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December 1, 2021

Darktrace AI Detects Egregor Ransomware On Day One

Discover how Darktrace AI detected the signs of an Egregor ransomware attack on day one of deployment. Stay informed on the latest cybersecurity threats!
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
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01
Dec 2021

It’s no secret that ransomware has shaped conversations in the SOC this year more than any other topic, as attackers use new malware variants and other sophisticated techniques, tools and procedures to bypass conventional security tools. Not only are these attacks becoming more advanced and difficult to stop, but the ransom demands are growing, with one source suggesting the average ransom demand has grown by over 500% since last year.

To stop novel ransomware attacks, security teams need to turn away from ‘rear-view mirror’ tools trained on previous attacks, and towards AI technology that learns the business from the ground up and autonomously responds with targeted action to contain the threat.

This blog showcases how defenders can fight back against even the most sophisticated attacks, dissecting a recent ransomware attack uncovered by Darktrace’s AI from its first day of deployment at a utility services company. This was a particularly devastating ransomware strain known as Egregor, which has likely been disrupted by a joint effort between law enforcement agencies in Ukraine, France and the US, but wreaked havoc in the winter of 2020/21, affecting 150 companies and demanding ransoms of up to $4 million.

Anatomy of an Egregor attack

Figure 1: A timeline of the attack.

The initial intrusion occurred prior to Darktrace’s deployment, via Emotet, a trojan malware typically spread via spam emails – that has also been disrupted since this attack happened. Had Antigena Email been installed, Darktrace’s AI would have picked up on subtle deviations within malicious emails and actioned a response, containing the ransomware attack in its earliest stages. In this case, Antigena Email was not installed, and so the attack was allowed to proceed.

On November 27, 2020, Darktrace’s AI was deployed and began learning the ‘patterns of life’ for every user and device in the organization. On the first day of learning the organization, the technology detected suspicious external connections on a laptop that was deviating from the ‘pattern of life’ of its peer group of similar devices, beaconing to unusual rare domains that were later associated with malware activity.

Lateral movement and privilege escalation indicators were then observed, as well as possible attempted email hijacking. Darktrace’s AI detected new and unusual svcctl requests, new remote procedure calls, and suspicious executable file writes over SMBv2, as well as new external connections over email-related ports.

Connecting the dots: Cyber AI Analyst investigates

Triggered by this unusual activity, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst launched an investigation into all observable stages of the kill chain including command and control connections, suspicious executable SMB writes and privilege escalation.

It then automatically generated an incident summary showcasing every stage of the attack, surfacing all the information the security team needed for a fast response.

Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst triaged and reported on the malicious activity from the device, surfacing useful metrics and natural language summaries for each stage of the kill chain.

Figure 3: This graph from the Darktrace UI displays how Cyber AI Analyst detected the various stages of the kill chain and correlated the timeline of events.

Figure 4: Darktrace reveals the spike in external connections in blue for the device and the DCE-RPC requests in green. The dots represent model breaches triggered by the unusual suspicious activity originating from the device. The external connection spikes match the internal DC-RPC request spikes indicating the device is attempting to move laterally during the C2 connections.

In this case, real-time detections from Darktrace’s AI coupled with a high-confidence alert from Darktrace’s SOC team enabled the company’s security team to isolate the device from the network, successfully containing the attack before encryption began.

While having AI-powered detection was enough to stop the attack in this scenario, relying on detection alone is playing with fire. With the average dwell time of attacks shrinking – particularly in the case of ransomware – Autonomous Response is becoming critical in taking action on behalf of human teams. Attackers are increasingly striking out of hours, when these teams aren’t available to respond, and performing exfiltration and encryption rapidly. In these cases, detection without immediate response is futile.

Autonomous Response: Revolutionizing ransomware defense

Recent galvanizing attacks have propelled us into a new era of ransomware. 65% of C-suite and other executives say that ransomware will be a major issue they face over the next twelve months.

An over-reliance on security defenses that depend on rules, signatures, and historical data has proven to leave organizations vulnerable to novel ransomware. Failure to prepare for the unknown often forces businesses into a difficult dilemma when it comes to ransomware: either pull the plug to stop the encryption by taking everything offline, or face encrypted systems, and be confronted with a hefty ransom.

But there is a third way, one which uses Self-Learning AI to understand your organization from the ground up to spot subtle deviations indicative of a cyber-threat, regardless of whether it has been seen before. Moreover, Autonomous Response ensures that fast, precise action will be taken against attacks whenever they occur. While even the most attentive human teams cannot hope to match the machine speed of modern ransomware attacks, Autonomous Response halts these sophisticated threats the moment they emerge. It really is the only way to truly level the playing field against today’s ransomware attacks.

Thanks to Darktrace analyst Dylan Evans for his insights on the above threat find.

