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October 1, 2017

Feodo Banking Trojan Threatens Government Network

Learn how AI detected new Feodo banking Trojan on a government network and the resurgence of the Feodo banking trojan on a government network.
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Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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01
Oct 2017

Famous malware like Zeus, Conficker, and CryptoLocker are still some of the most common threats globally. By repurposing and repackaging known threats like these, attackers can create unknown variants that bypass signature-based security tools.

For instance, an older class of banking Trojans – known as Feodo – recently cropped up again on the network of a local US government. However, this particular strain had a key differentiator.

Darktrace detected the malware when it first was downloaded onto the government’s network. After analysis, the malware was found to be consistent with two well-documented Trojans in the Feodo family: Dridex and Emotet.

Traditionally, Trojans in the Feodo family will infect just a single device, but this attack immediately began propagating on the network, spreading to over 200 devices in a matter of hours.

The incident is part of an emerging trend of similar infections, suggesting that the Feodo family of Trojans is undergoing a resurgence, but this time retooled with ability to rapidly spread across the network.

Darktrace first detected the threat when an internal device made a series of anomalous SSL connections to IPs with self-signed certificates. The abnormal connections were a deviation from what Darktrace’s AI algorithms had learned to be normal, triggering Darktrace to raise the first in a series of alerts.

Time: 2017-04-26 11:38:05 [UTC]
Source: 172.16.14.39
Destination: 76.164.161.46
Destination Port: 995
Protocol: SSL
Version: TLSv12 [Considered HIGH security]
Cipher: TLS_RSA_WI TH_AES_256_ GCM_SHA384 [Considered HIGH security]
UID: CbenK822ViUMxJok00

The identical IP certificate subject and issuer:
Subject: CN=euwtrdjuee.biz,OU=Tslspyqh Dfxdekt Brftapckwr,O=Kaqt Aooscr LLC.,street=132 Vfjteuadivm Fklhnxdmza.,L=Elqazgap Nvax,ST=XI,C=PO
Issuer: CN=euwtrdjuee.biz,OU=Tslspyqh Dfxdekt Brftapckwr,O=Kaqt Aooscr LLC.,street=132 Vfjteuadivm Fklhnxdmza.,L=Elqazgap Nvax,ST=XI,C=PO

The device proceeded to download an anomalous ZIP file from an unusual external server. The email purported to be a notification from FedEx, and the file was disguised as an attachment containing tracking numbers. The download was nearly identical to the malicious files usually seen in Dridex and Emotet infections.

Time: 2017-04-28 16:01:03 [UTC]
Source: 172.16.14.39
Destination: 89.38.128.232
Destination Port: 80/tcp
Protocol: HTTP
Path: hxxp://XX[.]ro/UPS__Ship__Notification__Tracking__Number__2SM099383266006810/Y0894C/FEDEX-TRACK/track-tracknumbers-673639733202/
Filename: fedex-track-tracknumbers-133977976498-language-en.zip
Mime Type: application/zip

After downloading the ZIP, the device wrote an executable file to a second device via SMB. This strongly suggested that the infection was spreading, and quickly.

Time: 2017-04-28 16:52:57 [UTC]
Source: 172.16.14.39
Destination: 172.16.10.41
Destination Port: 445/tcp
Protocol: SMB
Action: write
Filename: tptzfqa.exe
Path: \\PU12881\C$
Write Size: 65536
UID: Cxq64s3tCi1vq4Uo00

The graph shows the internal connectivity of the initial device. The spike in activity, which includes numerous alerts due to unusual behavior, occurs immediately following the SMB write made by the original device.

Devices across the network started to mimic this activity by performing the same type of SMB write, each time with the same amount of data – 65536B – and a random string of characters followed by the .exe filetype.

Meanwhile, the initial device was flagged for making a large number of SMB and Kerberos login attempts. At this point, the infection had spread to over 200 devices, which were all attempting to bruteforce passwords using the same credentials as the original device, in addition to standard usernames like ‘Administrator’ and ‘misadmin’.

Bruteforcing over SMB is consistent with lateral movement seen in recent instances of Emotet, in which the Trojan was seen with new, built-in functionality designed for network propagation.

As the malware continued to spread in the government network, devices began making anomalous SSL connections without SNI (Server Name Indication).

This series of anomalies represented a massive deviation from the network’s normal ‘pattern of life’, causing the Enterprise Immune System to raise three high-priority alerts in real time: one alert for the SMB session bruteforce, another for the Kerberos activity, and another for the anomalous SSL connections without SNI.

The final anomaly occurred when devices made a flurry of unusual DNS requests for DGA-generated domains, often involving rare TLDs such as .biz and .info. The DNS requests illustrate a sophisticated method to disguise communications to the attacker’s command and control centers. Darktrace’s AI algorithms deemed this domain fluxing activity to be highly unusual compared to ordinary behavior, thus raising one final alert before the security team was able to intervene.

