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December 20, 2023
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Ivanti Sentry Vulnerability | Analysis & Insights

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20
Dec 2023
Darktrace observed a critical vulnerability in Ivanti Sentry's cybersecurity. Learn how this almost become a huge threat and how we stopped it in its tracks.

In an increasingly interconnected digital landscape, the prevalence of critical vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems stands as an open invitation to malicious actors. These vulnerabilities serve as a near limitless resource, granting attackers a continually array of entry points into targeted networks.

In the final week of August 2023, Darktrace observed malicious actors validating exploits for one such critical vulnerability, likely the critical RCE vulnerability, CVE-2023-38035, on Ivanti Sentry servers within multiple customer networks. Shortly after these successful tests were carried out, malicious actors were seen delivering crypto-mining and reconnaissance tools onto vulnerable Ivanti Sentry servers.

Fortunately, Darktrace DETECT™ was able to identify this post-exploitation activity on the compromised servers at the earliest possible stage, allowing the customer security teams to take action against affected devices. In environments where Darktrace RESPOND™ was enabled in autonomous response mode, Darktrace was further able inhibit the identified post-exploitation activity and stop malicious actors from progressing towards their end goals.

Exploitation of Vulnerabilities in Ivanti Products

The software provider, Ivanti, offers a variety of widely used endpoint management, service management, and security solutions. In July and August 2023, the Norwegian cybersecurity company, Mnemonic, disclosed three vulnerabilities in Ivanti products [1]/[2]/[3]; two in Ivanti's endpoint management solution, Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) (formerly called 'MobileIron Core'), and one in Ivanti’s security gateway solution, Ivanti Sentry (formerly called 'MobileIron Sentry'):

CVE-2023-35078

  • CVSS Score: 10.0
  • Affected Product: Ivanti EPMM
  • Details from Ivanti: [4]/[5]/[6]
  • Vulnerability type: Authentication bypass

CVE-2023-35081

  • CVSS Score: 7.2
  • Affected Product: Ivanti EPMM
  • Details from Ivanti: [7]/[8]/[9]
  • Vulnerability type: Directory traversal

CVE-2023-38035

  • CVSS Score:
  • Affected Product: Ivanti Sentry
  • Details from Ivanti: [10]/[11]/[12]
  • Vulnerability type: Authentication bypass

At the beginning of August 2023, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Norwegian National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NO) provided details of advanced persistent threat (APT) activity targeting EPMM systems within Norwegian private sector and government networks via exploitation of CVE-2023-35078 combined with suspected exploitation of CVE-2023-35081.

In an article published in August 2023 [12], Ivanti disclosed that a very limited number of their customers had been subjected to exploitation of the Ivanti Sentry vulnerability, CVE-2023-38035, and on the August 22, 2023, CISA added the Ivanti Sentry vulnerability, CVE-2023-38035 to its ‘Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalogue’.  CVE-2023-38035 is a critical authentication bypass vulnerability affecting the System Manager Portal of Ivanti Sentry systems. The System Manager Portal, which is accessible by default on port 8433, is used for administration of the Ivanti Sentry system. Through exploitation of CVE-2023-38035, an unauthenticated actor with access to the System Manager Portal can achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the underlying Ivanti Sentry system.

Observed Exploitation of CVE-2023-38035

On August 24, Darktrace observed Ivanti Sentry servers within several customer networks receiving successful SSL connections over port 8433 from the external endpoint, 34.77.65[.]112. The usage of port 8433 indicates that the System Manager Portal was accessed over the connections. Immediately after receiving these successful connections, Ivanti Sentry servers made GET requests over port 4444 to 34.77.65[.]112. The unusual string ‘Wget/1.14 (linux-gnu)’ appeared in the User-Agent headers of these requests, indicating that the command-line utility, wget, was abused to initiate the requests.

