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How Self-Learning AI scaled to secure Cradlepoint’s SaaS environments

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02
Mar 2021
02
Mar 2021
As working patterns continue to evolve, Darktrace provides visibility over the remote business, detecting everything from account takeovers to advanced phishing attacks. This blog discusses how Cradlepoint utilizes Self-Learning AI to secure its SaaS environments.

Cradlepoint is a world leader in Wireless WAN connectivity. Its wireless edge solutions use 4G LTE and 5G cellular networks to help businesses connect people, places, and things to the cloud and critical applications. Our software-based 4G and 5G routers are used by more than 25,000 businesses and government agencies around the world. Cradlepoint technology is everywhere — you’ve likely interacted with it without even knowing. From being used on municipal buses and regional trains providing Wi-Fi, to being embedded in police vehicles and fire trucks providing reliable, security connectivity, Cradlepoint has a wide range of deployments.

Being a cloud-based company, some of Cradlepoint’s most sensitive assets — including our customer data—are stored and shared across SaaS applications. With SaaS account takeover and increasingly sophisticated phishing attacks becoming more of a threat to businesses, we were looking for a single solution that could deal with both threat vectors. With Darktrace’s AI, our entire Microsoft 365 environment feels secure from the full range of attacks.

Extending Darktrace’s coverage to email

We began our journey with Darktrace in 2018 and were quickly impressed with the AI’s ability to swiftly detect and neutralize a range of cyber-threats. With a general increase in the sophistication of attacks over the years, especially the prevalence of stealthy bitcoin mining malware that more and more companies are being hit by, we wanted to make sure we had a premier solution known for catching and triaging these events. With Darktrace, we are getting fully generated incident reports, surfacing all the relevant information for us on a single screen. What would normally take my team hours or days to triage and investigate is taken care of in minutes.

After being impressed by Darktrace initially, we decided to extend visibility into email and SaaS – two increasingly critical areas of our business. After three years of trialing various tools to target email attack prevention, we had pretty much exhausted all the traditional options available to secure our environment. And it wasn’t enough.

So when Antigena Email came along – a solution that uses that same self-learning AI and leverages insights from across the business – we had to try it out. We got it set up and running in five minutes, and from the first week it really impressed us. We have had, and continue to see, tremendous results as it catches everything from phishing attempts to spoofing attempts and more.

Spotting account takeovers with Darktrace’s SaaS connectors

Along with Antigena Email, we implemented Darktrace’s SaaS connectors, which gave us amazing visibility across our full Microsoft 365 environment, as well as our CRM, Salesforce. Our previous authentication approach wasn’t enough on its own to secure these environments, and with more companies experiencing account takeovers, we wanted to get in front of it and be confident we had full oversight of this threat vector. Once inside an email account, for example, attackers can gather and exfiltrate sensitive customer data, and use the account as a springboard for further malicious emails.

Working in tandem, Antigena Email and Darktrace’s Microsoft 365 SaaS connector together give us confidence that cases of account takeover will be detected, investigated, and neutralized, before any damage is done.

In the current working conditions, people are using email, CRMs and CMSs more than ever to store and share sensitive files; with Darktrace, I can monitor all that from a single user interface, or on the fly from the Darktrace Mobile App. Because the technology is self-learning, it’s low-maintenance – but when we do need to step in, we can do so with a single touch or click.

Cyber AI supports organization-wide security strategy

Like most companies right now, the majority of our employees are working from home. Our digital infrastructure has rapidly changed. Much of our intellectual property is shifting from our headquarters to remote endpoints. Darktrace will continue to be a crucial partner as we rethink how our users operate. What the ‘new normal’ will look like is yet to be established: the only certainty is uncertainty, and I am sure our digital landscape will continue to change in the months ahead. Having a cyber defense technology that evolves with us allows Cradlepoint to ride the storm, confident in the safety and integrity of our data.

