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April 12, 2022

Efficient Incident Reporting: Darktrace AI Analyst

Discover how Darktrace's Cyber AI Analyst accelerates incident reporting to the US federal government, enhancing cybersecurity response times.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Justin Fier
SVP, Red Team Operations
Written by
Sally Kenyon Grant
VP, Darktrace Federal
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12
Apr 2022

On March 15, 2022, President Biden signed the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act into law, included as part of the Congressional Omnibus Appropriations bill. The law requires critical infrastructure owners and operators to quickly notify the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of ransomware payments and significant cyber-attacks.

The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act creates two new reporting requirements:

  1. an obligation to report certain cyber incidents to DHS CISA within 72 hours
  2. an obligation to report ransomware payments within 24 hours

Supporting the new law, Darktrace AI accelerates the cyber incident reporting process. Specifically, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst understands the connections among disparate security incidents with supervised machine learning and autonomously writes incident reports in human-readable language using natural language processing (NLP). These Darktrace incident reports allow human analysts to send reports to CISA quickly and efficiently.

In the below real-world attack case study, we demonstrate how Cyber AI Analyst facilitates seamless reporting for critical infrastructure organizations that fall victim to ransomware and malicious data exfiltration. The AI technology, trained on human analyst behavior, replicates investigations at machine speed and scale, surfacing relevant details in minutes and allowing security teams to understand what happened precisely and share this information with the relevant authorities.

The below threat investigation details a significant threat find on a step by step level in technical detail to demonstrate the power and speed of Cyber AI Analyst.

Cyber AI Analyst’s incident report

When ransomware struck this organization, Cyber AI Analyst was invaluable, autonomously investigating the full scope of the incident and generating a natural language summary that clearly showed the progression of the attack.

Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst reveals the full scope of the attack

In the aftermath of this attack, Darktrace’s technology also offered analyst assistance in mapping out the timeline of the attack and identifying what files were compromised, helping the security team identify anomalous activity related to the ransomware attack.

Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst showing the stages of the attack chain undergone by the compromised device

With Darktrace AI’s insights, the team easily identified the timeline of the attack, affected devices, credentials used, file shares accessed, files exfiltrated, and malicious endpoints contacted, enabling the customer to disclose the scale of the attack and notify necessary parties.

This example demonstrates how Cyber AI Analyst empowers critical infrastructure owners and operators to swiftly report major cyber-attacks to the federal government. Considering that 72 hours is the reporting period is for significant incidents — and 24 hours for ransomware payments — Cyber AI Analyst is no longer a nice-to-have but a must-have for critical infrastructure.

Attack breakdown: Ransomware and data exfiltration

Cyber AI Analyst delivered the most critical information in an easy-to-read report — with no human touch involved — as shown in the incident report above. We will now break down the attack further to demonstrate how Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI understood the unusual activity throughout the attack lifecycle.

In this double extortion ransomware, attackers exfiltrated data over 22 days. The detections made by Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI, and the parallel investigation by Cyber AI Analyst, were used to map the attack chain and identify how and what data had been exfiltrated and encrypted.

The attack consisted of three general groups of events:

  • Unencrypted FTP (File Transfer Protocol) data exfiltration to rare malicious external endpoint in Bulgaria (May 9 07:23:46 UTC – May 21 03:06:46 UTC)
  • Ransomware encryption of files in network file shares (May 25 01:00:27 UTC – May 30 07:09:53 UTC)
  • Encrypted SSH (Secure Shell) data exfiltration to rare malicious external endpoint (May 29 16:43:37 UTC – May 30 13:23:59 UTC)
Figure 3: Timeline of the attack alongside Darktrace model breaches

First, uploads of internal data to a rare external endpoint in Bulgaria were observed within the networks. The exfiltration was preceded by SMB reads of internal file shares before approximately 450GB of data was exfiltrated via FTP.

Darktrace’s AI identified this threatening activity on its own, and the organization was quickly able to pinpoint what data had been exfiltrated, including files camouflaged by markings such as ‘Talent Acquisition’ and ‘Engineering and Construction,’ and legal and financial documents — suggesting that these were documents of an extremely sensitive nature.

