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August 15, 2022

Modern Cyber War: Our Role in New Cyber-Attacks

Explore the roles we all play in the modern cyber war and how you can protect your digital assets in an evolving threat landscape.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Marcus Fowler
CEO of Darktrace Federal
Written by
Sam Corbett
Content Marketing Executive
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15
Aug 2022

Cyber warfare is increasingly being conducted outside of centralized military or government efforts. In Ukraine, without direct government supervision, thousands of private individuals and organizations are involving themselves in the cyber-war against Russia. Yurii Shchyhol is head of Ukraine’s State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection. Speaking to Politico, he commends a group of “more than 270,000 volunteers who are self-coordinating their efforts and who can decide, plan, and execute any strikes on the Russian cyber infrastructure without Ukraine getting involved in any shape or form.”

‘Hacktivists’ have existed since the 1990s, but the term seems ill-suited to the scale and approach Shchyhol is describing. They might instead be labelled an auxiliary cyber force, playing a supportive role in a larger military effort. Shchyhol himself calls them “an army”. 

Open-source warfare

In the modern cyber landscape, anyone with a computer and a basic skill set can contribute to a war. Depending on who and perhaps where you are, this fact is inspiring, concerning, or a little of both. The challenge of distinguishing between official nation-state attacks and hacktivists raises certain issues, making it possible, for instance, for nation-states to conduct devastating attacks against critical national infrastructure from behind a mask of proxy criminal organizations. The ties between nation states and these organizations may be suspected, but any accusations are rarely confirmed. 

The converse problem is seen when idealistic individual actors launch provocative attacks with the potential to stoke tensions between nation states. Recent DDoS and defacement attacks against Taiwanese government sites and businesses are largely being attributed to Chinese hacktivists, but with the perpetrators unidentified, these attacks remain a concerning question mark and do little to ameliorate sharply rising tensions. A spokesperson for Taiwan’s ruling party has already said in a statement that these attacks are “unilaterally raising the situation in the Taiwan Strait.” Official Taiwanese websites, like that of the Presidential Office, the Ministry of National Defense, and a municipal Environment Protection Bureau have all been targeted, the latter defaced with five Chinese national flags. 

A spate of similar defacements preceded Russia’s February invasion of Ukraine, with more than a dozen Ukrainian national websites made to display threats like, “be afraid and expect the worst”. Once again, the perpetrators of this attack remained unconfirmed, with Ukrainian government institutions accusing the Russian Federation, and Russia denying all involvement. The degree to which modern war efforts can be influenced by – or concealed behind – individual threat actors is a new and disconcerting symptom of the modern cyber landscape. There are, however, more official ways in which cyber warfare has moved beyond government and military organizations as well.

Calling in a private cavalry

Just 15 months after it was opened by President Volodymyr Zelensky, the UA30 Cyber Center in Ukraine lies largely empty. It is located in an unsafe part of the war-torn country, and its operations have had to be moved elsewhere. In the time between its opening and Russia’s invasion in February, however, the center was able to host more than 100 cyber security training sessions. These sessions, which involved realistic cyber-attack simulations, hackathons, and other competitions, were attended by some military operators, but also by large numbers of civilian contractors and private sector representatives. Their attendance was part of an intentional and significant effort to involve the private sector in Ukraine’s cyber defense efforts. 

Shchyhol explains, “a lot of private sector IT cyber security experts are either directly serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine or my State Service or otherwise are indirectly involved in fighting against cyber-attacks.” This is the realization of the UA30 Cyber Center’s aim: using crucial assistance and expertise from the private sector in national cyber-defense efforts, and bolstering the security of those organizations on which Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure depends. As we have seen with attacks against Ukrainian telecom and internet providers, organizations operating the infrastructure which underpins a population’s daily life are often the first – and most appealing – targets for attackers looking to create disorder within a nation. 

It is not only Ukraine’s own private sector which is lending a hand. International organizations like SpaceX and Amazon have contributed to Ukraine’s efforts by providing technology and infrastructure, as well as their own expertise and services. In its report on Early Lessons from the Cyber War, Microsoft suggests that “defense against a military invasion now requires for most countries the ability to disperse and distribute digital operations and data assets across borders and into other countries”. With cloud services provided by Amazon, Microsoft and others, and data now hosted across Europe, Ukraine is managing to do just that. Like its army of guerilla cyber-fighters, the involvement of private organizations is dispersing and bolstering Ukraine’s war effort.

The new home front

Beyond these direct contributions, however, Shchyhol also notes those private sector organizations supporting the cyber-war “indirectly”. These indirect efforts have been a focus of US government statements on cyber security since the beginning of the conflict. A statement from President Biden in March read, “I urge our private sector partners to harden your cyber defenses immediately”, a message which has been repeated and reinforced by CISA.  

