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June 7, 2020

How Darktrace AI Identified Microsoft 365 Breaches

We cover two real cases on how Darktrace stopped Microsoft 365 account takeovers by correlating insights across SaaS applications & email activity.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Dan Fein
VP, Product
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07
Jun 2020

Social engineering’. ‘Credential theft’. ‘Account takeover’. If you were a fly on the wall of a Security Operations Center in 2020, you would have heard these phrases far more often than ‘banking trojan’, ‘SQL injection’ or ‘exploit kit’. The reason for this is simple – the reality for most security teams now is that their perimeter has shifted into the cloud. Identities are being attacked more than devices.

Microsoft 365 account compromise’ is the current favorite, with 29% of organizations reporting a related incident in one month alone. Security teams struggle with these attacks because the evidence needed to detect them is scattered across the enterprise: they begin via email, are executed over the network, and progress in the cloud. This broad and spread out digital footprint means that following the breadcrumbs is not easy.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Platform is designed to understand a user’s behavior as they move between devices and cloud services, tracking their activity to identify a compromise. To help understand how these attacks avoid detection, it is useful to look at a couple of examples of Microsoft Office 365 compromise detected recently in one of our customers.

Microsoft 365 compromised to launch external email threat

A Microsoft 365 account was recently compromised at a public accounting firm based in the United States. Darktrace initially picked up on several anomalies, including a sudden surge in outbound email traffic as well as the unusual login location – while the company and nearly all of its users were located in Wisconsin, an IP address located in Kansas was used to log in to the Microsoft 365 account. Along with the unusual login, a login to Microsoft Teams from the same Kansas IP address was detected.

Figure 1: Just after the new email rule was created, a Microsoft Teams 100% rare IP login occurred.

‘Impossible travel’ rules alone would have missed these anomalies, but an understanding of activity and behavior across different SaaS applications allowed Darktrace’s AI to recognize these events as one systematic case of credential theft. When the threat-actor subsequently created a new email rule, Darktrace was able to connect this event with the other anomalous behavior and understand its potentially malicious nature.

Figure 2: Darktrace’s SaaS Module noted a 100% rare IP logging into the user’s Microsoft 365 account and the creation of a new mailbox rules. All factors indicated 100% unusual SaaS activity.

Five minutes later, Antigena Email alerted on a large number of outbound emails containing a generic subject line and an attached PDF. The technology also detected that there was a clear spike in outbound emails from this user and flagged each of these emails with the “Out of Character” tag, which in this case denoted a change from normal behavior with the surge in recipients, and likely internal compromise.

Figure 3: Antigena Email detected a surge in recipients that indicated a serious breach of normal behavior for this user.

The unusual login behavior detected by Darktrace’s SaaS Module could be connected to the anomalous outbound email behavior flagged by Antigena Email, allowing the security team to see the extent of the attack and neutralize it as it emerged. It was clear that the account was being used to engage in malicious activity, as each of the 220 outbound emails used a generic subject line and contained a suspicious attachment. The security team therefore immediately disabled the compromised account.

Figure 4: A recreation of the email sent by the attacker, containing the malicious attachment.

‘Change of bank details’ sent from accounts department

When an Accounts Department’s Microsoft 365 account was compromised and used to send targeted phishing emails, Darktrace was able to track the attacker’s movement within the inbox, tying together information from Darktrace’s SaaS Module with Antigena Email’s alerts to understand the full picture of the threat and stop the attack.

The SaaS account appears to have been compromised via an inbound spear phishing attack, or some other form of attack that occurred before Darktrace began monitoring the organization. While Darktrace Cyber AI had no oversight of the initial compromise, it was still able to distinguish later attacker behavior as malicious, based on its actively evolving understanding of the organization and its workforce.

When the account user logged in from a 100% rare French IP address, Darktrace’s SaaS Module picked up on the anomaly immediately, and further detected a series of activities carried out after the unusual login. At the same time, Antigena Email noted an email being sent.

Figure 5: The login from a French IP was noted as 100% rare for this user and SaaS account.

Darktrace then identified more activity occurring from a second rare login location, a Swiss IP address. Very little email activity occurred when the account was logged in from this IP. Instead, Cyber AI saw the threat-actor using their illegitimate SaaS access to view information on the legitimate account user and files related to banking, invoices, and payments.