Figure 1: Event Log data for an Ivanti Sentry system showing the device breaching a range of DETECT models after contacting 34.77.65[.]112.The suspicious behavior highlighted by DETECT was subsequently investigated by Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst™, which was able to weave together these separate behaviors into single incidents representing the whole attack chain.

Figure 2: AI Analyst Incident representing a chain of suspicious activities from an Ivanti Sentry server.

In cases where Darktrace RESPOND was enabled in autonomous response mode, RESPOND was able to automatically enforce the Ivanti Sentry server’s normal pattern of life, thus blocking further exploit testing.

Figure 3: Event Log for an Ivanti Sentry server showing the device receiving a RESPOND action immediately after trying to 34.77.65[.]112.

The GET requests to 34.77.65[.]112 were responded to with the following HTML document:

Figure 4: Snapshot of the HTML document returned by 34.77.65[.]112.

None of the links within this HTML document were functional. Furthermore, the devices’ downloads of these HTML documents do not appear to have elicited further malicious activities. These facts suggest that the observed 34.77.65[.]112 activities were representative of a malicious actor validating exploits (likely for CVE-2023-38035) on Ivanti Sentry systems.

Over the next 24 hours, these Ivanti Sentry systems received successful SSL connections over port 8433 from a variety of suspicious external endpoints, such as 122.161.66[.]161. These connections resulted in Ivanti Sentry systems making HTTP GET requests to subdomains of ‘oast[.]site’ and ‘oast[.]live’. Strings containing ‘curl’ appeared in the User-Agent headers of these requests, indicating that the command-line utility, cURL, was abused to initiate the requests.

These ‘oast[.]site’ and ‘oast[.]live’ domains are used by the out-of-band application security testing (OAST) service, Interactsh. Malicious actors are known to abuse this service to carry out out-of-band (OOB) exploit testing. It, therefore, seems likely that these activities were also representative of a malicious actor validating exploits for CVE-2023-38035 on Ivanti Sentry systems.

Figure 5: Event Log for Ivanti Sentry system showing the device contacting an 'oast[.]site' endpoint after receiving connections from the suspicious, external endpoint 122.161.66[.]161.

The actors seen validating exploits for CVE-2023-38035 may have been conducting such activities in preparation for their own subsequent malicious activities. However, given the variety of attack chains which ensued from these exploit validation activities, it is also possible that they were carried out by Initial Access Brokers (IABs) The activities which ensued from exploit validation activities identified by Darktrace fell into two categories: internal network reconnaissance and cryptocurrency mining.

Reconnaissance Activities

In one of the reconnaissance cases, immediately after receiving successful SSL connections over port 8443 from the external endpoints 190.2.131[.]204 and 45.159.248[.]179, an Ivanti Sentry system was seen making a long SSL connection over port 443 to 23.92.29[.]148, and making wget GET requests over port 4444 with the Target URIs '/ncat' and ‘/TxPortMap’ to the external endpoints, 45.86.162[.]147 and 195.123.240[.]183.  

Figure 6: Event Log data for an Ivanti Sentry system showing the device making connections to the external endpoints, 45.86.162[.]147, 23.92.29[.]148, and 195.123.240[.]183, immediately after receiving connections from rare external endpoints.

The Ivanti Sentry system then went on to scan for open SMB ports on systems within the internal network. This activity likely resulted from an attacker dropping a port scanning utility on the vulnerable Ivanti Sentry system.

Figure 7: Event Log data for an Ivanti Sentry server showing the device breaching several DETECT models after downloading a port scanning tool from 195.123.240[.]183.

In another reconnaissance case, Darktrace observed multiple wget HTTP requests with Target URIs such as ‘/awp.tar.gz’ and ‘/resp.tar.gz’ to a suspicious, external server (78.128.113[.]130).  Shortly after making these requests, the Ivanti Sentry system started to scan for open SMB ports and to respond to LLMNR queries from other internal devices. These behaviors indicate that the server may have installed an LLMNR poisoning tool, such as Responder. The Ivanti Sentry server also went on to conduct further information-gathering activities, such as LDAP reconnaissance, HTTP-based vulnerability scanning, HTTP-based password searching, and RDP port scanning.