The great responsibility which private organizations have for critical national infrastructure has been highlighted in attacks like that on Colonial Pipeline last year, but organizations in every industry can offer opportunities for nation-state attackers. When more organizations are sufficiently prepared for cyber-attacks, the nation as a whole becomes stronger. 

In its report, Microsoft calls for “a common strategy” to thwart modern cyber-threats, which includes the need for greater public and private collaboration and advances in digital technology, Artificial Intelligence (AI), and data. By adopting stronger defenses, and employing well-suited emerging AI technologies, organizations can accelerate the detection and prevention of threats, and contribute to national security in the face of constantly developing international cyber-threats. 

When cyber-attackers are provided with funding, coordination, and thorough threat security intelligence, they can create scores of never-before-seen attacks, which circumvent pre-established security rules and avoid detection. As attackers develop their approach, so must defenders - not just by employing the latest technologies, but by embracing the changes in defensive strategy which those technologies enable. Defenders need to pivot away from focusing on patterns and predictions, and concentrate on understanding the landscapes and ‘normal’ operations of their digital environments. With this approach they can harden attack paths, visualize their internet-facing attack surface, detect the smallest deviations from ‘normal’, and disrupt attackers before damage is done.  

For private sector organizations, auxiliary cyber forces, and hacktivists alike, focusing on defensive rather than offensive action will be the surest way to win the battle and the war. 

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Marcus Fowler
CEO of Darktrace Federal
Written by
Sam Corbett
Content Marketing Executive

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April 30, 2026

Mythos vs Ethos: Defending in an Era of AI‑Accelerated Vulnerability Discovery

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Anthropic’s Mythos and what it means for security teams

Recent attention on systems such as Anthropic Mythos highlights a notable problem for defenders. Namely that disclosure’s role in coordinating defensive action is eroding.

As AI systems gain stronger reasoning and coding capability, their usefulness in analyzing complex software environments and identifying weaknesses naturally increases. What has changed is not attacker motivation, but the conditions under which defenders learn about and organize around risk. Vulnerability discovery and exploitation increasingly unfold in ways that turn disclosure into a retrospective signal rather than a reliable starting point for defense.

Faster discovery was inevitable and is already visible

The acceleration of vulnerability discovery was already observable across the ecosystem. Publicly disclosed vulnerabilities (CVEs) have grown at double-digit rates for the past two years, including a 32% increase in 2024 according to NIST, driven in part by AI even prior to Anthropic’s Mythos model. Most notably XBOW topped the HackerOne US bug bounty leaderboard, marking the first time an autonomous penetration tester had done so.  

The technical frontier for AI capabilities has been described elsewhere as jagged, and the implication is that Mythos is exceptional but not unique in this capability. While Mythos appears to make significant progress in complex vulnerability analysis, many other models are already able to find and exploit weaknesses to varying degrees.  

What matters here is not which model performs best, but the fact that vulnerability discovery is no longer a scarce or tightly bounded capability.

The consequence of this shift is not simply earlier discovery. It is a change in the defender-attacker race condition. Disclosure once acted as a rough synchronization point. While attackers sometimes had earlier knowledge, disclosure generally marked the moment when risk became visible and defensive action could be broadly coordinated. Increasingly, that coordination will no longer exist. Exploitation may be underway well before a CVE is published, if it is published at all.

Why patch velocity alone is not the answer

The instinctive response to this shift is to focus on patching faster, but treating patch velocity as the primary solution misunderstands the problem. Most organizations are already constrained in how quickly they can remediate vulnerabilities. Asset sprawl, operational risk, testing requirements, uptime commitments, and unclear ownership all limit response speed, even when vulnerabilities are well understood.

If discovery and exploitation now routinely precede disclosure, then patching cannot be the first line of defense. It becomes one necessary control applied within a timeline that has already shifted. This does not imply that organizations should patch less. It means that patching cannot serve as the organizing principle for defense.

Defense needs a more stable anchor

If disclosure no longer defines when defense begins, then defense needs a reference point that does not depend on knowing the vulnerability in advance.  

Every digital environment has a behavioral character. Systems authenticate, communicate, execute processes, and access resources in relatively consistent ways over time. These patterns are not static rules or signatures. They are learned behaviors that reflect how an organization operates.

When exploitation occurs, even via previously unknown vulnerabilities, those behavioral patterns change.

Attackers may use novel techniques, but they still need to gain access, create processes, move laterally, and will ultimately interact with systems in ways that diverge from what is expected. That deviation is observable regardless of whether the underlying weakness has been formally named.

