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June 13, 2021

Neutralizing QakBot: Darktrace SOC's Success Story

Learn about the strategies used by Darktrace's SOC team to neutralize the QakBot banking trojan and safeguard financial data.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Brianna Luong (Leddy)
Sr. Technical Alliances Manager
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13
Jun 2021

While cutting-edge technology is essential for organizations to secure their digital assets, having on-hand human support to deal with threats can be invaluable for lean security teams and organizations without Autonomous Response in their digital enterprise.

Cyber AI technology recently detected the QakBot banking trojan in a customer environment, and with the help of Darktrace’s SOC team, the customer was able to shut down the attack in under two hours.

QakBot malware

QakBot has built a name for itself over the past twelve years as one of the most deadly trojans in the game. Used in fast-paced, automated attacks against individual businesses, it has the ability to drain company resources and steal vast amounts of financial data. It is often downloaded during Emotet campaigns to infect devices and harvest bank account information.

Like other banking trojans, QakBot uses a dropper to install itself on a corporate device. It then self-propagates through a system and collects credentials at machine speed. Cyber-criminals can use this information to extract private data or distribute ransomware and further malicious payloads.

QakBot is extremely difficult for traditional security tools to detect. Due to a combination of its automatic worm-like capabilities, its use of a virus dropper with delayed execution, and several other obfuscation methods, it is able to bypass the majority of legacy tools and can lead to extreme financial repercussions if not dealt with in its initial stages.

The Darktrace SOC team

Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) team, located in Cambridge, San Francisco, and Singapore, deal with a wide range of these quick-moving and stealthy threats which are identified by Cyber AI, including ransomware deployments, SaaS account takeovers, and data exfiltration.

Such attacks often use ‘Living off the Land’ techniques which make them difficult to differentiate from legitimate network traffic. Moreover, many threat actors carry out malicious activities outside of a target organization’s normal working hours, amplifying the potential impact of a breach before it is discovered.

The Darktrace SOC team provides around-the-clock coverage of customer environments through Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) and Ask the Expert (ATE) services. Alongside autonomous AI detection, these services provide additional human monitoring and support for customers undergoing significant security events.

Uncovering the QakBot banking trojan

Figure 1: Timeline of the QakBot banking trojan attack, including the response from Darktrace’s services.

At a company in the EMEA region with around 7,000 devices, Cyber AI detected the early signs of a trojan horse. The organization did not have Antigena Email analyzing its email traffic in order to respond to attacks in the inbox, so when a phishing email slipped through the gateway and was opened by a user, their device began connecting to a high volume of suspicious endpoints.

This resembled command and control (C2) communication, and, based on the unusual nature of this activity for the device and the environment, this behavior triggered multiple high scoring model breaches. One of these was a high fidelity model breach for ‘Suspicious SSL Activity’, which prompted an investigation through the Proactive Threat Notification service.

Figure 2: An example of the Cyber AI Analyst incident timeline for an infected device, showing command and control and reconnaissance activity.

An expert Darktrace analyst was alerted to the unusual connectivity by the Enterprise Immune System and began to investigate the anomalous behavior, determining that this device was exhibiting strong signs of a banking trojan infection. The analyst needed to move quickly: the trojan had immediately begun reconnaissance and was preparing to spread across the network.

Within an hour, the analyst had produced a brief report summarizing the activity and this was sent as a PTN alert to the customer. The report contained key technical information from the model breach and Cyber AI Analyst incident – including the timeframe, device hostname and IP address, suspicious external domains, and a reference for the customer to view this alert in the Darktrace UI.

Figure 3: Visual example of the Darktrace threat tray. In the QakBot attack, four Enhanced Monitoring model breaches were triggered, and these were investigated and alerted through the PTN service. They were all high scoring detections, clearly indicating a compromise.

Upon receiving the alert, the customer initiated further investigation and quickly shut down the affected device. The attack was contained in less than two hours.