INSIDE THE SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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Brandon Ashey
Director of IT and Security
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Darktrace: Microsoft UK Partner of the Year 2024

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Jun 2024

Darktrace has been named as Microsoft UK Partner of the Year for 2024!    
The Microsoft Partner Awards recognize winners for their commitment to customers, impact of solutions, and exemplary use of Microsoft technologies.  

Whilst the award was granted based on our innovations combining Darktrace/Email and Microsoft Defender for Office 365, our shared values go beyond technology. Darktrace stood out for the integration of our products to deliver exceptional security value to customers, as well as our investment in partnerships, marketplace and go to market. Microsoft was also impressed with our strong commitment to diversity and inclusion and our broader contribution to both the UK economy and the UK tech sector.

Microsoft Defender for Office 365 + Darktrace/Email leave attackers nowhere to hide

The email threat landscape is constantly evolving. Attacks are becoming more sophisticated, more targeted and increasing in multi-stage payload attacks. Across the Darktrace customer base in 2023 alone, we have seen a 135% increase in ‘novel social engineering attacks’, corresponding with the rise of ChatGPT, 45% of phishing emails were identified as spear phishing attempts and a 59% increase in multi-stage payload attacks.  

Legacy defenses were built to address a high volume of unsophisticated attacks, but generative AI has shifted the threats towards lower quantity yet very sophisticated, high impact targeted attacks. Microsoft Defender for Office 365’s rapid innovation has outpaced the Secure Email Gateway’s rule and signature based historical data approach. Customers no longer need email gateways which duplicate workflows and add expense native to their Defender for O365 solution.    

Point email solutions overlap with Microsoft in 3 key areas: detection approach, workflows, capabilities  

  • Detection - Microsoft receives trillions threat signals daily, giving customers the broadest scope of the attack landscape. Darktrace combined with Microsoft unites business and attack centric approaches
  • Workflows – any Microsoft configurations are reflected automatically in Darktrace/Email. Users can keep daily workflow in Microsoft, while a traditional SEG requires duplicated workflows  
  • Capabilities – Microsoft handles foundational elements like archiving/encryption/signature matching while Darktrace handles advanced threat security

Darktrace/Email is built to elevate, not duplicate, Microsoft email security – removing the burden of operating legacy point solutions and blocking 25% more threats. Robust account takeover protections to stop the 38% of sophisticated threats other tools miss. Customers can seamlessly correlate activity and insights across Microsoft email, DMARC and Teams to stop threats on average 13 days earlier.  

Azure Marketplace

Microsoft Azure customers can access Darktrace in the Azure Marketplace to take advantage of the scalability, reliability, and agility of Azure to drive rapid IT operations and security integrations across the enterprise. Customers can leverage their Microsoft Azure Consumption Commitments (MACC), making procurement simple.

As UK Partner of the Year winner, customers know they have a trusted partner with Darktrace and a proven solution to work seamlessly with Azure.

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About the author
Francesca Bowen
Global Vice President, Cloud GTM

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Inside the SOC

Following up on our Conversation: Detecting & Containing a LinkedIn Phishing Attack with Darktrace

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25
Jun 2024

Note: Real organization, domain and user names have been modified and replaced with fictitious names to maintain anonymity.  

Social media cyber-attacks

Social media is a known breeding ground for cyber criminals to easily connect with a near limitless number of people and leverage the wealth of personal information shared on these platforms to defraud the general public.  Analysis suggests even the most tech savvy ‘digital natives’ are vulnerable to impersonation scams over social media, as criminals weaponize brands and trends, using the promise of greater returns to induce sensitive information sharing or fraudulent payments [1].

LinkedIn phishing

As the usage of a particular social media platform increases, cyber criminals will find ways to exploit the increasing user base, and this trend has been observed with the rise in LinkedIn scams in recent years [2].  LinkedIn is the dominant professional networking site, with a forecasted 84.1million users by 2027 [3].  This platform is data-driven, so users are encouraged to share information publicly, including personal life updates, to boost visibility and increase job prospects [4] [5].  While this helps legitimate recruiters to gain a good understanding of the user, an attacker could also leverage the same personal content to increase the sophistication and success of their social engineering attempts.  