Antigena Email then identified a series of email communications that, when seen in the context of the SaaS account compromise, pointed to a clear threat. There were no obvious malicious attachments or links in the emails. However, the subject of the final reply was ‘Change of Bank Details’, and the email prompted a high Solicitation Inducement Score within Antigena Email, strongly implying that the malicious actor had sent emails instructing the destination to change payment details in order to route money to the attacker, instead of the company.

It seems the attackers went through the banking and invoicing files in order to find a customer with a big bill to pay, then used the compromised email account to launch an outbound phishing attack, changing the billing details. With Darktrace AI correlating information within the SaaS platform and insights from Antigena Email, this targeted phishing attack could be contained before further compromise or damage could occur.

The below screenshot also indicates a series of inbox processing rules made on the compromised account, showing actions that are typical of an account takeover.

Figure 6: Darktrace’s records of new inbox rules being set up on the compromised SaaS account.

The benefits of a unified approach

These stories are all too familiar. Most security tools would not be able to take action on any one of these steps individually. But the combination reveals the tell-tale sign of a Microsoft 365 account hijack. Organizations are struggling to manage their user identities across their cloud infrastructure, and rule and policy-based detection is no longer feasible.

However, by learning identities and behavior across the enterprise, Darktrace is able to detect, and seamlessly respond, to combat these threats. Hundreds of organizations are now using Antigena Email to protect their email and cloud environments continuously, trusting it to dynamically enforce MFA, lock accounts, block network traffic, and withhold emails when necessary.

As cloud-native applications become more popular, organizations face the growing problem of separate end-to-end security solutions for each type of workload. With Antigena Email working in conjunction with Darktrace’s Enterprise Immune System, defenders can be assured that a single, unified platform is tracking every suspicious behavior, wherever it arises in the organization.

Learn more about Antigena Email

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Dan Fein
VP, Product

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November 6, 2025

Darktrace Named the Only 2025 Gartner® Peer Insights™ Customers’ Choice for Network Detection and Response

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Darktrace: The only Customers’ Choice for NDR in 2025

In a year defined by rapid change across the threat landscape, recognition from those who use and rely on security technology every day means the most.

That’s why we’re proud to share that Darktrace has been named the only Customers’ Choice in the 2025 Gartner® Peer Insights™ Voice of the Customer for Network Detection and Response (NDR).

Out of 11 leading NDR vendors evaluated, Darktrace stood alone as the sole Customers’ Choice, a recognition that we feel reflects not just our innovation, but the trust and satisfaction of the customers who secure their networks with Darktrace every day.

What the Gartner® Peer Insights™ Voice of the Customer means

“Voice of the Customer” is a document that synthesizes Gartner Peer Insights reviews into insights for buyers of technology and services. This aggregated peer perspective, along with the individual detailed reviews, is complementary to Gartner expert research and can play a key role in your buying process. Peers are verified reviewers of a technology product or service, who not only rate the offering, but also provide valuable feedback to consider before making a purchase decision. Vendors placed in the upper-right “Customers’ Choice” quadrant of the “Voice of the Customer” have scores that meet or exceed the market average for both axes (User Interest and Adoption, and Overall Experience).It’s not just a rating. We feel it’s a reflection of genuine customer sentiment and success in the field.

In our view, Customers consistently highlight Darktrace’s ability to:

  • Detect and respond to unknown threats in real time
  • Deliver unmatched visibility across IT, OT, and cloud environments
  • Automate investigations and responses through AI-driven insights

We believe this recognition reinforces what our customers already know: that Darktrace helps them see, understand, and stop attacks others miss.

A rare double: recognized by customers and analysts alike

This distinction follows another major recogniton. Darktrace’s placement as a Leader in the Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for Network Detection and Response earlier this year.

That makes Darktrace the only vendor to achieve both:

  • A Leader status in the Gartner Magic Quadrant for NDR, and
  • A Customers’ Choice in Gartner Peer Insights 2025

It’s a rare double that we feel reflects both industry leadership and customer trust, two perspectives that, together, define what great cybersecurity looks like.

A Customers’ Choice across the network and the inbox

To us, this recognition also builds on Darktrace’s momentum across multiple domains. Earlier this year, Darktrace was also named a Customers’ Choice for Email Security Platforms in the Gartner® Peer Insights™ report.

With more than 1,000 verified reviews across Network Detection and Response, Email Security Platforms, and Cyber Physical Systems (CPS), we at Darktrace are proud to be trusted across the full attack surface, from the inbox to the industrial network.

Thank you to our customers

We’re deeply grateful to every customer who shared their experience with Darktrace on Gartner Peer Insights. Your insights drive our innovation and continue to shape how we protect complex, dynamic environments across the world.