Figure 8: Event Log data for an Ivanti Sentry system showing the device making connections to 78.128.113[.]130, scanning for an open SMB port on internal endpoints, and responding to LLMNR queries from internal endpoints.

In cases where Darktrace RESPOND was active, reconnaissance activities resulted in RESPOND enforcing the Ivanti Sentry server’s pattern of life.

Figure 9: Event Log data for an Ivanti Sentry system receiving a RESPOND action as a result of its SMB port scanning activity.
Figure 10: Event Log data for an Ivanti Sentry system receiving a RESPOND action as a result of its LDAP reconnaissance activity.

Crypto-Mining Activities

In one of the cryptomining cases, Darktrace detected an Ivanti Sentry server making SSL connections to aelix[.]xyz and mining pool endpoints after receiving successful SSL connections over port 8443 from the external endpoint, 140.228.24[.]160.

Figure 11: Event Log data for an Ivanti Sentry system showing the device contacting aelix[.]xyz and mining pool endpoints immediately after receiving connections from the external endpoint, 140.228.24[.]160.

In a cryptomining case on another customer’s network, an Ivanti Sentry server was seen making GET requests indicative of Kinsing malware infection. These requests included wget GET requests to 185.122.204[.]197 with the Target URIs ‘/unk.sh’ and ‘/se.sh’ and a combination of GET and POST requests to 185.221.154[.]208 with the User-Agent header ‘Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/99.0.4844.51 Safari/537.36’ and the Target URIs, ‘/mg’, ‘/ki’, ‘/get’, ‘/h2’, ‘/ms’, and ‘/mu’. These network-based artefacts have been observed in previous Kinsing infections [13].

Figure 12: Event Log data for an Ivanti Sentry system showing the device displaying likely Kinsing C2 activity.

On customer environments where RESPOND was active, Darktrace was able to take swift autonomous action by blocking cryptomining connection attempts to malicious command-and-control (C2) infrastructure, in this case Kinsing servers.

Figure 13: Event Log data for an Ivanti Sentry server showing the device receiving a RESPOND action after attempting to contact Kinsing C2 infrastructure.

Fortunately, due to Darktrace DETECT+RESPOND prompt identification and targeted actions against these emerging threats, coupled with remediating steps taken by affected customers’ security teams, neither the cryptocurrency mining activities nor the network reconnaissance activities led to significant disruption.  

Figure 14: Timeline of observed malicious activities.

Conclusion The inevitable presence of critical vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems underscores the perpetual challenge of defending against malicious intrusions. The near inexhaustible supply of entry routes into organizations’ networks available to malicious actors necessitates a more proactive and vigilant approach to network security.

While it is, of course, essential for organizations to secure their digital environments through the regular patching of software and keeping abreast of developing vulnerabilities that could impact their network, it is equally important to have a safeguard in place to mitigate against attackers who do manage to exploit newly discovered vulnerabilities.

In the case of Ivanti Sentry, Darktrace observed malicious actors validating exploits against affected servers on customer networks just a few days after the public disclosure of the critical vulnerability.  This activity was followed up by a variety of malicious and disruptive, activities including cryptocurrency mining and internal network reconnaissance.

Darktrace DETECT immediately detected post-exploitation activities on compromised Ivanti Sentry servers, enabling security teams to intervene at the earliest possible stage. Darktrace RESPOND, when active, autonomously inhibited detected post-exploitation activities. These DETECT detections, along with their accompanying RESPOND interventions, prevented malicious actors from being able to progress further towards their likely harmful objectives.

