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June 19, 2019

How Autonomous Response AI is Winning Automated Extortion

Darktrace, creator of the first enterprise-grade autonomous response technology, leverages AI algorithms to stop malware in its tracks. Learn more here!
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Justin Fier
SVP, Red Team Operations
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19
Jun 2019

Just threat detection is not enough

At a time when automated cyber-attacks execute at machine speed, the reality is that merely detecting these attacks is no longer sufficient to stop them before the damage is done. According to the Ponemon Institute’s oft-cited study on the topic, US companies take an average of 206 days to identify a data breach. And even when security teams discover a potential compromise the moment it begins, human professionals are fundamentally overmatched by malicious code that can encrypt or exfiltrate data in under a minute.

In this era of fast-acting threats, the only way forward is to fight code with code, to pit algorithm against algorithm, and to counter machine-speed attacks with machine-speed defenses. Darktrace, creator of the first enterprise-grade autonomous response technology, leverages AI algorithms to stop malware in its tracks, allowing incident responders to investigate and take action at their own pace. And critically, Darktrace safeguards the digital estate day and night, weekend and holiday, because cyber-criminals don’t wait until business hours to strike.

Examined below are three sophisticated attacks that Darktrace neutralized on behalf of security teams that were either out of office or unable to react in time. Collectively, they demonstrate that the future of autonomous cyber defense has already arrived.

Automated extortion, absent security team

The quintessential example of a cyber-threat too rapid for human professionals to parry, ransomware has become a top-of-mind concern for organizations around the world. In fact, previous research has found that approximately 70% of companies simply hand over the ransom upon getting hit, regardless of the cost. However, Darktrace's Autonomous Response prevents ransomware from spreading by confining users and devices to their typical ‘patterns of life’. Rooted in a constantly refined understanding of ‘self’ versus ‘not self’, Darktrace AI surgically intervenes to shut off just the anomalous activity, while still allowing business operations to continue uninterrupted.

At 7:05 pm on a Friday, an employee at a large telecommunications firm accessed his personal email from a corporate smartphone and was tricked into downloading a malicious file that contained ransomware. Seconds later, the device began connecting to an external server on the Tor network — executing the attack just after the company’s security team had left the office for the weekend.

Darktrace AI, meanwhile, responded nine seconds after encryption began, raising a prioritized alert that called for immediate action. As the behavior persisted over the next few seconds, Darktrace activated AI-enabled autonomous response, which interrupted all attempts to write encrypted files before the ransomware spread across the telecom’s network. Critically, the autonomous response technology was on guard, even when the security team couldn’t be.

Darktrace anticipates the alphabet

Nearly 95% of all successful cyber-attacks begin with a phishing email, which dupe employees into breaching their organizations before the security team realizes that anything is wrong. Even more difficult to catch are personalized “spear phishing” emails that use reconnaissance gathered from either social media or physical surveillance to impersonate trusted colleagues. Thwarting an advanced spear phishing campaign requires understanding normal behavior for each user well enough to flag subtly suspicious emails, as well as the ability to autonomously disable their malicious links — a combination that only Darktrace AI has achieved.

On the network of a major US city, a sophisticated spear phishing campaign managed to bypass the city’s native email controls. The attackers, who had obtained the city’s address book, were emailing recipients alphabetically, from “A” to “Z,” with ostensibly harmless emails that contained a malicious payload. Despite the well-disguised nature of this attack, Darktrace immediately flagged the domain linked in the emails as abnormal for the city’s employees, an action only possible with the evolving understanding of ‘self’ that Darktrace AI learns.

Darktrace's Autonomouse Response was deployed in ‘Passive Mode’ at the time, a trust-building setting that restricts the AI to communicating what it would have done in response to the threat rather than actually interceding. Interestingly enough, however, this nuance served to demonstrate the technology’s ability to stop attacks that conventional tools miss. Whereas Darktrace detected the campaign at the letter “A,” the city’s array of legacy tools finally woke up to the threat at “R.” In ‘Active Mode’, Darktrace would have neutralized the attack before it reached a single user.

Serious threat at amusement park

Data exfiltration is among the most common objectives of cyber-criminals today, as stolen personal information and credentials can be sold on the Dark Web, used to commit identity theft, or leveraged to move laterally within a victim’s network. At a North American amusement park, an advanced attacker targeted an IoT device — a physical locker designed to store personal belongings — in an attempt to exfiltrate such data. As part of its default setting, the ‘smart’ locker regularly established contact with the supplier’s third-party online platform, a process that the attackers hijacked to compromise the device.

