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June 5, 2023

PerfectData Software Abuse and Account Takeover Risks

Darktrace investigates several attacks through PerfectData Software on Microsoft 365 accounts and shows how we were able to prevent full account takeovers.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Dariush Onsori
Cyber Security Analyst
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher
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05
Jun 2023

Introduction: PerfectData Software

Amidst the ever-changing threat landscape, new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) seem to emerge daily, creating extreme challenges for security teams. The broad range of attack methods utilized by attackers seems to present an insurmountable problem: how do you defend against a playbook that does not yet exist?

Faced with the growing number of novel and uncommon attack methods, it is essential for organizations to adopt a security solution able to detect threats based on their anomalies, rather than relying on threat intelligence alone.   

In March 2023, Darktrace observed an emerging trend in the use of an application known as ‘PerfectData Software’ for probable malicious purposes in several Microsoft 365 account takeovers.

Using its anomaly-based detection, Darktrace was able to identify the activity chain surrounding the use of this application, potentially uncovering a novel piece of threat actor tradecraft in the process.

Microsoft 365 Intrusions

In recent years, Microsoft’s Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) suite, Microsoft 365, along with its built-in identity and access management (IAM) service, Azure Active Directory (Azure AD), have been heavily targeted by threat actors due to their near-ubiquitous usage across industries. Four out of every five Fortune 500 companies, for example, use Microsoft 365 services [1].  

Malicious actors typically gain entry to organizations’ Microsoft 365 environments by abusing either stolen account credentials or stolen session cookies [2]. Once inside, actors can access sensitive data within mailboxes or SharePoint repositories, and send out emails or Teams messages. This activity can often result in serious financial harm, especially in cases where the malicious actor’s end-goal is to elicit fraudulent transactions.  

Darktrace regularly observes malicious actors behaving in predictable ways once they gain access to customer Microsoft 365 environment. One typical example is the creation of new inbox rules and sending deceitful emails intended to convince recipients to carry out subsequent actions, such as following a malicious link or providing sensitive information. It is also common for actors to register new applications in Azure AD so that they can be used to conduct follow-up activities, like mass-mailing or data theft. The registration of applications in Azure AD therefore seems to be a relatively predictable threat actor behavior [3][4]. Darktrace DETECT understands that unusual application registrations in Azure AD may constitute a deviation in expected behavior, and therefore a possible indicator of account compromise.

These registrations of applications in Azure AD are evidenced by creations of, as well as assignments of permissions to, Service Principals in Azure AD. Darktrace has detected a growing trend in actors creating and assigning permissions to a Service Principal named ‘PerfectData Software’. Further investigation of this Azure AD activity revealed it to be part of an ongoing account takeover. 

‘PerfectData Software’ Activity 

Darktrace observed variations of the following pattern of activity relating to an application named ‘PerfectData Software’ within its customer base:

  1. Actor signs in to a Microsoft 365 account from an endpoint associated with a Virtual Private Server (VPS) or Virtual Private Network (VPN) service
  2. Actor registers an application called 'PerfectData Software' with Azure AD, and then grants permissions to the application
  3. Actor accesses mailbox data and creates inbox rule 

In two separate incidents, malicious actors were observed conducting their activities from endpoints associated with VPN services (HideMyAss (HMA) VPN and Surfshark VPN, respectively) and from endpoints within the Autonomous System AS396073 MAJESTIC-HOSTING-01. 

In March 2023, Darktrace observed a malicious actor signing in to a Microsoft 365 account from a Kuwait-based IP address within the Autonomous System, AS198605 AVAST Software s.r.o. This IP address is associated with the VPN service, HMA VPN. Over the next couple of days, an actor (likely the same malicious actor) signed in to the account several more times from two different Nigeria-based endpoints, as well as a VPS-related endpoint and a HMA VPN endpoint. 

During their login sessions, the actor performed a variety of actions. First, they created and assigned permissions to a Service Principal named ‘PerfectData Software’. This Service Principal creation represents the registration of an application called ‘PerfectData Software’ in Azure AD.  Although the reason for registering this application is unclear, within a few days the actor registered and granted permission to another application, ‘Newsletter Software Supermailer’, and created a new inbox rule names ‘s’ on the mailbox of the hijacked account. This inbox rule moved emails meeting certain conditions to a folder named ‘RSS Subscription. The ‘Newsletter Software Supermailer’ application was likely registered by the actor to facilitate mass-mailing activity.