Figure 4: Screenshots showing two model breaches relating to external uploads over FTP
Figure 5: Screenshot showing SMB reads from a file share before FTP upload

Model breaches:

  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Incoming Data Volume
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity
  • Compromise / Ransomware / SMB Reads then Writes with Additional Extensions
  • Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Move & Write
  • Unusual Activity / High Volume Server Data Transfer
  • Unusual Activity / Sustained Anomalous SMB Activity
  • Device / SMB Lateral Movement

Four days following this observed activity, Darktrace’s AI detected the deployment of ransomware when multiple compromised devices began making anomalous SMB connections to file shares that they do not typically access, reading and writing similar volumes to the SMB file shares, as well as writing additional extensions to files over SMB. The file extension comprised a random string of letters and was likely to be unique to this target.

Using Darktrace, the customer obtained a full list of files that had been encrypted. The list included apparent financial records in an ‘Accounts’ file share.

Figure 6: Model breach showing additional extension written to file during ransomware encryption

Model breaches:

  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Incoming Data Volume
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity
  • Compromise / Ransomware / SMB Reads then Writes with Additional Extensions
  • Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Move & Write
  • Unusual Activity / High Volume Server Data Transfer
  • Unusual Activity / Sustained Anomalous SMB Activity
  • Device / SMB Lateral Movement

Simultaneously, uploads of internal data to a rare external endpoint were observed within the network. The uploads were all performed using encrypted SSH/SFTP. In total, approximately 3.5GB of data was exfiltrated this way.

Despite the attacker using an encrypted channel to exfiltrate this data, Darktrace detected anomalous SMB file transfers prior to the external upload, indicating which files were exfiltrated. Here, Darktrace’s ability to go ‘back in time’ proved invaluable in helping analysts determine which files had been exfiltrated, although they were exfiltrated via an encrypted means.

Figure 7: Model breaches showing anomalous SMB activity before upload over SSH

Model breaches:

  • Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
  • Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination
  • Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer
  • Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Breaches
  • Device / Large Number of Model Breaches
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent To New External Device

How did the attack bypass the rest of the security stack?

Existing administrative credentials were used to escalate privileges within the network and perform malicious activity.

Had Darktrace Antigena been active, it would have actioned a targeted, autonomous response to contain the activity in its early stages. Antigena would have enforced the ‘pattern of life’ on the devices involved in anomalous SMB activity — containing activity such as reading from file shares that are not normally connected, appending extensions to files and blocking outgoing connections to rare external endpoints.

However, in this case, Antigena was not set up to take action – it was configured in Human Confirmation mode. The incident was clearly alerted on by Darktrace, and appeared as a top priority item in the security team’s workflow. However, the security team was not monitoring Darktrace’s user interface, and in the absence of any action taken by other tools, the attack was allowed to progress, and the organization was obligated to disclose the details of the incident.

Streamlining the reporting process

In the modern threat landscape, leaning on AI to stop fast-moving and sophisticated attacks at machine speed and scale is critical. As this attack shows, the technology also helps organizations fulfill reporting requirements in the aftermath of an attack.

New legislation requires timely disclosure; with many traditional approaches to security, organizations do not have the capacity to surface the full details after an attack. On top of this, collating these details can take days or weeks. This is why Darktrace is no longer a nice-to-have but a must-have for critical infrastructure organizations, which are now required to report significant incidents swiftly.

Darktrace’s AI detects malicious activity as it happens and empowers customers to quickly understand the timeline of a compromise, as well as files accessed and exfiltrated by an attacker. This not only prepares organizations to resist the most sophisticated attacks, but also accelerates and radically simplifies the process of reporting the data breach.

