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March 24, 2020

Securing Operational Technology in Remote Working Conditions

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24
Mar 2020
Remote work poses new challenges for cybersecurity professionals. Use these tips to secure your operational technology (OT) in remote working conditions.

Remote work poses new challenges

As organizations rapidly transition to remote working, security professionals tasked with defending critical infrastructure and OT systems are faced with a broad set of challenges. New business measures, many of which were enacted overnight, have introduced risks to OT environments that can be safety-critical. This blog post summarizes the emerging vulnerabilities and offers advice for OT security professionals to stay secure under these evolving and dynamic business conditions.

Remote access

Under new business pressures, operators and engineers are being granted levels of remote access that were previously considered unacceptable risks. Remote access to OT networks has always been a significant threat vector, whether the intended users are company staff or third-party contractors and vendors. Compromised remote access can serve as a launching point for many other malicious or dangerously misguided activities – something referred to many times in the recently released MITRE ATT&CK for ICS matrix under the ‘Initial Access’ and ‘Lateral Movement’ sections. This is especially true in the current period of sweeping and sudden changes in working practices, where staff may not have been trained in advance and static cyber defenses have to be rapidly adjusted. The potential for new oversights and mistakes is at an all-time high.

Many OT security architectures heavily rely on a ‘defense-in-depth’ approach, which involves building multiple layers of defense outside the core OT functions. This has always been vulnerable to a dedicated attacker or an effective worm malware. However, recent measures have seen a rapid escalation in the most dangerous form of remote access, which likely emerges within most of those defensive layers – and without the long planning process that would usually be followed in preparation.

These changes open the door to new vulnerabilities at a time when industrial environments are already experiencing significant operator resource problems. Remote access is not efficient, which means these organizations will already be struggling. Asking these organizations to also take on new security responsibilities, that take time to put in place and facilitate, hugely exacerbates the problem.

Convergence with IT

This transition to remote access exposes some of the longer-term security challenges faced by teams overseeing industrial environments. This includes the historical trend of IT hardware, operating systems, and services invading OT networks for financial efficiency without being suitable for the availability-first environment – hence the difficulty of maintaining up-to-date patching.

The increasing interconnectivity of OT and IT means that defending against an attack on the operational side, whether intentional or as collateral damage, has become of paramount importance. Vulnerable OT equipment is often used as a gateway for a more pernicious attack on the network, and in equal measure, attacks that start in the corporate IT system can result in disruption to physical operations – causing catastrophic losses to production.

Supply chain risk

Physically establishing a test environment may be impossible given the current circumstances, and yet the production environment has to keep running. This may again result in a lower level of testing than was previously acceptable, as well as opening up another vector of attack through the supply chain – as pre-infected hardware and malware can appear directly within the production environment.

In these conditions, carrying out risk and security reviews for all vendors and the products they are purchasing has never been more important. Additional reviews and monitoring of any outsourced or open-sourced components will be critical to mitigate against supply chain risk – but these precautions may be neglected due to current business environments and policies.

An overnight change

The sudden shift in working practices will also expose the limitations of staff training – for example, in what they are supposed to be doing and not doing over remote access. Taken away from the secure environment normally supported by a location in a physical HQ, security professionals and OT engineers will now be working within their own home networks, which invariably will not be as secure as the working environment. The required level of education cannot be rolled out over this short timeframe. As well-meaning employees seek to urgently resolve business obstacles, protocol will inevitably be breached.

Further, sudden changes in static security like firewall rules are destabilizing, and more likely to have errors and unwanted permissions. Alterations to OT systems, in particular safety-critical processes, take enormous forward planning, and it is extremely rare for them to have to take place because of sudden and fundamental change.

Mitigating the risks

The transition to remote working means OT security teams will have to be able to better investigate security incidents without being onsite. This means a marked improvement in visibility and forensic capabilities is required.