Ask the Expert

After their initial remediation, the company reached out to the Darktrace team via Ask the Expert to confirm that this was a QakBot infection and to gain additional assistance in investigating the extent of the compromise.

The analyst team provided ongoing support to the investigation over the next six hours, concluding that this likely came from a phishing email and that no other devices in the environment were compromised. The analyst provided a list of observed Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) and worked with the customer to add these to the Darktrace Watched Domains List for further monitoring. The customer was also able to use this list to block the IoCs at the firewall.

The organization contained the infection, and no further suspicious behavior was observed from network devices.

Humans and AI

This case study is a perfect example of how Darktrace’s services provide constant assistance to customers every day of every week. On top of Darktrace’s advanced machine learning technology, the Darktrace SOC team serves as an additional layer of support for security teams of all sizes. Proactive Threat Notifications offer an extra set of eyes on emerging threats, while Ask The Expert provides a mechanism for customers to gain investigative support directly from Darktrace analysts.

The early detection of this banking trojan allowed the organization to deal with the threat before it could develop into a serious infection or a ransomware attack. QakBot is just one of many strains of swift self-spreading malware in today’s threat landscape. Such automated attacks consistently outpace the fastest of human defenders, exposing the desperate need for AI and autonomous systems to augment human teams and protect digital systems in real time.

If Antigena Network had been active in this environment, the suspicious external connectivity would have been blocked upon first detection, stopping the attack within seconds. In fact, the customer decided to deploy Antigena Network following this incident, and now benefits from 24/7 Autonomous Response against all emerging cyber-threats.

IoCs:

nerotimethod[.]com193[.]29[.]58[.]17345[.]32[.]211[.]20754[.]36[.]108[.]120144[.]139[.]166[.]1875[.]67[.]192[.]125 149[.]28[.]101[.]9037[.]211[.]90[.]17568[.]131[.]107[.]37162[.]222[.]226[.]194mywebscrap[.]com

Darktrace model detections:

  • Compromise / SSL or HTTP Beacon
  • Compromise / Suspicious SSL Activity
  • Device / Multiple C2 Model Breaches
  • Device / Lateral Movement and C2 Activity
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches
  • Device / Large Number of Model Breaches
  • Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing Behaviour
  • Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination
  • Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL
  • Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Device / Reverse DNS Sweep
  • Unusual Activity / Possible RPC Recon Activity
  • Device / Active Directory Reconnaissance
  • Device / Network Scan - Low Anomaly Score
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

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Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Brianna Luong (Leddy)
Sr. Technical Alliances Manager

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November 18, 2026

Agentic attacks in the wild: Inside three ARTEX investigations

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Key insights

·       Darktrace observed activity in several customer environments involving infrastructure and behaviors associated with reported ARTEX-enabled campaigns, including activity linked to China-nexus espionage and financially motivated attacks.

·       In the higher-confidence cases, known infrastructure appeared alongside beaconing, unusual TLS, reconnaissance, tunneling, script retrieval, SMB activity and external data transfer. One Azure case had no observed network command and control at all, only key listing and application identity activity.

·       ARTEX is now used by actors with different objectives. Identifying the framework can help locate relevant activity, while the behavior around the affected system provides the stronger evidence for understanding compromise and attribution.

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Introduction

Attackers have moved beyond using AI for phishing and are running agentic frameworks; open-source tools like ARTEX, CAIRN, PentAGI and Hexstrike that let AI agents scan, exploit and move through an environment with little human input [1]. ARTEX has moved quickly from an offensive security project into live intrusion activity. Since at least August 2026, the framework has been associated with espionage, financially motivated attacks and opportunistic campaigns across government, financial services, technology, defense, telecommunications and other sectors. The FBI has documented ARTEX activity spanning reconnaissance, exploitation, credential abuse, lateral movement, collection, command and control, and exfiltration [2].

