April 16, 2026

Inside ZionSiphon: Darktrace’s Analysis of OT Malware Targeting Israeli Water Systems

Darktrace analysis reveals ZionSiphon, an OT‑focused malware targeting Israeli water treatment and desalination systems. The malware combines privilege escalation, persistence, USB propagation, and ICS scanning with sabotage capabilities aimed at chlorine and pressure controls, highlighting growing experimentation with politically motivated critical ‑infrastructure attacks against industrial operational technologies globally.

Written by

Calum Hall

Technical Content Researcher

Inside the SOC

Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.

Written by

Calum Hall

Technical Content Researcher

Apr 2026

What is ZionSiphon?

Darktrace recently analyzed a malware sample, which identifies itself as ZionSiphon. This sample combines several familiar host-based capabilities, including privilege escalation, persistence, and removable-media propagation, with targeting logic themed around water treatment and desalination environments.

This blog details Darktrace’s investigation of ZionSiphon, focusing on how the malware identifies targets, establishes persistence, attempts to tamper with local configuration files, and scans for Operational Technology (OT)-relevant services on the local subnet. The analysis also assesses what the code suggests about the threat actor’s intended objectives and highlights where the implementation appears incomplete.

*Figure 1: Function “ZionSiphon()” used by the malware author.*

ZionSiphon targets and motivations

Israel-Focused Targeting and Messaging‍

The clearest indicators of intent in this sample are its hardcoded Israel-focused targeting checks and the strong political messaging found in some strings in the malware’s binary.

In the class initializer, the malware defines a set of IPv4 ranges, including “2.52.0.0-2.55.255.255”, “79.176.0.0-79.191.255.255”, and “212.150.0.0-212.150.255.255”, indicating that the author intended to restrict execution to a narrow range of addresses. All of the specified IP blocks are geographically located within Israel.

*Figure 2: The malware obfuscates the IP ranges by encoding them in Base64.*

The ideological motivations behind this malware are also seemingly evident in two Base64-encoded strings embedded in the binary. The first (shown in Figure 1) is:

“Netanyahu = SW4gc3VwcG9ydCBvZiBvdXIgYnJvdGhlcnMgaW4gSXJhbiwgUGFsZXN0aW5lLCBhbmQgWWVtZW4gYWdhaW5zdCBaaW9uaXN0IGFnZ3Jlc3Npb24uIEkgYW0gIjB4SUNTIi4=“, which decodes to “In support of our brothers in Iran, Palestine, and Yemen against Zionist aggression. I am "0xICS".

The second string, “Dimona = UG9pc29uaW5nIHRoZSBwb3B1bGF0aW9uIG9mIFRlbCBBdml2IGFuZCBIYWlmYQo=“, decodes to “Poisoning the population of Tel Aviv and Haifa”. These strings do not appear to be used by the malware for any operational purpose, but they do offer an indication of the attacker’s motivations. Dimona, referenced in the second string, is an Israeli city in the Negev desert, primarily known as the site of the Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center.

*Figure 3: The Dimona string as it appears in the decompiled malware, with the Base64-decoded text.*

The hardcoded IP ranges and propaganda‑style text suggest politically motivated intent, with Israel appearing to be a likely target.

Water and desalination-themed targeting?

The malware also includes Israel-linked strings in its target list, including “Mekorot, “Sorek”, “Hadera”, “Ashdod”, “Palmachim”, and “Shafdan”. All of the strings correspond to components of Israel’s national water infrastructure: Mekorot is Israel’s national water company responsible for managing the country’s water system, including major desalination and wastewater projects. Sorek, Hadera, Ashdod, and Palmachim are four of Israel’s five major seawater desalination plants, each producing tens of millions of cubic meters of drinking water annually. Shafdan is the country’s central wastewater treatment and reclamation facility. Their inclusion in ZionSiphon’s targeting list suggests an interest in infrastructure linked to Israel’s water sector.