Security teams should not have to confront disclosure processes on their own. Attacks happen fast, and their aftermaths are messy – retrospective investigation of lost data can be a futile effort with traditional approaches. With Darktrace, security teams can meet disruptive and sudden attacks with precise and nimble means of uncovering data, as well as detection and mitigation of risk. And, should the need arise, rapid and accurate reporting of events is laid out on a silver platter by the AI.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Justin Fier
SVP, Red Team Operations
Written by
Sally Kenyon Grant
VP, Darktrace Federal

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May 14, 2026

Chinese APT Campaign Targets Entities with Updated FDMTP Backdoor

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Darktrace have identified activity consistent with Chinese-nexus operations, a Twill Typhoon-linked campaign targeting customer environments, primarily within the Asia-Pacific & Japan (APJ) region

Beginning in late September 2025, multiple affected hosts were observed making requests to domains impersonating content delivery networks (CDNs), including infrastructure masquerading as Yahoo- and Apple-affiliated services. Across these cases, Darktrace identified a consistent behavioral execution pattern: the retrieval of legitimate binaries alongside malicious Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs), enabling sideloading and execution of a modular .NET-based Remote Access Trojan (RAT) framework.

The activity aligns with patterns described in Darktrace’s previous Chinese-nexus operations report, Crimson Echo. In this case, observed modular intrusion chains built on legitimate software, and staged payload delivery. Threat actors retrieve legitimate binaries alongside configuration files and malicious DLLs to enable sideloading of a .NET-based RAT.

Observed Campaign

Across cases, the same ordered sequence appears: retrieval of a legitimate executable, (2) retrieval of a matching .config file, (3) retrieval of the malicious

DLL, (4) repeated DLL downloads over time, and (5) command-and-control (C2) communication. The .config file retrieves a malicious binary, while the legitimate binary provides a legitimate process to run it in.

Darktrace assesses with moderate confidence that this activity aligns with publicly reported Twill Typhoon tradecraft. The observed use of FDMTP, DLL sideloading, and overlapping infrastructure is consistent with previously observed operations, though not unique to a single actor. While initial access was not directly observed, previous Twill Typhoon campaigns have typically involved spear-phishing.

What Darktrace Observed

Since late September 2025, Darktrace has observed multiple customer environments making HTTP GET requests to infrastructure presenting as “CDN” endpoints for well-known platforms (including Yahoo and Apple lookalikes). Across cases, the affected hosts retrieved legitimate executables, then matching .config files (same base filename), then DLLs intended for sideloading. The sequencing of a legitimate binary + configuration + DLL  has been previously observed in campaigns linked to China-nexus threat actors.

In several cases, affected hosts also issued outbound requests to a /GetCluster endpoint, including the protocol=Dotnet-Tcpdmtp parameter. This activity was repeatedly followed by retrieval of DLL content that was subsequently used for search-order hijacking within legitimate processes.

In the September–October 2025 cases, Darktrace alerting commonly surfaced early-stage registration and C2 setup behaviors, followed by retrieval of a DLL (e.g., Client.dll) from the same external host, sometimes repeatedly over multiple days, consistent with establishing and maintaining the execution chain.

In April 2026, a finance-sector endpoint initiated a series of GET requests to yahoo-cdn[.]it[.]com, first fetching legitimate binaries (including vshost.exe and dfsvc.exe), then repeatedly retrieving associated configuration and DLL components (including dfsvc.exe.config and dnscfg.dll) over an 11-day window. The use of both Visual Studio hosting and OneClick (dfsvc.exe) paths are used to ensure the malware can run in the targeted environment.

Technical Analysis

Initial staging and execution

While the initial access method is unknown, Darktrace security researchers identified multiple archives containing the malware.

A representative example includes a ZIP archive (“test.zip”) containing:

  • A legitimate executable: biz_render.exe (Sogou Pinyin IME)
  • A malicious DLL: browser_host.dll

Contained within the zip archive named “test.zip” is the legitimate binary “biz_render.exe”, a popular Chinese Input Method Editor (IME) Sogou Pinyin.