Darktrace detection of LinkedIn phishing

Darktrace detected a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) compromise affecting a construction company, where the attack vector originated from LinkedIn (outside the monitoring of corporate security tools), but then pivoted to corporate email where a credential harvesting payload was delivered, providing the attacker with credentials to access a corporate file storage platform.  

Because LinkedIn accounts are typically linked to an individual’s personal email and are most commonly accessed via the mobile application [6] on personal devices that are not monitored by security teams, it can represent an effective initial access point for attackers looking to establish an initial relationship with their target. Moreover, user behaviors to ignore unsolicited emails from new or unknown contacts are less frequently carried over to platforms like LinkedIn, where interactions with ‘weak ties’ as opposed to ‘strong ties’ are a better predictor of job mobility [7]. Had this attack been allowed to continue, the threat actor could have leveraged access to further information from the compromised business cloud account to compromise other high value accounts, exfiltrate sensitive data, or defraud the organization.

LinkedIn phishing attack details

Reconnaissance

The initial reconnaissance and social engineering occurred on LinkedIn and was thus outside the purview of corporate security tools, Darktrace included.

However, the email domain “hausconstruction[.]com” used by the attacker in subsequent communications appears to be a spoofed domain impersonating a legitimate construction company “haus[.]com”, suggesting the attacker may have also impersonated an employee of this construction company on LinkedIn.  In addition to spoofing the domain, the attacker seemingly went further to register “hausconstruction.com” on a commercial web hosting platform.  This is a technique used frequently not just to increase apparent legitimacy, but also to bypass traditional security tools since newly registered domains will have no prior threat intelligence, making them more likely to evade signature and rules-based detections [8].  In this instance, open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources report that the domain was created several months earlier, suggesting this may have been part of a targeted attack on construction companies.  

Initial Intrusion

It was likely that during the correspondence over LinkedIn, the target user was solicited into following up over email regarding a prospective construction project, using their corporate email account.  In a probable attempt to establish a precedent of bi-directional correspondence so that subsequent malicious emails would not be flagged by traditional security tools, the attacker did not initially include suspicious links, attachments or use solicitous or inducive language within their initial emails.

Example of bi-directional email correspondence between the target and the attacker impersonating a legitimate employee of the construction company haus.com.
Figure 1: Example of bi-directional email correspondence between the target and the attacker impersonating a legitimate employee of the construction company haus.com.
Cyber AI Analyst investigation into one of the initial emails the target received from the attacker.
Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst investigation into one of the initial emails the target received from the attacker.  

To accomplish the next stage of their attack, the attacker shared a link, hidden behind the inducing text “VIEW ALL FILES”, to a malicious file using the Hightail cloud storage service. This is also a common method employed by attackers to evade detection, as this method of file sharing does not involve attachments that can be scanned by traditional security tools, and legitimate cloud storage services are less likely to be blocked.

OSINT analysis on the malicious link link shows the file hosted on Hightail was a HTML file with the associated message “Following up on our LinkedIn conversation”.  Further analysis suggests the file contained obfuscated Javascript that, once opened, would automatically redirect the user to a malicious domain impersonating a legitimate Microsoft login page for credential harvesting purposes.  

The malicious HTML file containing obfuscated Javascript, where the highlighted string references the malicious credential harvesting domain.
Figure 3: The malicious HTML file containing obfuscated Javascript, where the highlighted string references the malicious credential harvesting domain.
Screenshot of fraudulent Microsoft Sign In page hosted on the malicous credential harvesting domain.
Figure 4: Screenshot of fraudulent Microsoft Sign In page hosted on the malicious credential harvesting domain.

Although there was prior email correspondence with the attacker, this email was not automatically deemed safe by Darktrace and was further analyzed for unusual properties and unusual communications for the recipient and the recipient’s peer group.  