*Figure 4: Strings in the target list, all related to Israel and water treatment.*

Beyond geographic targeting, the sample contains a second layer of environment-specific checks aimed at water treatment and desalination systems. In the function ”IsDamDesalinationPlant()”, the malware first inspects running process names for strings such as “DesalPLC”, “ROController”, “SchneiderRO”, “DamRO”, “ReverseOsmosis”, “WaterGenix”, “RO_Pump”, “ChlorineCtrl”, “WaterPLC”, “SeaWaterRO”, “BrineControl”, “OsmosisPLC”, “DesalMonitor”, “RO_Filter”, “ChlorineDose”, “RO_Membrane”, “DesalFlow”, “WaterTreat”, and “SalinityCtrl”. These strings are directly related to desalination, reverse osmosis, chlorine handling, and plant control components typically seen in the water treatment industry.

The filesystem checks reinforce this focus. The code looks for directories such as “C:\Program Files\Desalination”, “C:\Program Files\Schneider Electric\Desal”, “C:\Program Files\IDE Technologies”, “C:\Program Files\Water Treatment”, “C:\Program Files\RO Systems”, “C:\Program Files\DesalTech”, “C:\Program Files\Aqua Solutions”, and “C:\Program Files\Hydro Systems”, as well as files including “C:\DesalConfig.ini”, “C:\ROConfig.ini”, “C:\DesalSettings.conf”, “C:\Program Files\Desalination\system.cfg”, “C:\WaterTreatment.ini”, “C:\ChlorineControl.dat”, “C:\RO_PumpSettings.ini”, and “C:\SalinityControl.ini.”

Malware Analysis

Privilege Escalation

*Figure 5: The “RunAsAdmin” function from the malware sample.*

The malware’s first major action is to check whether it is running with administrative rights. The “RunAsAdmin()” function calls “IsElevated()”, which retrieves the current Windows identity and checks whether it belongs to the local Administrators group. If the process is already elevated, execution proceeds normally.

*Figure 6: The “IsElevated” function as seen in the sample.*

If not, the code waits on the named mutex and launches “powershell.exe” with the argument “Start-Process -FilePath <current executable> -Verb RunAs”, after which it waits for that process to finish and then exits. ‍

Persistence and stealth installation

Persistence is handled by “s1()”. This routine opens “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”, retrieves the current process path, and compares it to “stealthPath”. If the current file is not already running from that location, it copies itself to the stealth path and sets the copied file’s attributes to “hidden”.

The code then creates a “Run” value named “SystemHealthCheck” pointing to the stealth path. Because “stealthPath” is built from “LocalApplicationData” and the hardcoded filename “svchost.exe”, the result is a user-level persistence mechanism that disguises the payload under a familiar Windows process name. The combination of a hidden file and a plausible-sounding autorun value suggests an intent to blend into ordinary Windows artifacts rather than relying on more complex persistence methods.

Target determination

The malware’s targeting determination is divided between “IsTargetCountry()” and “IsDamDesalinationPlant()”. The “IsTargetCountry()” function retrieves the local IPv4 address, converts it to a numeric value, and compares it against each of the hardcoded ranges stored in “ipRanges”. Only if the address falls within one of these ranges does the code move on to next string-comparison step, which ultimately determines whether the country check succeeded.

*Figure 8: The main target validation function.*

“IsDamDesalinationPlant()” then assesses whether the host resembles a relevant OT environment. It first scans running process names for the hardcoded strings previously mentioned, followed by checks for the presence of any of the hardcoded directories or files. The intended logic is clear: the payload activates only when both a geographic condition and an environment specific condition related to desalination or water treatment are met.