Immediately after these actions, Darktrace detected the actor sending out thousands of malicious emails from the account. The emails included an attachment named ‘Credit Transfer Copy.html’, which contained a suspicious link. Further investigation revealed that the customer’s network had received several fake invoice emails prior to this initial intrusion activity. Additionally, there was an unusually high volume of failed logins to the compromised account around the time of the initial access. 

Figure 1: Advanced Search logs depicting the steps which the actor took after logging in to a user’s Microsoft 365 account.
Figure 1: Advanced Search logs depicting the steps which the actor took after logging in to a user’s Microsoft 365 account.

In a separate case also observed by Darktrace in March 2023, a malicious actor was observed signing in to a Microsoft 365 account from an endpoint within the Autonomous System, AS397086 LAYER-HOST-HOUSTON. The endpoint appears to be related to the VPN service, Surfshark VPN. This login was followed by several failed and successful logins from a VPS-related within the Autonomous System, AS396073 MAJESTIC-HOSTING-01. The actor was then seen registering and assigning permissions to an application called ‘PerfectData Software’. As with the previous example, the motives for this registration are unclear. The actor proceeded to log in several more times from a Surfshark VPN endpoint, however, they were not observed carrying out any further suspicious activity. 

Advanced Search logs depicting the steps which the actor took after logging in to a user’s Microsoft 365 account.
Figure 2: Advanced Search logs depicting the steps which the actor took after logging in to a user’s Microsoft 365 account.

It was not clear in either of these examples, nor in fact any of cases observed by Darktrace, why actors had registered and assigned permissions to an application called ‘PerfectData Software’, and there do not appear to be any open-source intelligence (OSINT) resources or online literature related to the malicious usage of an application by that name. That said, there are several websites which appear to provide email migration and data recovery/backup tools under the moniker ‘PerfectData Software’. 

It is unclear whether the use of ‘PerfectData Software’ by malicious actors observed on the networks of Darktrace customers was one of these tools. However, given the nature of the tools, it is possible that the actors intended to use them to facilitate the exfiltration of email data from compromises mailboxes.

If the legitimate software ‘PerfectData’ is the application in question in these incidents, it is likely being purchased and misused by attackers for malicious purposes. It is also possible the application referenced in the incidents is a spoof of the legitimate ‘PerfectData’ software designed to masquerade a malicious application as legitimate.

Darktrace Coverage

Cases of ‘PerfectData Software’ activity chains detected by Darktrace typically began with an actor signing into an internal user’s Microsoft 365 account from a VPN or VPS-related endpoint. These login events, along with the suspicious email and/or brute-force activity which preceded them, caused the following detection models to breach:

  • SaaS / Access / Unusual External Source for SaaS Credential Use
  • SaaS / Access / Suspicious Login Attempt
  • SaaS / Compromise / Login From Rare Following Suspicious Login Attempt(s)
  • SaaS / Email Nexus / Unusual Location for SaaS and Email Activity

Subsequent activities, including inbox rule creations, registration of applications in Azure AD, and mass-mailing activity, resulted in breaches of the following detection models.

  • SaaS / Admin / OAuth Permission Grant 
  • SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Logic Following OAuth Grant 
  • SaaS / Admin / New Application Service Principal
  • IaaS / Admin / Azure Application Administration Activities
  • SaaS / Compliance / New Email Rule
  • SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login and New Email Rule
  • SaaS / Email Nexus / Suspicious Internal Exchange Activity
  • SaaS / Email Nexus / Possible Outbound Email Spam
  • SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login and Outbound Email Spam
  • SaaS / Compromise / Suspicious Login and Suspicious Outbound Email(s)
DETECT Model Breaches highlighting unusual login and 'PerfectData Software' registration activity from a malicious actor
Figure 3: Detection Model Breaches highlighting unusual login and 'PerfectData Software' registration activity from a malicious actor.

In cases where Darktrace's Autonomous Response was enabled in autonomous response mode, ‘PerfectData Software’ activity chains resulted in breaches of the following Darktrace Autonomous Response models:

• Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Suspicious SaaS Activity Block

• Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Significant Compliance Activity Block

In response to these model breaches, Darktrace's Autonomous Response took immediate action, performing aggressive, inhibitive actions, such as forcing the actor to log out of the SaaS platform, and disabling the user entirely. When applied autonomously, these Autonomous Response actions would seriously impede an attacker’s progress and minimize network disruption.