Alongside the legitimate binary is a malicious DLL named “browser_host.dll”. As the legitimate binary loads a legitimate DLL named “browser_host.dll” via LoadLibraryExW, the malicious DLL has been named the same to sideload the malicious DLL into biz_render.exe. By supplying a malicious DLL with an identical name, the actor hijacks execution flow, enabling the payload to execute within a trusted process.

Figure 1: Biz_render.exe loading browser_host.dll.

The legitimate binary invokes the function GetBrowserManagerInstance from the sideloaded “browser_host.dll”, which then performs XOR-based decryption of embedded strings (key 0x90) to resolve and dynamically load mscoree.dll.

The DLL uses the Windows Common Language Runtime (CLR) to execute managed .NET code inside the process rather than relying solely on native binaries. During execution, the loader loads a payload directly into memory as .NET assemblies, enabling an in-memory execution.

C2 Registration

A GET request is made to:

GET /GetCluster?protocol=DotNet-TcpDmtp&tag={0}&uid={1}

with the custom header:

Verify_Token: Dmtp

This returns Base64-encoded and gzip-compressed IP addresses used for subsequent communication.

Figure 2: Decoded IPs.

Staged payload retrieval

Subsequent activity includes retrieval of multiple components from yahoo-cdn.it[.]com. The following GET requests are made:

/dfsvc.exe

/dnscfg.dll

/dfsvc.exe.config

/vhost.exe

/Microsoft.VisualStudio.HostingProcess.Utilities.Sync.dll

/config.etl

ClickOnce and AppDomain hijacking

Dfsvc.exe is the legitimate Windows ClickOnce Engine, part of the .NET framework used for updating ClickOnce Applications. Accompanying dfsvc.exe is a legitimate dfsvc.exe.config file that is used to store configuration data for the application. However, in this instance the malware has replaced the legitimate dfsvc.exe.config with the one retrieved from the server in: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319.

Additionally, vhost.exe the legitimate Visual Studio hosting process is retrieved from the server, along with “Microsoft.VisualStudio.HostingProcess.Utilities.Sync.dll” and “config.etl”. The DLL is used to decrypt the AES encrypted payload in config.etl and load it. The encrypted payload is dnscfg.dll, which can be loaded into vshost instead of dfsvc, and may be used if the environment does not support .NET.

Figure 3: ClickOnce configuration.

The malicious configuration disables logging, forces the application to load dnscfg.dll from the remote server, and uses a custom AppDomainManager to ensure the DLL is executed during initialization of dfsvc.exe. To ensure persistence, a scheduled task is added for %APPDATA%\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\dfsvc.exe.

Core payload

The DLL dnscfg.dll is a .NET binary named Client.TcpDmtp.dll. The payload is a heavily obfuscated backdoor that generates its logic at runtime and communicates with the command and control (C2) over custom TCP, DMTP (Duplex Message Transport Protocol) and appears to be an updated version of FDMTP to version 3.2.5.1

Figure 4: InitializeNewDomain.

The payload:

  • Uses cluster-based resolution (GetHostFromCluster)
  • Implements token validation
  • Enters a persistent execution loop (LoopMessage)
  • Supports structured remote tasking over DMTP

Once connected, the malware enters a persistent loop (LoopMessage), enabling it to receive commands from the remote server.

Figure 5: DMTP Connect function.

Rather than referencing values directly, they are retrieved through containers that are resolved at runtime. String values are stored in an encrypted byte array (_0) and decrypted by a custom XOR-based string decryption routine (dcsoft). The lower 16 bits of the provided key are XORed with 0xA61D (42525) to derive the initial XOR key, while subsequent bits define the string length and offset into the encrypted byte array. Each character is reconstructed from two encrypted bytes and XORed with the incrementing key value, producing the plaintext string used by the payload.

Figure 6: Decrypted strings.

Embedded in the resources section are multiple compressed binaries, the majority of which are library files. The only exceptions are client.core.dll and client.dmtpframe.dll.

Figure 7: Resources.