*Figure. 10: An excerpt of the list of strings used in the “IsDamDesalinationPlant” function*

Why this version appears dysfunctional

Although the file contains sabotage, scanning, and propagation functions, the current sample appears unable to satisfy its own target-country checking function even when the reported IP falls within the specified ranges. In the static constructor, every “ipRanges” entry is associated with the same decoded string, “Nqvbdk”, derived from “TnF2YmRr”. Later, “IsTargetCountry()” (shown in Figure 8) compares that stored value against “EncryptDecrypt("Israel", 5)”.

*Figure 11: The “EncryptDecrypt” function*

As implemented, “EncryptDecrypt("Israel", 5)” does not produce “Nqvbdk”, it produces a different string. This function seems to be a basic XOR encode/decode routine, XORing the string “Israel” with value of 5. Because the resulting output does not match “Nqvbdk” the comparison always fails, even when the host IP falls within one of the specified ranges. As a result, this build appears to consistently determine that the device is not a valid target. This behavior suggests that the version is either intentionally disabled, incorrectly configured, or left in an unfinished state. In fact, there is no XOR key that would transform “Israel” into “Nqvbdk” using this function.‍

Self-destruct function

If IsTargetCountry() returns false, the malware invokes “SelfDestruct()”. This routine removes the SystemHealthCheck value from “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”, writes a log file to “%TEMP%\target_verify.log” containing the message “Target not matched. Operation restricted to IL ranges. Self-destruct initiated.” and creates the batch file “%TEMP%\delete.bat”. This file repeatedly attempts to delete the malware’s executable, before deleting itself.

Local configuration file tampering

If the malware determines that the system it is on is a valid target, its first action is local file tampering. “IncreaseChlorineLevel()” checks a hardcoded list of configuration files associated with desalination, reverse osmosis, chlorine control, and water treatment OT/Industrial Control Systems (ICS). As soon as it finds any one of these file present, it appends a fixed block of text to it and returns immediately.

*Figure 13: The block of text appended to relevant configuration files.*

The appended block of text contains the following entries: “Chlorine_Dose=10”, “Chlorine_Pump=ON”, “Chlorine_Flow=MAX”, “Chlorine_Valve=OPEN”, and “RO_Pressure=80”. Only if none of the hardcoded files are found does the malware proceed to its network-based OT discovery logic.

OT discovery and protocol logic

This section of the code attempts to identify devices on the local subnet, assign each one a protocol label, and then attempt protocol-specific communication. While the overall structure is consistent across protocols, the implementation quality varies significantly.

The discovery routine, “UZJctUZJctUZJct()”, obtains the local IPv4 address, reduces it to a /24 prefix, and iterates across hosts 1 through 255. For each host, it probes ports 502 (Modbus), 20000 (DNP3), and 102 (S7comm), which the code labels as “Modbus”, “DNP3”, and “S7” respectively if a valid response is received on the relevant port.

The probing is performed in parallel. For every “ip:port” combination, the code creates a task and attempts a TCP connection. The “100 ms” value in the probe routine is a per-connection timeout on “WaitOne(100, ...)”, rather than a delay between hosts or protocols. In practice, this results in a burst of short-lived OT-focused connection attempts across the local subnet.

Protocol validation and device classification

When a connection succeeds, the malware does not stop at the open port. It records the endpoint as an “ICSDevice” with an IP address, port, and protocol label. It then performs a second-stage validation by writing a NULL byte to the remote stream and reading the response that comes back.

For Modbus, the malware checks whether the first byte of the reply is between 1 and 255, for DNP3, it checks whether the first two bytes are “05 64”, and for S7comm, it checks whether the first byte is “03”. These checks are not advanced parsers, but they do show that the author understood the protocols well enough to add lightweight confirmation before sending follow-on data.

*Figure 15: The Modbus read request along with unfinished code for additional protocols.*

The most developed OT-specific logic is the Modbus-oriented path. In the function “IncreaseChlorineLevel(string targetIP, int targetPort, string parameter)”, the malware connects to the target and sends “01 03 00 00 00 0A”. It then reads the response and parses register values in pairs. The code then uses some basic logic to select a register index: for “Chlorine_Dose”, it looks for values greater than 0 and less than 1000; for “Turbine_Speed”, it looks for values greater than 100.