Figure 4: An Autonomous Response model breach created in response to a malicious actor's registration of 'PerfectData Software'

In addition, Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst was able to autonomously investigate registrations of the ‘PerfectData Software’ application and summarized its findings into digestible reports. 

A Cyber AI Analyst Incident Event log
Figure 5: A Cyber AI Analyst Incident Event log showing AI Analyst autonomously pivoting off a breach of 'SaaS / Admin / OAuth Permission Grant' to uncover details of an account hijacking.

Growing threat of account hijackings in the remote workplace 

Due to the widespread adoption of Microsoft 365 services in the workplace and continued emphasis on a remote workforce, account hijackings now pose a more serious threat to organizations around the world than ever before. The cases discussed here illustrate the tendency of malicious actors to conduct their activities from endpoints associated with VPN services, while also registering new applications, like PerfectData Software, with malicious intent. 

While it was unclear exactly why the malicious actors were using ‘PerfectData Software’ as part of their account hijacking, it is clear that either the legitimate or spoofed version of the application is becoming an very likely emergent piece of threat actor tradecraft.

Darktrace's anomaly-based detection allowed it to recognize that the use of ‘PerfectData Software’ represented a deviation in the SaaS user’s expected behavior while Darktrace's Autonomous Response, when enabled in autonomous response mode, was able to quickly take preventative action against threat actors, blocking the potential use of the application for data exfiltration or other nefarious purposes.

[related-resource]

Appendices

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Reconnaissance:

T1598 ­– Phishing for Information

Credential Access:

T1110 – Brute Force

Initial Access:

T1078.004 – Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts

Command and Control:

T1105 ­– Ingress Tool Transfer

Persistence:

T1098.003 – Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles 

Collection:

• T1114 – Email Collection 

Defense Evasion:

• T1564.008 ­– Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules­

Lateral Movement:

T1534 – Internal Spearphishing

Unusual Source IPs

• 5.62.60[.]202  (AS198605 AVAST Software s.r.o.) 

• 160.152.10[.]215 (AS37637 Smile-Nigeria-AS)

• 197.244.250[.]155 (AS37705 TOPNET)

• 169.159.92[.]36  (AS37122 SMILE)

• 45.62.170[.]237 (AS396073 MAJESTIC-HOSTING-01)

• 92.38.180[.]49 (AS202422 G-Core Labs S.A)

• 129.56.36[.]26 (AS327952 AS-NATCOM)

• 92.38.180[.]47 (AS202422 G-Core Labs S.A.)

• 107.179.20[.]214 (AS397086 LAYER-HOST-HOUSTON)

• 45.62.170[.]31 (AS396073 MAJESTIC-HOSTING-01)

References

[1] https://www.investing.com/academy/statistics/microsoft-facts/

[2] https://intel471.com/blog/countering-the-problem-of-credential-theft

[3] https://darktrace.com/blog/business-email-compromise-to-mass-phishing-campaign-attack-analysis

[4] https://darktrace.com/blog/breakdown-of-a-multi-account-compromise-within-office-365

Darktrace's Threat Research Report

This report explores the latest trends shaping the cybersecurity landscape and what defenders need to know in 2025

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Dariush Onsori
Cyber Security Analyst
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher

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November 27, 2025

CastleLoader & CastleRAT: Behind TAG150’s Modular Malware Delivery System

CastleLoader & CastleRAT: Behind TAG150’s Modular Malware Delivery SystemDefault blog imageDefault blog image

What is TAG-150?

TAG-150, a relatively new Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) operator, has been active since March 2025, demonstrating rapid development and an expansive, evolving infrastructure designed to support its malicious operations. The group employs two custom malware families, CastleLoader and CastleRAT, to compromise target systems, with a primary focus on the United States [1]. TAG-150’s infrastructure included numerous victim-facing components, such as IP addresses and domains functioning as command-and-control (C2) servers associated with malware families like SecTopRAT and WarmCookie, in addition to CastleLoader and CastleRAT [2].

As of May 2025, CastleLoader alone had infected a reported 469 devices, underscoring the scale and sophistication of TAG-150’s campaign [1].

What are CastleLoader and CastleRAT?