Darktrace model breaches:

  • Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External
  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname
  • Experimental / Possible Emotet Callback URL
  • Device / Large Number of Model Breaches
  • Device / Lateral Movement and C2 Activity
  • Compromise / SSL or HTTP Beacon
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches
  • Compromise / Suspicious SSL Activity
  • Compromise / Unusual SMB Session and DRS
  • Compromise / Suspicious Spam Activity
  • Compromise / Unusual DRS Activity
  • Anomalous Connection / High Volume of New or Uncommon Service Control
  • Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Compliance / SMB Drive Write
  • Experimental / Anomalous GetNCChanges and Kerberos Ticket
  • Experimental / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe V4
  • Device / Large Number of Connections to New Endpoints
  • Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control
  • User / New Admin Credentials on Client
  • Anomalous Connection / Possible Outbound Spam
  • Compromise / New or Repeated to Unusual SSL Port
  • Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External
  • Experimental / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe V3
  • Experimental / Anomalous DRSGetNCChanges Operation
  • Anomalous Connection / Possible Callback URL
  • Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple SMB Admin Session
  • Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname
  • Device / New Failed External Connections
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL
  • Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination
  • Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination
  • Experimental / Rare Device TLS Agent

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Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO

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November 18, 2026

Agentic attacks in the wild: Inside three ARTEX investigations

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Key insights

·       Darktrace observed activity in several customer environments involving infrastructure and behaviors associated with reported ARTEX-enabled campaigns, including activity linked to China-nexus espionage and financially motivated attacks.

·       In the higher-confidence cases, known infrastructure appeared alongside beaconing, unusual TLS, reconnaissance, tunneling, script retrieval, SMB activity and external data transfer. One Azure case had no observed network command and control at all, only key listing and application identity activity.

·       ARTEX is now used by actors with different objectives. Identifying the framework can help locate relevant activity, while the behavior around the affected system provides the stronger evidence for understanding compromise and attribution.

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Introduction

Attackers have moved beyond using AI for phishing and are running agentic frameworks; open-source tools like ARTEX, CAIRN, PentAGI and Hexstrike that let AI agents scan, exploit and move through an environment with little human input [1]. ARTEX has moved quickly from an offensive security project into live intrusion activity. Since at least August 2026, the framework has been associated with espionage, financially motivated attacks and opportunistic campaigns across government, financial services, technology, defense, telecommunications and other sectors. The FBI has documented ARTEX activity spanning reconnaissance, exploitation, credential abuse, lateral movement, collection, command and control, and exfiltration [2].

Darktrace has observed activity in customer environments that overlaps with infrastructure, tooling and behaviors reported in several of these campaigns. The cases below highlight how those intrusions appeared on the network, including the activity visible before an analyst can determine which actor or framework may be responsible.

ARTEX as part of the attacker workflow

ARTEX is an open-source, multi-agent offensive security platform that converts high-level objectives into actions carried out by specialized agents [2]. Operators have used it to automate activity across the attack lifecycle, including scanning, exploitation, credential activity and post-compromise operations. Some reported intrusions moved from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours [2].

The framework is now associated with actors pursuing different objectives and using different post-exploitation tooling. The original public repository was removed in October 2026, but archived copies and localized versions remain available. For defenders, ARTEX is more useful as context for an investigation than as an attribution shortcut.

Darktrace observations show the same point at network level. Infrastructure linked to reported ARTEX campaigns appeared alongside beaconing, tunneling, unusual TLS, reconnaissance, file retrieval and lateral activity.

Case 1: Espionage-linked activity

Darktrace observed activity associated with BLOODALCHEMY command-and-control (C2) infrastructure in two customer environments. In one environment, five devices communicated with nginxmysql[.]com and 45.153.126[.]223 between October 23 and November 2. Both indicators had previously been linked to China-nexus espionage activity involving ARTEX [4].

The connections were accompanied by suspicious beaconing, repeated successful connections and unusual self-signed TLS. One system began making suspicious TLS connections to nginxmysql[.]com on October 23. Beaconing followed on October 24, and SMB scanning appeared later in the sequence. Other affected systems subsequently communicated with previously unseen external endpoints.

Prior to the observed C2, Darktrace detected curl requests retrieving executable and script content including /systemd, /wazuh, linux_amd64, u.sh and q.sh. Related telemetry included DRSGetNCChanges activity consistent with DCSync, LDAP enumeration, DNS zone transfers, network scanning, certificate downloads and SMB writes involving start.bat.

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Figure 1: Darktrace investigation showing suspicious network activity associated with infrastructure linked to reported ARTEX activity.

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Figure 2: Darktrace detection showing anomalous self-signed TLS activity during the espionage-linked investigation.