The Modbus command observed in the sample (01 03 00 00 00 0A) is a Read Holding Registers request. The first byte (0x01) represents the unit identifier, which in traditional Modbus RTU specifies the addressed slave device; in Modbus TCP, however, this value is often ignored or used only for gateway routing because device addressing is handled at the IP/TCP layer.

The second byte (0x03) is the Modbus function code indicating a Read Holding Registers request. The following two bytes (0x00 0x00) specify the starting register address, indicating that the read begins at address zero. The final two bytes (0x00 0A) define the number of registers to read, in this case ten consecutive registers. Taken together, the command requests the contents of the first ten holding registers from the target device and represents a valid, commonly used Modbus operation.

If a plausible register is found, the malware builds a six-byte Modbus write using function code “6” (Write)” and sets the value to 100 for “Chlorine_Dose”, or 0 for any other parameter. If no plausible register is found, it falls back to using hardcoded write frames. In the main malware path, however, the code only calls this function with “Chlorine_Dose".

If none of the ten registers meets the expected criteria, the malware does not abandon the operation. Instead, it defaults to a set of hardcoded Modbus write frames that specify predetermined register addresses and values. This behavior suggests that the attacker had only partial knowledge of the target environment. The initial register-scanning logic appears to be an attempt at dynamic discovery, while the fallback logic ensures that a write operation is still attempted even if that discovery fails.

Incomplete DNP3 and S7comm Logic

The DNP3 and S7comm branches appear much less complete. In “GetCommand()”, the DNP3 path returns the fixed byte sequence “05 64 0A 0C 01 02”, while the S7comm path returns “03 00 00 13 0E 00”. Neither sequence resembles a fully formed command for the respective protocol.

In the case of the S7comm section, the five byte‑ sequence found in the malware sample (05 00 1C 22 1E) most closely matches the beginning of an S7comm parameter block, specifically the header of a “WriteVar (0x05)” request, which is the S7comm equivalent of a Modbus register write operation. In the S7comm protocol, the first byte of a parameter block identifies the function code, but the remaining bytes in this case do not form a valid item definition. A vaild S7 WriteVar parameter requires at least one item and a full 11-byte variable-specification structure. By comparison this 5‑ byte array is far too short to be a complete or usable command.

The zero item count (0x00) and the trailing three bytes appear to be either uninitialized data or the beginning of an incomplete address field. Together, these details suggest that the attacker likely intended to implement S7 WriteVar functionality, like the Modbus function, but left this portion of the code unfinished.

The DNP3 branch of the malware also appears to be only partially implemented. The byte sequence returned by the DNP3 path (05 64 0A 0C 01 02) begins with the correct two‑byte DNP3 link‑layer sync header (0x05 0x64) and includes additional bytes that resemble the early portion of a link‑layer header. However, the sequence is far too short to constitute a valid DNP3 frame. It lacks the required destination and source address fields, the 16‑bit CRC blocks, and any application‑layer payload in which DNP3 function code would reside. As a result, this fragment does not represent a meaningful DNP3 command.

The incomplete S7 and DNP3 fragments suggest that these protocol branches were still in a developmental or experimental state when the malware was compiled. Both contain protocol‑accurate prefixes, indicating an intent to implement multi‑protocol OT capabilities, however for reasons unknow, these sections were not fully implemented or could not be completed prior to deployment.

USB Propagation

The malware also includes a removable-media propagation mechanism. The “sdfsdfsfsdfsdfqw()” function scans for drives, selects those identified as removable, and copies the hidden payload to each one as “svchost.exe” if it is not already present. The copied executable is marked with the “Hidden” and “System” attributes to reduce visibility.