Credit to Sam Lister, Senior Cyber Analyst, and Trent Kessler, SOC Analyst  

Appendices

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Initial Access techniques:

  • Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190)

Credential Access techniques:

  • Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001)
  • Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001)

Discovery

  • Network Service Discovery (T1046)
  • Remote System Discovery (T1018)
  • Account Discovery: Domain Account (T1087.002)

Command and Control techniques:

  • Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001)
  • Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105)
  • Non-Standard Port (T1571)
  • Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography (T1573.002)

Impact techniques

  • Resource Hijacking (T1496)
List of IoCs

Exploit testing IoCs:

·      34.77.65[.]112

·      Wget/1.14 (linux-gnu)

·      cjjovo7mhpt7geo8aqlgxp7ypod6dqaiz.oast[.]site • 178.128.16[.]97

·      curl/7.19.7 (x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu) libcurl/7.19.7 NSS/3.27.1 zlib/1.2.3 libidn/1.18 libssh2/1.4.2

·      cjk45q1chpqflh938kughtrfzgwiofns3.oast[.]site • 178.128.16[.]97

·      curl/7.29.0

Kinsing-related IoCs:

·      185.122.204[.]197

·      /unk.sh

·      /se.sh

·      185.221.154[.]208

·      185.221.154[.]208

·      45.15.158[.]124

·      Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/99.0.4844.51 Safari/537.36

·      /mg

·      /ki

·      /get

·      /h2

·      /ms

·      /mu

·      vocaltube[.]ru • 185.154.53[.]140

·      92.255.110[.]4

·      194.87.254[.]160

Responder-related IoCs:

·      78.128.113[.]130

·      78.128.113[.]34

·      /awp.tar.gz

·      /ivanty

·      /resp.tar.gz

Crypto-miner related IoCs:

·      140.228.24[.]160

·      aelix[.]xyz • 104.21.60[.]147 / 172.67.197[.]200

·      c8446f59cca2149cb5f56ced4b448c8d (JA3 client fingerprint)

·      b5eefe582e146aed29a21747a572e11c (JA3 client fingerprint)

·      pool.supportxmr[.]com

·      xmr.2miners[.]com

·      xmr.2miners[.]com

·      monerooceans[.]stream

·      xmr-eu2.nanopool[.]org

Port scanner-related IoCs:

·      122.161.66[.]161

·      192.241.235[.]32

·      45.86.162[.]147

·      /ncat

·      Wget/1.14 (linux-gnu)

·      45.159.248[.]179

·      142.93.115[.]146

·      23.92.29[.]148

·      /TxPortMap

·      195.123.240.183

·      6935a8d379e086ea1aed159b8abcb0bc8acf220bd1cbc0a84fd806f14014bca7 (SHA256 hash of downloaded file)

Darktrace DETECT Model Breaches

·      Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System

·      Device / New User Agent

·      Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

·      Device / New User Agent and New IP

·      Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port

·      Anomalous Connection / Callback on Web Facing Device

·      Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

·      Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

·      Compromise / Beacon for 4 Days

·      Compromise / Agent Beacon (Short Period)

·      Device / Large Number of Model Breaches

·      Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·      Compromise / Monero Mining

·      Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining

·      Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint

·      Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

·      Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

·      Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

·      Device / Network Scan

·      Device / Unusual LDAP Bind and Search Activity

·      Compliance / Vulnerable Name Resolution

·      Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Breaches

·      Device / New User Agent To Internal Server

·      Anomalous Connection / Suspicious HTTP Activity

·      Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Connections

·      Anomalous Connection / Suspicious HTTP Activity

·      Device / RDP Scan

·      Device / Large Number of Model Breaches

·      Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

·      Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

·      Anomalous Connection / Suspicious HTTP Activity

·      Compromise / Suspicious Internal Use Of Web Protocol

·      Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File / Internet Facing System File Download