In an environment where disclosure can no longer be relied on for timing or coordination, behavioral understanding is no longer an optional enhancement; it becomes the only consistently available defensive signal.

Detecting risk before disclosure

Darktrace’s threat research has consistently shown that malicious activity often becomes visible before public disclosure.

In multiple cases, including exploitation of Ivanti, SAP NetWeaver, and Trimble Cityworks, Darktrace detected anomalous behavior days or weeks ahead of CVE publication. These detections did not rely on signatures, threat intelligence feeds, or awareness of the vulnerability itself. They emerged because systems began behaving in ways that did not align with their established patterns.

This reflects a defensive approach grounded in ‘Ethos’, in contrast to the unbounded exploration represented by ‘Mythos’. Here, Mythos describes continuous vulnerability discovery at speed and scale. Ethos reflects an understanding of what is normal and expected within a specific environment, grounded in observed behavior.

Revisiting assume breach

These conditions reinforce a principle long embedded in Zero Trust thinking: assume breach.

If exploitation can occur before disclosure, patching vulnerabilities can no longer act as the organizing principle for defense. Instead, effective defense must focus on monitoring for misuse and constraining attacker activity once access is achieved. Behavioral monitoring allows organizations to identify early‑stage compromise and respond while uncertainty remains, rather than waiting for formal verification.

AI plays a critical role here, not by predicting every exploit, but by continuously learning what normal looks like within a specific environment and identifying meaningful deviation at machine speed. Identifying that deviation enables defenders to respond by constraining activity back towards normal patterns of behavior.

Not an arms race, but an asymmetry

AI is often framed as fueling an arms race between attackers and defenders. In practice, the more important dynamic is asymmetry.

Attackers operate broadly, scanning many environments for opportunities. Defenders operate deeply within their own systems, and it’s this business context which is so significant. Behavioral understanding gives defenders a durable advantage. Attackers may automate discovery, but they cannot easily reproduce what belonging looks like inside a particular organization.

A changed defensive model

AI‑accelerated vulnerability discovery does not mean defenders have lost. It does mean that disclosure‑driven, patch‑centric models no longer provide a sufficient foundation for resilience.

As vulnerability volumes grow and exploitation timelines compress, effective defense increasingly depends on continuous behavioral understanding, detection that does not rely on prior disclosure, and rapid containment to limit impact. In this model, CVEs confirm risk rather than define when defense begins.

The industry has already seen this approach work in practice. As AI continues to reshape both offense and defense, behavioral detection will move from being complementary to being essential.

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April 27, 2026

How a Compromised eScan Update Enabled Multi‑Stage Malware and Blockchain C2

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The rise of supply chain attacks

In recent years, the abuse of trusted software has become increasingly common, with supply chain compromises emerging as one of the fastest growing vectors for cyber intrusions. As highlighted in Darktrace’s Annual Threat Report 2026, attackers and state-actors continue to find significant value in gaining access to networks through compromised trusted links, third-party tools, or legitimate software. In January 2026, a supply chain compromise affecting MicroWorld Technologies’ eScan antivirus product was reported, with malicious updates distributed to customers through the legitimate update infrastructure. This, in turn, resulted in a multi‑stage loader malware being deployed on compromised devices [1][2].

An overview of eScan exploitation

According to eScan’s official threat advisory, unauthorized access to a regional update server resulted in an “incorrect file placed in the update distribution path” [3]. Customers associated with the affected update servers who downloaded the update during a two-hour window on January 20 were impacted, with affected Windows devices subsequently have experiencing various errors related to update functions and notifications [3].

While eScan did not specify which regional update servers were affected by the malicious update, all impacted Darktrace customer environments were located in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region.

External research reported that a malicious 32-bit executable file , “Reload.exe”, was first installed on affected devices, which then dropped the 64-bit downloader, “CONSCTLX.exe”. This downloader establishes persistence by creating scheduled tasks such as “CorelDefrag”, which are responsible for executing PowerShell scripts. Subsequently, it evades detection by tampering with the Windows HOSTS file and eScan registry to prevent future remote updates intended for remediation. Additional payloads are then downloaded from its command-and-control (C2) server [1].

Darktrace’s coverage of eScan exploitation

Initial Access and Blockchain as multi-distributed C2 Infrastructure

On January 20, the same day as the aforementioned two‑hour exploit window, Darktrace observed multiple devices across affected networks downloading .dlz package files from eScan update servers, followed by connections to an anomalous endpoint, vhs.delrosal[.]net, which belongs to the attackers’ C2 infrastructure.

The endpoint contained a self‑signed SSL certificate with the string “O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd, ST=SomeState, C=AU”, a default placeholder commonly used in SSL/TLS certificates for testing and development environments, as well as in malicious C2 infrastructure [4].