Discover why customers choose Darktrace for network and email security.

Gartner® Peer Insights™ content consists of the opinions of individual end users based on their own experiences, and should not be construed as statements of fact, nor do they represent the views of Gartner or its affiliates. Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or service depicted in this content nor makes any warranties, expressed or implied, with respect to this content, about its accuracy or completeness, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.

GARTNER is a registered trademark and service mark of Gartner, Inc. and/or its affiliates in the U.S. and internationally and is used herein with permission. All rights reserved.

Magic Quadrant and Peer Insights are registered trademarks of Gartner, Inc. and/or its affiliates and is used herein with permission. All rights reserved.

Gartner, Voice of the Customer for Network Detection and Response, By Peer Community Contributor, 30 October 2025

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Mikey Anderson
Product Marketing Manager, Network Detection & Response

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November 5, 2025

Tracking a Dragon: Investigating a DragonForce-affiliated ransomware attack with Darktrace

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What is DragonForce?

DragonForce is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) platform that emerged in late 2023, offering broad-scale capabilities and infrastructure to threat actors. Recently, DragonForce has been linked to attacks targeting the UK retail sector, resulting in several high-profile cases [1][2]. Moreover, the group launched an affiliate program offering a revenue share of roughly 20%, significantly lower than commissions reported across other RaaS platforms [3].

This Darktrace case study examines a DragonForce-linked RaaS infection within the manufacturing industry. The earliest signs of compromise were observed during working hours in August 2025, where an infected device started performing network scans and attempted to brute-force administrative credentials. After eight days of inactivity, threat actors returned and multiple devices began encrypting files via the SMB protocol using a DragonForce-associated file extension. Ransom notes referencing the group were also dropped, suggesting the threat actor is claiming affiliation with DragonForce, though this has not been confirmed.

Despite Darktrace’s detection of the attack in its early stages, the customer’s deployment did not have Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability configured, allowing the threat to progress to data exfiltration and file encryption.

Darktrace's Observations

While the initial access vector was not clearly defined in this case study, it was likely achieved through common methods previously employed out by DragonForce affiliates. These include phishing emails leveraging social engineering tactics, exploitation of public-facing applications with known vulnerabilities, web shells, and/or the abuse of remote management tools.

Darktrace’s analysis identified internal devices performing internal network scanning, brute-forcing credentials, and executing unusual Windows Registry operations. Notably, Windows Registry events involving "Schedule\Taskcache\Tasks" contain subkeys for individual tasks, storing GUIDs that can be used to locate and analyze scheduled tasks. Additionally, Control\WMI\Security holds security descriptors for WMI providers and Event Tracing loggers that use non-default security settings respectively.

Furthermore, Darktrace identified data exfiltration activity over SSH, including connections to an ASN associated with a malicious hosting service geolocated in Russia.

1. Network Scan & Brute Force

Darktrace identified anomalous behavior in late August to early September 2025, originating from a source device engaging in internal network scanning followed by brute-force attempts targeting administrator credential, including “administrator”, “Admin”, “rdpadmin”, “ftpadmin”.

Upon further analysis, one of the HTTP connections seen in this activity revealed the use of the user agent string “OpenVAS-VT”, suggesting that the device was using the OpenVAS vulnerability scanner. Subsequently, additional devices began exhibiting network scanning behavior. During this phase, a file named “delete.me” was deleted by multiple devices using SMB protocol. This file is commonly associated with network scanning and penetration testing tool NetScan.

2. Windows Registry Key Update

Following the scanning phase, Darktrace observed the initial device then performing suspicious Winreg operations. This included the use of the ”BaseRegOpenKey” function across multiple registry paths.

Additional operations such as “BaseRegOpenKey” and “BaseRegQueryValue” were also seen around this time. These operations are typically used to retrieve specific registry key values and allow write operations to registry keys.

The registry keys observed included “SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security” and “Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\Taskcache\Tasks”. These keys can be leveraged by malicious actors to update WMI access controls and schedule malicious tasks, respectively, both of which are common techniques for establishing persistence within a compromised system.

3. New Administrator Credential Usage

Darktrace subsequently detected the device using a highly privileged credential, “administrator”, via a successful Kerberos login for the first time. Shortly after, the same credential was used again for a successful SMB session.

These marked the first instances of authentication using the “administrator” credential across the customer’s environment, suggesting potential malicious use of the credential following the earlier brute-force activity.