Darktrace determined that:

  • It was unusual for this file storage solution to be referenced in communications to the user and the wider network
  • Textual properties of the email body suggested a high level of inducement from the sender, with a high level of focus on the phishing link.
  • The full link contained suspicious properties suggesting it is high risk.
Darktrace’s analysis of the phishing email, presenting key information about the unusual characteristics of this email, information on highlighted content, and an overview of actions that were initially applied.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s analysis of the phishing email, presenting key information about the unusual characteristics of this email, information on highlighted content, and an overview of actions that were initially applied.  

Based on these anomalies, Darktrace initially moved the phishing email to the junk folder and locked the link, preventing the user from directly accessing the malicious file hosted on Hightail.  However, the customer’s security team released the email, likely upon end-user request, allowing the target user to access the file and ultimately enter their credentials into that credential harvesting domain.

Darktrace alerts triggered by the malicious phishing email and the corresponding Autonomous Response actions.
Figure 6: Darktrace alerts triggered by the malicious phishing email and the corresponding Autonomous Response actions.

Lateral Movement

Correspondence between the attacker and target continued for two days after the credential harvesting payload was delivered.  Five days later, Darktrace detected an unusual login using multi-factor authentication (MFA) from a rare external IP and ASN that coincided with Darktrace/Email logs showing access to the credential harvesting link.

This attempt to bypass MFA, known as an Office365 Shell WCSS attack, was likely achieved by inducing the target to enter their credentials and legitimate MFA token into the fake Microsoft login page. This was then relayed to Microsoft by the attacker and used to obtain a legitimate session. The attacker then reused the legitimate token to log into Exchange Online from a different IP and registered the compromised device for MFA.

Screenshot within Darktrace/Email of the phishing email that was released by the security team, showing the recipient clicked the link to file storage where the malicious payload was stored.
Figure 7: Screenshot within Darktrace/Email of the phishing email that was released by the security team, showing the recipient clicked the link to file storage where the malicious payload was stored.
Event Log showing a malicious login and MFA bypass at 17:57:16, shortly after the link was clicked.  Highlighted in green is activity from the legitimate user prior to the malicious login, using Edge.
Figure 8: Event Log showing a malicious login and MFA bypass at 17:57:16, shortly after the link was clicked.  Highlighted in green is activity from the legitimate user prior to the malicious login, using Edge. Highlighted in orange and red is the malicious activity using Chrome.

The IP addresses used by the attacker appear to be part of anonymization infrastructure, but are not associated with any known indicators of compromise (IoCs) that signature-based detections would identify [9] [10].

In addition to  logins being observed within half an hour of each other from multiple geographically impossible locations (San Francisco and Phoenix), the unexpected usage of Chrome browser, compared to Edge browser previously used, provided Darktrace with further evidence that this activity was unlikely to originate from the legitimate user.  Although the user was a salesperson who frequently travelled for their role, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI understood that the multiple logins from these locations was highly unusual at the user and group level, and coupled with the subsequent unexpected account modification, was a likely indicator of account compromise.  

Accomplish mission

Although the email had been manually released by the security team, allowing the attack to propagate, additional layers of defense were triggered as Darktrace's Autonomous Response initiated “Disable User” actions upon detection of the multiple unusual logins and the unauthorized registration of security information.  

However, the customer had configured Autonomous Response to require human confirmation, therefore no actions were taken until the security team manually approved them over two hours later. In that time, access to mail items and other SharePoint files from the unusual IP address was detected, suggesting a potential loss of confidentiality to business data.

Advanced Search query showing several FilePreviewed and MailItemsAccessed events from either the IPs used by the attacker, or using the software Chrome.  Note some of the activity originated from Microsoft IPs which may be whitelisted by traditional security tools.
Figure 9: Advanced Search query showing several FilePreviewed and MailItemsAccessed events from either the IPs used by the attacker, or using the software Chrome.  Note some of the activity originated from Microsoft IPs which may be whitelisted by traditional security tools.

However, it appears that the attacker was able to maintain access to the compromised account, as login and mail access events from 199.231.85[.]153 continued to be observed until the afternoon of the next day.  

