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March 13, 2024

Simulated vs. Real Malware: What You Need To Know

Learn how Darktrace distinguishes between simulated and real malware. Discover the advanced detection techniques used to protect your network.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Priya Thapa
Cyber Analyst
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13
Mar 2024

Distinguishing attack simulations from the real thing

In an era marked by the omnipresence of digital technologies and the relentless advancement of cyber threats, organizations face an ongoing battle to safeguard their digital environment. Although red and blue team exercises have long served as cornerstones in evaluating organizational defenses, their reliance on manual processes poses significant constraints [1]. Led by seasoned security professionals, these tests offer invaluable insights into security readiness but can be marred by their resource-intensive and infrequent testing cycles. The gaps between assessments leave organizations open to undetected vulnerabilities, compromising the true state of their security environment. In response to the ever-changing threat landscape, organizations are adopting a proactive stance towards cyber security to fortify their defenses.

At the forefront, these efforts tend to revolve around simulated attacks, a process designed to test an organization's security posture against both known and emerging threats in a safe and controlled environment [2]. These meticulously orchestrated simulations imitate the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed by actual adversaries and provide organizations with invaluable insights into their security resilience and vulnerabilities. By immersing themselves in simulated attack scenarios, security teams can proactively probe for vulnerabilities, adopt a more aggressive defense posture, and stay ahead of evolving cyber threats.

Distinguishing between simulated malware observations and authentic malware activities stands as a critical imperative for organizations bolstering their cyber defenses. While simulated platforms offer controlled scenarios for testing known attack patterns, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI can detect known and unknown threats, identify zero-day threats, and previously unseen malware variants, including attack simulations. Whereas simulated platforms focus on specific known attack vectors, Darktrace DETECT™ and Darktrace RESPOND™ can identify and contain both known and unknown threats across the entire attack surface, providing unparalleled protection of the cyber estate.

Darktrace’s Coverage of Simulated Attacks

In January 2024, the Darktrace Security Operations Center (SOC) received a high volume of alerts relating to an unspecified malware strain that was affecting multiple customers across the fleet, raising concerns, and prompting the Darktrace Analyst team to swiftly investigate the multitude of incident. Initially, these activities were identified as malicious, exhibiting striking resemblance to the characteristics of Remcos, a sophisticated remote access trojan (RAT) that can be used to fully control and monitor any Windows computer from XP and onwards [3]. However, further investigation revealed that these activities were intricately linked to a simulated malware provider.

This discovery underscores a pivotal insight into Darktrace’s capabilities. To this point, leveraging advanced AI, Darktrace operates with a sophisticated framework that extends beyond conventional threat detection. By analyzing network behavior and anomalies, Darktrace not only discerns between simulated threats, such as those orchestrated by breach and attack simulation platforms and genuine malicious activities but can also autonomously respond to these threats with RESPOND. This showcases Darktrace’s advanced capabilities in effectively mitigating cyber threats.

Attack Simulation Process: Initial Access and Intrusion

Darktrace initially observed devices breaching several DETECT models relating to the hostname “new-tech-savvy[.]com”, an endpoint that was flagged as malicious by multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) vendors [4].

In addition, multiple HTML Application (HTA) file downloads were observed from the malicious endpoint, “new-tech-savvy[.]com/5[.]hta”. HTA files are often seen as part of the UAC-0050 campaign, known for its cyber-attacks against Ukrainian targets, which tends to leverage the Remcos RAT with advanced evasion techniques [5] [6]. Such files are often critical components of a malware operation, serving as conduits for the deployment of malicious payloads onto a compromised system. Often, within the HTA file resides a VBScript which, upon execution, triggers a PowerShell script. This PowerShell script is designed to facilitate the download of a malicious payload, namely “word_update.exe”, from a remote server. Upon successful execution, “word_update.exe” is launched, invoking cmd.exe and initiating the sharing of malicious data. This process results in the execution of explorer.exe, with the malicious RemcosRAT concealed within the memory of explorer.exe. [7].