Modular framework and plugins

The payload embeds multiple compressed libraries, notably:

  • client.core.dll
  • client.dmtpframe.dll

Client.core.dll is a core library used for system profiling, C2 communication and plugin execution. The implant has the functionality to retrieve information including antivirus products, domain name, HWID, CLR version, administrator status, hardware details, network details, operating system, and user.

Figure 8: Client.Core.Info functions.

Additionally, the component is responsible for loading plugins, with support for both binary and JSON-based plugin execution. This allows plugins to receive commands and parameters in different formats depending on the task being performed.

The framework handles details such as plugin hashes, method names, task identifiers, caller tracking, and argument processing, allowing plugins to be executed consistently within the environment. In addition to execution management, the library also provides plugins with access to common runtime functionality such as logging, communication, and process handling.

Figure 9: Client.core functions.

client.dmtpframe.dll handles:

  • DMTP communication
  • Heartbeats and reconnection
  • Plugin persistence via registry:

HKCU\Software\Microsoft\IME\{id}

Client.dmtpframe.dll is built on the TouchSocket DMTP networking library and continues to manage the remote plugins. The DLL implements remote communication features including heartbeat maintenance, reconnection handling, RPC-style messaging, SSL support, and token-based verification. The DLL also has the ability to add plugins to the registry under HKCU/Software/Microsoft/IME/{id} for persistence.

Plugins observed

While the full set of plugins remains unknown, researchers were able to identify four plugins, including:

  • Persist.WpTask.dll - used to create, remove and trigger scheduled Windows tasks remotely.
  • Persist.registry.dll - used to manage registry persistence with the ability to create, and delete registry values, along with hidden persistence keys.
  • Persist.extra.dll - used to load and persist the main framework.
  • Assist.dll - used to remotely retrieve files or commands, as well as manipulate system processes.
Figure 10: Plugins stored in IME registry.
Figure 11: Obfuscated script in plugin resources.

Persist.extra.dll is a module that is used to load a script “setup.log” to load and persist the main framework. Stored within the resources section of the binary is an obfuscated script that creates a .NET COM object that is added to the registry key HKCU\Software\Classes\TypeLib\ {9E175B61-F52A-11D8-B9A5-505054503030} \1.0\1\Win64 for persistence. After deobfuscating this script, another DLL is revealed named “WindowsBase.dll”.

Figure 12: Registry entry for script.

The binary checks in with icloud-cdn[.]net every five minutes, retrieves a version string, downloads an encrypted payload named checksum.bin, saves it locally as C:\ProgramData\USOShared\Logs\checksum.etl, decrypts it with AES using the hardcoded key POt_L[Bsh0=+@0a., and loads the decrypted assembly directly from memory via Assembly.Load(byte[]). The version.txt file acts as an update marker so it only re-downloads when the remote version changes, while the mutex prevents duplicate instances.

Figure 13: USOShared/Logs.

Checksum.etl is decrypted with AES and loaded into memory, loading another .NET DLL named “Client.dll”. This binary is the same as “dnscfg.dll” mentioned at the start and allows the threat actors to update the main framework based on the version.

Conclusion

Across cases, Darktrace consistently observed the following sequence:

  • Retrieval of legitimate executables
  • Retrieval of DLLs for sideloading
  • C2 registration via /GetCluster

This approach is consistent with broader China-nexus tradecraft. As outlined in Darktrace’s Crimson Echo report, the stable feature of this activity is behavioral. Infrastructure rotates and payloads can change, but the execution model persists. For defenders, the implication is straightforward: detection anchored to individual indicators will degrade quickly. Detection anchored to a behavioral sequence offer a far more durable approach.