CastleLoader is a loader malware, primarily designed to download and install additional malware, enabling chain infections across compromised systems [3]. TAG-150 employs a technique known as ClickFix, which uses deceptive domains that mimic document verification systems or browser update notifications to trick victims into executing malicious scripts. Furthermore, CastleLoader leverages fake GitHub repositories that impersonate legitimate tools as a distribution method, luring unsuspecting users into downloading and installing malware on their devices [4].

CastleRAT, meanwhile, is a remote access trojan (RAT) that serves as one of the primary payloads delivered by CastleLoader. Once deployed, CastleRAT grants attackers extensive control over the compromised system, enabling capabilities such as keylogging, screen capturing, and remote shell access.

TAG-150 leverages CastleLoader as its initial delivery mechanism, with CastleRAT acting as the main payload. This two-stage attack strategy enhances the resilience and effectiveness of their operations by separating the initial infection vector from the final payload deployment.

How are they deployed?

Castleloader uses code-obfuscation methods such as dead-code insertion and packing to hinder both static and dynamic analysis. After the payload is unpacked, it connects to its command-and-control server to retrieve and running additional, targeted components.

Its modular architecture enables it to function both as a delivery mechanism and a staging utility, allowing threat actors to decouple the initial infection from payload deployment. CastleLoader typically delivers its payloads as Portable Executables (PEs) containing embedded shellcode. This shellcode activates the loader’s core module, which then connects to the C2 server to retrieve and execute the next-stage malware.[6]

Following this, attackers deploy the ClickFix technique, impersonating legitimate software distribution platforms like Google Meet or browser update notifications. These deceptive sites trick victims into copying and executing PowerShell commands, thereby initiating the infection kill chain. [1]

When a user clicks on a spoofed Cloudflare “Verification Stepprompt, a background request is sent to a PHP script on the distribution domain (e.g., /s.php?an=0). The server’s response is then automatically copied to the user’s clipboard using the ‘unsecuredCopyToClipboard()’ function. [7].

The Python-based variant of CastleRAT, known as “PyNightShade,” has been engineered with stealth in mind, showing minimal detection across antivirus platforms [2]. As illustrated in Figure 1, PyNightShade communicates with the geolocation API service ip-api[.]com, demonstrating both request and response behavior

Packet Capture (PCAP) of PyNightShade, the Python-based variant of CastleRAT, communicating with the geolocation API service ip-api[.]com.
Figure 1: Packet Capture (PCAP) of PyNightShade, the Python-based variant of CastleRAT, communicating with the geolocation API service ip-api[.]com.

Darktrace Coverage

In mid-2025, Darktrace observed a range of anomalous activities across its customer base that appeared linked to CastleLoader, including the example below from a US based organization.

The activity began on June 26, when a device on the customer’s network was observed connecting to the IP address 173.44.141[.]89, a previously unseen IP for this network along with the use of multiple user agents, which was also rare for the user.  It was later determined that the IP address was a known indicator of compromise (IoC) associated with TAG-150’s CastleRAT and CastleLoader operations [2][5].

Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of a device making unusual connections to the malicious endpoint 173.44.141[.]89.

The device was observed downloading two scripts from this endpoint, namely ‘/service/download/data_5x.bin’ and ‘/service/download/data_6x.bin’, which have both been linked to CastleLoader infections by open-source intelligence (OSINT) [8]. The archives contains embedded shellcode, which enables attackers to execute arbitrary code directly in memory, bypassing disk writes and making detection by endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools significantly more difficult [2].

 Darktrace’s detection of two scripts from the malicious endpoint.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of two scripts from the malicious endpoint.

In addition to this, the affected device exhibited a high volume of internal connections to a broad range of endpoints, indicating potential scanning activity. Such behavior is often associated with reconnaissance efforts aimed at mapping internal infrastructure.

Darktrace / NETWORK correlated these behaviors and generated an Enhanced Monitoring model, a high-fidelity security model designed to detect activity consistent with the early stages of an attack. These high-priority models are continuously monitored and triaged by Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) as part of the Managed Threat Detection and Managed Detection & Response services, ensuring that subscribed customers are promptly alerted to emerging threats.

Darktrace detected an unusual ZIP file download alongside the anomalous script, followed by internal connectivity. This activity was correlated under an Enhanced Monitoring model.
Figure 4: Darktrace detected an unusual ZIP file download alongside the anomalous script, followed by internal connectivity. This activity was correlated under an Enhanced Monitoring model.