As the customers were subscribed to Darktrace’s Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) service, an Enhanced Monitoring model was breached upon detection of the malicious HTA file. Enhanced Monitoring models are high-fidelity DETECT models designed to identify activity likely to be indicative of compromise. These PTN alerts were swiftly investigated by Darktrace’s round the clock SOC team.

Following this successful detection, Darktrace RESPOND took immediate action by autonomously blocking connections to the malicious endpoint, effectively preventing additional download attempts. Similar activity may be seen in the case of a legitimate malware attack; however, in this instance, the hostname associated with the download confirmed the detected malicious activity was the result of an attack simulation.

Figure 1: The Breach Log displays the model breach, “Anomalous File/Incoming HTA File”, where a device was detected downloading the HTA file, “5.hta” from the endpoint, “new-tech-savvy[.]com”.
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Figure 2: The Model Breach Event Log shows a device making connections to the endpoint, “new-tech-savvy[.]com”. As a result, theRESPOND model, “Antigena/Network/External Threat/Antigena File then New Outbound Block", breached and connections to this malicious endpoint were blocked.
Figure 3: The Breach Log further showcases another RESPOND model, “Antigena/Network/External Threat/Antigena Suspicious File Block", which was triggered when the device downloaded a  HTA file from the malicious endpoint, “new-tech-savvy[.]com".

In other cases, Darktrace observed SSL and HTTP connections also attributed to the same simulated malware provider, highlighting Darktrace’s capability to distinguish between legitimate and simulated malware attack activity.

Figure 4: The Model Breach “Anomalous Connection/Low and Slow Exfiltration" displays the hostname of a simulated malware provider, confirming the detected malicious activity as the result of an attack simulation.
Figure 5: The Model Breach Event Log shows the SSL connections made to an endpoint associated with the simulated malware provider.
Figure 6: Darktrace’s Advanced Search displays SSL connection logs to the endpoint of the simulated malware provider around the time the simulation activity was observed.

Upon detection of the malicious activity occurring within affected customer networks, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst™ investigated and correlated the events at machine speed. Figure 8 illustrates the synopsis and additional technical information that AI Analyst generated on one customer’s environment, detailing that over 220 HTTP queries to 18 different endpoints for a single device were seen. The investigation process can also be seen in the screenshot, showcasing Darktrace’s ability to provide ‘explainable AI’ detail. AI Analyst was able to autonomously search for all HTTP connections made by the breach device and identified a single suspicious software agent making one HTTP request to the endpoint, 45.95.147[.]236.

Furthermore, the malicious endpoints, 45.95.147[.]236, previously observed in SSH attacks using brute-force or stolen credentials, and “tangible-drink.surge[.]sh”, associated with the Androxgh0st malware [8] [9] [10], were detected to have been requested by another device.

This highlights Darktrace’s ability to link and correlate seemingly separate events occurring on different devices, which could indicate a malicious attack spreading across the network.  AI Analyst was also able to identify a username associated with the simulated malware prior to the activity through Kerberos Authentication Service (AS) requests. The device in question was also tagged as a ‘Security Device’ – such tags provide human analysts with valuable context about expected device activity, and in this case, the tag corroborates with the testing activity seen. This exemplifies how Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst takes on the labor-intensive task of analyzing thousands of connections to hundreds of endpoints at a rapid pace, then compiling results into a single pane that provides customer security teams with the information needed to evaluate activities observed on a device.

All in all, this demonstrates how Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI is capable of offering an unparalleled level of awareness and visibility over any anomalous and potentially malicious behavior on the network, saving security teams and administrators a great deal of time.

Figure 7: Cyber AI Analyst Incident Log containing a summary of the attack simulation activity,, including relevant technical details, and the AI investigation process.

Conclusion

Simulated cyber-attacks represent the ever-present challenge of testing and validating security defenses, while the threat of legitimate compromise exemplifies the constant risk of cyber threats in today’s digital landscape. Darktrace emerges as the solution to this conflict, offering real-time detection and response capabilities that identify and mitigate simulated and authentic threats alike.