·      Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

·      Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

·      Device / Network Scan

·      Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise

References

[1] https://www.mnemonic.io/resources/blog/ivanti-endpoint-manager-mobile-epmm-authentication-bypass-vulnerability/
[2] https://www.mnemonic.io/resources/blog/threat-advisory-remote-file-write-vulnerability-in-ivanti-epmm/
[3] https://www.mnemonic.io/resources/blog/threat-advisory-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-in-ivanti-sentry/
[4] https://www.ivanti.com/blog/cve-2023-35078-new-ivanti-epmm-vulnerability
[5] https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/CVE-2023-35078-Remote-unauthenticated-API-access-vulnerability?language=en_US
[6] https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/KB-Remote-unauthenticated-API-access-vulnerability-CVE-2023-35078?language=en_US
[7] https://www.ivanti.com/blog/cve-2023-35081-new-ivanti-epmm-vulnerability
[8] https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/CVE-2023-35081-Arbitrary-File-Write?language=en_US
[9] https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/KB-Arbitrary-File-Write-CVE-2023-35081?language=en_US
[10] https://www.ivanti.com/blog/cve-2023-38035-vulnerability-affecting-ivanti-sentry
[11] https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/CVE-2023-38035-API-Authentication-Bypass-on-Sentry-Administrator-Interface?language=en_US
[12] https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/KB-API-Authentication-Bypass-on-Sentry-Administrator-Interface-CVE-2023-38035?language=en_US
[13] https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Your+Business+Data+and+Machine+Learning+at+Risk+Attacks+Against+Apache+NiFi/29900

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Author
Sam Lister
SOC Analyst
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November 19, 2024

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Darktrace Leading the Future of Network Detection and Response with Recognition from KuppingerCole

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KuppingerCole has recognized Darktrace as an overall Leader, Product Leader, Market Leader and Innovation Leader in the KuppingerCole Leadership Compass: Network Detection and Response (2024).

With the perimeter all but dissolved, Network Detection and Response (NDR) tools are quickly becoming a critical component of the security stack, as the main tool to span the modern network. NDRs connect on-premises infrastructure to cloud, remote workers, identities, SaaS applications, and IoT/OT – something not available to EDR that requires agents and isolates visibility to individual devices.

KuppingerCole Analysts AG designated Darktrace an ‘Overall Leader’ position because of our continual innovation around user-led security. Self-Learning AI together with automated triage through Cyber AI Analyst and real-time autonomous response actions have been instrumental to security teams in stopping potential threats before they become a breach. With this time saved, Darktrace is leading beyond reactive security to truly harden a network, allowing the team to spend more time in preventive security measures.

Network Detection and Response protects where others fail to reach

NDR solutions operate at the network level, deploying inside or parallel to your network to ingest raw traffic via virtual or physical sensors. This gives them unprecedented potential to identify anomalies and possible breaches in any network - far beyond simple on-prem, into dynamic virtual environments, cloud or hybrid networks, cloud applications, and even remote devices accessing the corporate network via ZTNA or VPN.

Rather than looking at processes level data, NDR can detect the lateral movement of an adversary across multiple assets by analyzing network traffic patterns which endpoint solutions may not be able to identify [1]. In the face of a growing, complex environment, organizations large and small, will benefit from using NDRs either in conjunction, or as the foundation for, their Extended Detection and Response (XDR) for a unified view that improves their overall threat detection, ease of investigation and faster response times.

Today's NDR solutions are expected to include advanced ML and artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms [1]

Traditional IDS & IPS systems are labor intensive, requiring continuous rule creation, outdated signature maintenance, and manual monitoring for false positives or incorrect actions. This is no longer viable against a higher volume and changing landscape, making NDR the natural network tool to level against these evolutions. The role of AI in NDRs is designed to meet this challenge, “to reduce both the labor need for analysis and false positives, as well as add value by improving anomaly detection and overall security posture” .