The malware then calls “CreateUSBShortcut()”, which uses “WScript.Shell” to create .lnk files for each file in the removable drive root. Each shortcut’s TargetPath is set to the hidden malware copy, the icon is set to “shell32.dll, 4” (this is the windows genericfile icon), and the original file is hidden. Were a victim to click this “file,” they would unknowingly run the malware.

*Figure 14:The creation of the shortcut on the USB device.*

Key Insights

ZionSiphon represents a notable, though incomplete, attempt to build malware capable of malicious interaction with OT systems targeting water treatment and desalination environments.

While many of ZionSiphon’s individual capabilities align with patterns commonly found in commodity malware, the combination of politically motivated messaging, Israel‑specific IP targeting, and an explicit focus on desalination‑related processes distinguishes it from purely opportunistic threats. The inclusion of Modbus sabotage logic, filesystem tampering targeting chlorine and pressure control, and subnet‑wide ICS scanning demonstrates a clear intent to interact directly with industrial processes controllers and to cause significant damage and potential harm, rather than merely disrupt IT endpoints.

At the same time, numerous implementation flaws, most notably the dysfunctional country‑validation logic and the placeholder DNP3 and S7comm components, suggest that analyzed version is either a development build, a prematurely deployed sample, or intentionally defanged for testing purposes. Despite these limitations, the overall structure of the code likely indicates a threat actor experimenting with multi‑protocol OT manipulation, persistence within operational networks, and removable‑media propagation techniques reminiscent of earlier ICS‑targeting campaigns.

Even in its unfinished state, ZionSiphon underscores a growing trend in which threat actors are increasingly experimenting with OT‑oriented malware and applying it to the targeting of critical infrastructure. Continued monitoring, rapid anomaly detection, and cross‑visibility between IT and OT environments remain essential for identifying early‑stage threats like this before they evolve into operationally viable attacks.

Credit to Calum Hall (Cyber Analyst)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

References

1. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/07c3bbe60d47240df7152f72beb98ea373d9600946860bad12f7bc617a5d6f5f/details

Written by

Calum Hall

Technical Content Researcher

Inside the SOC

Written by

Calum Hall

Technical Content Researcher

Malware Research Lead

Product Marketing Manager, Network Detection & Response

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May 22, 2026

Darktrace named a Leader in the 2026 Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for Network Detection and Response (NDR) For the Second Consecutive Year

Continued recognition in NDR

Darktrace has been recognized as a Leader in the 2026 Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for Network Detection and Response (NDR), marking the second consecutive year in the Leaders quadrant.

We believe this consistency reflects sustained ability to execute, adapt, and deliver outcomes as the market evolves.

While we are immensely proud to be recognized by industry analysts as a Leader in NDR, that's just part of the story. Darktrace was also Named the Only 2025 Gartner® Peer Insights™ Customers’ Choice for Network Detection and Response based on direct customer feedback and real-world experience.

We believe the combination of these two signals is important. One reflects how the market is evaluated. The other reflects how technology performs in practice.

Why Darktrace continues to be recognized as a leader

We believe our position as a Leader for the second consecutive year reflects a combination of our sustained ability to execute in NDR, continued AI innovation, and proven delivery of security outcomes for customers and partners worldwide.

We also feel that our leadership in the NDR market is a testament to our unique and multi-layered AI approach, for which we were recognized as No.7 on Fast Company’s Most Innovative AI Companies of 2026 list, plus one of the hottest AI cybersecurity companies in CRN's AI 100.

Adapting to complex, real-world environments

Organizations are no longer protecting a single network perimeter. They are securing a mix of users, devices, applications, and data that move across hybrid environments.

Darktrace has focused on maintaining visibility and detection across these conditions, allowing security teams to understand activity as it scales.

Supporting organizations globally, not just technically

Security outcomes are shaped as much by deployment and support as they are by detection capability.

Darktrace continues to invest in regional presence across 29 countries around the world, helping organizations operationalize NDR in ways that align with local requirements, internal processes, and team structures.