A sample of the DNS requests:

15:33:00 hd12530.mi.SALTEDHAZE.org made a successful DNS request for rbqfkjjemttqumeobxb.org to dc1-2012.mi.[REDACTED].org
15:33:10 hd12530.mi.SALTEDHAZE.org made a successful DNS request for tmmiqtsdnkjdcqr.biz to dc1-2012.mi.SALTEDHAZE.org
15:33:20 hd12530.mi.SALTEDHAZE.org made a successful DNS request for mehqdlodsgggehchxdwfsmmoq.biz to dc1-2012.mi.SALTEDHAZE.org

Taken on their own, each of these anomalies could be explained as an isolated incident or perhaps a false-positive. But taken together, they form a broader picture of a widespread and aggressive infection, in which an external hacker had taken control of over 200 devices and was using them to attempt to harvest the users’ banking credentials and transfer funds into their own account.

In accordance with the Feodo family of banking Trojans, the malware was likely attempting to steal banking credentials by intercepting web form submissions. Yet, by adding the ability to spread through the network, the attacker was able to create a completely novel attack type that circumvented the perimeter security controls and infected over 200 devices.

As the threat progressed, the Enterprise Immune System raised real-time alerts and revealed in-depth details on the nature of the compromise. Using this information, the government’s security team was able to remediate the situation before any banking credentials could be stolen.

To learn more about the threats Darktrace finds, check out our Threat Use Cases page which discusses a host of other novel infections that were stopped by the Enterprise Immune System.

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Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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July 3, 2025

Top Eight Threats to SaaS Security and How to Combat Them

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The latest on the identity security landscape

Following the mass adoption of remote and hybrid working patterns, more critical data than ever resides in cloud applications – from Salesforce and Google Workspace, to Box, Dropbox, and Microsoft 365.

On average, a single organization uses 130 different Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) applications, and 45% of organizations reported experiencing a cybersecurity incident through a SaaS application in the last year.

As SaaS applications look set to remain an integral part of the digital estate, organizations are being forced to rethink how they protect their users and data in this area.

What is SaaS security?

SaaS security is the protection of cloud applications. It includes securing the apps themselves as well as the user identities that engage with them.

Below are the top eight threats that target SaaS security and user identities.

1.  Account Takeover (ATO)

Attackers gain unauthorized access to a user’s SaaS or cloud account by stealing credentials through phishing, brute-force attacks, or credential stuffing. Once inside, they can exfiltrate data, send malicious emails, or escalate privileges to maintain persistent access.

2. Privilege escalation

Cybercriminals exploit misconfigurations, weak access controls, or vulnerabilities to increase their access privileges within a SaaS or cloud environment. Gaining admin or superuser rights allows attackers to disable security settings, create new accounts, or move laterally across the organization.

3. Lateral movement

Once inside a network or SaaS platform, attackers move between accounts, applications, and cloud workloads to expand their foot- hold. Compromised OAuth tokens, session hijacking, or exploited API connections can enable adversaries to escalate access and exfiltrate sensitive data.

4. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) bypass and session hijacking

Threat actors bypass MFA through SIM swapping, push bombing, or exploiting session cookies. By stealing an active authentication session, they can access SaaS environments without needing the original credentials or MFA approval.

5. OAuth token abuse

Attackers exploit OAuth authentication mechanisms by stealing or abusing tokens that grant persistent access to SaaS applications. This allows them to maintain access even if the original user resets their password, making detection and mitigation difficult.

6. Insider threats

Malicious or negligent insiders misuse their legitimate access to SaaS applications or cloud platforms to leak data, alter configurations, or assist external attackers. Over-provisioned accounts and poor access control policies make it easier for insiders to exploit SaaS environments.

7. Application Programming Interface (API)-based attacks

SaaS applications rely on APIs for integration and automation, but attackers exploit insecure endpoints, excessive permissions, and unmonitored API calls to gain unauthorized access. API abuse can lead to data exfiltration, privilege escalation, and service disruption.

8. Business Email Compromise (BEC) via SaaS

Adversaries compromise SaaS-based email platforms (e.g., Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace) to send phishing emails, conduct invoice fraud, or steal sensitive communications. BEC attacks often involve financial fraud or data theft by impersonating executives or suppliers.

BEC heavily uses social engineering techniques, tailoring messages for a specific audience and context. And with the growing use of generative AI by threat actors, BEC is becoming even harder to detect. By adding ingenuity and machine speed, generative AI tools give threat actors the ability to create more personalized, targeted, and convincing attacks at scale.

Protecting against these SaaS threats

Traditionally, security leaders relied on tools that were focused on the attack, reliant on threat intelligence, and confined to a single area of the digital estate.

However, these tools have limitations, and often prove inadequate for contemporary situations, environments, and threats. For example, they may lack advanced threat detection, have limited visibility and scope, and struggle to integrate with other tools and infrastructure, especially cloud platforms.

