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February 6, 2022

Ransomware Groups Aim for Maximum Disruption

Discover key ransomware trends and effective strategies to safeguard your organization. Marcus Fowler provides insights on combating cyber threats!
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Marcus Fowler
CEO of Darktrace Federal and SVP of Strategic Engagements and Threats
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06
Feb 2022

In parallel to the global COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a growing ransomware pandemic. Darktrace researchers discovered that ransomware attacks on US organizations tripled in 2021 compared to 2020, and attacks on UK organizations doubled.

This crisis brought 30 nations together to discuss a counter-ransomware initiative focused on cryptocurrency regulation, security resilience, attack disruption, and international cyber diplomacy. Despite these landmark policies and law enforcement efforts, it’s safe to say that ransomware will remain as a top priority threat and is not going anywhere.

As ransomware permeates, cyber-attackers will continue evolving techniques in 2022

Ransomware gangs are becoming more sophisticated in how they select targets and how they carry out attacks. Many organizations think that ransomware shouldn’t be a serious concern if they have backups in place because they can quickly bring business operations back online. But modern attacks are about more than encryption or data exfiltration; they focus on maximizing disruption to business operations, including targeting backups for encryption and deletion. In 2022, we could see ransomware gangs target cloud service providers as well as backup and archiving providers.

Critical infrastructure organizations and businesses will continue to assess how quickly they can restore operations in the aftermath of an attack and how extensively they will be able to rely on, and the costs required for cyber insurers to cover entire ransom payments and costly systems repairs.

In early January, Microsoft researchers found evidence of malware targeting multiple Ukrainian organizations deploying what appeared to be ransomware but was actually a wiper. The malware displays a ransom note then executes the wiper when the target device is powered down. If adopted by other non-state actors, this evolution goes beyond ransomware, and some organizations won’t be able to survive these types of attacks.

Sophisticated ransomware gangs will expand their detailed targeting efforts from only ‘big game hunting,’ where they target large and well-known targets, to use more resources directly targeting midsize and smaller organizations. With increased scalability through automation and leveraging supply chain attacks, ransomware gangs will have the resources to expand their operations. Large organizations have more substantial budgets and more people, and they can prioritize resources to deal with ransomware’s effects — it will be far more difficult for small businesses.

Not only are ransomware operators expanding whom they can target, but the group of cyber-attackers able to execute attacks is expanding. The rise of Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) gives low-skilled threat actors access to sophisticated malware strains, lowering the barrier to entry for attackers. RaaS has expanded the criminal ecosystem to include lower-level threat actors who find and attack the targets before installing the malicious software. Threat actors are increasingly using bots to automate the initial attack that gets them a foothold in the system.

There is also a varying degree of professionalism amongst cyber-criminals, from seasoned veterans (with current or previous nation-state experience) to ‘script kiddies’ with little expertise. This array translates to greater potential for untested or reckless use of sophisticated tools by unsophisticated actors.

Ransomware groups will bounce back

Ransomware groups are resilient. Even if government pressures force ransomware groups to disband or criminally charge them, they will continue to rebrand and crop back up. For example, DarkSide, confirmed by the FBI to be behind the attack on Colonial Pipeline, shut down a week after the attack. Shortly after, BlackMatter emerged, widely believed to be a rebranded version of the same cyber-crime group.

Figure 1: Darktrace breaks down the stages of a BlackMatter ransomware attack targeting a marketing firm in the US

Earlier this year, Russia’s security agency announced that it had arrested several members belonging to the notorious REvil ransomware gang and neutralized its operations. While this is a significant step against a major group, it is unlikely to reflect a long-term change in Russian policy towards cyber-criminal gangs. These arrests almost certainly do not mark the end of REvil.

Five ransomware groups have formed a cartel to exchange data and ‘best’ practices. These groups include Wizard Spider (linked to the Ryuk and Conti ransomware strains), Twisted Spider (which developed Maze and uses Egregor), Viking Spider (the group behind Ragnar), and LockBit.

Even if government pressures force ransomware groups to disband or criminally charge ransomware gangs, these groups will continue to rebrand and crop back up with even more sophisticated techniques and capabilities.

A static ‘hardened’ perimeter defense isn’t the answer – a dynamic self-defending one is

For organizations to build systems to withstand cyber-attacks, security leaders need to think and, more importantly, defend beyond the initial breach to maximize continuity of business operations. Security defenses like firewalls centered on defending the cyber perimeter are not enough to protect against evolving threats.