Darktrace has observed activity in customer environments that overlaps with infrastructure, tooling and behaviors reported in several of these campaigns. The cases below highlight how those intrusions appeared on the network, including the activity visible before an analyst can determine which actor or framework may be responsible.

ARTEX as part of the attacker workflow

ARTEX is an open-source, multi-agent offensive security platform that converts high-level objectives into actions carried out by specialized agents [2]. Operators have used it to automate activity across the attack lifecycle, including scanning, exploitation, credential activity and post-compromise operations. Some reported intrusions moved from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours [2].

The framework is now associated with actors pursuing different objectives and using different post-exploitation tooling. The original public repository was removed in October 2026, but archived copies and localized versions remain available. For defenders, ARTEX is more useful as context for an investigation than as an attribution shortcut.

Darktrace observations show the same point at network level. Infrastructure linked to reported ARTEX campaigns appeared alongside beaconing, tunneling, unusual TLS, reconnaissance, file retrieval and lateral activity.

Case 1: Espionage-linked activity

Darktrace observed activity associated with BLOODALCHEMY command-and-control (C2) infrastructure in two customer environments. In one environment, five devices communicated with nginxmysql[.]com and 45.153.126[.]223 between October 23 and November 2. Both indicators had previously been linked to China-nexus espionage activity involving ARTEX [4].

The connections were accompanied by suspicious beaconing, repeated successful connections and unusual self-signed TLS. One system began making suspicious TLS connections to nginxmysql[.]com on October 23. Beaconing followed on October 24, and SMB scanning appeared later in the sequence. Other affected systems subsequently communicated with previously unseen external endpoints.

Prior to the observed C2, Darktrace detected curl requests retrieving executable and script content including /systemd, /wazuh, linux_amd64, u.sh and q.sh. Related telemetry included DRSGetNCChanges activity consistent with DCSync, LDAP enumeration, DNS zone transfers, network scanning, certificate downloads and SMB writes involving start.bat.

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Figure 1: Darktrace investigation showing suspicious network activity associated with infrastructure linked to reported ARTEX activity.

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Figure 2: Darktrace detection showing anomalous self-signed TLS activity during the espionage-linked investigation.

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BLOODALCHEMY has been reported in more than one China-nexus cluster [5]. SoftEther infrastructure observed in one environment provided another point of correlation with reported VAPOR PANDA tradecraft. The moderate-confidence assessment tying this to a Chinese nexus threat actor is based on infrastructure, victim context, tradecraft behavior that followed the initial connection, and public reporting.

Case 2: Financial-sector activity

In early November, Darktrace observed activity in two financial-sector environments that overlap with reported ARTEX infrastructure. On November 5, a server connected to 213.111.150[.]145:8099 and downloaded wisp-agent, associated with WISP C2 activity.

In a second environment, a device attempted connections to 85.11.167[.]52 on November 1 and 2. The connections occurred alongside beaconing to new and rare destinations, anomalous TLS, possible tunneling and unusual package downloads.

The device also communicated with temp[.]sh, ssh.localhost[.]run, localhost[.]run, termbin[.]com, pastebin[.]com and GitHub-hosted release infrastructure. The sequence showed potential tooling retrieval, C2, tunneling and use of external services capable of staging or moving data.

Figure 3: Darktrace investigation showing connections to new and rare external destinations during the financial-sector activity.

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Case 3: Credential collection in Azure

On October 20, Darktrace observed a sweep of credential collection in a customer’s Azure environment that is consistent with ARTEX use. The intrusion began with connections to the virtual network from 43.98.196[.]73 (Alibaba Cloud). Open-source scanning data associates the address with ARTEX.

A compromised user identity made requests to the Azure Resource Manager API, though how it was compromised is unknown. The requests listed keys and secrets across API Management, web and function apps, Cognitive Services, Event Hubs, storage accounts and a managed Kubernetes cluster. With those credentials the attacker compromised multiple application identities. The attacker then used the application identities and the user identity to retrieve more credentials, change firewall and security rules and run scripts on virtual machines. Microsoft Defender alerts showed attempted execution of scripts related to Mimikatz and Impacket.