The limitations of traditional security tools reliant on rules and signatures of previously identified threats will be thrown into the spotlight under the current circumstances. Organizations will instead need to move to more flexible security platforms that can adapt to sudden business changes. Hundreds of organizations have turned to cyber AI as an ally in enhancing their defense strategy to combat these OT challenges. AI is particularly suited to supporting security teams in this new set of dynamic conditions due to three key features:

  • The detection capability is consistent across both OT and IT technologies. These are always intermingled in real OT networks, but significant remote access increases the presence of more traditionally IT services and risks.
  • Its unsupervised machine learning core does not require extensive manual configuration or maintenance. This is particularly crucial at a time when working practices have changed to generally less efficient methods, meaning human resources are now at a premium.
  • The Cyber AI Analyst advances both of the prior themes even further by automatically applying expert IT and OT analysis skills, saving human analysts large amounts of time on triage and investigation.

The Industrial Immune System can be installed within just one hour, allowing organizations to adapt to these sudden changes within the timeframe required. Darktrace is committed to helping its customers with their urgent cyber security needs at this time of rapid and sudden change.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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February 24, 2025

Bytesize Security: Insider Threats in Google Workspace

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What is an insider threat?

An insider threat is a cyber risk originating from within an organization. These threats can involve actions such as an employee inadvertently clicking on a malicious link (e.g., a phishing email) or an employee with malicious intent conducting data exfiltration for corporate sabotage.

Insiders often exploit their knowledge and access to legitimate corporate tools, presenting a continuous risk to organizations. Defenders must protect their digital estate against threats from both within and outside the organization.

For example, in the summer of 2024, Darktrace / IDENTITY successfully detected a user in a customer environment attempting to steal sensitive data from a trusted Google Workspace service. Despite the use of a legitimate and compliant corporate tool, Darktrace identified anomalies in the user’s behavior that indicated malicious intent.

Attack overview: Insider threat

In June 2024, Darktrace detected unusual activity involving the Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) account of a former employee from a customer organization. This individual, who had recently left the company, was observed downloading a significant amount of data in the form of a “.INDD” file (an Adobe InDesign document typically used to create page layouts [1]) from Google Drive.

While the use of Google Drive and other Google Workspace platforms was not unexpected for this employee, Darktrace identified that the user had logged in from an unfamiliar and suspicious IPv6 address before initiating the download. This anomaly triggered a model alert in Darktrace / IDENTITY, flagging the activity as potentially malicious.

A Model Alert in Darktrace / IDENTITY showing the unusual “.INDD” file being downloaded from Google Workspace.
Figure 1: A Model Alert in Darktrace / IDENTITY showing the unusual “.INDD” file being downloaded from Google Workspace.

Following this detection, the customer reached out to Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) team via the Security Operations Support service for assistance in triaging and investigating the incident further. Darktrace’s SOC team conducted an in-depth investigation, enabling the customer to identify the exact moment of the file download, as well as the contents of the stolen documents. The customer later confirmed that the downloaded files contained sensitive corporate data, including customer details and payment information, likely intended for reuse or sharing with a new employer.

In this particular instance, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was not active, allowing the malicious insider to successfully exfiltrate the files. If Autonomous Response had been enabled, Darktrace would have immediately acted upon detecting the login from an unusual (in this case 100% rare) location by logging out and disabling the SaaS user. This would have provided the customer with the necessary time to review the activity and verify whether the user was authorized to access their SaaS environments.

Conclusion

Insider threats pose a significant challenge for traditional security tools as they involve internal users who are expected to access SaaS platforms. These insiders have preexisting knowledge of the environment, sensitive data, and how to make their activities appear normal, as seen in this case with the use of Google Workspace. This familiarity allows them to avoid having to use more easily detectable intrusion methods like phishing campaigns.

Darktrace’s anomaly detection capabilities, which focus on identifying unusual activity rather than relying on specific rules and signatures, enable it to effectively detect deviations from a user’s expected behavior. For instance, an unusual login from a new location, as in this example, can be flagged even if the subsequent malicious activity appears innocuous due to the use of a trusted application like Google Drive.

Credit to Vivek Rajan (Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Get the latest insights on emerging cyber threats

Attackers are adapting, are you ready? This report explores the latest trends shaping the cybersecurity landscape and what defenders need to know in 2025.

