager API, though how it was compromised is unknown. The requests listed keys and secrets across API Management, web and function apps, Cognitive Services, Event Hubs, storage accounts and a managed Kubernetes cluster. With those credentials the attacker compromised multiple application identities. The attacker then used the application identities and the user identity to retrieve more credentials, change firewall and security rules and run scripts on virtual machines. Microsoft Defender alerts showed attempted execution of scripts related to Mimikatz and Impacket.
In a cloud environment, such privileged and enumerative operations are potentially indistinguishable from legitimate administrative actions. Consequently, the sequence and context of such operations signified more than any specific API call. There was no C2 traffic to match, and listing keys and using application identities are also what administrators and automation do. A compromised user, credential retrieval across several Azure services, new application identities, more credential collection and changes to security controls only made sense together, and by then access was spreading through the cloud environment.
Figure 5: Darktrace Advanced Search showing Azure AD operation names associated with the activity.
Figure 6: Darktrace Advanced Search showing the Azure Resource Manager action used to execute scripts.
Figure 7: Darktrace Device Event log window showing the triggered models related to the suspicious Azure activity.
Shared tooling weakens attribution signals
The three cases looked different on the network: BLOODALCHEMY infrastructure and espionage-consistent tradecraft, WISP infrastructure in financial-sector systems, and Azure identity and control-plane activity with no C2 at all.
Shared tooling has complicated attribution for years, and ARTEX adds to it because the framework carries out more of the attack, so reconnaissance, exploitation attempts and some post-compromise activity can look the same whoever set the objective. Attribution still needs infrastructure, malware, victimology, timing and the sequence of behavior inside the environment, and an ARTEX link is one input to that. Moreover, the behavior and the agent will still be shaped by the biases, preferences, and tradecraft of its operators.
At its core, ARTEX’s planner and worker agents identify and record facts, while exploring intents. However, the way the Large Language Model (LLM) chooses its next steps toward an objective is shaped fundamentally by the skills and tools available in its context. This includes its starting context, as well as various possible Model Context Protocol (MCP) plugins and user-injected context (e.g. user input mid-operation). Operators still have preferred tradecraft, and this preference shapes the pathways the harness will provide to the LLM in context prompts. Even on the same platform, customization based on operator preferences and goals will remain a key facet of campaign and actor identification.
Detection and response
Across the Darktrace cases, the stronger signals came from behavior after the connection: beaconing, abnormal TLS, reconnaissance, unusual authentication, tunneling, script retrieval, SMB activity and outbound transfer. Automated activity also produced compressed bursts of requests, sequential enumeration and repeated attempts with small changes.
With agentic tools reaching privileged access in under three hours, analysts may have only a short window to connect scanning or authentication activity to credential changes, new administrative access, tooling retrieval or lateral movement. Keeping network, identity and cloud telemetry together shows what happened before and after the first match, and whether a connection was noise or an intrusion moving toward privileged access.
In some of these cases, Darktrace's Autonomous Response took or recommended action against the activity, including blocking internal connectivity over specified ports, inhibiting outbound connections with likely C2 endpoints, and/or disabling SaaS/IaaS user accounts. While many of these recommended actions required human confirmation due to deployment configuration preferences, had these actions been applied autonomously at the time of alert, the scope of activity would have been limited, thereby giving analysts time to investigate and respond.
Figure 9: Autonomous Response summary for affected cloud users during the intrusion.
Figure 10: Autonomous Response taking action against unusual lateral movement activity on an affected device.
Figure 12: Autonomous Response summary for affected network users during the time of the intrusion.
ARTEX won’t be the last of these frameworks. The next ones will come with new capabilities and defaults, but an intrusion still must interact with the target environment, and that shows up in how systems, identities and applications behave even after the indicator has aged out. The harder intrusions to catch will have no infrastructure to match, just ordinary API calls and legitimate identities. Detecting those depends on knowing what normal looks like for each identity and device. Containing abnormal activity at machine speed can stop an intrusion progressing while analysts establish impact and its extent. Autonomous Response does not replace that human analysis, but rather augments defender teams' capabilities by extending the window for investigation.
Credit to Nathaniel Jones (SVP, Global Threat Intelligence), Eugene Chua (Principal Analyst), Sam Lister (Senior Security Researcher), Adam Potter (Associate Principal Cyber Analyst), Daniel Levy (Threat Hunting Data Scientist)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)
Appendices
Darktrace model detections
· Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname
· Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections
· Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing Behaviour
· Compromise / Agent Beacon to New Endpoint
· Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint
· Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination
· Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External
· Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services
· Device / Anomalous Github Download
· Device / Anomalous Package Download
· Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity
Indicators of compromise (IoCs)
nginxmysql[.]com
45.153.126[.]223
213.111.150[.]145
wisp-agent
85.11.167[.]52
43.98.196[.]73
192.121.47[.]20
www[.]ddduuuppp[.]com
89.46.234[.]50
sqlserver-sqlite[.]com
199.19.95[.]66
graphics-hook-filter64.dll
graphics-hook_config.bin
References
1. Google. GTIG AI Threat Tracker - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/agentic-threat-activity-crosses-a-significant-threshold
2. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Threat Overview of ARTEX Autonomous Penetration Testing Framework, FLASH-20261113-001, 13 November 2026: https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261113.pdf
3. Microsoft Security Blog, Storm-0940 Uses ARTEX Agentic AI in ConnectWise Supply Chain Compromise: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/21/storm-0940-uses-artex-agentic-ai-connectwise-supply-chain-compromise/
4. CrowdStrike, VAPOR PANDA Uses ARTEX to Scale Global Campaign: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/vapor-panda-uses-artex-to-scale-global-campaign/
5. Bitdefender, SilkParasite: Tracking a China-Nexus APT Across Central Asia: https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/silkparasite-tracking-china-nexus-apt-across-central-asia