Continuing to push AI beyond detection

AI in cybersecurity is often positioned as a way to improve detection accuracy. But the more important shift is how AI can influence decision-making and response.

Darktrace continues to develop models that learn from both live environments and historical incident data, combining real-time behavioral analysis with insights derived from prior attack patterns.

Using technologies such as the Incident Graph and DIGEST (Darktrace Incident Graph Evaluation for Security Threats), activity is not analyzed in isolation. Instead, relationships between users, devices, connections, and events are mapped over time, allowing the system to reconstruct how an incident is unfolding and how similar incidents have progressed in the past.

By evaluating these patterns, Darktrace can assess the likelihood that an incident will escalate, prioritizing the activity that poses the greatest risk and surfacing the most relevant context for investigation.

This shifts security operations from simply identifying anomalies to understanding their trajectory, helping teams anticipate potential impact and respond earlier with greater precision.

Why NDR is shifting from reactive detection to proactive, AI-driven security

Traditional approaches to NDR have been built around reactively identifying threats once they become clearly visible. That model is increasingly difficult to rely on.

Attackers are no longer operating in ways that stand out. They use valid credentials, trusted tools, and low-and-slow techniques that blend into everyday activity. By the time something looks obviously malicious, the impact is often already underway.

This is the core limitation of reactive detection. It depends on recognizing something that already looks like a threat.

As a result, many of the most consequential incidents today fall into a gap.

Insider activity, compromised credentials, and novel attacks rarely trigger traditional alerts because they do not follow known patterns. On the surface, they often appear legitimate, making them difficult to distinguish from normal behavior without deeper context.

This is why we believe this Gartner recognition reflects a broader shift in NDR toward autonomous, proactive and pre‑emptive security operations.

By understanding normal behavior within an environment, it is possible to identify subtle deviations rather than waiting for confirmation of threats as they are taking place.

Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI is designed for behavioral understanding. By continuously learning each organization’s normal patterns, it can detect deviations in real time, enabling a proactive and pre-emptive model of NDR where security teams can respond to early signs of risk as they emerge, reducing the window in which attacks can develop.

In multiple cases, this behavioral approach has led to early threat detection where Darktrace identified completely unknown threats, including pre-CVE zero-day activity. By detecting subtle behavioral changes before vulnerabilities were publicly disclosed or widely understood, organizations can mitigate threats before they do damage.

This shift is subtle but important. Modern NDR solutions must shift from a system that explains what happened to one that helps prevent threats from developing in the first place, and Darktrace is proud to be at the forefront of this shift - helping organizations build and maintain a state of proactive network resilience.

Continuing to innovate at the forefront of NDR

In our view, recognition as a Leader reflects where the market is today. Continuing to innovate defines what comes next.

As businesses evolve, new technologies like AI tools and agents introduce new security risks and challenges; security teams need more than simple detection. They need a complete understanding of risk as it develops, the ability to investigate it in context, and to contain threats at machine speed.

Darktrace / NETWORK is built to deliver across that full spectrum. Its Self-Learning AI continuously adapts to each organization’s environment, identifying subtle behavioral changes that signal emerging threats. Integrated investigation and autonomous response reduce the time between detection and action, allowing teams to move with greater speed and confidence.

This combination enables organizations to detect and contain known, unknown, and insider threats as they develop, while also strengthening resilience over time.

As a two-time Leader in the Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for NDR and the only 2025 Gartner® Peer Insights™ Customers’ Choice, we feel Darktrace continues to evolve its platform to meet the demands of modern environments, delivering a more complete and adaptive approach to network security.