Celebrating success in leadership and innovation

Darktrace is proud to have been recognized as an NDR “Overall Leader” in KuppingerCole Analyst AG’s Leadership Compass. The report gave further recognition to Darktrace as a ‘Product Leader”, “Innovation Leader” and “Market Leader”.

Maximum scores were received for core product categories, in addition to market presence and financial strength. Particular attention was directed to our innovation. This year has seen several NDR updates via Darktrace’s ActiveAI Security Platform version 6.2 which has enhanced investigation workflows and provided new AI transparency within the toolset.

Positive scores were also received for Darktrace’s deployment ecosystem and surrounding support, minimizing the need for extraneous integrations through a unique platform architecture that connects with over 90 other vendors.

High Scores received in Darktrace’s KuppingerCole Spider Chart across Core NDR capability areas
Figure 1: High Scores received in Darktrace’s KuppingerCole Spider Chart across Core NDR capability areas

Darktrace’s pioneering AI approach sets it apart

Darktrace / NETWORK’s approach is fundamentally different to other NDRs. Continual anomaly-based detection (our Self-Learning AI), understands what is normal across each of your network entities, and then examines deviations from these behaviors rather than needing to apply static rules or ML to adversary techniques. As a result, Darktrace / NETWORK can focus on surfacing the novel threats that cannot be anticipated, whilst our proactive solutions expose gaps that can be exploited and reduce the risk of known threats.    

Across the millions of possible network events that may occur, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst reduces that manual workload for SOC teams by presenting only what is most important in complete collated incidents. This accelerates SOC Level 2 analyses of incidents by 10x2, giving time back, first for any necessary response and then for preventive workflows.

Finally, when incidents begin to escalate, Darktrace can natively (or via third-party) autonomously respond and take precise actions based on a contextual understanding of both the affected assets and incident in question so that threats can be disarmed without impacting wider operations.

Within the KuppingerCole report, several standout strengths were listed:

  • Cyber AI Analyst was celebrated as a core differentiator, enhancing both visibility and investigation into critical network issues and allowing a faster response.
  • Darktrace / NETWORK was singled for its user benefits. Both a clear interface for analysts with advanced filtering and analytical tools, and efficient role-based access control (RBAC) and configuration options for administrators.
  • At the product level, Darktrace was recognized for complete network traffic analysis (NTA) capabilities allowing extensive analysis into components like application use/type, fingerprinting, source/destination communication, in addition to comprehensive protocol support across a range of network device types from IT, OT, IoT and mobiles and detailed MITRE ATT&CK mapping.
  • Finally, at the heart of it, Darktrace’s innovation was highlighted in relation to its intrinsic Self Learning AI, utilizing multiple layers of deep learning, neural networks, LLMs, NLP, Generative AI and more to understand network activity and filter it for what’s critical on an individual customer level.

Going beyond reactive security

Darktrace’s visibility and AI-enabled detection, investigation and response enable security teams to focus on hardening gaps in their network through contextual relevance & priority. Darktrace / NETWORK explicitly gives time back to security teams allowing them to focus on the bigger strategic and governance workflows that sometimes get overlooked. This is enabled through proactive solutions intrinsically connected to our NDR:

  • Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management, which looks beyond just CVE risks to instead discover, prioritize and validate risks by business impact and how to mobilize against them early, to reduce the number of real threats security teams face.
  • Darktrace / Incident Readiness & Recovery, a solution rather than service-based approach to incident response (IR) that lets teams respond in the best way to each incident and proactively test their familiarity and effectiveness of IR workflows with sophisticated incident simulations involving their own analysts and assets.

Together, these solutions allow Darktrace / NETWORK to go beyond the traditional NDR and shift teams to a more hardened and proactive state.

Putting customers first

Customers continue to sit at the forefront of Darktrace R&D, with their emerging needs and pain points being the direct inspiration for our continued innovation.

This year Darktrace / NETWORK has protected thousands of customers against the latest attacks, from data exfil and destruction, to unapproved privilege escalation and ransomware including strains like Medusa, Qilin and AlphV BlackCat.