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BLOODALCHEMY has been reported in more than one China-nexus cluster [5]. SoftEther infrastructure observed in one environment provided another point of correlation with reported VAPOR PANDA tradecraft. The moderate-confidence assessment tying this to a Chinese nexus threat actor is based on infrastructure, victim context, tradecraft behavior that followed the initial connection, and public reporting.

Case 2: Financial-sector activity

In early November, Darktrace observed activity in two financial-sector environments that overlap with reported ARTEX infrastructure. On November 5, a server connected to 213.111.150[.]145:8099 and downloaded wisp-agent, associated with WISP C2 activity.

In a second environment, a device attempted connections to 85.11.167[.]52 on November 1 and 2. The connections occurred alongside beaconing to new and rare destinations, anomalous TLS, possible tunneling and unusual package downloads.

The device also communicated with temp[.]sh, ssh.localhost[.]run, localhost[.]run, termbin[.]com, pastebin[.]com and GitHub-hosted release infrastructure. The sequence showed potential tooling retrieval, C2, tunneling and use of external services capable of staging or moving data.

Figure 3: Darktrace investigation showing connections to new and rare external destinations during the financial-sector activity.

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Case 3: Credential collection in Azure

On October 20, Darktrace observed a sweep of credential collection in a customer’s Azure environment that is consistent with ARTEX use. The intrusion began with connections to the virtual network from 43.98.196[.]73 (Alibaba Cloud). Open-source scanning data associates the address with ARTEX.

A compromised user identity made requests to the Azure Resource Manager API, though how it was compromised is unknown. The requests listed keys and secrets across API Management, web and function apps, Cognitive Services, Event Hubs, storage accounts and a managed Kubernetes cluster. With those credentials the attacker compromised multiple application identities. The attacker then used the application identities and the user identity to retrieve more credentials, change firewall and security rules and run scripts on virtual machines. Microsoft Defender alerts showed attempted execution of scripts related to Mimikatz and Impacket.

In a cloud environment, such privileged and enumerative operations are potentially indistinguishable from legitimate administrative actions. Consequently, the sequence and context of such operations signified more than any specific API call. There was no C2 traffic to match, and listing keys and using application identities are also what administrators and automation do. A compromised user, credential retrieval across several Azure services, new application identities, more credential collection and changes to security controls only made sense together, and by then access was spreading through the cloud environment.

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Figure 4: Darktrace Advanced Search showing Azure AD operation names associated with the activity.

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Figure 5: Darktrace Advanced Search showing the Azure Resource Manager action used to execute scripts.
Figure 6: Darktrace Device Event log window showing the triggered models related to the suspicious Azure activity.

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Shared tooling weakens attribution signals

The three cases looked different on the network: BLOODALCHEMY infrastructure and espionage-consistent tradecraft, WISP infrastructure in financial-sector systems, and Azure identity and control-plane activity with no C2 at all.

Shared tooling has complicated attribution for years, and ARTEX adds to it because the framework carries out more of the attack, so reconnaissance, exploitation attempts and some post-compromise activity can look the same whoever set the objective. Attribution still needs infrastructure, malware, victimology, timing and the sequence of behavior inside the environment, and an ARTEX link is one input to that. Moreover, the behavior and the agent will still be shaped by the biases, preferences, and tradecraft of its operators.

At its core, ARTEX’s planner and worker agents identify and record facts, while exploring intents. However, the way the Large Language Model (LLM) chooses its next steps toward an objective is shaped fundamentally by the skills and tools available in its context. This includes its starting context, as well as various possible Model Context Protocol (MCP) plugins and user-injected context (e.g. user input mid-operation). Operators still have preferred tradecraft, and this preference shapes the pathways the harness will provide to the LLM in context prompts. Even on the same platform, customization based on operator preferences and goals will remain a key facet of campaign and actor identification.

Detection and response

Across the Darktrace cases, the stronger signals came from behavior after the connection: beaconing, abnormal TLS, reconnaissance, unusual authentication, tunneling, script retrieval, SMB activity and outbound transfer. Automated activity also produced compressed bursts of requests, sequential enumeration and repeated attempts with small changes.

With agentic tools reaching privileged access in under three hours, analysts may have only a short window to connect scanning or authentication activity to credential changes, new administrative access, tooling retrieval or lateral movement. Keeping network, identity and cloud telemetry together shows what happened before and after the first match, and whether a connection was noise or an intrusion moving toward privileged access.

ARTEX won’t be the last of these frameworks. The next ones will come with new capabilities and defaults, but an intrusion still must interact with the target environment, and that shows up in how systems, identities and applications behave even after the indicator has aged out. The harder intrusions to catch will have no infrastructure to match, just ordinary API calls and legitimate identities. Detecting those depends on knowing what normal looks like for each identity and device.