Once infiltrated, the locker started to transfer more than a gigabyte of unencrypted data across the network to a rare external site. The connections, which likely included identifying details and sensitive credentials, had the potential to be transmitted over the internet entirely unprotected — allowing the attackers to intercept the connections and use the information to breach the company’s network perimeter.

Due to the severity of the threat, Darktrace determined that an autonomous response was required. Within seconds, Darktrace AI took action by intelligently blocking all outgoing connections from the compromised locker. In doing so, it gave ample time for the security team to remove the smart locker from the internet — before any sensitive company or consumer data could be exfiltrated.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Justin Fier
SVP, Red Team Operations

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March 5, 2026

Inside Cloud Compromise: Investigating Attacker Activity with Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation

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Investigating Cloud Attacks with Forensic Acquisition & Investigation

Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation™ is the industry’s first truly automated forensic solution purpose-built for the cloud. This blog will demonstrate how an investigation can be carried out against a compromised cloud server in minutes, rather than hours or days.

The compromised server investigated in this case originates from Darktrace’s Cloudypots system, a global honeypot network designed to observe adversary activity in real time across a wide range of cloud services. Whenever an attacker successfully compromises one of these honeypots, a forensic copy of the virtual server's disk is preserved for later analysis. Using Forensic Acquisition & Investigation, analysts can then investigate further and obtain detailed insights into the compromise including complete attacker timelines and root cause analysis.

Forensic Acquisition & Investigation supports importing artifacts from a variety of sources, including EC2 instances, ECS, S3 buckets, and more. The Cloudypots system produces a raw disk image whenever an attack is detected and stores it in an S3 bucket. This allows the image to be directly imported into Forensic Acquisition & Investigation using the S3 bucket import option.

As Forensic Acquisition & Investigation runs cloud-natively, no additional configuration is required to add a specific S3 bucket. Analysts can browse and acquire forensic assets from any bucket that the configured IAM role is permitted to access. Operators can also add additional IAM credentials, including those from other cloud providers, to extend access across multiple cloud accounts and environments.

Figure 1: Forensic Acquisition & Investigation import screen.

Forensic Acquisition & Investigation then retrieves a copy of the file and automatically begins running the analysis pipeline on the artifact. This pipeline performs a full forensic analysis of the disk and builds a timeline of the activity that took place on the compromised asset. By leveraging Forensic Acquisition & Investigation’s cloud-native analysis system, this process condenses hour of manual work into just minutes.

Successful import of a forensic artifact and initiation of the analysis pipeline.
Figure 2: Successful import of a forensic artifact and initiation of the analysis pipeline.

Once processing is complete, the preserved artifact is visible in the Evidence tab, along with a summary of key information obtained during analysis, such as the compromised asset’s hostname, operating system, cloud provider, and key event count.

The Evidence overview showing the acquired disk image.
Figure 3: The Evidence overview showing the acquired disk image.

Clicking on the “Key events” field in the listing opens the timeline view, automatically filtered to show system- generated alarms.

The timeline provides a chronological record of every event that occurred on the system, derived from multiple sources, including:

  • Parsed log files such as the systemd journal, audit logs, application specific logs, and others.
  • Parsed history files such as .bash_history, allowing executed commands to be shown on the timeline.
  • File-specific events, such as files being created, accessed, modified, or executables being run, etc.

This approach allows timestamped information and events from multiple sources to be aggregated and parsed into a single, concise view, greatly simplifying the data review process.

Alarms are created for specific timeline events that match either a built-in system rule, curated by Darktrace’s Threat Research team or an operator-defined created at the project level. These alarms help quickly filter out noise and highlight on events of interest, such as the creation of a file containing known malware, access to sensitive files like Amazon Web Service (AWS) credentials, suspicious arguments or commands, and more.

 The timeline view filtered to alarm_severity: “1” OR alarm_severity: “3”, showing only events that matched an alarm rule.
Figure 4: The timeline view filtered to alarm_severity: “1” OR alarm_severity: “3”, showing only events that matched an alarm rule.

In this case, several alarms were generated for suspicious Base64 arguments being passed to Selenium. Examining the event data, it appears the attacker spawned a Selenium Grid session with the following payload:

"request.payload": "[Capabilities {browserName: chrome, goog:chromeOptions: {args: [-cimport base64;exec(base64...], binary: /usr/bin/python3, extensions: []}, pageLoadStrategy: normal}]"

This is a common attack vector for Selenium Grid. The chromeOptions object is intended to specify arguments for how Google Chrome should be launched; however, in this case the attacker has abused the binary field to execute the Python3 binary instead of Chrome. Combined with the option to specify command-line arguments, the attacker can use Python3’s -c option to execute arbitrary Python code, in this instance, decoding and executing a Base64 payload.