AI-powered SaaS security stays ahead of the threat landscape

New, more effective approaches involve AI-powered defense solutions that understand the digital business, reveal subtle deviations that indicate cyber-threats, and action autonomous, targeted responses.

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Carlos Gray
Senior Product Marketing Manager, Email

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July 2, 2025

Pre-CVE Threat Detection: 10 Examples Identifying Malicious Activity Prior to Public Disclosure of a Vulnerability

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Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in a system that can be exploited by malicious actors to gain unauthorized access or to disrupt normal operations. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (or CVEs) are a list of publicly disclosed cybersecurity vulnerabilities that can be tracked and mitigated by the security community.

When a vulnerability is discovered, the standard practice is to report it to the vendor or the responsible organization, allowing them to develop and distribute a patch or fix before the details are made public. This is known as responsible disclosure.

With a record-breaking 40,000 CVEs reported for 2024 and a predicted higher number for 2025 by the Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) [1], anomaly-detection is essential for identifying these potential risks. The gap between exploitation of a zero-day and disclosure of the vulnerability can sometimes be considerable, and retroactively attempting to identify successful exploitation on your network can be challenging, particularly if taking a signature-based approach.

Detecting threats without relying on CVE disclosure

Abnormal behaviors in networks or systems, such as unusual login patterns or data transfers, can indicate attempted cyber-attacks, insider threats, or compromised systems. Since Darktrace does not rely on rules or signatures, it can detect malicious activity that is anomalous even without full context of the specific device or asset in question.

For example, during the Fortinet exploitation late last year, the Darktrace Threat Research team were investigating a different Fortinet vulnerability, namely CVE 2024-23113, for exploitation when Mandiant released a security advisory around CVE 2024-47575, which aligned closely with Darktrace’s findings.

Retrospective analysis like this is used by Darktrace’s threat researchers to better understand detections across the threat landscape and to add additional context.

Below are ten examples from the past year where Darktrace detected malicious activity days or even weeks before a vulnerability was publicly disclosed.

ten examples from the past year where Darktrace detected malicious activity days or even weeks before a vulnerability was publicly disclosed.

Trends in pre-cve exploitation

Often, the disclosure of an exploited vulnerability can be off the back of an incident response investigation related to a compromise by an advanced threat actor using a zero-day. Once the vulnerability is registered and publicly disclosed as having been exploited, it can kick off a race between the attacker and defender: attack vs patch.

Nation-state actors, highly skilled with significant resources, are known to use a range of capabilities to achieve their target, including zero-day use. Often, pre-CVE activity is “low and slow”, last for months with high operational security. After CVE disclosure, the barriers to entry lower, allowing less skilled and less resourced attackers, like some ransomware gangs, to exploit the vulnerability and cause harm. This is why two distinct types of activity are often seen: pre and post disclosure of an exploited vulnerability.

Darktrace saw this consistent story line play out during several of the Fortinet and PAN OS threat actor campaigns highlighted above last year, where nation-state actors were seen exploiting vulnerabilities first, followed by ransomware gangs impacting organizations [2].

The same applies with the recent SAP Netweaver exploitations being tied to a China based threat actor earlier this spring with subsequent ransomware incidents being observed [3].

Autonomous Response

Anomaly-based detection offers the benefit of identifying malicious activity even before a CVE is disclosed; however, security teams still need to quickly contain and isolate the activity.

For example, during the Ivanti chaining exploitation in the early part of 2025, a customer had Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability enabled on their network. As a result, Darktrace was able to contain the compromise and shut down any ongoing suspicious connectivity by blocking internal connections and enforcing a “pattern of life” on the affected device.

This pre-CVE detection and response by Darktrace occurred 11 days before any public disclosure, demonstrating the value of an anomaly-based approach.

In some cases, customers have even reported that Darktrace stopped malicious exploitation of devices several days before a public disclosure of a vulnerability.

For example, During the ConnectWise exploitation, a customer informed the team that Darktrace had detected malicious software being installed via remote access. Upon further investigation, four servers were found to be impacted, while Autonomous Response had blocked outbound connections and enforced patterns of life on impacted devices.

Conclusion

By continuously analyzing behavioral patterns, systems can spot unusual activities and patterns from users, systems, and networks to detect anomalies that could signify a security breach.

Through ongoing monitoring and learning from these behaviors, anomaly-based security systems can detect threats that traditional signature-based solutions might miss, while also providing detailed insights into threat tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). This type of behavioral intelligence supports pre-CVE detection, allows for a more adaptive security posture, and enables systems to evolve with the ever-changing threat landscape.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO), Emma Fougler (Global Threat Research Operations Lead), Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

References and further reading:

  1. https://www.first.org/blog/20250607-Vulnerability-Forecast-for-2025
  2. https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/fortimanager-zero-day-exploitation-cve-2024-47575
  3. https://thehackernews.com/2025/05/china-linked-hackers-exploit-sap-and.html

Related Darktrace blogs:

*Self-reported by customer, confirmed afterwards.

**Updated January 2024 blog now reflects current findings

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