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Credit to Nathaniel Jones (SVP, Global Threat Intelligence), Eugene Chua (Principal Analyst), Sam Lister (Senior Security Researcher), Adam Potter (Associate Principal Cyber Analyst)

Appendices

Darktrace model detections

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

·       Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed

·       Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL

·       Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·       Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing Behaviour

·       Compromise / Agent Beacon to New Endpoint

·       Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

·       Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

·       Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External

·       Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

·       Device / Anomalous Github Download

·       Device / Anomalous Package Download

·       Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

Indicators of compromise (IoCs)

nginxmysql[.]com

45.153.126[.]223

213.111.150[.]145

wisp-agent

85.11.167[.]52

43.98.196[.]73

192.121.47[.]20

www[.]ddduuuppp[.]com

89.46.234[.]50

sqlserver-sqlite[.]com

199.19.95[.]66

graphics-hook-filter64.dll

graphics-hook_config.bin

References

1.      Google. GTIG AI Threat Tracker - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/agentic-threat-activity-crosses-a-significant-threshold

2.      Federal Bureau of Investigation, Threat Overview of ARTEX Autonomous Penetration Testing Framework, FLASH-20261113-001, 13 November 2026: https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261113.pdf

3.      Microsoft Security Blog, Storm-0940 Uses ARTEX Agentic AI in ConnectWise Supply Chain Compromise: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/21/storm-0940-uses-artex-agentic-ai-connectwise-supply-chain-compromise/

4.      CrowdStrike, VAPOR PANDA Uses ARTEX to Scale Global Campaign: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/vapor-panda-uses-artex-to-scale-global-campaign/

5.      Bitdefender, SilkParasite: Tracking a China-Nexus APT Across Central Asia: https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/silkparasite-tracking-china-nexus-apt-across-central-asia

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
SVP, Global Threat Intelligence

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November 18, 2026

Darktrace qualifies for NATO’s Cybersecurity Dynamic Marketplace

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Darktrace has been selected to join NATO’s Cybersecurity Dynamic Marketplace (CSDM), an initiative designed to give NATO faster, more flexible access to cybersecurity technology and services in support of its missions.  

Established by the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), the marketplace brings together qualified suppliers whose technical capabilities have been reviewed, helping NATO match specialist expertise to project needs and respond more quickly to changing operational priorities.

Qualified across all eight cybersecurity categories

The program’s first phase, known as Lot 1, covers eight cybersecurity categories. Suppliers can qualify in individual categories; Darktrace has qualified to compete for future work across all eight:

  • Identity, Credential and Access Management
  • Endpoint Protection and Platforms
  • Network and Perimeter Security
  • Cloud Security
  • Threat Detection and Analytics Platforms
  • Vulnerability and Exposure Management
  • Digital Forensics and Evidence Platforms
  • Professional Services

Darktrace’s qualification across all eight categories reflects the breadth of our technology and services.

Supporting government and defense organizations

Nation-state attacks, compromised suppliers, the rapid exploitation of security weaknesses and attackers’ growing use of AI are increasing pressure on public-sector organizations. At the same time, agencies are adopting cloud services, connecting the technology that runs physical operations, and introducing automation and AI. Security teams must manage these changes while keeping essential operations running and sensitive information secure.

Protecting these environments requires an understanding of how people, AI and connected systems interact, and the ability to recognize when their activity creates risk. Threats can span several systems, making it essential for security teams to connect related activity and respond quickly.

The Darktrace Behavioral Defense Platform™ supports this approach through unified visibility, continuous behavioral monitoring and autonomous response across AI, people and infrastructure.

At its core, Darktrace’s Adaptive AI™ continuously learns how each organization behaves, building a unique understanding of its people, AI agents and connected systems. This enables the platform to help identify activity that does not belong, connect related behavior across the organization, and investigate and respond to threats autonomously in real time, helping prevent disruption to essential operations.

Our selection builds on work to meet government security requirements internationally. Darktrace recently completed an independent assessment under Australia’s InfoSec Registered Assessors Program (IRAP) for Darktrace / NETWORK™ and Darktrace / OT™ against the Australian Government’s Information Security Manual PROTECTED-level controls. In the United States, Darktrace Federal continues to deliver the Darktrace technology to Department of War, Department of State, and Federal civilian organizations via its on-premises and FedRAMP CLASS D (High) Authorization platforms.

Together, these achievements demonstrate Darktrace’s ability to meet rigorous public-sector security requirements and reinforce its position as a trusted provider of mission-critical cybersecurity technology for government environments.

Meet us at NATO Edge 2026

Darktrace representatives will attend NATO Edge 2026, NCIA’s flagship technology event, in İzmir, Türkiye, from 17 to 19 November. We look forward to meeting government, military, and industry partners to discuss their cybersecurity priorities and how we can support them.

To learn more about the Darktrace Behavioral Defense Platform, visit the platform hub.

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