Utilizing a multi‑distributed C2 infrastructure, the attackers also leveraged domains linked with the Solana open‑source blockchain for C2 purposes, namely “.sol”. These domains were human‑readable names that act as aliases for cryptocurrency wallet addresses. As browsers do not natively resolve .sol domains, the Solana Naming System (formerly known as Bonfida, an independent contributor within the Solana ecosystem) provides a proxy service, through endpoints such as sol-domain[.]org, to enable browser access.

Darktrace observed devices connecting to blackice.sol-domain[.]org, indicating that attackers were likely using this proxy to reach a .sol domain for C2 activity. Given this behavior, it is likely that the attackers leveraged .sol domains as a dead drop resolver, a C2 technique in which threat actors host information on a public and legitimate service, such as a blockchain. Additional proxy resolver endpoints, such as sns-resolver.bonfida.workers[.]dev, were also observed.

Solana transactions are transparent, allowing all activity to be viewed publicly. When Darktrace analysts examined the transactions associated with blackice[.]sol, they observed that the earliest records dated November 7, 2025, which coincides with the creation date of the known C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net as shown in WHOIS Lookup information [4][5].

WHOIS Look records of the C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net.
Figure 1: WHOIS Look records of the C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net.
 Earliest observed transaction record for blackice[.]sol on public ledgers.
Figure 2: Earliest observed transaction record for blackice[.]sol on public ledgers.

Subsequent instructions found within the transactions contained strings such as “CNAME= vhs[.]delrosal[.]net”, indicating attempts to direct the device toward the malicious endpoint. A more recent transaction recorded on January 28 included strings such as “hxxps://96.9.125[.]243/i;code=302”, suggesting an effort to change C2 endpoints. Darktrace observed multiple alerts triggered for these endpoints across affected devices.

Similar blockchain‑related endpoints, such as “tumama.hns[.]to”, were also observed in C2 activities. The hns[.]to service allows web browsers to access websites registered on Handshake, a decentralized blockchain‑based framework designed to replace centralized authorities and domain registries for top‑level domains. This shift toward decentralized, blockchain‑based infrastructure likely reflects increased efforts by attackers to evade detection.

In outgoing connections to these malicious endpoints across affected networks, Darktrace / NETWORK recognized that the activity was 100% rare and anomalous for both the devices and the wider networks, likely indicative of malicious beaconing, regardless of the underlying trusted infrastructure. In addition to generating multiple model alerts to capture this malicious activity across affected networks, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to compile these separate events into broader incidents that summarized the entire attack chain, allowing customers’ security teams to investigate and remediate more efficiently. Moreover, in customer environments where Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was enabled, Darktrace took swift action to contain the attack by blocking beaconing connections to the malicious endpoints, even when those endpoints were associated with seemingly trustworthy services.

Conclusion

Attacks targeting trusted relationships continue to be a popular strategy among threat actors. Activities linked to trusted or widely deployed software are often unintentionally whitelisted by existing security solutions and gateways. Darktrace observed multiple devices becoming impacted within a very short period, likely because tools such as antivirus software are typically mass‑deployed across numerous endpoints. As a result, a single compromised delivery mechanism can greatly expand the attack surface.

Attackers are also becoming increasingly creative in developing resilient C2 infrastructure and exploiting legitimate services to evade detection. Defenders are therefore encouraged to closely monitor anomalous connections and file downloads. Darktrace’s ability to detect unusual activity amidst ever‑changing tactics and indicators of compromise (IoCs) helps organizations maintain a proactive and resilient defense posture against emerging threats.

Credit to Joanna Ng (Associate Principal Cybersecurity Analyst) and Min Kim (Associate Principal Cybersecurity Analyst) and Tara Gould (Malware Researcher Lead)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

  • Anomalous File::Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL
  • Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Expired SSL
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

  • vhs[.]delrosal[.]net – C2 server
  • tumama[.]hns[.]to – C2 server
  • blackice.sol-domain[.]org – C2 server
  • 96.9.125[.]243 – C2 Server

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1071.001 - Command and Control: Web Protocols
  • T1588.001 - Resource Development
  • T1102.001 - Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver
  • T1195 – Supple Chain Compromise

References

[1] https://www.morphisec.com/blog/critical-escan-threat-bulletin/

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/escan-confirms-update-server-breached-to-push-malicious-update/

[3] hxxps://download1.mwti.net/documents/Advisory/eScan_Security_Advisory_2026[.]pdf

[4] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/delrosal.net

[5] hxxps://explorer.solana[.]com/address/2wFAbYHNw4ewBHBJzmDgDhCXYoFjJnpbdmeWjZvevaVv

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About the author
Joanna Ng
Associate Principal Analyst
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