While simulations are crafted to mimic legitimate threats within predefined parameters and controlled environments, the capabilities of Darktrace DETECT transcend these limitations. Even in scenarios where intent is not malicious, Darktrace’s ability to identify anomalies and raise alerts remains unparalleled. Moreover, Darktrace’s AI Analyst and autonomous response technology, RESPOND, underscore Darktrace’s indispensable role in safeguarding organizations against emerging threats.

Credit to Priya Thapa, Cyber Analyst, Tiana Kelly, Cyber Analyst & Analyst Team Lead

Appendices

Model Breaches

Darktrace DETECT Model Breach Coverage

Anomalous File / Incoming HTA File

Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration

Darktrace RESPOND Model Breach Coverage

§  Antigena / Network/ External Threat/ Antigena File then New Outbound Block

Cyber AI Analyst Incidents

• Possible HTTP Command and Control

• Suspicious File Download

List of IoCs

IP Address

38.52.220[.]2 - Malicious Endpoint

46.249.58[.]40 - Malicious Endpoint

45.95.147[.]236 - Malicious Endpoint

Hostname

tangible-drink.surge[.]sh - Malicious Endpoint

new-tech-savvy[.]com - Malicious Endpoint

References

1.     https://xmcyber.com/glossary/what-are-breach-and-attack-simulations/

2.     https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/glossary/what-is-an-attack-simulation

3.     https://success.trendmicro.com/dcx/s/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information?language=en_US&sfdcIFrameOrigin=null

4.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/c145cf7010545791602e9585f447347c75e5f19a0850a24e12a89325ded88735

5.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/7afd19e5696570851e6413d08b6f0c8bd42f4b5a19d1e1094e0d1eb4d2e62ce5

6.     https://thehackernews.com/2024/01/uac-0050-group-using-new-phishing.html

7.     https://www.uptycs.com/blog/remcos-rat-uac-0500-pipe-method

8.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/45.95.147.236/community

9.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/tangible-drink.surge.sh/community

10.  https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-016a

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Priya Thapa
Cyber Analyst

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October 22, 2026

Vulnerability Discovery to Active Attacks: AI in Cyber Operations

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The disclosure of CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 placed immediate pressure on organizations running PHP. Both vulnerabilities can allow unauthenticated remote code execution, including in products and appliances where PHP is embedded, and updates depend on third-party vendors [1].

Early guidance focused on patching internet-facing systems and monitoring for behavior associated with successful exploitation, including unexpected command execution, Webroot changes and outbound connections from PHP servers.

Darktrace observed widespread scanning across monitored environments involving hundreds of distinct source IP addresses that public reporting has associated with activity targeting the PHP vulnerabilities. The volume of scanning was significantly greater than the evidence available for successful exploitation. For analysts, that distinction is important. Scanning demonstrates interest in exposed infrastructure; establishing compromise requires evidence of subsequent behavior on the targeted system, including command execution, file modification or unexpected outbound communication.

While Darktrace has not observed direct evidence of CVE-2026-109618 or CVE-2026-109619 exploitation, on October 21st we observed a six-month high in detections consistent with zero-day exploitation activity, representing a 64% increase compared to historic data. This increase has not been confirmed as related to the PHP vulnerabilities. Darktrace’s behavioral approach is designed to detect anomalous activity without relying solely on rules written for a specific exploit. Comparable increases were observed around the Log4j disclosure and other globally significant vulnerability disclosures.

AI-assisted vulnerability research

The PHP disclosure arrives as AI systems have become more capable at vulnerability research [2]. OpenAI launched Daybreak in June 2026, combining GPT-5.5-Cyber, Codex Security and partnerships with security researchers and software maintainers. OpenAI says its models have been applied to discovering and generating patches for vulnerabilities in browsers, network infrastructure, FreeBSD and the Linux kernel. Darktrace joined the OpenAI Daybreak Cyber Partner Program in June to explore how OpenAI's cyber capabilities could be integrated within Darktrace products and services [3][9].

OpenAI reported in August that Codex Security Cloud had analyzed more than 30 million commits across more than 30,000 codebases. According to OpenAI, Cloudflare uses models accessed through Daybreak to investigate customer-authorized code and combines findings with live traffic and security signals to assess whether affected routes are active or receiving suspicious traffic, with proposed mitigations and patches remaining subject to customer review [4][5].