In each instance, Darktrace / NETWORK was able to provide a holistic lens of the anomalies present in their traffic, collated those that were important, and either responded or gave teams the ability to take targeted actions against their threats – even when adversaries pivoted. In one example of a Gootloader compromise, Darktrace ensured a SOC went from detection to recovery within 5 days, 92.8% faster than the average containment time of 69 days.

Results like these, focused on user-led security, have secured Darktrace’s position within the latest NDR Leadership Compass.

To find out more about what makes Darktrace / NETWORK special, read the full KuppingerCole report.

References

[1] Osman Celik, KuppingerCole Leadership Compass:Network Detection and Response (2024)

[2] Darktrace's AI Analyst customer fleet data

[3] https://www.ibm.com/reports/data-breach

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Gabriel Few-Wiegratz
Product Marketing Manager

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November 1, 2024

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Inside the SOC

Phishing and Persistence: Darktrace’s Role in Defending Against a Sophisticated Account Takeover

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The exploitation of SaaS platforms

As businesses continue to grow and evolve, the need for sharing ideas through productivity and cloud Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) platforms is becoming increasingly crucial. However, these platforms have also become prime targets for cyber attackers.

Threat actors often exploit these widely-used services to gain unauthorized access, steal sensitive information, and disrupt business operations. The growing reliance on SaaS platforms makes them attractive entry points for cybercriminals, who use sophisticated techniques such as phishing, social engineering, and malware to compromise these systems.

Services like Microsoft 365 are regularly targeted by threat actors looking for an entry point into an organization’s environment to carry out malicious activities. Securing these platforms is crucial to protect business data and ensure operational continuity.

Darktrace / EMAIL detection of the phishing attack

In a recent case, Darktrace observed a customer in the manufacturing sector receiving a phishing email that led to a threat actor logging in and creating an email rule. Threat actors often create email rules to move emails to their inbox, avoiding detection. Additionally, Darktrace detected a spoofed domain registered by the threat actor. Despite already having access to the customer’s SaaS account, the actor seemingly registered this domain to maintain persistence on the network, allowing them to communicate with the spoofed domain and conduct further malicious activity.

Darktrace / EMAIL can help prevent compromises like this one by blocking suspicious emails as soon as they are identified. Darktrace’s AI-driven email detection and response recognizes anomalies that might indicate phishing attempts and applies mitigative actions autonomously to prevent the escalation of an attack.

Unfortunately, in this case, Darktrace was not configured in Autonomous Response mode at the time of the attack, meaning actions had to be manually applied by the customer’s security team. Had it been fully enabled, it would have held the emails, preventing them from reaching the intended recipient and stopping the attack at its inception.

However, Darktrace’s Managed Threat Detection alerted the Security Operations Center (SOC) team to the compromise, enabling them to thoroughly investigate the incident and notify the customer before further damage could occur.

The Managed Threat Detection service continuously monitors customer networks for suspicious activities that may indicate an emerging threat. When such activities are detected, alerts are sent to Darktrace’s expert Cyber Analysts for triage, significantly speeding up the remediation process.

Attack Overview

On May 2, 2024, Darktrace detected a threat actor targeting a customer in the manufacturing sector then an unusual login to their SaaS environment was observed prior to the creation of a new email rule.

Darktrace immediately identified the login as suspicious due to the rarity of the source IP (31.222.254[.]27) and ASN, coupled with the absence of multi-factor authentication (MFA), which was typically required for this account.

The new email rule was intended to mark emails as read and moved to the ‘Conversation History’ folder for inbound emails from a specific domain. The rule was named “….,,,”, likely the attacker attempting to setup their new rule with an unnoteworthy name to ensure it would not be noticed by the account’s legitimate owner. Likewise, by moving emails from a specific domain to ‘Conversation History’, a folder that is rarely used by most users, any phishing emails sent by that domain would remain undetected by the user.