Darktrace Autonomous Response

Fortunately, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was fully configured, enabling it to take immediate action against the offending device by blocking any further connections external to the malicious endpoint, 173.44.141[.]89. Additionally, Darktrace enforced a ‘group pattern of life’ on the device, restricting its behavior to match other devices in its peer group, ensuring it could not deviate from expected activity, while also blocking connections over 443, shutting down any unwanted internal scanning.

Figure 5: Actions performed by Darktrace’s Autonomous Response to contain the ongoing attack.

Conclusion

The rise of the MaaS ecosystem, coupled with attackers’ growing ability to customize tools and techniques for specific targets, is making intrusion prevention increasingly challenging for security teams. Many threat actors now leverage modular toolkits, dynamic infrastructure, and tailored payloads to evade static defenses and exploit even minor visibility gaps. In this instance, Darktrace demonstrated its capability to counter these evolving tactics by identifying early-stage attack chain behaviors such as network scanning and the initial infection attempt. Autonomous Response then blocked the CastleLoader IP delivering the malicious ZIP payload, halting the attack before escalation and protecting the organization from a potentially damaging multi-stage compromise

Credit to Ahmed Gardezi (Cyber Analyst) Tyler Rhea (Senior Cyber Analyst)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Connections
  • Anomalous File / Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location
  • Initial Attack Chain Activity (Enhanced Monitoring Model)

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T15588.001 - Resource Development – Malware
  • TG1599 – Defence Evasion – Network Boundary Bridging
  • T1046 – Discovery – Network Service Scanning
  • T1189 – Initial Access

List of IoCs
IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

  • 173.44.141[.]89 – IP – CastleLoader C2 Infrastructure
  • 173.44.141[.]89/service/download/data_5x.bin – URI – CastleLoader Script
  • 173.44.141[.]89/service/download/data_6x.bin – URI  - CastleLoader Script
  • wsc.zip – ZIP file – Possible Payload

References

[1] - https://blog.polyswarm.io/castleloader

[2] - https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/from-castleloader-to-castlerat-tag-150-advances-operations

[3] - https://www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/34160-castleloader-malware

[4] - https://www.scworld.com/brief/malware-loader-castleloader-targets-devices-via-fake-github-clickfix-phishing

[5] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/173.44.141.89/community

[6] https://thehackernews.com/2025/07/castleloader-malware-infects-469.html

[7] https://www.cryptika.com/new-castleloader-attack-using-cloudflare-themed-clickfix-technique-to-infect-windows-computers/

[8] https://www.cryptika.com/castlebot-malware-as-a-service-deploys-range-of-payloads-linked-to-ransomware-attacks/

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November 20, 2025

Managing OT Remote Access with Zero Trust Control & AI Driven Detection

managing OT remote access with zero trust control and ai driven detectionDefault blog imageDefault blog image

The shift toward IT-OT convergence

Recently, industrial environments have become more connected and dependent on external collaboration. As a result, truly air-gapped OT systems have become less of a reality, especially when working with OEM-managed assets, legacy equipment requiring remote diagnostics, or third-party integrators who routinely connect in.

This convergence, whether it’s driven by digital transformation mandates or operational efficiency goals, are making OT environments more connected, more automated, and more intertwined with IT systems. While this convergence opens new possibilities, it also exposes the environment to risks that traditional OT architectures were never designed to withstand.

The modernization gap and why visibility alone isn’t enough

The push toward modernization has introduced new technology into industrial environments, creating convergence between IT and OT environments, and resulting in a lack of visibility. However, regaining that visibility is just a starting point. Visibility only tells you what is connected, not how access should be governed. And this is where the divide between IT and OT becomes unavoidable.

Security strategies that work well in IT often fall short in OT, where even small missteps can lead to environmental risk, safety incidents, or costly disruptions. Add in mounting regulatory pressure to enforce secure access, enforce segmentation, and demonstrate accountability, and it becomes clear: visibility alone is no longer sufficient. What industrial environments need now is precision. They need control. And they need to implement both without interrupting operations. All this requires identity-based access controls, real-time session oversight, and continuous behavioral detection.

The risk of unmonitored remote access

This risk becomes most evident during critical moments, such as when an OEM needs urgent access to troubleshoot a malfunctioning asset.