A truly dynamic defense is achievable. Organizations need to actively enforce ‘normal’ for businesses and disrupt attacks at the earliest indicators of malicious anomalous behavior, such as file encryption or data exfiltration. Security technology needs to learn, make micro-decisions, and take proportional responses to detect and stop attacks early enough before data exfiltration or encryption occurs.

Attackers are acutely aware of Threat Intelligence-reliant defensive tools they need to evade and know the limitations of the legacy, siloed approach many organizations employ. Attackers are finding valuable information, exfiltrating the files, and encrypting the data in a short period. The race condition and response window for defenders to detect and stop attacks is getting smaller; security teams and solution responses must get faster.

Cyber security is no longer a human-scale problem. Organizations need to adopt AI-based protections that can defend against increasingly automated ransomware attacks. In an era of fast-moving cyber-attacks, and with threat actors deliberately striking when security teams are out of the office, AI technologies have become essential in taking targeted action to contain attacks without interrupting normal business.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Marcus Fowler
CEO of Darktrace Federal and SVP of Strategic Engagements and Threats

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January 30, 2026

ClearFake: From Fake CAPTCHAs to Blockchain-Driven Payload Retrieval

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What is ClearFake?

As threat actors evolve their techniques to exploit victims and breach target networks, the ClearFake campaign has emerged as a significant illustration of this continued adaptation. ClearFake is a campaign observed using a malicious JavaScript framework deployed on compromised websites, impacting sectors such as e‑commerce, travel, and automotive. First identified in mid‑2023, ClearFake is frequently leveraged to socially engineer victims into installing fake web browser updates.

In ClearFake compromises, victims are steered toward compromised WordPress sites, often positioned by attackers through search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning. Once on the site, users are presented with a fake CAPTCHA. This counterfeit challenge is designed to appear legitimate while enabling the execution of malicious code. When a victim interacts with the CAPTCHA, a PowerShell command containing a download string is retrieved and executed.

Attackers commonly abuse the legitimate Microsoft HTML Application Host (MSHTA) in these operations. Recent campaigns have also incorporated Smart Chain endpoints, such as “bsc-dataseed.binance[.]org,” to obtain configuration code. The primary payload delivered through ClearFake is typically an information stealer, such as Lumma Stealer, enabling credential theft, data exfiltration, and persistent access [1].

Darktrace’s Coverage of ClearFake

Darktrace / ENDPOINT first detected activity likely associated with ClearFake on a single device on over the course of one day on November 18, 2025. The system observed the execution of “mshta.exe,” the legitimate Microsoft HTML Application Host utility. It also noted a repeated process command referencing “weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru”, indicating suspicious external activity. Subsequent analysis of this endpoint using open‑source intelligence (OSINT) indicated that it was a malicious, domain generation algorithm (DGA) endpoint [2].

The process line referencing weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, as observed by Darktrace / ENDPOINT.
Figure 1: The process line referencing weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, as observed by Darktrace / ENDPOINT.

This activity indicates that mshta.exe was used to contact a remote server, “weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru/rpxacc64mshta,” and execute the associated HTA file to initiate the next stage of the attack. OSINT sources have since heavily flagged this server as potentially malicious [3].

The first argument in this process uses the MSHTA utility to execute the HTA file hosted on the remote server. If successful, MSHTA would then run JavaScript or VBScript to launch PowerShell commands used to retrieve malicious payloads, a technique observed in previous ClearFake campaigns. Darktrace also detected unusual activity involving additional Microsoft executables, including “winlogon.exe,” “userinit.exe,” and “explorer.exe.” Although these binaries are legitimate components of the Windows operating system, threat actors can abuse their normal behavior within the Windows login sequence to gain control over user sessions, similar to the misuse of mshta.exe.

EtherHiding cover

Darktrace also identified additional ClearFake‑related activity, specifically a connection to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org, a legitimate BNB Smart Chain endpoint. This activity was triggered by injected JavaScript on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com, where the script initiated an eth_call POST request to the Smart Chain endpoint.

Example of a fake CAPTCHA on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com.
Figure 2: Example of a fake CAPTCHA on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com.

EtherHiding is a technique in which threat actors leverage blockchain technology, specifically smart contracts, as part of their malicious infrastructure. Because blockchain is anonymous, decentralized, and highly persistent, it provides threat actors with advantages in evading defensive measures and traditional tracking [4].