Credit to Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead), Adam Potter (Senior Cyber Analyst), Emma Foulger (Global Threat Research Operations Lead), Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)


Appendices

A detailed list of detection models and triggered indicators is provided alongside IoCs.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Test.zip - fc3959ebd35286a82c662dc81ca658cb

Dnscfg.dll - b2c8f1402d336963478f4c5bc36c961a

Client.TcpDmtp.dll - c52b4a16d93a44376f0407f1c06e0b

Browser_host.dll - c17f39d25def01d5c87615388925f45a

Client.DmtpFrame.dll - 482cc72e01dfa54f30efe4fefde5422d

Persist.Extra - 162F69FE29EB7DE12B684E979A446131

Persist.Registry - 067FBAD4D6905D6E13FDC19964C1EA52

Assist - 2CD781AB63A00CE5302ED844CFBECC27

Persist.WpTask - DF3437C88866C060B00468055E6FA146

Microsoft.VisualStudio.HostingProcess.Utilities.Sync.dll - c650a624455c5222906b60aac7e57d48

www.icloud-cdn[.]net

www.yahoo-cdn.it[.]com

154.223.58[.]142[AP8] [EF9]

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

T1106 – Native API

T1053.005 - Scheduled Task

T1546.16 - Component Object Model Hijacking

T1547.001 - Registry Run Keys

T1511.001 - Dynamic Link Library Injection

T1622 – Debugger Evasion

T1140 – Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

T1574.001 - Hijack Execution Flow: DLL

T1620 – Reflective Code Loading

T1082 – System Information Discovery

T1007 – System Service Discovery

T1030 – System Owner/User Discovery

T1071.001 - Web Protocols

T1027.007 - Dynamic API Resolution

T1095 – Non-Application Layer Protocol

Darktrace Model Alerts

·      Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

·      Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination

·      Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location

·      Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

·      Compromise / Agent Beacon to New Endpoint

·      Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

·      Compromise / Quick and Regular Windows HTTP Beaconing

·      Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

·      Anomalous File / Anomalous Octet Stream (No User Agent)

·      Compromise / Repeating Connections Over 4 Days

·      Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

·      Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

·      Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

·      Device / Increased External Connectivity

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About the author
Tara Gould
Malware Research Lead

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May 12, 2026

Resilience at the Speed of AI: Defending the Modern Campus with Darktrace

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Why higher education is a different cybersecurity battlefield

After four decades in IT, now serving as both CIO and CISO, I’ve learned one simple truth: cybersecurity is never “done.” It’s a constant game of cat and mouse. Criminals evolve. Technologies advance. Regulations expand. But in higher education, the challenge is uniquely complex.

Unlike a bank or a military installation, we can’t lock down networks to a narrow set of approved applications. Higher education environments are open by design. Students collaborate globally, faculty conduct cutting-edge research, and administrators manage critical operations, all of which require seamless access to the internet, global networks, cloud platforms, and connected systems.

Combine that openness with expanding regulatory mandates and tight budgets, and the balancing act becomes clear.

Threat actors don’t operate under the same constraints. Often well-funded and sponsored by nation-states with significant resources, they’re increasingly organized, strategic, and innovative.

That sophistication shows up in the tactics we face every day, from social engineering and ransomware to AI-driven impersonation attacks. We’re dealing with massive volumes of data, countless signals, and a very small window between detection and damage.

No human team, no matter how talented or how numerous, can manually sift through that noise at the speed required.

Discovering a force multiplier

Nothing in cybersecurity is 100% foolproof. I never “set it and forget it.” But for institutions balancing rising threats and finite resources, the Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platform™ offers something incredibly valuable: peace of mind through speed and scale.

It closes the gap between detection and response in a way humans can’t possibly match. At the speed of light, it can quarantine, investigate, and contain anomalous activity.

I’ve purchased and deployed Darktrace three separate times at three different institutions because I’ve seen firsthand what it can do and what it enables teams like mine to achieve.

I first encountered Darktrace while serving as CIO for a large multi-campus college system. What caught my attention was Darktrace's Self-Learning AI, and its ability to learn what "normal" looked like across our network. Instead of relying solely on static signatures or rigid rules, Darktrace built a behavioral baseline unique to our environment and alerted us in real time when something simply didn’t look right.

In higher education, where strict lockdowns aren’t realistic, that behavioral model made all the difference. We deployed it across five campuses, and the impact was immediate. Operating 24/7, Darktrace surfaced threats in ways our team couldn’t replicate manually.