Under that time pressure, access is often provisioned quickly with minimal verification, bypassing established processes. Once inside, there’s little to no real-time oversight of user actions whether they’re executing commands, changing configurations, or moving laterally across the network. These actions typically go unlogged or unnoticed until something breaks. At that point, teams are stuck piecing together fragmented logs or post-incident forensics, with no clear line of accountability.  

In environments where uptime is critical and safety is non-negotiable, this level of uncertainty simply isn’t sustainable.

The visibility gap: Who’s doing what, and when?

The fundamental issue we encounter is the disconnect between who has access and what they are doing with it.  

Traditional access management tools may validate credentials and restrict entry points, but they rarely provide real-time visibility into in-session activity. Even fewer can distinguish between expected vendor behavior and subtle signs of compromise, misuse or misconfiguration.  

As a result, OT and security teams are often left blind to the most critical part of the puzzle, intent and behavior.

Closing the gaps with zero trust controls and AI‑driven detection

Managing remote access in OT is no longer just about granting a connection, it’s about enforcing strict access parameters while continuously monitoring for abnormal behavior. This requires a two-pronged approach: precision access control, and intelligent, real-time detection.

Zero Trust access controls provide the foundation. By enforcing identity-based, just-in-time permissions, OT environments can ensure that vendors and remote users only access the systems they’re explicitly authorized to interact with, and only for the time they need. These controls should be granular enough to limit access down to specific devices, commands, or functions. By applying these principles consistently across the Purdue Model, organizations can eliminate reliance on catch-all VPN tunnels, jump servers, and brittle firewall exceptions that expose the environment to excess risk.

Access control is only one part of the equation

Darktrace / OT complements zero trust controls with continuous, AI-driven behavioral detection. Rather than relying on static rules or pre-defined signatures, Darktrace uses Self-Learning AI to build a live, evolving understanding of what’s “normal” in the environment, across every device, protocol, and user. This enables real-time detection of subtle misconfigurations, credential misuse, or lateral movement as they happen, not after the fact.

By correlating user identity and session activity with behavioral analytics, Darktrace gives organizations the full picture: who accessed which system, what actions they performed, how those actions compared to historical norms, and whether any deviations occurred. It eliminates guesswork around remote access sessions and replaces it with clear, contextual insight.

Importantly, Darktrace distinguishes between operational noise and true cyber-relevant anomalies. Unlike other tools that lump everything, from CVE alerts to routine activity, into a single stream, Darktrace separates legitimate remote access behavior from potential misuse or abuse. This means organizations can both audit access from a compliance standpoint and be confident that if a session is ever exploited, the misuse will be surfaced as a high-fidelity, cyber-relevant alert. This approach serves as a compensating control, ensuring that even if access is overextended or misused, the behavior is still visible and actionable.

If a session deviates from learned baselines, such as an unusual command sequence, new lateral movement path, or activity outside of scheduled hours, Darktrace can flag it immediately. These insights can be used to trigger manual investigation or automated enforcement actions, such as access revocation or session isolation, depending on policy.

This layered approach enables real-time decision-making, supports uninterrupted operations, and delivers complete accountability for all remote activity, without slowing down critical work or disrupting industrial workflows.

Where Zero Trust Access Meets AI‑Driven Oversight:

  • Granular Access Enforcement: Role-based, just-in-time access that aligns with Zero Trust principles and meets compliance expectations.
  • Context-Enriched Threat Detection: Self-Learning AI detects anomalous OT behavior in real time and ties threats to access events and user activity.
  • Automated Session Oversight: Behavioral anomalies can trigger alerting or automated controls, reducing time-to-contain while preserving uptime.
  • Full Visibility Across Purdue Layers: Correlated data connects remote access events with device-level behavior, spanning IT and OT layers.
  • Scalable, Passive Monitoring: Passive behavioral learning enables coverage across legacy systems and air-gapped environments, no signatures, agents, or intrusive scans required.

Complete security without compromise

We no longer have to choose between operational agility and security control, or between visibility and simplicity. A Zero Trust approach, reinforced by real-time AI detection, enables secure remote access that is both permission-aware and behavior-aware, tailored to the realities of industrial operations and scalable across diverse environments.

Because when it comes to protecting critical infrastructure, access without detection is a risk and detection without access control is incomplete.

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Pallavi Singh
Product Marketing Manager, OT Security & Compliance
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