In this case, when a user visits a compromised WordPress site, injected base64‑encoded JavaScript retrieved an ABI string, which was then used to load and execute a contract hosted on the BNB Smart Chain.

JavaScript hosted on the compromised site www.allstaruae[.]com.
Figure 3: JavaScript hosted on the compromised site www.allstaruae[.]com.

Conducting malware analysis on this instance, the Base64 decoded into a JavaScript loader. A POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org was then used to retrieve a hex‑encoded ABI string that loads and executes the contract. The JavaScript also contained hex and Base64‑encoded functions that decoded into additional JavaScript, which attempted to retrieve a payload hosted on GitHub at “github[.]com/PrivateC0de/obf/main/payload.txt.” However, this payload was unavailable at the time of analysis.

Darktrace’s detection of the POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org.
Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of the POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of the executable file and the malicious hostname.

Autonomous Response

As Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was enabled on this customer’s network, Darktrace was able to take swift mitigative action to contain the ClearFake‑related activity early, before it could lead to potential payload delivery. The affected device was blocked from making external connections to a number of suspicious endpoints, including 188.114.96[.]6, *.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, and neighb0rrol1[.]ru, ensuring that no further malicious connections could be made and no payloads could be retrieved.

Autonomous Response also acted to prevent the executable mshta.exe from initiating HTA file execution over HTTPS from this endpoint by blocking the attempted connections. Had these files executed successfully, the attack would likely have resulted in the retrieval of an information stealer, such as Lumma Stealer.

Autonomous Response’s intervention against the suspicious connectivity observed.
Figure 6: Autonomous Response’s intervention against the suspicious connectivity observed.

Conclusion

ClearFake continues to be observed across multiple sectors, but Darktrace remains well‑positioned to counter such threats. Because ClearFake’s end goal is often to deliver malware such as information stealers and malware loaders, early disruption is critical to preventing compromise. Users should remain aware of this activity and vigilant regarding fake CAPTCHA pop‑ups. They should also monitor unusual usage of MSHTA and outbound connections to domains that mimic formats such as “bsc-dataseed.binance[.]org” [1].

In this case, Darktrace was able to contain the attack before it could successfully escalate and execute. The attempted execution of HTA files was detected early, allowing Autonomous Response to intervene, stopping the activity from progressing. As soon as the device began communicating with weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, an Autonomous Response inhibitor triggered and interrupted the connections.

As ClearFake continues to rise, users should stay alert to social engineering techniques, including ClickFix, that rely on deceptive security prompts.

Credit to Vivek Rajan (Senior Cyber Analyst) and Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Process / New Executable Launched

Endpoint / Anomalous Use of Scripting Process

Endpoint / New Suspicious Executable Launched

Endpoint / Process Connection::Unusual Connection from New Process

Autonomous Response Models

Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

  • weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru – URL - Malicious Domain
  • 188.114.96[.]6 – IP – Suspicious Domain
  • *.neighb0rrol1[.]ru – URL – Malicious Domain

MITRE Tactics

Initial Access, Drive-by Compromise, T1189

User Execution, Execution, T1204

Software Deployment Tools, Execution and Lateral Movement, T1072

Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1059

System Binary Proxy Execution: MSHTA, T1218.005

References

1.        https://www.kroll.com/en/publications/cyber/rapid-evolution-of-clearfake-delivery

2.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/weiss.neighb0rrol1.ru

3.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1f1aabe87e5e93a8fff769bf3614dd559c51c80fc045e11868f3843d9a004d1e/community

4.        https://www.packetlabs.net/posts/etherhiding-a-new-tactic-for-hiding-malware-on-the-blockchain/

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Vivek Rajan
Cyber Analyst

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January 30, 2026

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector: Six Trends to Watch

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The evolving cybersecurity threat landscape in finance

The financial sector, encompassing commercial banks, credit unions, financial services providers, and cryptocurrency platforms, faces an increasingly complex and aggressive cyber threat landscape. The financial sector’s reliance on digital infrastructure and its role in managing high-value transactions make it a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored threat actors.

Darktrace’s latest threat research, The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector, draws on a combination of Darktrace telemetry data from real-world customer environments, open-source intelligence, and direct interviews with financial-sector CISOs to provide perspective on how attacks are unfolding and how defenders in the sector need to adapt.  