‍

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^{Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or service depicted in its research publications, and does not advise technology users to select only those vendors with the highest ratings or other designation. Gartner research publications consist of the opinions of Gartner’s research organization and should not be construed as statements of fact. Gartner disclaims all warranties, expressed or implied, with respect to this research, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.}

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About the author

Mikey Anderson

Product Marketing Manager, Network Detection & Response

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AI

May 21, 2026

Prompt Security in Enterprise AI: Strengths, Weaknesses, and Common Approaches

How enterprise AI Agents are changing the risk landscape

Generative AI Agents are changing the way work gets done inside enterprises, and subsequently how security risks may emerge. Organizations have quickly realized that providing these agents with wider access to tooling, internal information, and granting permissions for the agent to perform autonomous actions can greatly increase the efficiency of employee workflows.

Early deployments of Generative AI systems led many organizations to scope individual components as self-contained applications: a chat interface, a model, and a prompt, with guardrails placed at the boundary. Research from Gartner has shown that while the volume and scope of Agentic AI deployments in enterprise environments is rapidly accelerating, many of the mechanisms required to manage risk, trust, and cost are still maturing.

The issue now resides on whether an agent can be influenced, misdirected, or manipulated in ways that leads to unsafe behavior across a broader system.

Why prompt security matters in enterprise AI

Prompt security matters in enterprise AI because prompts are the primary way users and systems interact with Agentic AI models, making them one of the earliest and most visible indicators of how these systems are being used and where risk may emerge.

For security teams, prompt monitoring is a logical starting point for understanding enterprise AI usage, providing insight into what types of questions are being asked and tasks are being given to AI Agents, how these systems are being guided, and whether interactions align with expected behavior. Complete prompt security takes this one step further, filtering out or blocking sensitive or dangerous content to prevent risks like prompt injection and data leakage.

However, visibility only at the prompt layer can create a false sense of security. Prompts show what was asked, but not always why it was asked, or what downstream actions were triggered by the agent across connected systems, data sources, or applications.

What prompt security reveals

The primary function of prompt security is to minimize risks associated with generative and agentic AI use, but monitoring and analysis of prompts can also grant insight into use cases for particular agents and model. With comprehensive prompt security, security teams should be able to answer the following questions for each prompt:

What task was the user attempting to complete?
What data was included in the request, and was any of the data high-risk or confidential?
Was the interaction high-risk, potentially malicious, or in violation of company policy?
Was the prompt anomalous (in comparison to previous prompts sent to the agent / model)?

Improving visibility at this layer is a necessary first step, allowing organizations to establish a baseline for how AI systems are being used and where potential risks may exist.

Prompt security alone does not provide a complete view of risk. Further data is needed to understand how the prompt is interpreted, how context is applied, what autonomous actions the agent takes (if any), or what downstream systems are affected. Understanding the outcome of a query is just as important for complete prompt security as understanding the input prompt itself – for example, a perfectly normal, low-risk prompt may inadvertently result in an agent taking a high-risk action.

Comprehensive AI security systems like Darktrace / SECURE AI can monitor and analyze both the prompt submitted to a Generative AI system, as well as the responses and chain-of-thought of the system, providing greater insight into the behavior of the system. Darktrace / SECURE AI builds on the core Darktrace methodology, learning the expected behaviors of your organization and identifying deviations from the expected pattern of life.

How organizations address prompt security today

As prompt-level visibility has become a focus, a range of approaches have emerged to make this activity more observable and controllable. Various monitoring and logging tools aim to capture prompt inputs to be analyzed after the fact.

Input validation and filtering systems attempt to intervene earlier, inspecting prompts before they reach the model. These controls look for known jailbreak patterns, language indicative of adversarial attacks, or ambiguous instructions which could push the system off course.

Importantly, for a prompt security solution to be accurate and effective, prompts must be continually observed and governed, rather than treated as a point-in-time snapshot.

Where prompt security breaks down in real environments

In more complex environments, especially those involving multiple agents or extensive tool use, AI security becomes harder to define and control.

Agent-to-Agent communications can be harder to monitor and trace as these happen without direct user interaction. Communication between agents can create routes for potential context leakage between agents, unintentional privilege escalation, or even data leakage from a higher privileged agent to a lower privileged one.