Darktrace’s detection of the unusual SaaS login and subsequent creation of the new email rule “….,,,”.
Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of the unusual SaaS login and subsequent creation of the new email rule “….,,,”.

The domain in question was identified as being newly registered and an example of a typosquat domain. Typosquatting involves registering new domains with intentional misspelling designed to convince users to visit fake, and often malicious, websites. This technique is often used in phishing campaigns to create a sense of legitimacy and trust and deceive users into providing sensitive information. In this case, the suspicious domain closely resembled several of the customer’s internal domains, indicating an attempt to impersonate the organization’s legitimate internal sites to gain the target’s trust. Furthermore, the creation of this lookalike domain suggests that the attack was highly targeted at this specific customer.

Interestingly, the threat actor registered this spoofed domain despite already having account access. This was likely intended to ensure persistence on the network without having to launch additional phishing attacks. Such use of spoofed domain could allow an attacker to maintain a foothold in their target network and escalate their malicious activities without having to regain access to the account. This persistence can be used for various purposes, including data exfiltration, spreading malware, or launching further attacks.

Following this, Darktrace detected a highly anomalous email being sent to the customer’s account from the same location as the initial unsual SaaS login. Darktrace’s anomaly-based detection is able to identify threats that human security teams and traditional signature-based methods might miss. By analyzing the expected behavior of network users, Darktrace can recognize the subtle deviations from the norm that may indicate malicious activity. Unfortunately, in this instance, without Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability enabled, the phishing email was able to successfully reach the recipient. While Darktrace / EMAIL did suggest that the email should be held from the recipients inbox, the customer was required to manually approve it.

Despite this, the Darktrace SOC team were still able to support the customer as they were subscribed to the Managed Threat Detection service. Following the detection of the highlight anomalous activity surrounding this compromise, namely the unusual SaaS login followed by a new email rule, an alert was sent to the Darktrace SOC for immediate triage, who then contacted the customer directly urging immediate action.

Conclusion

This case underscores the need to secure SaaS platforms like Microsoft 365 against sophisticated cyber threats. As businesses increasingly rely on these platforms, they become prime targets for attackers seeking unauthorized access and disruption.

Darktrace’s anomaly-based detection and response capabilities are crucial in identifying and mitigating such threats. In this instance, Darktrace detected a phishing email that led to a threat actor logging in and creating a suspicious email rule. The actor also registered a spoofed domain to maintain persistence on the network.

Darktrace / EMAIL, with its AI-driven detection and analysis, can block suspicious emails before they reach the intended recipient, preventing attacks at their inception. Meanwhile, Darktrace’s SOC team promptly investigated the activity and alerted the customer to the compromise, enabling them to take immediate action to remediate the issue and prevent any further damage.

Credit to Vivek Rajan (Cyber Security Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Threat Content Lead).

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

  • SaaS / Access / Unusual External Source for SaaS Credential Use
  • SaaS / Compromise / Login From Rare Endpoint While User Is Active
  • SaaS / Resource / Unusual Access to Delegated Resource by Non Owner
  • SaaS / Email Nexus / Unusual Login Location Following Sender Spoof
  • Compliance / Anomalous New Email Rule
  • SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login and New Email Rule

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

31.222.254[.]27 – IP -  Suspicious Login Endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – Technqiue – Sub-technique of (if applicable)

Cloud Accounts - DEFENSE EVASION, PERSISTENCE, PRIVILEGE ESCALATION, INITIAL ACCESS - T1078.004 - T1078

Cloud Service Dashboard – DISCOVERY - T1538

Compromise Accounts - RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1586

Steal Web Session Cookie - CREDENTIAL ACCESS - T1539

Outlook Rules – PERSISTENCE - T1137.005 - T1137

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About the author
Vivek Rajan
Cyber Analyst
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