  • Identity-based attacks: How attackers are bypassing traditional defenses
  • Zero-day exploitation: The rise of previously unknown vulnerabilities
  • AI-driven threats: How adversaries are leveraging AI to outmaneuver security controls

Stay ahead of evolving threats with expert analysis from Darktrace. Download the report here.

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

SaaS / Resource::Unusual Download Of Externally Shared Google Workspace File

References

[1]https://www.adobe.com/creativecloud/file-types/image/vector/indd-file.html

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technqiue – Tactic – ID

Data from Cloud Storage Object – COLLECTION -T1530

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Vivek Rajan
Cyber Analyst

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February 24, 2025

RansomHub Ransomware: investigación de Darktrace sobre la herramienta más nueva en ShadowSyndicate's Arsenal

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What is ShadowSyndicate?

ShadowSyndicate, also known as Infra Storm, is a threat actor reportedly active since July 2022, working with various ransomware groups and affiliates of ransomware programs, such as Quantum, Nokoyawa, and ALPHV. This threat actor employs tools like Cobalt Strike, Sliver, IcedID, and Matanbuchus malware in its attacks. ShadowSyndicate utilizes the same SSH fingerprint (1ca4cbac895fc3bd12417b77fc6ed31d) on many of their servers—85 as of September 2023. At least 52 of these servers have been linked to the Cobalt Strike command and control (C2) framework [1].

What is RansomHub?

First observed following the FBI's takedown of ALPHV/BlackCat in December 2023, RansomHub quickly gained notoriety as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operator. RansomHub capitalized on the law enforcement’s disruption of the LockBit group’s operations in February 2024 to market themselves to potential affiliates who had previously relied on LockBit’s encryptors. RansomHub's success can be largely attributed to their aggressive recruitment on underground forums, leading to the absorption of ex-ALPHV and ex-LockBit affiliates. They were one of the most active ransomware operators in 2024, with approximately 500 victims reported since February, according to their Dedicated Leak Site (DLS) [2].

ShadowSyndicate and RansomHub

External researchers have reported that ShadowSyndicate had as many as seven different ransomware families in their arsenal between July 2022, and September 2023. Now, ShadowSyndicate appears to have added RansomHub’s their formidable stockpile, becoming an affiliate of the RaaS provider [1].

Darktrace’s analysis of ShadowSyndicate across its customer base indicates that the group has been leveraging RansomHub ransomware in multiple attacks in September and October 2024. ShadowSyndicate likely shifted to using RansomHub due to the lucrative rates offered by this RaaS provider, with affiliates receiving up to 90% of the ransom—significantly higher than the general market rate of 70-80% [3].

In many instances where encryption was observed, ransom notes with the naming pattern “README_[a-zA-Z0-9]{6}.txt” were written to affected devices. The content of these ransom notes threatened to release stolen confidential data via RansomHub’s DLS unless a ransom was paid. During these attacks, data exfiltration activity to external endpoints using the SSH protocol was observed. The external endpoints to which the data was transferred were found to coincide with servers previously associated with ShadowSyndicate activity.

Darktrace’s coverage of ShadowSyndicate and RansomHub

Darktrace’s Threat Research team identified high-confidence indicators of compromise (IoCs) linked to the ShadowSyndicate group deploying RansomHub. The investigation revealed four separate incidents impacting Darktrace customers across various sectors, including education, manufacturing, and social services. In the investigated cases, multiple stages of the kill chain were observed, starting with initial internal reconnaissance and leading to eventual file encryption and data exfiltration.

Attack Overview

Timeline attack overview of ransomhub ransomware

Internal Reconnaissance

The first observed stage of ShadowSyndicate attacks involved devices making multiple internal connection attempts to other internal devices over key ports, suggesting network scanning and enumeration activity. In this initial phase of the attack, the threat actor gathers critical details and information by scanning the network for open ports that might be potentially exploitable. In cases observed by Darktrace affected devices were typically seen attempting to connect to other internal locations over TCP ports including 22, 445 and 3389.

C2 Communication and Data Exfiltration

In most of the RansomHub cases investigated by Darktrace, unusual connections to endpoints associated with Splashtop, a remote desktop access software, were observed briefly before outbound SSH connections were identified.