Faster discovery still leaves defenders with the work of locating affected software, testing fixes and completing remediation. The PHP case shows that gap clearly, particularly when vulnerable runtimes are embedded inside other products.

Enterprise agents as an attack surface

Darktrace Signal Labs has also examined how a trusted enterprise agent could be abused after an attacker has already obtained access to an environment. In a controlled simulation, researchers demonstrated that, in that post-compromise scenario, the Claude platform’s memory stores feature could be abused to establish a live C2 channel between an external operator and internal Claude Code agents. The external operator was able to dynamically assign network discovery, credential access, and data exfiltration tasks to the agents via this C2 channel. Detection of the agents’ activities relied on the correlation of process creation and network traffic activity from agent harness processes, alongside behavioral analysis to identify deviations from expected behavior. Darktrace has not claimed it observed this memory-store command-and-control technique in operational attacks [6].

AI-assisted attacks in Japan

Evidence from Japan indicates AI being used for vulnerability scanning and attacks outside controlled research. On 21 October, JPCERT/CC published findings from an investigation into recent unauthorized access incidents affecting organizations in Japan. JPCERT/CC states that it confirmed attackers had used AI to scan for known vulnerabilities and conduct attacks through APIs. According to JPCERT/CC, its examination of attack infrastructure found evidence of Android application analysis, API discovery and testing for weaknesses including server-side request forgery, and the infrastructure also targeted services intended for users outside Japan [7].

JPCERT/CC does not identify ARTEX by name in that publication. The named ARTEX attribution comes from separate investigations, including Microsoft's analysis of Storm-0940.

AI in Offensive Operations

Microsoft describes ARTEX as an open-source, multi-agent penetration-testing system capable of automating activity with limited human interaction. Microsoft reported that Storm-0940, which it assesses to be a China state-aligned actor active since 2021, used ARTEX against hundreds of organizations, and Microsoft attributed the ConnectWise supply-chain compromise [8].

Microsoft observed ARTEX accelerating scanning, reconnaissance, password spraying and OAuth application abuse. Several ARTEX-driven operations reached privileged cloud access less than three hours after initial targeting. Following the ConnectWise compromise, Storm-0940 attempted to authenticate to more than 2,250 tenants at rates of up to 2,900 attempts per minute [8].

Darktrace Threat Research found activity in its own telemetry involving infrastructure later associated with the campaign. On 13 October, Darktrace recorded failed authentication activity involving 144.172.64[.]128, one of the addresses Microsoft later identified as performing sign-ins and Microsoft Graph activity in ConnectWise customer environments. Darktrace analysis identified 65 failed authentication attempts in around 20 minutes.

Figure 1: Darktrace Advanced Search showing failed authentication events involving 144.172.64[.]128 on 13 October 2026, (customer-identifying information redacted).

The telemetry establishes repeated failed authentication from infrastructure later associated with the campaign. It does not establish ARTEX execution or successful compromise. At the time of observation, Microsoft's later attribution was unavailable. Analysts therefore had the behavior itself: repeated failed authentication from the same source over a short period, together with any related identity, application or network activity inside the environment.

Microsoft documented a wider password-spray campaign against 327 accounts across eight organizations between 10 and 14 October. It recorded more than 151,000 failed logons, including more than 111,000 on 11 October, but no successful authentication, token issuance, Graph call or directory change from that campaign. Microsoft also reported that most Storm-0940 targeting was unsuccessful [8].

Where the actor progressed beyond authentication, Microsoft observed service-principal sign-ins followed by Graph and directory operations. Activity included reconnaissance, application credential changes and attempts to modify privileges. Microsoft recommends correlating service-principal sign-ins with Graph activity, directory changes and resource access [8].

Behavior before Attribution

The PHP and ARTEX cases begin with different information. PHP defenders knew which software required urgent remediation but initially had limited information about exploitation. Process execution, file modification and outbound communication could still provide evidence of compromise.