Darktrace’s detection of administrator credentials being used in Kerberos login events by an infected device.
Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of administrator credentials being used in Kerberos login events by an infected device.
Darktrace’s detection of administrator credentials being used in SMB sessions by an infected device.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of administrator credentials being used in SMB sessions by an infected device.

4. Data Exfiltration

Prior to ransomware deployment, several infected devices were observed exfiltrating data to the malicious IP 45.135.232[.]229 via SSH connections [7][8]. This was followed by the device downloading data from other internal devices and transferring an unusually large volume of data to the same external endpoint.

The IP address was first seen on the network on September 2, 2025 - the same date as the observed data exfiltration activity preceding ransomware deployment and encryption.

Further analysis revealed that the endpoint was geolocated in Russia and registered to the malicious hosting provider Proton66. Multiple external researchers have reported malicious activity involving the same Proton66 ASN (AS198953 Proton66 OOO) as far back as April 2025. These activities notably included vulnerability scanning, exploitation attempts, and phishing campaigns, which ultimately led to malware [4][5][6].

Data Exfiltration Endpoint details.

  • Endpoint: 45.135.232[.]229
  • ASN: AS198953 Proton66 OOO
  • Transport protocol: TCP
  • Application protocol: SSH
  • Destination port: 22
Darktrace’s summary of the external IP 45.135.232[.]229, first detected on September 2, 2025. The right-hand side showcases model alerts triggered related to this endpoint including multiple data exfiltration related model alerts.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s summary of the external IP 45.135.232[.]229, first detected on September 2, 2025. The right-hand side showcases model alerts triggered related to this endpoint including multiple data exfiltration related model alerts.

Further investigation into the endpoint using open-source intelligence (OSINT) revealed that it led to a Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) Manager console webpage. This interface is typically used to configure and manage web servers. However, threat actors have been known to exploit similar setups, using fake certificate warnings to trick users into downloading malware, or deploying malicious IIS modules to steal credentials.

Live screenshot of the destination (45.135.232[.]229), captured via OSINT sources, displaying a Microsoft IIS Manager console webpage.
Figure 4: Live screenshot of the destination (45.135.232[.]229), captured via OSINT sources, displaying a Microsoft IIS Manager console webpage.

5. Ransomware Encryption & Ransom Note

Multiple devices were later observed connecting to internal devices via SMB and performing a range of actions indicative of file encryption. This suspicious activity prompted Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst to launch an autonomous investigation, during which it pieced together associated activity and provided concrete timestamps of events for the customer’s visibility.

During this activity, several devices were seen writing a file named “readme.txt” to multiple locations, including network-accessible webroot paths such as inetpub\ and wwwroot\. This “readme.txt” file, later confirmed to be the ransom note, claimed the threat actors were affiliated with DragonForce.

At the same time, devices were seen performing SMB Move, Write and ReadWrite actions involving files with the “.df_win” extension across other internal devices, suggesting that file encryption was actively occurring.

Darktrace’s detection of SMB events (excluding Read events) where the device was seen moving or writing files with the “.df_win” extension.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of SMB events (excluding Read events) where the device was seen moving or writing files with the “.df_win” extension.
Darktrace’s detection of a spike in SMB Write events with the filename “readme.txt” on September 9, indicating the start of file encryption.
Figure 6: Darktrace’s detection of a spike in SMB Write events with the filename “readme.txt” on September 9, indicating the start of file encryption.

Conclusion

The rise of Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) and increased attacker customization is fragmenting tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), making it increasingly difficult for security teams to prepare for and defend against each unique intrusion. RaaS providers like DragonForce further complicate this challenge by enabling a wide range of affiliates, each with varying levels of sophistication [9].

In this instance, Darktrace was able to identify several stages of the attack kill chain, including network scanning, the first-time use of privileged credentials, data exfiltration, and ultimately ransomware encryption. Had the customer enabled Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability, it would have taken timely action to interrupt the attack in its early stages, preventing the eventual data exfiltration and ransomware detonation.

Credit to Justin Torres, Senior Cyber Analyst, Nathaniel Jones, VP, Security & AI Strategy, FCISO, & Emma Foulger, Global Threat Research Operations Lead.