Over time, the Darktrace platform evolved alongside the changing threat landscape, expanding into intrusion prevention, cloud visibility, and email security. At subsequent institutions, including Washington College, Darktrace was one of my first strategic investments.

Revealing the hidden threat other tools missed

One of the most surprising investigations of my career involved a data leak. Leadership suspected sensitive information from high-level meetings was being exposed, but our traditional tools couldn’t provide any answers.

Using Darktrace’s deep network visibility, down to packet-level data, we traced unusual connections to our CCTV camera system, which had been configured with a manufacturer’s default password. A small group of employees had hacked into the CCTV cameras, accessed audio-enabled recordings from boardroom meetings, and stored copies locally.

No other tool in our environment could have surfaced those connections the way Darktrace did. It was a clear example of why using AI to deeply understand how your organization, systems, and tools normally behave, matters: threats and risks don’t always look the way we expect.

Elevating a D-rating into a A-level security program

When I arrived at my last CISO role, the institution had recently experienced a significant ransomware attack. Attackers located  data  which informed their setting  ransom demands to an amount they knew would likely result in payment. It was a sobering example of how calculated and strategic modern cybercriminals have become.

Third-party cyber ratings reflected that reality, with a  D rating.

To raise the bar, we implemented a comprehensive security program and integrated layered defenses; -deploying state of the art tools and methods-  across the environment, with Darktrace at its core.

After a 90-day learning period to establish our behavioral baseline, we transitioned the platform into fully autonomous mode. In a single 30-day span, Darktrace conducted more than 2,500 investigations and autonomously resolved 92% of all false positives.

For a small team, that’s transformative. Instead of drowning in alerts, my staff focused on less than  200 meaningful cases that warranted human review.

Today, we maintain a perfect A rating from third-party assessors and have remained cybersafe.

Peace of mind isn’t about complacency

The effect of Darktrace as a force multiplier has a real human impact.

With the time reclaimed through automation, we expanded community education programs and implemented simulated phishing exercises. Through sustained training and awareness efforts, we reduced social engineering susceptibility from nearly 45% to under 5%.

On a personal level, Darktrace allows me to sleep better at night and take time off knowing we have intelligent systems monitoring and responding around the clock. For any CIO or CISO carrying institutional risk on their shoulders, that matters.

The next era: AI vs. AI

A new chapter in cybersecurity is unfolding as adversaries leverage AI to enhance scale, speed, and believability. Phishing campaigns are more personalized, impersonation attempts are more precise, and deepfake video technology, including live video, is disturbingly authentic. At the same time, organizations are rapidly adopting AI across their own environments —from GenAI assistants to embedded tools to autonomous agents. These systems don’t operate within fixed rules. They act across email, cloud, SaaS, and identity systems, often with broad permissions, and their behavior can evolve over time in ways that are difficult to predict or control.

That creates a new kind of security challenge. It’s not just about defending against AI-powered threats but understanding and governing how AI behaves within your environment, including what it can access, how it acts, and where risk begins to emerge.

From my perspective, this is a natural next step for Darktrace.

Darktrace brings a level of maturity and behavioral understanding uniquely suited to the complexity of AI environments. Self-Learning AI learns the normal patterns of each business to interpret context, uncover subtle intent, and detect meaningful deviations without relying on predefined rules or signatures. Extending into securing AI by bringing real-time visibility and control to GenAI assistants, AI agents, development environments and Shadow AI, feels like the logical evolution of what Darktrace already does so well.

Just as importantly, Darktrace is already built for dynamic, cross-domain environments where risk doesn’t sit in a single tool or control plane. In higher education, activity already spans multiple systems and, with AI, that interconnection only accelerates.

Having deployed Darktrace multiple times, I have confidence it’s uniquely positioned to lead in this space and help organizations adopt AI with greater visibility and control.

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Since authoring this blog, Irving Bruckstein has transitioned to the role of Chief Executive Officer of the Cyberaigroup.

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About the author
Irving Bruckstein
CEO CyberAIgroup
Your data. Our AI.
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