In a cloud environment, such privileged and enumerative operations are potentially indistinguishable from legitimate administrative actions. Consequently, the sequence and context of such operations signified more than any specific API call. There was no C2 traffic to match, and listing keys and using application identities are also what administrators and automation do. A compromised user, credential retrieval across several Azure services, new application identities, more credential collection and changes to security controls only made sense together, and by then access was spreading through the cloud environment.

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Figure 4: Darktrace Advanced Search showing Azure AD operation names associated with the activity.

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Figure 5: Darktrace Advanced Search showing the Azure Resource Manager action used to execute scripts.
Figure 6: Darktrace Device Event log window showing the triggered models related to the suspicious Azure activity.

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Shared tooling weakens attribution signals

The three cases looked different on the network: BLOODALCHEMY infrastructure and espionage-consistent tradecraft, WISP infrastructure in financial-sector systems, and Azure identity and control-plane activity with no C2 at all.

Shared tooling has complicated attribution for years, and ARTEX adds to it because the framework carries out more of the attack, so reconnaissance, exploitation attempts and some post-compromise activity can look the same whoever set the objective. Attribution still needs infrastructure, malware, victimology, timing and the sequence of behavior inside the environment, and an ARTEX link is one input to that. Moreover, the behavior and the agent will still be shaped by the biases, preferences, and tradecraft of its operators.

At its core, ARTEX’s planner and worker agents identify and record facts, while exploring intents. However, the way the Large Language Model (LLM) chooses its next steps toward an objective is shaped fundamentally by the skills and tools available in its context. This includes its starting context, as well as various possible Model Context Protocol (MCP) plugins and user-injected context (e.g. user input mid-operation). Operators still have preferred tradecraft, and this preference shapes the pathways the harness will provide to the LLM in context prompts. Even on the same platform, customization based on operator preferences and goals will remain a key facet of campaign and actor identification.

Detection and response

Across the Darktrace cases, the stronger signals came from behavior after the connection: beaconing, abnormal TLS, reconnaissance, unusual authentication, tunneling, script retrieval, SMB activity and outbound transfer. Automated activity also produced compressed bursts of requests, sequential enumeration and repeated attempts with small changes.

With agentic tools reaching privileged access in under three hours, analysts may have only a short window to connect scanning or authentication activity to credential changes, new administrative access, tooling retrieval or lateral movement. Keeping network, identity and cloud telemetry together shows what happened before and after the first match, and whether a connection was noise or an intrusion moving toward privileged access.

ARTEX won’t be the last of these frameworks. The next ones will come with new capabilities and defaults, but an intrusion still must interact with the target environment, and that shows up in how systems, identities and applications behave even after the indicator has aged out. The harder intrusions to catch will have no infrastructure to match, just ordinary API calls and legitimate identities. Detecting those depends on knowing what normal looks like for each identity and device.

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Credit to Nathaniel Jones (SVP, Global Threat Intelligence), Eugene Chua (Principal Analyst), Sam Lister (Senior Security Researcher), Adam Potter (Associate Principal Cyber Analyst)

Appendices

Darktrace model detections

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

·       Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed

·       Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL

·       Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·       Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing Behaviour

·       Compromise / Agent Beacon to New Endpoint

·       Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

·       Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

·       Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External

·       Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

·       Device / Anomalous Github Download

·       Device / Anomalous Package Download

·       Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

Indicators of compromise (IoCs)

nginxmysql[.]com

45.153.126[.]223

213.111.150[.]145

wisp-agent

85.11.167[.]52

43.98.196[.]73

192.121.47[.]20

www[.]ddduuuppp[.]com

89.46.234[.]50

sqlserver-sqlite[.]com

199.19.95[.]66

graphics-hook-filter64.dll

graphics-hook_config.bin

References

1.      Google. GTIG AI Threat Tracker - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/agentic-threat-activity-crosses-a-significant-threshold