Following this, Darktrace detected outbound SSH connections to the external IP address 46.161.27[.]151 using WinSCP, an open-source SSH client for Windows used for secure file transfer. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) identified this IP address as malicious and associated it with ShadowSyndicate’s C2 infrastructure [4]. During connections to this IP, multiple gigabytes of data were exfiltrated from customer networks via SSH.

Data exfiltration attempts were consistent across investigated cases; however, the method of egress varied from one attack to another, as one would expect with a RaaS strain being employed by different affiliates. In addition to transfers to ShadowSyndicate’s infrastructure, threat actors were also observed transferring data to the cloud storage and file transfer service, MEGA, via HTTP connections using the ‘rclone’ user agent – a command-line program used to manage files on cloud storage. In another case, data exfiltration activity occurred over port 443, utilizing SSL connections.

Lateral Movement

In investigated incidents, lateral movement activity began shortly after C2 communications were established. In one case, Darktrace identified the unusual use of a new administrative credential which was quickly followed up with multiple suspicious executable file writes to other internal devices on the network.

The filenames for this executable followed the regex naming convention “[a-zA-Z]{6}.exe”, with two observed examples being “bWqQUx.exe” and “sdtMfs.exe”.

Cyber AI Analyst Investigation Process for the SMB Writes of Suspicious Files to Multiple Devices' incident.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst Investigation Process for the SMB Writes of Suspicious Files to Multiple Devices' incident.

Additionally, script files such as “Defeat-Defender2.bat”, “Share.bat”, and “def.bat” were also seen written over SMB, suggesting that threat actors were trying to evade network defenses and detection by antivirus software like Microsoft Defender.

File Encryption

Among the three cases where file encryption activity was observed, file names were changed by adding an extension following the regex format “.[a-zA-Z0-9]{6}”. Ransom notes with a similar naming convention, “README_[a-zA-Z0-9]{6}.txt”, were written to each share. While the content of the ransom notes differed slightly in each case, most contained similar text. Clear indicators in the body of the ransom notes pointed to the use of RansomHub ransomware in these attacks. As is increasingly the case, threat actors employed double extortion tactics, threatening to leak confidential data if the ransom was not paid. Like most ransomware, RansomHub included TOR site links for communication between its "customer service team" and the target.

Figure 2: The graph shows the behavior of a device with encryption activity, using the “SMB Sustained Mimetype Conversion” and “Unusual Activity Events” metrics over three weeks.

Since Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was not enabled during the compromise, the ransomware attack succeeded in its objective. However, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst provided comprehensive coverage of the kill chain, enabling the customer to quickly identify affected devices and initiate remediation.

Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst panel showing the critical incidents of the affected device from one of the cases investigated.

In lieu of Autonomous Response being active on the networks, Darktrace was able to suggest a variety of manual response actions intended to contain the compromise and prevent further malicious activity. Had Autonomous Response been enabled at the time of the attack, these actions would have been quickly applied without any human interaction, potentially halting the ransomware attack earlier in the kill chain.

Figure 4: A list of suggested Autonomous Response actions on the affected devices."

Conclusion

The Darktrace Threat Research team has noted a surge in attacks by the ShadowSyndicate group using RansomHub’s RaaS of late. RaaS has become increasingly popular across the threat landscape due to its ease of access to malware and script execution. As more individual threat actors adopt RaaS, security teams are struggling to defend against the increasing number of opportunistic attacks.

For customers subscribed to Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) services, the Analyst team promptly investigated detections of the aforementioned unusual and anomalous activities in the initial infection phases. Multiple alerts were raised via Darktrace’s Managed Threat Detection to warn customers of active ransomware incidents. By emphasizing anomaly-based detection and response, Darktrace can effectively identify devices affected by ransomware and take action against emerging activity, minimizing disruption and impact on customer networks.

Credit to Kwa Qing Hong (Senior Cyber Analyst and Deputy Analyst Team Lead, Singapore) and Signe Zahark (Principal Cyber Analyst, Japan)

Get the latest insights on emerging cyber threats

Attackers are adapting, are you ready? This report explores the latest trends shaping the cybersecurity landscape and what defenders need to know in 2025.