The PHP and ARTEX observations also illustrate the difference between volume and impact. Darktrace observed broad scanning around the PHP disclosure, while the ARTEX-associated infrastructure produced concentrated authentication activity. Neither observation independently demonstrates compromise and in each case examining the behavior that follows the initial interaction is the investigative clue.

The Darktrace ARTEX-related observation began with authentication behavior. Microsoft publicly attributed the source infrastructure eight days later. That attribution added context, but it did not change what had originally been recorded in the environment.

AI is now present at several points in this cycle. Daybreak applies models to vulnerability discovery and remediation. Darktrace Signal Labs demonstrated how a trusted enterprise agent could be co-opted in a controlled environment. JPCERT/CC confirmed AI-assisted vulnerability scanning and API attacks in recent incidents. Microsoft documented ARTEX being used by Storm-0940 in active operations [3][6][7][8].

Microsoft's findings also show why scale and impact must be assessed separately. One ARTEX-associated campaign produced more than 151,000 failed logons without successful access, while other operations reached privileged cloud access in less than three hours. Security teams have to distinguish high-volume attempts from activity that progresses through authentication, privilege changes and resource access.

The evidence required to assess these cases remains familiar: authentication records, process execution, application and directory changes, file activity and network communication. AI can increase the rate at which those behaviors occur. Defenders still need to establish their sequence and impact.

Credit to Emma Foulger, Sam Lister, Dylan Evans, Moishe Tajtelbaum

References

[1] NCSC-NL, php2shell vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619), 21 October 2026. https://github.com/NCSC-NL/php2shell

[2] Cyber Security Agency of Singapore, https://www.csa.gov.sg/alerts-and-advisories/alerts/al-2026-151/

[3] OpenAI, Daybreak: Tools for securing every organization in the world, 22 June 2026. https://openai.com/index/daybreak-securing-the-world/

[4] OpenAI Developers, Scaling cyber defenders with Daybreak, 21 August 2026. https://developers.openai.com/blog/scaling-cyber-defenders-with-daybreak

[5] OpenAI, Cloudflare links vulnerability discovery to defense with OpenAI, 21 October 2026. https://openai.com/index/cloudflare-cyber/

[6] Darktrace Signal Labs, Shared Memories as a Covert C2 Channel, draft research supplied for review.

[7] JPCERT/CC, Recent AI-Assisted Cyber Attacks in Japan: Investigating Attack Infrastructure and Techniques, 21 October 2026. https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2026/10/web_api_attacks.html

[8] Microsoft Security Research and Microsoft Threat Intelligence, AI-driven, large-scale nation-state campaign using ARTEX enables supply chain compromise, 21 October 2026. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/21/storm-0940-uses-artex-agentic-ai-connectwise-supply-chain-compromise/

[9] Darktrace, Advancing the Use of Frontier AI in Cybersecurity: Darktrace Joins the OpenAI Daybreak Cyber Partner Program to Explore Defensive AI Integrations, 22 June 2026. https://www.darktrace.com/blog/advancing-the-use-of-frontier-ai-in-cybersecurity-darktrace-joins-the-openai-daybreak-cyber-partner-program-to-explore-defensive-ai-integrations

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October 21, 2026

Beyond the Fridge: Exposed Industrial Control Systems

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Introduction

In October 2026, hundreds of supermarkets across France were reportedly affected by a cyberattack targeting their refrigeration systems. According to public reports, the attackers gained access to internet-connected controllers and modified their settings, forcing refrigeration units into high and extremely low temperatures and causing significant disruption. Total losses have been reported to reach several million euros.

The incident drew attention to the security of industrial refrigeration systems, particularly older devices with exposed management interfaces and known vulnerabilities.

The exact details of how the attackers gained access have not been confirmed, however it is speculated that the public-facing web server could be accessed with the username “admin” and password being the current date. Researchers from Claroty’s Team82 identified a vulnerability in Danfoss AK-SM 8xxA Series in 2025, “CVE-2025-41450", allowing for administrative access using a time-based “code-of-the-day" for authentication [1].

Default credentials, outdated firmware and publicly accessible administrative interfaces have been an issue for years. And yet these systems continue to appear in internet scans and require little sophistication to gain admin access. A simple search of internet-connected devices shows a range of exposed devices from Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and remote gateways, to, yes, more fridges.