Conclusion

This incident demonstrates the necessity of AI to security teams, with Darktrace’s ActiveAI Security Platform detecting a sophisticated phishing attack where human judgement fell short and initiated a real-time response when security teams could not physically respond as fast.  

Security teams are very familiar with social engineering and impersonation attempts, but these attacks remain highly prevalent due to the widespread adoption of technologies that enable these techniques to be deployed with great sophistication and ease.  In particular, the popularity of information-rich platforms like LinkedIn that are geared towards connecting with unknown people make it an attractive initial access point for malicious attackers.

In the second half of 2023 alone, over 200 thousand fake profiles were reported by members on LinkedIn [11].  Fake profiles can be highly sophisticated, use professional images, contain compelling descriptions, reference legitimate company listings and present believable credentials.  

It is unrealistic to expect end users to defend themselves against such sophisticated impersonation attempts. Moreover, it is extremely difficult for human defenders to recognize every fraudulent interaction amidst a sea of fake profiles. Instead, defenders should leverage AI, which can conduct autonomous investigations without human biases and limitations. AI-driven security can ensure successful detection of fraudulent or malicious activity by learning what real users and devices look like and identifying deviations from their learned behaviors that may indicate an emerging threat.

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

DETECT/ Apps

SaaS / Compromise / SaaS Anomaly Following Anomalous Login

SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login and Account Update

SaaS / Unusual Activity / Multiple Unusual External Sources For SaaS Credential

SaaS / Access / Unusual External Source for SaaS Credential Use

SaaS / Compliance / M365 Security Information Modified

RESPOND/ Apps

Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Suspicious SaaS Activity Block

Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Unusual Activity Block

DETECT & RESPOND/ Email

·      Link / High Risk Link + Low Sender Association

·      Link / New Correspondent Classified Link

·      Link / Watched Link Type

·      Antigena Anomaly

·      Association / Unknown Sender

·      History / New Sender

·      Link / Link to File Storage

·      Link / Link to File Storage + Unknown Sender

·      Link / Low Link Association

List of IoCs

·      142.252.106[.]251 - IP            - Possible malicious IP used by attacker during cloud account compromise

·      199.231.85[.]153 – IP - Probable malicious IP used by attacker during cloud account compromise

·      vukoqo.hebakyon[.]com – Endpoint - Credential harvesting endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

·      Resource Development - T1586 - Compromise Accounts

·      Resource Development - T1598.003 – Spearphishing Link

·      Persistence - T1078.004 - Cloud Accounts

·      Persistence - T1556.006 - Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication

·      Reconnaissance - T1593.001 – Social Media

·      Reconnaissance - T1598 – Phishing for Information

·      Reconnaissance - T1589.001 – Credentials

·      Reconnaissance - T1591.002 – Business Relationships

·      Collection - T1111 – Multifactor Authentication Interception

·      Collection - T1539 – Steal Web Session Cookie

·      Lateral Movement - T1021.007 – Cloud Services

·      Lateral Movement - T1213.002 - Sharepoint

References

[1] Jessica Barker, Hacked: The secrets behind cyber attacks, (London: Kogan Page, 2024), p. 130-146.

[2] https://www.bitdefender.co.uk/blog/hotforsecurity/5-linkedin-scams-and-how-to-avoid-them/

[3] https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/08/31/linkedin-personal-posts/

[4] https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshbersin/2012/05/21/facebook-vs-linkedin-whats-the-difference/

[5] https://thelinkedblog.com/2022/3-reasons-why-you-should-make-your-profile-public-1248/

[6] https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/50-linkedin-statistics-every-professional-should-ti9ue

[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/24/business/linkedin-social-experiments.html

[8] https://darktrace.com/blog/the-domain-game-how-email-attackers-are-buying-their-way-into-inboxes

[9] https://spur.us/context/142.252.106[.]251

[10] https://spur.us/context/199.231.85[.]153

[11]https://www.statista.com/statistics/1328849/linkedin-number-of-fake-accounts-detected-and-removed

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About the author
Nicole Wong
Cyber Security Analyst
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