Selenium’s logs truncate the Arguments field automatically, so an alternate method is required to retrieve the full payload. To do this, the search bar can be used to find all events that occurred around the same time as this flagged event.

Pivoting off the previous event by filtering the timeline to events within the same window using timestamp: [“2026-02-18T09:09:00Z” TO “2026-02-18T09:12:00Z”].
Figure 5: Pivoting off the previous event by filtering the timeline to events within the same window using timestamp: [“2026-02-18T09:09:00Z” TO “2026-02-18T09:12:00Z”].

Scrolling through the search results, an entry from Java’s systemd journal can be identified. This log contains the full, unaltered payload. GCHQ’s CyberChef can then be used to decode the Base64 data into the attacker’s script, which will ultimately be executed.[NJ9]

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About the author
Nathaniel Bill
Malware Research Engineer

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February 19, 2026

CVE-2026-1731: How Darktrace Sees the BeyondTrust Exploitation Wave Unfolding

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Note: Darktrace's Threat Research team is publishing now to help defenders. We will continue updating this blog as our investigations unfold.

Background

On February 6, 2026, the Identity & Access Management solution BeyondTrust announced patches for a vulnerability, CVE-2026-1731, which enables unauthenticated remote code execution using specially crafted requests.  This vulnerability affects BeyondTrust Remote Support (RS) and particular older versions of Privileged Remote Access (PRA) [1].

A Proof of Concept (PoC) exploit for this vulnerability was released publicly on February 10, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) reported exploitation attempts within 24 hours [2].

Previous intrusions against Beyond Trust technology have been cited as being affiliated with nation-state attacks, including a 2024 breach targeting the U.S. Treasury Department. This incident led to subsequent emergency directives from  the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and later showed attackers had chained previously unknown vulnerabilities to achieve their goals [3].

Additionally, there appears to be infrastructure overlap with React2Shell mass exploitation previously observed by Darktrace, with command-and-control (C2) domain  avg.domaininfo[.]top seen in potential post-exploitation activity for BeyondTrust, as well as in a React2Shell exploitation case involving possible EtherRAT deployment.

Darktrace Detections

Darktrace’s Threat Research team has identified highly anomalous activity across several customers that may relate to exploitation of BeyondTrust since February 10, 2026. Observed activities include:

Outbound connections and DNS requests for endpoints associated with Out-of-Band Application Security Testing; these services are commonly abused by threat actors for exploit validation.  Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

Suspicious executable file downloads. Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Outbound beaconing to rare domains. Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)
  • Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)
  • Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint
  • Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
  • Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

Unusual cryptocurrency mining activity. Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Compromise / Monero Mining
  • Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining

And model alerts for:

  • Compromise / Rare Domain Pointing to Internal IP

IT Defenders: As part of best practices, we highly recommend employing an automated containment solution in your environment. For Darktrace customers, please ensure that Autonomous Response is configured correctly. More guidance regarding this activity and suggested actions can be found in the Darktrace Customer Portal.  

Appendices

Potential indicators of post-exploitation behavior:

·      217.76.57[.]78 – IP address - Likely C2 server

·      hXXp://217.76.57[.]78:8009/index.js - URL -  Likely payload

·      b6a15e1f2f3e1f651a5ad4a18ce39d411d385ac7  - SHA1 - Likely payload

·      195.154.119[.]194 – IP address – Likely C2 server

·      hXXp://195.154.119[.]194/index.js - URL – Likely payload

·      avg.domaininfo[.]top – Hostname – Likely C2 server

·      104.234.174[.]5 – IP address - Possible C2 server

·      35da45aeca4701764eb49185b11ef23432f7162a – SHA1 – Possible payload

·      hXXp://134.122.13[.]34:8979/c - URL – Possible payload

·      134.122.13[.]34 – IP address – Possible C2 server

·      28df16894a6732919c650cc5a3de94e434a81d80 - SHA1 - Possible payload

References:

1.        https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1731

2.        https://www.securityweek.com/beyondtrust-vulnerability-targeted-by-hackers-within-24-hours-of-poc-release/

3.        https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-1731-critical-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-rce-beyondtrust-remote-support-rs-privileged-remote-access-pra/

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About the author
Emma Foulger
Global Threat Research Operations Lead
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