Darktrace malware researchers identified hundreds of IoT and OT devices publicly exposed on the internet, many of which are configured with no authentication, weak credentials, or default credentials. As shown in Figure 1, an exposed Copeland XWEB web interface, used to manage Dixell equipment, including refrigerators, can provide the ability to remotely control connected devices.

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Figure 1: Copeland XWEB interface used to control systems including refrigerators and air conditioning.

However, it’s not only fridges; web management interfaces for industrial controls are also publicly accessible, often protected only by weak credentials. Figure 2 shows an example of a publicly exposed WAGO interface. The WAGO management interface is a configuration and administration panel for controllers. Through it, a logged-in user can view device details and diagnostics, manage user accounts and passwords, update firmware, back up or restore the full configuration, set the clock, and manage SD card storage. While it typically doesn’t manage switch outputs or read live process values, someone with access could still disrupt operation by changing network or Modbus settings, loading bad firmware or configurations, or by resetting passwords and enabling insecure services.

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Figure 2: WAGO Management interface.

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The issue extends beyond management interfaces. During our research, we identified publicly accessible web interfaces belonging to PLCs, including Rockwell Automation Allen-Bradley devices. In each case, the risk arises from how the devices have been deployed and configured, not from a flaw in the vendors’ products.

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Figure 3: Web interface for Allen-Bradley CompactLogix controller.

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Figure 3 shows the web interface of an Allen-Bradley CompactLogix controller. Unlike the previous examples, this interface provides a view into the controller's operation, including running tasks, network connections, memory usage and diagnostic information. Rockwell Automation's CompactLogix controllers are commonly used to automate industrial processes, from manufacturing and packaging lines to water treatment and material handling systems. Depending on their configuration, these controllers can operate motors, pumps, valves and other physical equipment.

Although in this example the interface shown does not provide direct control over the PLC's logic, it exposes information about the model, firmware, network layout, and connections, which is useful reconnaissance for a bigger attack.

The concern is not necessarily that every exposed interface allows an attacker to immediately manipulate industrial processes. However, these devices are accessible from the public internet in the first place, providing information about systems that may be responsible for controlling physical equipment.

The attacks on refrigeration systems in France highlight the consequences of poorly secured industrial devices. As demonstrated throughout this research, publicly accessible management interfaces are not limited to refrigeration controllers but extend to PLCs and other systems used to manage industrial equipment.

Finding these devices requires little effort. Internet scanners make it possible to identify publicly exposed interfaces quickly, and in some cases these interfaces rely on publicly documented default credentials or have no authentication at all. As attackers increasingly use AI tools, such attacks may be identified and carried out faster and at a greater scale.

The consequences of this access depend on the device and the functionality exposed. While some interfaces provide little more than diagnostic information, others allow users to modify configurations, disrupt communications, or change settings that affect physical equipment. In industrial environments, this can result in operational downtime, damaged equipment and financial losses.

Weak passwords, default credentials and exposed administrative interfaces are not new security issues. Yet their continued presence on internet-connected industrial systems demonstrates how easily preventable weaknesses can leave physical operations vulnerable to attack.

Exposed devices often come from third-party suppliers and contractors, who frequently install refrigeration controllers, gateways and PLCs without the organization ever being aware they are connected to the internet. Asset visibility remains an important foundation, but organizations should assume that some unknown assets and services will exist. Effective security therefore also depends on continuous monitoring, anomaly detection, network segmentation and rapid response, so that risky exposure and unusual activity can be identified and addressed before it becomes disruptive.

Darktrace helps security teams gain visibility across IT and OT and respond to risks: https://www.darktrace.com/products/operational-technology.

Copeland, Dixell, WAGO, Rockwell Automation, Allen-Bradley and CompactLogix are trademarks of their respective owners. Their use here is for identification only and does not imply any affiliation with or endorsement by those owners.

References

1.        https://claroty.com/team82/research/freeze-the-controller-defrost-the-food-uncovering-vulnerabilities-in-danfoss-refrigeration-controllers

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Tara Gould
Malware Research Lead
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