  • Identity-based attacks: How attackers are bypassing traditional defenses
  • Zero-day exploitation: The rise of previously unknown vulnerabilities
  • AI-driven threats: How adversaries are leveraging AI to outmaneuver security controls

Stay ahead of evolving threats with expert analysis from Darktrace. Download the report here.

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Antigena Models / Autonomous Response:

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Network Scan Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena SMB Enumeration Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Internal Anomalous File Activity

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Large Data Volume Outbound Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Breaches Over Time Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Breach

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Pattern of Life Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block


Network Reconnaissance:

Device / Network Scan

Device / ICMP Address Scan

Device / RDP Scan
Device / Anomalous LDAP Root Searches
Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
Device / Spike in LDAP Activity

C2:

Enhanced Monitoring - Device / Lateral Movement and C2 Activity

Enhanced Monitoring - Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise

Enhanced Monitoring - Compromise / Suspicious File and C2

Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

Anomalous Connection / Outbound SSH to Unusual Port


External Data Transfer:

Enhanced Monitoring - Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination

Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port

Enhanced Monitoring - Anomalous File / Numeric File Download

Anomalous File / New User Agent Followed By Numeric File Download

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Device / Large Number of Connections to New Endpoints

Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

Lateral Movement:

User / New Admin Credentials on Server

Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control

Anomalous Connection / High Volume of New or Uncommon Service Control

Anomalous File / Internal / Executable Uploaded to DC

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Activity On High Risk Device

File Encryption:

Compliance / SMB Drive Write

Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File

Compromise / Ransomware / Possible Ransom Note Write

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

83.97.73[.]198 - IP - Data exfiltration endpoint

108.181.182[.]143 - IP - Data exfiltration endpoint

46.161.27[.]151 - IP - Data exfiltration endpoint

185.65.212[.]164 - IP - Data exfiltration endpoint

66[.]203.125.21 - IP - MEGA endpoint used for data exfiltration

89[.]44.168.207 - IP - MEGA endpoint used for data exfiltration

185[.]206.24.31 - IP - MEGA endpoint used for data exfiltration

31[.]216.148.33 - IP - MEGA endpoint used for data exfiltration

104.226.39[.]18 - IP - C2 endpoint

103.253.40[.]87 - IP - C2 endpoint

*.relay.splashtop[.]com - Hostname - C2 & data exfiltration endpoint

gfs***n***.userstorage.mega[.]co.nz - Hostname - MEGA endpoint used for data exfiltration

w.api.mega[.]co.nz - Hostname - MEGA endpoint used for data exfiltration

ams-rb9a-ss.ams.efscloud[.]net - Hostname - Data exfiltration endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic - Technqiue

RECONNAISSANCE – T1592.004 Client Configurations

RECONNAISSANCE – T1590.005 IP Addresses

RECONNAISSANCE – T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks

RECONNAISSANCE – T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning

DISCOVERY – T1046 Network Service Scanning

DISCOVERY – T1018 Remote System Discovery

DISCOVERY – T1083 File and Directory Discovery
INITIAL ACCESS - T1189 Drive-by Compromise

INITIAL ACCESS - T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1001 Data Obfuscation

COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071 Application Layer Protocol

COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001 Web Protocols

COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography

COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1571 Non-Standard Port

DEFENSE EVASION – T1078 Valid Accounts

DEFENSE EVASION – T1550.002 Pass the Hash

LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1021.004 SSH

LATERAL MOVEMENT – T1080 Taint Shared Content

LATERAL MOVEMENT – T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer

LATERAL MOVEMENT – T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares

COLLECTION - T1185 Man in the Browser

EXFILTRATION - T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

EXFILTRATION - T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

EXFILTRATION - T1029 Scheduled Transfer

IMPACT – T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact

References

1.     https://www.group-ib.com/blog/shadowsyndicate-raas/

2.     https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/news/366617096/ESET-RansomHub-most-active-ransomware-group-in-H2-2024

3.     https://cyberint.com/blog/research/ransomhub-the-new-kid-on-the-block-to-know/

4.     https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/AA24-131A.stix_.xml

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About the author
Qing Hong Kwa
Senior Cyber Analyst and Deputy Analyst Team Lead, Singapore
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