2.      Federal Bureau of Investigation, Threat Overview of ARTEX Autonomous Penetration Testing Framework, FLASH-20261113-001, 13 November 2026: https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261113.pdf

3.      Microsoft Security Blog, Storm-0940 Uses ARTEX Agentic AI in ConnectWise Supply Chain Compromise: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/21/storm-0940-uses-artex-agentic-ai-connectwise-supply-chain-compromise/

4.      CrowdStrike, VAPOR PANDA Uses ARTEX to Scale Global Campaign: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/vapor-panda-uses-artex-to-scale-global-campaign/

5.      Bitdefender, SilkParasite: Tracking a China-Nexus APT Across Central Asia: https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/silkparasite-tracking-china-nexus-apt-across-central-asia

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
SVP, Global Threat Intelligence

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November 18, 2026

Darktrace qualifies for NATO’s Cybersecurity Dynamic Marketplace

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Darktrace has been selected to join NATO’s Cybersecurity Dynamic Marketplace (CSDM), an initiative designed to give NATO faster, more flexible access to cybersecurity technology and services in support of its missions.  

Established by the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), the marketplace brings together qualified suppliers whose technical capabilities have been reviewed, helping NATO match specialist expertise to project needs and respond more quickly to changing operational priorities.

Qualified across all eight cybersecurity categories

The program’s first phase, known as Lot 1, covers eight cybersecurity categories. Suppliers can qualify in individual categories; Darktrace has qualified to compete for future work across all eight:

  • Identity, Credential and Access Management
  • Endpoint Protection and Platforms
  • Network and Perimeter Security
  • Cloud Security
  • Threat Detection and Analytics Platforms
  • Vulnerability and Exposure Management
  • Digital Forensics and Evidence Platforms
  • Professional Services

Darktrace’s qualification across all eight categories reflects the breadth of our technology and services.

Supporting government and defense organizations

Nation-state attacks, compromised suppliers, the rapid exploitation of security weaknesses and attackers’ growing use of AI are increasing pressure on public-sector organizations. At the same time, agencies are adopting cloud services, connecting the technology that runs physical operations, and introducing automation and AI. Security teams must manage these changes while keeping essential operations running and sensitive information secure.

Protecting these environments requires an understanding of how people, AI and connected systems interact, and the ability to recognize when their activity creates risk. Threats can span several systems, making it essential for security teams to connect related activity and respond quickly.

The Darktrace Behavioral Defense Platform™ supports this approach through unified visibility, continuous behavioral monitoring and autonomous response across AI, people and infrastructure.

At its core, Darktrace’s Adaptive AI™ continuously learns how each organization behaves, building a unique understanding of its people, AI agents and connected systems. This enables the platform to help identify activity that does not belong, connect related behavior across the organization, and investigate and respond to threats autonomously in real time, helping prevent disruption to essential operations.

Our selection builds on work to meet government security requirements internationally. Darktrace recently completed an independent assessment under Australia’s InfoSec Registered Assessors Program (IRAP) for Darktrace / NETWORK™ and Darktrace / OT™ against the Australian Government’s Information Security Manual PROTECTED-level controls. In the United States, Darktrace Federal continues to deliver the Darktrace technology to Department of War, Department of State, and Federal civilian organizations via its on-premises and FedRAMP CLASS D (High) Authorization platforms.

Together, these achievements demonstrate Darktrace’s ability to meet rigorous public-sector security requirements and reinforce its position as a trusted provider of mission-critical cybersecurity technology for government environments.

Meet us at NATO Edge 2026

Darktrace representatives will attend NATO Edge 2026, NCIA’s flagship technology event, in İzmir, Türkiye, from 17 to 19 November. We look forward to meeting government, military, and industry partners to discuss their cybersecurity priorities and how we can support them.

To learn more about the Darktrace Behavioral Defense Platform, visit the platform hub.

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