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

References:

1. https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/dragonforce-goup-ms-coop-harrods/

2. https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/dragonforce-ransomware-attacks-retail-giants

3. https://blog.checkpoint.com/security/dragonforce-ransomware-redefining-hybrid-extortion-in-2025/

4. https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/proton66-part-1-mass-scanning-and-exploit-campaigns/

5. https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/proton66-part-2-compromised-wordpress-pages-and-malware-campaigns/

6. https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/proton66-infrastructure-tied-to-expanding-malware-campaigns-and-c2-operations

7. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/45.135.232.229

8. https://spur.us/context/45.135.232.229

9. https://www.group-ib.com/blog/dragonforce-ransomware/

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

·      45.135.232[.]229 - Endpoint Associated with Data Exfiltration

·      .readme.txt – Ransom Note File Extension

·      .df_win – File Encryption Extension Observed

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

DragonForce TTPs vs Darktrace Models

Initial Access:

·      Anomalous Connection::Callback on Web Facing Device

Command and Control:

·      Compromise::SSL or HTTP Beacon

·      Compromise::Beacon to Young Endpoint

·      Compromise::Beaconing on Uncommon Port

·      Compromise::Suspicious SSL Activity

·      Anomalous Connection::Devices Beaconing to New Rare IP

·      Compromise::Suspicious HTTP and Anomalous Activity

·      DNS Tunnel with TXT Records

Tooling:

·      Anomalous File::EXE from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File::Masqueraded File Transfer

·      Anomalous File::Numeric File Download

·      Anomalous File::Script from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File::Uncommon Microsoft File then Exe

·      Anomalous File::Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File::Uncommon Microsoft File then Exe

·      Anomalous File::Internet Facing System File Download

Reconnaissance:

·      Device::Suspicious SMB Query

·      Device::ICMP Address Scan

·      Anomalous Connection::SMB Enumeration

·      Device::Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance

·      Anomalous Connection::Possible Share Enumeration Activity

·      Device::Possible Active Directory Enumeration

·      Anomalous Connection::Large Volume of LDAP Download

·      Device::Suspicious LDAP Search Operation

Lateral Movement:

·      User::Suspicious Admin SMB Session

·      Anomalous Connection::Unusual Internal Remote Desktop

·      Anomalous Connection::Unusual Long Remote Desktop Session

·      Anomalous Connection::Unusual Admin RDP Session

·      User::New Admin Credentials on Client

·      User::New Admin Credentials on Server

·      Multiple Device Correlations::Spreading New Admin Credentials

·      Anomalous Connection::Powershell to Rare External

·      Device::New PowerShell User Agent

·      Anomalous Active Directory Web Services

·      Compromise::Unusual SVCCTL Activity

Evasion:

·      Unusual Activity::Anomalous SMB Delete Volume

·      Persistence

·      Device::Anomalous ITaskScheduler Activity

·      Device::AT Service Scheduled Task

·      Actions on Objectives

·      Compromise::Ransomware::Suspicious SMB Activity (EM)

·      Anomalous Connection::Sustained MIME Type Conversion

·      Compromise::Ransomware::SMB Reads then Writes with Additional Extensions

·      Compromise::Ransomware::Possible Ransom Note Write

·      Data Sent to Rare Domain

·      Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

·      Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst Coverage/Investigation Events:

·      Web Application Vulnerability Scanning of Multiple Devices

·      Port Scanning

·      Large Volume of SMB Login Failures

·      Unusual RDP Connections

·      Widespread Web Application Vulnerability Scanning

·      Unusual SSH Connections

·      Unusual Repeated Connections

·      Possible Application Layer Reconnaissance Activity

·      Unusual Administrative Connections

·      Suspicious Remote WMI Activity

·      Extensive Unusual Administrative Connections

·      Suspicious Directory Replication Service Activity

·      Scanning of Multiple Devices

·      Unusual External Data Transfer

·      SMB Write of Suspicious File

·      Suspicious Remote Service Control Activity

·      Access of Probable Unencrypted Password Files

·      Internal Download and External Upload

·      Possible Encryption of Files over SMB

·      SMB Writes of Suspicious Files to Multiple Devices

The content provided in this blog is published by Darktrace for general informational purposes only and reflects our understanding of cybersecurity topics, trends, incidents, and developments at the time of publication. While we strive to ensure accuracy and relevance, the information is provided “as is” without any representations or warranties, express or implied. Darktrace makes no guarantees regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information presented and expressly disclaims all warranties.

Nothing in this blog constitutes legal, technical, or professional advice, and readers should consult qualified professionals before acting on any information contained herein. Any references to third-party organizations, technologies, threat actors, or incidents are for informational purposes only and do not imply affiliation, endorsement, or recommendation.

Darktrace, its affiliates, employees, or agents shall not be held liable for any loss, damage, or harm arising from the use of or reliance on the information in this blog.

The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content.

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About the author
Justin Torres
Cyber Analyst
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