Six cybersecurity trends in the finance sector for 2026

1. Credential-driven attacks are surging

Phishing continues to be a leading initial access vector for attacks targeting confidentiality. Financial institutions are frequently targeted with phishing emails designed to harvest login credentials. Techniques including Adversary-in-The-Middle (AiTM) to bypass Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) and QR code phishing (“quishing”) are surging and are capable of fooling even trained users. In the first half of 2025, Darktrace observed 2.4 million phishing emails within financial sector customer deployments, with almost 30% targeted towards VIP users.  

2. Data Loss Prevention is an increasing challenge

Compliance issues – particularly data loss prevention -- remain a persistent risk. In October 2025 alone, Darktrace observed over 214,000 emails across financial sector customers that contained unfamiliar attachments and were sent to suspected personal email addresses highlighting clear concerns around data loss prevention. Across the same set of customers within the same time frame, more than 351,000 emails containing unfamiliar attachments were sent to freemail addresses (e.g. gmail, yahoo, icloud), highlighting clear concerns around DLP.  

Confidentiality remains a primary concern for financial institutions as attackers increasingly target sensitive customer data, financial records, and internal communications.  

3. Ransomware is evolving toward data theft and extortion

Ransomware is no longer just about locking systems, it’s about stealing data first and encrypting second. Groups such as Cl0p and RansomHub now prioritize exploiting trusted file-transfer platforms to exfiltrate sensitive data before encryption, maximizing regulatory and reputational fallout for victims.  

Darktrace’s threat research identified routine scanning and malicious activity targeting internet-facing file-transfer systems used heavily by financial institutions. In one notable case involving Fortra GoAnywhere MFT, Darktrace detected malicious exploitation behavior six days before the CVE was publicly disclosed, demonstrating how attackers often operate ahead of patch cycles

This evolution underscores a critical reality: by the time a vulnerability is disclosed publicly, it may already be actively exploited.

4. Attackers are exploiting edge devices, often pre-disclosure.  

VPNs, firewalls, and remote access gateways have become high-value targets, and attackers are increasingly exploiting them before vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed. Darktrace observed pre-CVE exploitation activity affecting edge technologies including Citrix, Palo Alto, and Ivanti, enabling session hijacking, credential harvesting, and privileged lateral movement into core banking systems.  

Once compromised, these edge devices allow adversaries to blend into trusted network traffic, bypassing traditional perimeter defenses. CISOs interviewed for the report repeatedly described VPN infrastructure as a “concentrated focal point” for attackers, especially when patching and segmentation lag behind operational demands.

5. DPRK-linked activity is growing across crypto and fintech.  

State-sponsored activity, particularly from DPRK-linked groups affiliated with Lazarus, continues to intensify across cryptocurrency and fintech organizations. Darktrace identified coordinated campaigns leveraging malicious npm packages, previously undocumented BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware, and exploitation of React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) for credential theft and persistent backdoor access.  

Targeting was observed across the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Chile, Nigeria, Kenya, and Qatar, highlighting the global scope of these operations.  

6. Cloud complexity and AI governance gaps are now systemic risks.  

Finally, CISOs consistently pointed to cloud complexity, insider risk from new hires, and ungoverned AI usage exposing sensitive data as systemic challenges. Leaders emphasized difficulty maintaining visibility across multi-cloud environments while managing sensitive data exposure through emerging AI tools.  

Rapid AI adoption without clear guardrails has introduced new confidentiality and compliance risks, turning governance into a board-level concern rather than a purely technical one.

Building cyber resilience in a shifting threat landscape

The financial sector remains a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored adversaries. What this research makes clear is that yesterday’s security assumptions no longer hold. Identity attacks, pre-disclosure exploitation, and data-first ransomware require adaptive, behavior-based defenses that can detect threats as they emerge, often ahead of public disclosure.

As financial institutions continue to digitize, resilience will depend on visibility across identity, edge, cloud, and data, combined with AI-driven defense that learns at machine speed.  

Learn more about the threats facing the finance sector, and what your organization can do to keep up in The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector report here.  

Acknowledgements:

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance sector report was authored by Calum Hall, Hugh Turnbull, Parvatha Ananthakannan, Tiana Kelly, and Vivek Rajan, with contributions from Emma Foulger, Nicole Wong, Ryan Traill, Tara Gould, and the Darktrace Threat Research and Incident Management teams.

[related-resource]  

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Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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