Risk is shaped not just by what is asked, but by the conditions in which that prompt operates and the actions an agent takes. Controls at the orchestration layer are starting to reflect this reality. Techniques such as context isolation, scoped memory, and role-based boundaries aim to limit how far a prompt’s influence can extend.

Furthermore, Shadow AI usage can be difficult to monitor. AI systems that are deployed outside of formal governance structures and Generative AI systems hosted on unknown endpoints can fly under the radar and can go unseen by monitoring tools, leaving a critical opening where adversarial prompts may go undetected. Darktrace / SECURE AI features comprehensive detection of Shadow AI usage, helping organizations identify potential risk areas.

How prompt security fits in a broader AI risk model

Prompt security is an important starting point, but it is not a complete security strategy. As AI systems become more integrated into enterprise environments, the risks extend to what resources the system can access, how it interprets context, and what actions it is allowed to take across connected tools and workflows.

This creates a gap between visibility and control. Prompt security alone allows security teams to observe prompt activity but falls short of creating a clear understanding of how that activity translates into real-world impact across the organization.

Closing that gap requires a broader approach, one that connects signals across human and AI agent identities, SaaS, cloud, and endpoint environments. It means understanding not just how an AI system is being used, but how that usage interacts with the rest of the digital estate.

Prompt security, in that sense, is less of a standalone solution and more of an entry point into a larger problem: securing AI across the enterprise as a whole.

‍

Explore how Darktrace / SECURE AI brings prompt security to enterprises

Darktrace brings more than a decade of AI expertise, built on an enterprise‑wide platform designed to operate in and understand the behaviors of the complex, ambiguous environments where today’s AI now lives. With Darktrace / SECURE AI, enterprises can safely adopt, manage, monitor, and build AI within their business.

Learn about Darktrace / SECURE AI here.

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About the author

Jamie Bali

Technical Author (AI) Developer

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Check out this article by Darktrace: Inside ZionSiphon: Darktrace’s Analysis of OT Malware Targeting Israeli Water Systems

Inside ZionSiphon: Darktrace’s Analysis of OT Malware Targeting Israeli Water Systems

What is ZionSiphon?

ZionSiphon targets and motivations

Water and desalination-themed targeting?

Malware Analysis

Privilege Escalation

Persistence and stealth installation

Target determination

Why this version appears dysfunctional

Self-destruct function

Local configuration file tampering

OT discovery and protocol logic

Protocol validation and device classification

Incomplete DNP3 and S7comm Logic

USB Propagation

Key Insights

References

Chinese APT Campaign Targets Entities with Updated FDMTP Backdoor

Darktrace named a Leader in the 2026 Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for Network Detection and Response (NDR) For the Second Consecutive Year

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More in this series

Data Center Security: Improving Visibility and Threat Detection Across IT, OT, and IoT

Advancing OT Security with Architecture Visibility, Operational Reporting, and Industrial Context

Darktrace Recognized as the Only Visionary in the 2026 Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for CPS Protection Platforms

Blog

Network

May 22, 2026

Darktrace named a Leader in the 2026 Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for Network Detection and Response (NDR) For the Second Consecutive Year

Continued recognition in NDR

Why Darktrace continues to be recognized as a leader

Adapting to complex, real-world environments

Supporting organizations globally, not just technically

Continuing to push AI beyond detection

Why NDR is shifting from reactive detection to proactive, AI-driven security

Continuing to innovate at the forefront of NDR

Blog

AI

May 21, 2026

Prompt Security in Enterprise AI: Strengths, Weaknesses, and Common Approaches

How enterprise AI Agents are changing the risk landscape

Why prompt security matters in enterprise AI

What prompt security reveals

How organizations address prompt security today

Where prompt security breaks down in real environments

How prompt security fits in a broader AI risk model